

**ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF AUTHENTIC AND FABRICATED SUICIDE NOTES
AS INDISTINGUISHABLE TEXTS**

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LEZANDRA GRUNDLINGH

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SUPERVISOR: DR T. R. CARNEY

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*I declare that “**Arguments in favour of authentic and fabricated suicide notes as indistinguishable texts**” is my own work and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.*

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SUMMARY

Analyses of suicide notes have been conducted from varied perspectives in both linguistics and psychology. Not only have these studies added considerable value to the study of suicide, but they have also enriched the field of forensic linguistics. By analysing suicide notes, researchers are able to speculate about the state of mind of a suicidal individual from a psychological perspective, as well as gain insights into the characteristics of this genre from a linguistic perspective. Studies of suicide notes that are most relevant to forensic linguistics are those that compare authentic and fabricated suicide notes to determine whether these types of suicide notes may be distinguished from one another. Although the literature on suicide notes includes multiple studies that consider the differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, none seems to consider the fact that there might not be distinct differences between these types of suicide notes. Past studies also do not seem to consider that it might not be possible to determine whether a single suicide note is authentic or not. The present study fills this gap by considering authentic and fabricated suicide notes as indistinguishable texts. In this study, appraisal theory is used as the main theory of linguistic analysis to prove that authentic and fabricated suicide notes do not have distinct linguistic characteristics that can be used to differentiate them and that aiming to authenticate suicide notes might be a very risky and problematic undertaking. The results indicate that based on the theories and methods discussed in this thesis, it is not possible to successfully distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. It appears that, overall, the suicide notes included here would be more suited to analyses aimed at determining authorship identification or verification than analyses aimed at authenticating suicide notes. Accordingly, the study contributes not only to research concerned with the analysis of suicide notes but also to that concerned with forensic linguistics. Furthermore, the study includes analyses of South African suicide notes, and specifically Afrikaans suicide notes, which has not been attempted in previous research.

Key terms: appraisal; appraisal theory; authentic suicide notes; fabricated suicide notes; forensic linguistics; linguistics; linguistic characteristics; South African corpora; suicide; suicide notes

KAKARETŠO

Tshekatsheko ya mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya e dirilwe go tšwa mahlakoreng ao a fapanego ka go bobedi dithutapolelo le dithutamahlale tša menagano. Dinyakišišo tše ga se tša oketša boleng bjo bogolo fela go dinyakišišo ka ga ditiragalo tša go ipolaya, eupša di humišitše gape lekala la dithutapolelo tša mabapi le batho bao ba ipolailego. Ka go sekaseka mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya, banyakišiši gape ba kgona go akanya mabapi le seemo sa monagano sa motho yo a ipolailego ka lehlakoreng la tša menagano, gammogo le go hwetša tsebo mabapi le dipharologantšhi tša mohuta wo wa sengwalwa ka lehlakoreng la dithutapolelo. Dinyakišišo tša mabapi le mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya tše di nyalelanago kudu le dithutapolelo tša mabapi le batho ba go ipolaya ke tše di bapetšago mangwalo a go ipolaya a makgonthe le a bofora go tseba ge eba mehuta ye ya mangwalo a batho ba go ipolaya a ka faralogantšhwa le a mangwe. Le ge e le gore dingwalwa tša mabapi le mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya di akaretša dinyakišišo tše ntši tše di hlokometšego go fapana magareng ga mangwalo a batho ba go ipolaya a makgonthe le a bofora, ga go seo se hlokometšego ntlha ya gore go ka no se be le diphapano magareng ga mehuta ye ya mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya. Dinyakišišo tše di dirilwego mo nakong ye e fetilego le tšona di bonala di sa hlokomele ntlha ya gore go ka no se kgonagale go tseba ge eba lengwalo le tee leo le ngwadilwego ke motho wa go ipolaya ke la makgonthe goba aowa. Dinyakišišo tše di tlatša sekgoba se ka go bona mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya a makgonthe le a bofora bjalo ka dingwalwa tše di ka farologanywago. Ka mo dinyakišišong tše, teori ya go utolla tshekatsheko ya maikutlo e a šomišwa bjalo ka teori ye kgolo ya go sekaseka polelo ka nepo ya go laetša gore mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya a makgonthe le a bofora ga a na le dipharologantšhi tše di bonagalago tše di ka šomišwago go a farologanya le gore go ikemišetša go dira gore mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya ke a makgonthe go ka ba mošomo o kotsi kudu le wo o nago le mathata. Dipoele di laetša gore go ya ka diteori le mekgwa ye e ahlaahlwago ka mo thesesing ye, ga go kgonagale go farologanya ka katlego phapano magareng ga mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya a makgonthe le a bofora. Go bonala gore, ka kakaretšo, mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya ao a akareditšwego ka mo a tla lokela kudu go tshekatsheko ye e ikemišeditšego go tseba motho yo a ngwadilego lengwalo la go ipolaya goba tiišetšo go feta tshekatsheko ye e ikemišeditšego go tiišetša gore mangwalo ao a mabapi le go ipolaya a ngwadilwe ke bomang. Ka se, dinyakišišo ga di tsenye letsogo fela go dinyakišišo tša mabapi le tshekatsheko ya mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya, eupša gape mabapi le dithutapolelo tša mabapi le batho bao ba ipolailego. Godimo ga fao, dinyakišišo di akaretša tshekatsheko ya mangwalo ao a ngwadilwego ke batho ba go ipolaya ka mo Afrika Borwa, gomme kudukudu mangwalo a go ngwalwa ka Seafrikantshe a batho bao ba ipolailego, e lego seo se sego sa dirwa ka dinyakišišong tše di fetilego.

NGAMAFUPHI

Ukuhlaziywa kwamanothi ezehlakalo zokuzikhunga/zokuzibulala kudala kwenziwa ngokwemiqondo eyehlukahlukene ngezindlela ezimbili ngokwelingwistiki nangokwengqondo. Izifundo zocwaningo azikhulisanga kuphela ukubaluleka kocwaningo olumayelana nokuzikhunga kuphela, kodwa ziphinde zanothisa umkhakha weforensiki yelingwistiki. Ngokuhlaziya amanothi amayelana nocwaningo, abacwaningi bayakwazi ukwenza umhlahlo ngesimo somqondo womuntu ozikhungayo ngokomqondo wezengqondo, kanye nangokuzuza ulwazi olumayelana nezimpawu zalo mkhakha ngokomqondo welingwistiki. Izimfundo ezimayelana namanothi ashiywa ngabantu abazibulalayo ahlobene kakhulu neforensiki yelingwistiki yilawo aqhathanisa amanothi okuzibulala oqobo nalawo angamanothimbumbulu, ukucacisa kahle ukuthi mhlawumbe lezi zinhlobo zamanothi angahlukaniswa kwamanye. Yize umbhalo wobuciko omayelana namanothi okuzibulala axuba izimfundo zocwaningo eziningi ezigxile kwimehluko ephakathi kwamanothi okuzibulala oqobo nalawo okuzakhela/ambumbulu, akhekho obheka udaba lokuthi kungahle kungabi khona umehluko ogqamile phakathi kwalezi zinhlobo zamanothi okuzibulala. Izimfundo zocwaningo zesikhathi esedlule nazo azilubheki udaba lokuthi angekhe kwenzeka ukuthi kutholakale ukuthi mhlawumbe inothi lokuzibulala ngabe elangempela noma yinothimbumbulu. Isifundo samanje sivala lesi sikhala ngokuthatha amanothi angempela namanothimbumbulu njengemibhalo engahlukaniseki. Kulesi sifundo socwaningo, ithiyori yokuhlola isetshenziswe njengethiyori eyinsika yokuhlaziya ilingwistiki ukukhombisa ukuthi amanothi okuzibulala angempela nalawo okuzakhela akanazo izimpawu ezibaphawulekayo ezingasetshenziswa ukuwehlukanisa kanti lokho kuqonde ukuqinisekisa ukuthi amanothi okuzibulala kungenzeka abe wumsebenzi onobungozi obukhulu kanye nenkinga enkulu. Imiphumela ikhombisa ukuthi ngokwamathiyori nangezindlela ezixoxwe kule thiyori, kunzima ukuphumelela uthole umehluko phakathi mwamanothi angempela nalawo ambumbulu. Ngaphezu kwalokho, kuyakhombisa ukuthi, amanothi okuzibulala aqukethwe lapha azohambisana kakhulu nolwazi oluhlaziyiwe oluqonde ukuthola umnini wenothi noma ukuqinisekisa kunolwazi oluhlaziyiwe oluhlose ukuqinisekisa umbhali wamanothi okuzibulala. Ngokosiko lwakhona, isifundo asifakanga kuphela igalelo kucwaningo kuphela ngokuhlaziya amanothi okuzibulala, kanti lokho futhi kumayelana neforensiki yelingwistiki. Ngaphezu kwalokho, ucwaningo luqukethe ulwazi oluhlaziyiwe lwamanothi okuzibulala eNingizimu Afrika, ikakhulu amanothi okuzibulala abhalwe ngesiBhunu, angakazwe alokothe kucwaningo lwesikhathi esedlule.

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Chapter 1

Suicide and suicide notes

1.1 Introduction and background

On 8 April 1994, Kurt Cobain, the lead singer of the band Nirvana, was found dead at his home in Seattle. Cobain's death was ruled a suicide, but many individuals, including private investigator Tom Grant and Seattle Public Access host Richard Lee, believed that Cobain was murdered. Lee argued that there were discrepancies in the police reports on the apparent suicide, while Grant argued that Cobain did not write the entire suicide note. Grant made use of handwriting experts to determine whether Cobain wrote the entire note but the results varied. While certain experts found the handwriting to be that of Cobain, others argued that Cobain could not have written the entire note and some found the results of the analysis to be inconclusive.

Shapero (2011: 1) also refers to a case involving a disputed suicide note.¹ Paula Gilfoyle was found hanged in her garage on 24 June 1992 and a suicide note was discovered. Suspecting foul play, Paula's friends told police that Paula's husband, Eddie, had persuaded her to write suicide notes in order to assist him with his hospital coursework. Eddie Gilfoyle was arrested and found guilty of murder. According to the courts, Paula's husband used one of the suicide notes she had written to make the murder seem like a suicide.

A well-known South African case of a disputed suicide note pertains to the death of Afrikaans singer-songwriter, Johannes Kerkorrel (Ralph Rabie). On 12 November 2002, Kerkorrel was found hanging from a tree. An apparent suicide note addressed to his mother was found. The suicide note included Kerkorrel's reasons for dying by suicide but in the years since his death, many have come to believe that he was murdered. This is mainly based on additional information that has come to light such as blood evidence at the scene and the fact that Kerkorrel was not in any financial trouble as was initially argued. It also appears that the suicide note was transferred to his computer after his death.

¹ *R v. Gilfoyle*. 2000. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Lexis UK CD M428, [2001] 2 Cr App Rep 57, (Transcript: Smith Bernal), 20 December 2000.

A more recent case of a disputed suicide note is a cell phone message that formed part of the Stella murder case. The bodies of Sharnelle Hough and Marna Engelbrecht were found in the Stella High School hostel (in the North West province, South Africa) on Saturday 26 May 2018. It appeared that they both died by suicide (Bruwer, 2018). That morning, Ronnie Hough, Sharnelle's father, received a text message from Sharnelle's phone telling him that she was sorry but that they (she and Marna) were leaving "this place" (Van der Merwe, Coetzer and Coetzee, 2018). However, shortly after the bodies were discovered, the police determined that it was a staged suicide and that Sharnelle's ex-boyfriend, Xander Bylsma, who had strangled them both and then staged the scene to make it look like a suicide, had sent the text message (Head, 2018).

As may be inferred from the examples above, fabricated suicide notes can be linked to fraud and murder cases. To aid criminal investigations, it is important that the authentication of a suicide note is as accurate and reliable as possible. However, the question remains whether a suicide note can indeed be accurately authenticated. A more important question is whether suicide notes can be authenticated through linguistic means. Investigations into the authentication and analysis of text types like suicide and ransom notes, as well as threat messages, have typically been attempted within the field of forensic linguistics (Chaski, 2005; Gales, 2010; Danielewicz-Betz, 2012).

McMenamin (2002: 56) describes forensic linguistics as a discipline in applied linguistics "which draws on the scientific study of language to solve forensic problems". Yet, even within the discipline, the term "forensics" remains contested. Rock (2013: 139) explains why "forensic linguistics" is hotly debated. For terminological purists, the term denotes only the work of those who provide expert evidence on language for police investigations or court hearings, while others extend the meaning of the term to that of examining communication in courtrooms and analysing the talk of lawyers and witnesses. Rock (2013: 139) further states that outside the USA, "forensic linguistics" has become an umbrella term for "all forms of language-based research on legal matters" and argues that the scope of the field "will continue to shift as scholars pursue new foci and new alignments with the *forensic linguistic* label" (Rock, 2013: 139). As understood for the purposes of this study, forensic linguistics, in its broadest sense, is the application of linguistics to three principal domains: written legal texts, spoken legal practices and the provision of evidence for criminal and civil investigations and courtroom disputes (Coulthard, Grant and Kredens, 2011: 529).

It is worth noting that in terms of authenticating a document in forensic linguistics, handwriting analysis is not always considered a reliable method (Sulner, 2018). Coulthard and Sousa-Silva (2016: 1–2) argue that while handwriting analysis can complement forensic linguistics in some cases, most academics and lawyers challenge its status as a science. Thus, a handwriting analysis of a suicide note, similar to the method referred to in the Kurt Cobain case, would not be sufficient to determine the authenticity of a suicide note. Firstly, a handwriting analysis compares the shapes of a character or specific words in a text with those of other known handwritten texts by the individual concerned (Bensefia, Paquet and Heutte, 2004). In some cases, a suicide note is typed and it would be impossible to analyse it using traditional handwriting analysis techniques. It is also often the case that an individual's handwriting changes under stressful situations (such as writing a suicide note). The author observed this in many of the authentic handwritten suicide notes gathered for the South African corpus. Secondly, simply considering the shapes of characters or specific words in a suicide note would not provide sufficient data to draw conclusions concerning the authenticity of the suicide note. Sulner (2018: 638–646) does argue that handwriting analysis can be improved through various means such as replacing the foundational tenets of traditional handwriting analysis with less absolutist statements derived from the principles of neuroscience and human motor control theory, but these considerations are beyond the scope of the present study.

The concept of authenticity includes two aspects that are relevant in terms of forensic linguistics. Authenticity can be investigated in terms of either *authorship* or *content*. For example, if someone logged onto your computer and sent messages to co-workers while pretending to be you, the problem of authentication would pertain to the *author* of the messages (Chaski, 2005; Juola, Noecker, Stolerman, Ryan, Brennan and Greenstadt, 2013). However, if a threat or suicide note is found (either on a computer or elsewhere) the authentication may also pertain to the *content* of the message, aiming to answer the question “is this a real suicide note or threat?” (Gales, 2010; Shapero, 2011). The present study is specifically concerned with the second aspect: exploring the possibilities of authenticating the content of a suicide note by investigating its linguistic features.

Studies that analyse the content of suicide notes often stem from research that considers suicidal behaviour in general (Ho, Yip, Chiu and Halliday, 1998; Canetto and Lester, 1999; Fincham, Langer, Scourfield and Shiner, 2011). It is important to note that the present study considers

research on suicide as a central part of analysing suicide notes. This is one reason why an interdisciplinary approach is followed. A further explanation of the interdisciplinary nature of the present study is included later in this chapter as well as in Chapter 2. In this case, conducting an interdisciplinary study is necessary; to do otherwise would be irresponsible and result in an incomplete study.

Suicide is the result of a very complex psychological process and is not the process itself (Zubin, 1974: 4). Therefore, insight into the suicidal mind is of great importance to psychologists. Zubin (1974: 5) mentions that intention should be one of the primary considerations in suicide and suicidal behaviour and argues that without investigations into intentionality and volition, the study of suicide is hampered.

Beck, Schuyler and Herman (1974: 45) define *intent* in terms of suicide as “the seriousness or intensity of the wish of a person to terminate his life”. However, they stress that intent is only one component of an aggregation of suicidal factors that includes access to lethal methods and knowledge regarding the use of these methods. Beck et al (1974: 45) also emphasise the fact that suicidal intent cannot be determined by any single factor and that a cluster of factors should be taken into account. Nonetheless, studies that try to determine the intent of both suicide note writers and the writers of threatening communications have been attempted (Gales, 2010; Roubidoux, 2012). These studies have shown that, to some extent, one can determine the possible intent of an individual by examining the linguistic features of the specific text. However, claiming to be able to determine the intent of a writer accurately, especially concerning such a sensitive situation, is very risky. Shuy (2014: 91) mentions that we can only “assume” the author’s intentions if they are not clearly stated. With reference to assumptions, he states the following:

To discover whether or not assumptions are accurate, I suggest that it is best for the analysis to be accountable for the entire context, beginning by identifying the speech event, then noting the schemas and agendas, then the speech acts and conventional strategies, and finally the smaller units of language, where linguistic analysis can help resolve the grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, and phonetic ambiguities.

Shuy (2014: 93) also states that many actions are performed spontaneously, “without an individual forming any prior intention or predisposition to carry them out”. Likewise, Coulthard et al (2011: 537) warn against drawing certain conclusions, especially in a forensic linguistic analysis.

According to Coulthard et al (2011: 537), a distinction should be made between linguistic and psychological considerations. Psychological commentary on a suicide note might include an opinion on whether the individual who wrote the letter was suicidal. Coulthard et al (2011: 537) argue that providing such opinions is not the role of a linguist and that a linguist is not in any position to make comments concerning the intent of an author of any text. In fact, a linguist should only comment on the linguistic aspects of a particular text or corpus of texts without drawing any definitive conclusions based on the psychological state of the author. Thus, determining whether someone intended to write a particular text is possible to some degree, but it can only be verified by the analysis of other texts related to a particular case. Such documents would include medical documents revealing the psychological state of the author or statements by friends and family in which the psychological state of the person in question is disclosed.

Determining the intent of the note writers is not the focus of the current study, since intentionality to die by suicide is a complex state of mind that can most probably only be determined to some extent through *both* psychological and linguistic analysis (the pitfalls of determining intent are explored in Chapter 2). In this study, no documents revealing the psychological states of the suicide note writers are available for analysis. It is worth mentioning that there is a difference between determining the *intent* of a suicide note writer and identifying the *characteristics* of a suicide note. Although any conclusions drawn about the characteristics of an authentic or fabricated suicide note should be done with caution, one does not necessarily need additional psychological information on an individual in order to analyse their suicide notes from a linguistic perspective. Thus, if linguistic characteristics are present that can distinguish authentic suicide notes from fabricated suicide notes, they will be identifiable through a purely linguistic analysis.

A study by Yang and Lester (2011) supports the argument that an analysis of suicide notes must be approached with caution and actually suggests that suicide notes might be misleading. They claim that these notes do not provide insights into the psychodynamics of the suicidal individual, but rather present the picture of the note writer that he or she wants others to remember. Yang and Lester (2011: 76) state the following:

... researchers assume that suicide notes reveal accurate information about the psychological states of those committing suicide and the reasons for their suicide. As a result, researchers have not viewed suicide notes as a possible means by which the suicides consciously present a particular self-image.

This is an important aspect of suicide notes that should be taken into account whenever such notes are analysed to determine the psychological characteristics of the writers. Based on the statements by Yang and Lester (2011), one could argue that any characteristics identified in suicide notes are not necessarily a true representation of a suicidal mind but rather represent the memory of the writer that he or she wants the reader to preserve. This hypothesis will not be investigated in the present study but it is discussed in more detail later in this chapter with reference to suicide notes in general. The hypothesis proposed by Yang and Lester (2011) emphasises the importance of acknowledging the pitfalls when analysing suicide notes. It also refers to two disciplines that are of importance in the present study: research in psychology and research in deception detection.

The act of suicide is complex and often difficult to comprehend. Furthermore, there seems to be no real consensus regarding the true insights that suicide notes might provide. Researchers like Leenaars (1988) believe that suicide notes reveal the mental state of the author, while researchers such as Fincham et al (2011) and Lester (2014) claim that a suicide note does not necessarily provide insights into the suicidal mind. Suicide notes themselves can be misleading, even if they are authentic (MacDonald and Murphy, 1990; Orbell and Morikawa, 2011; Yang and Lester, 2011). These claims seem to support the argument that there is no way to authenticate a suicide note, since suicide notes do not fully reveal the suicidal mind. Therefore, no general distinctive linguistic features that can be used to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes would be present.

An overview of the ways in which the disciplines of psychology and deception detection relate to the analysis of suicide notes is provided in Chapter 2.

Before moving on to a discussion of the problem statement, a short summary of the concepts *suicide* and *suicide notes* is provided since these concepts are central to the present study.

1.2 Suicide and suicide notes

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, considering the psychological aspects of suicide is a crucial part of any suicide note analysis, since a suicide note is produced within a specific psychological state of mind. Although research in psychology is not the main focus of this thesis, it does provide important information that assists in understanding suicide notes as a genre. The following sections briefly discuss both suicide and suicide notes from a psychological perspective.

1.2.1 Understanding and defining suicide

Maltsberger and Goldblatt (1996: 1) make the following observation regarding suicide:

Though suicide has not one cause, but many, they all flow together into one river whose overwhelming current, mental pain, carries everything before it. Those doomed to it choose death over intolerable suffering that to them seems interminable.

Maltsberger and Goldblatt (1996: 2) claim that suicide has been studied since the 18th century, but that research in this field has only really improved since the 1960s. After the 1960s, psychoanalytic writers turned their attention to other aspects of suicide, which included the relationship between the therapist and the patient, the continuity between paranoid states and melancholia and the erotic components of suicide and suicide attempts (Maltsberger and Goldblatt, 1996: 5).

Jackson (1957: 11), in a study that predates that of Maltsberger and Goldblatt (1996), states that there is an increased recognition of suicide as something which consists of a number of syndromes, rather than being a discrete psychological entity. He states that the earliest theories of suicide were dominated by arguments centred on the right of the individual to take his own life and mentions that suicide was considered a “conscious volitional act” which was banned by some religions. Zilboorg (1996: 37) agrees with this claim and states that in the past, suicide was viewed “with awe and a certain psychologic embarrassment”. Furthermore, Zilboorg (1996: 37) mentions that Saint Augustine was the first to postulate that suicide is a sin, viewing a sin as a “voluntary surrender of one’s reason to the pressure of evil”. According to Jackson (1957: 11) and Leenaars (1988: 19), the breakthrough in the understanding of suicide came from Freud’s psychodynamic elucidation and Durkheim’s sociological approach. Jackson describes Freud’s theory as “one which posits the turning of sadism against the individual himself”. The theory, in short, describes how every person has a desire to live, a desire to feel self-esteem and a desire to feel supported by the protective forces of the superego. When these feelings disappear, the individual experiences a feeling of annihilation. Jackson (1957: 12) explains how the individual deals with these feelings of annihilation as follows:

Since the superego is made up of introjects which represent incorporated love objects, suicide involves the murder of the original object whose incorporation helped to create the superego. Along with the self-murder goes the hopeful illusion that forgiveness and

reconciliation will be attained by the killing of the punishing superego and the regaining of union with the protective superego.

However, Zilboorg (1996: 40) states that Freud's theory fails to adequately answer the question of what the psychology of suicide is. He states the following:

Fundamentally the formula was correct, but it was too general to be of any real value, for while it is true that any one who wants to or who does commit suicide suffers from strong aggressive (unconscious) murderous impulses, these impulses are so universal that according to this formula alone the whole world should be in danger of committing suicide, which is obviously not true.

According to Zilboorg (1996: 40), further studies did lead to a better understanding of the depressive psychosis and to insights that explained that an individual's identification with someone whom he or she once loved and then hated is of a special nature and is based on a particular type of fantasy.

On the other hand, Durkheim's (1952) approach focuses on societal forces that influence and affect the individual. Durkheim distinguishes between four types of suicide: egoistic suicide, altruistic suicide, anomic suicide and fatalistic suicide (Durkheim, 1952: 105–239). Egoistic suicide occurs when the individual is not sufficiently integrated into society. Altruistic suicide appears to be the opposite situation to egoistic suicide. Here the suicide seems to be linked to the “overintegration of the individual with society and he sacrifices himself as in the case of a soldier on the battlefield” (Jackson, 1957: 12; Durkheim, 1952: 105–200). Anomic suicide seems to occur when the individual experiences a sudden disruption in his or her adjustment to society. This could be, for example, in the form of a great financial setback or even sudden wealth (Durkheim, 1952: 201–202). The final type of suicide is called fatalistic suicide. This occurs in societies “where social regulation is extreme and authority is oppressive and controlling” (Olson, 2014: 2). An example of this could be a young woman who lives in a patriarchal society and is forced into an arranged marriage.

Jackson (1957: 12–19) mentions that the many theories of suicide, both psychoanalytic and nonpsychoanalytic, can be combined under three headings: “Self-directed aggression”, “Rebirth and restitution” and “Socioeconomic theories of suicide”.

In short, self-directed aggression includes the three elements of any suicide – “the wish to kill, the wish to be killed, and the wish to die”. The first two elements are an expression of the law of talion, “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”, while the third element refers to the controversial “death instinct”. These three elements are also central to Menninger’s work on the psychoanalytic aspects of suicide (1938, 1963).

The basis of the rebirth and restitution category seems to be the belief that killing oneself opens up the possibility of making a new start. There is also a belief that through death one may be “joined with the love object”. Furthermore, this category of suicide may also be related to the “birth of a new cycle” – this may be a new season, a new year etc.

Jackson (1957: 18) defines the third category, the socioeconomic theories of suicide, as follows:

These theories range from those which propose a one-to-one relationship between economic factors and suicide to those which correlate socioeconomic forces with the knowledge of human psychology. Unfortunately, an adequate operational socioeconomic theory of suicide does not exist.

Jackson (1957: 18–19) mentions that sociological data are “selective and incomplete and lack valid controls” and furthermore states that a cause-and-effect relationship which is based on socioeconomic factors is nearly impossible to determine. He warns that there is a tendency to accept external causes as a frequent explanation for suicide but emphasises that the so-called “rational” suicide should also be taken into account. Even though suicide is often described as an illogical act, arguments for the rationale behind such an act do exist. According to Hustvedt (2013: 106), “an intense conscious feeling state of some kind” seems to be present before the act of suicide is triggered, but she states that this does not mean that unconscious forces are not at work in a suicidal person.

Shneidman and Farberow (1957: 31) take the position that there is “an implicit syllogism or argument in the suicidal act”, meaning that the suicidal person behaves as if he or she had reasoned and had come to a conclusion. They acknowledge that suicidal reasoning has unconscious motivations and psychodynamic determinants, but state that the logical analysis of suicide is important since it can explain other details of suicide. Furthermore, Shneidman and Farberow (1957: 31) argue that if one is able to identify and analyse the modes of reasoning and the beliefs

which lead to suicide, then one can gather effective clues to use in the prediction and prevention of suicide.

Based on their analysis of the logic of suicide, Shneidman and Farberow (1957: 36) identify four “logical types” linked to four different “personal characteristics” of people who die by suicide. These four logical types include the following: (1) The “catalogic” (destructive logic), which is exhibited by lonely individuals who feel helpless and fearful. (2) The “normal logic” is found in older individuals or people who are widowed or in pain. These individuals believe that death will release them from the pain they are experiencing. (3) The “contaminated logic” is experienced by individuals who view suicide as “a transition to another life or as a means of saving reputation”, and (4) the “paleologic” is exhibited by individuals who are delusional and/or hallucinatory. The theory of suicide by Shneidman and Farberow (1957) is similar to Durkheim’s (1952) theory discussed earlier and comes to the same conclusion – that individuals are always seeking social acceptance (Johnson, 2010: 39).

Williams and Pollock (2000: 81) mention that even though some theories of suicide could seem archaic, those proposed by earlier researchers such as Freud (1917), Zilboorg (1937), Menninger (1938) and Litman (1967) have recurring themes and concepts that appear repeatedly in later empirical studies. For example, the concept of “self-directed aggression” proposed by Jackson (1957) is a main theme in a 2016 empirical study by Gorodetsky, Carli, Sarchiapone, Roy, Goldman and Enoch. However, Gorodetsky et al (2016: 465) do not attribute the concept of self-directed aggression to Jackson (1957). In their study, Gorodetsky et al (2016) investigate the influence of externalising behaviours, depressive symptoms and childhood trauma on self-directed aggression in a group of male Italian prisoners.

Similarly, in a 2007 study by Disayavanish and Disayavanish, Jackson’s (1957) concept of “rebirth” manifests itself in terms of a Buddhist perspective on suicide. Here, contrary to Jackson’s (1957) notion that suicide could be understood to signify a new start or cycle for the individual who dies by suicide, Disayavanish and Disayavanish (2007: 1680) argue that within Buddhist beliefs, dying by suicide is a rebirth “in the woeful planes of existence, and hence further suffering”.

The theories of suicide by Shneidman and Farberow (1957) also seem to still have relevance in the 21st century, with both Waters and Ussery (2007), as well as Johnson (2010), noting that Shneidman and Farberow's (1957) notion of a "normal logic" may be particularly helpful in assisting to explain why law enforcement officers commit suicide.

According to Williams and Pollock (2000), there are six major themes in suicide studies that are still particularly relevant today. These are impulsivity, dichotomous thinking, cognitive rigidity, problem-solving, autobiographical memory and hopelessness. Williams and Pollock (2000: 81–90) note that while these themes were first researched as early as the 1960s, they are still associated with suicidal behaviour and still help psychologists to understand which elements of life experience will most likely trigger suicidal behaviour.

Based on the discussion thus far, it is clear that it is often difficult to categorise suicide into two or three categories that encompass all the aspects associated with different types of suicide and the different individuals who die by suicide. However, Aldridge and Pérez Barrero (2012) argue that suicide and suicidal behaviour can be classified based on general characteristics. Firstly, a distinction is made between *suicide* and *attempted suicide*. From a Durkheimian (1952) perspective, suicide refers to "all deaths resulting from a positive or negative act carried out by the victim being aware of its lethal outcome" (Aldridge and Pérez Barrero, 2012: 37). Attempted suicide is seen as a behaviour that does not lead to a fatal outcome and includes "every self-inflicted injury carried out deliberately or carefully planned to obtain certain desired changes either by means of this behaviour or its present or future consequences" (Aldridge and Pérez Barrero, 2012: 37). Secondly, suicidal behaviour can be classified based on the methods used. Aldridge and Pérez Barrero (2012: 39) suggest distinguishing between hard (violent) suicidal behaviour and soft (non-violent) suicidal behaviour. A soft suicidal behaviour is often considered less lethal than a hard suicidal behaviour (for example ingesting poison versus shooting oneself), but even soft suicidal behaviour can lead to death.

Nonetheless, defining the concept of suicide can be complicated. Hustvedt (2013: 106) asks what it means to kill one's self. She argues that there is no consensus about what "a self" is. The concept of the self can be an illusion or something real or it can be an aspect of our consciousness. However, Leenaars (1988: 17–18), in attempting to define suicide, refers to a definition by Shneidman (1973) and states that suicide can, in simple terms, be defined as "the human act of self-inflicted, self-

intentioned cessation”. He also emphasises that one theory will never be enough to define or explain a phenomenon as complicated and varied as suicide. Since Leenaars (1988: 15) is of the opinion that suicide is a complicated human act, he states that understanding this act means gathering information and insights from many sources. One of these sources is suicide notes.

1.2.2 Suicide notes

Suicide notes are described by Leenaars (1988: 34) as “ultrapersonal documents” and “unsolicited productions of the suicidal person”. Since suicide notes are often written only minutes before an individual takes his/her own life, Leenaars (1988: 41) claims that these are invaluable for understanding not only the suicidal act but also the people who die by suicide:

Suicide notes are a special kind of personal document. They are unstructured and unsolicited communication by a person written just before death in which that person conveys last thoughts, feelings, and wishes. The importance of such personal documents in the understanding of an individual, the building of theoretical models, and the undertaking of psychological research is not to be underestimated.

However, as alluded to earlier, Lester and Yang (2015) warn about the dangers of assuming that everything written in a suicide note is true or an accurate representation of the person who wrote the suicide note. They argue that individuals present various images of themselves on a daily basis. This is a result of their different roles and the corresponding functions they perform (Lester and Yang, 2015: 13). Furthermore, Lester and Yang (2015: 13) claim that we are used to switching from one image to another and even choosing images that fit specific occasions. Therefore, there is “no reason to doubt that this is true when we die” (Lester and Yang, 2013). Social media such as Facebook and Twitter also allow people to construct the narrative of their lives and provide them with opportunities to decide how they want to present themselves to friends, family, and the world (Lester and Yang, 2015: 13).

Keeping this in mind, it is important to note that suicide notes are often examined on the presupposition that they reveal accurate information about the psychological states of those dying by suicide and reveal accurate information concerning the reasons for the individual’s suicide (Lester and Yang, 2015: 14). However, as Yang and Lester (2011) and Lester and Yang (2015) propose, those writing a suicide note might actually have a hidden agenda; suicide note writers may make a decision (conscious or unconscious) to present themselves in a particular way (Lester

and Yang, 2015: 14). For example, a suicide note by a suicide bomber in the form of either a letter or a video cannot be seen as a true suicide note since there are often signs of editing and the bombers usually write the letters or record the videos in the presence of other members of the group or their superiors (Lester and Yang, 2015: 14–15). Thus, such suicide notes are most likely representations of the self rather than windows into the suicidal mind. This is also true for other types of suicide note since suicide notes will usually be read by at least one other individual. Therefore, a suicide note is often seen as a public statement and will consequently be crafted to project an image that others will remember (Lester and Yang, 2015: 15–16).

A second pragmatic problem concerning suicide notes is the fact that they are not easy to obtain and are not a very representative genre of texts. According to Leenaars (1988: 35), only about 12 to 15% of people leave a suicide note. And in a five-year study of attempted suicide by Barr, Leitner and Thomas (2007: 124), it was also found that only 14.03% of the individuals left a suicide note. The lack of suicide note data and its impact on suicide note studies are discussed further in Chapter 2. Data retrieval in the present study supports the statements by both Leenaars (1988) and Barr et al (2007). Many of the dockets searched in order to obtain the South African sample of suicide notes indicated the cause of death as a possible suicide but contained no suicide notes. As already mentioned, the suicide notes analysed in this study are not representative of all suicide notes in all communities. The aim is simply to analyse the different datasets available and draw possible conclusions based on those analyses. Furthermore, the data in the current study do not include access to the medical records of the deceased and therefore the suicide notes will be the sole focus of the analyses. However, during a real-life investigation the background of individuals as well as interviews with family members and medical records should ideally be taken into account if the legitimacy of a suicide note is questioned. Having said that, background information might still not be enough to determine the legitimacy of a suicide note.

It is obvious that the act of suicide is extremely complex and is not only difficult to categorise but also difficult to define. Although suicide notes as a genre of texts are difficult to gather and not representative of all suicide note writers, an analysis of the notes can still provide insights into the language use of individuals who chose to take their own lives and write a final communication to their loved ones. Since the objective of the study is to indicate that there are no linguistic characteristics that can reliably be used to authenticate a suicide note or unequivocally distinguish

between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, an in-depth linguistic study of suicide notes is undertaken.

1.3 Problem statement

The importance of the present study is based on two scenarios that are sometimes investigated when someone dies by suicide (or apparent suicide). The first scenario is described as a “fake suicide” or “pseudocide” (Yang and Lester 2011; Lester and Yang, 2015). This is a situation where an individual fakes his or her own death in order to move somewhere else and start a new life. Yang and Lester (2011: 77) refer to such a case mentioned by Etkind (1997), where an individual who was a member of the board of San Francisco supervisors left a suicide note and then turned up a year later in Houston, selling bibles.

A second scenario is similar to the Kurt Cobain case and could be one where a possible homicide occurred, fuelling speculation that the victim was forced to write a suicide note or suspecting that the murderer was the author of such a note (Chaski, 2005: 2). In both cases, it would be of the utmost importance to identify a suicide note as either authentic or fabricated.

It is the degree to which such a distinction is possible that is a main point of discussion in the present study. Studies in psychology and deception detection suggest that identifying a real lie and accurate truth is not always possible (Wolpe, Foster and Langleben, 2005; Vrij, Granhag and Porter, 2010; Yang and Lester, 2011; Lester and Yang, 2015). In my opinion, these findings have serious implications for any type of analysis aimed at distinguishing an authentic suicide note from a fabricated one.

The present study contributes to the field of forensic linguistics, specifically suicide note analysis and authentication, by investigating the lack of distinct linguistic differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes using an appraisal theory analysis. However, this study also contributes to studies in suicide note analyses and studies in appraisal theory by critiquing both. In the discussion that follows each of these contributions is considered.

The present study differs from previous studies in forensic linguistics and suicide note analysis in three ways. Firstly, the present study is based on the premise that there is nothing linguistically distinctive about authentic suicide notes compared to fabricated suicide notes. This means that it

is essentially impossible to authenticate a single suicide note with any certainty. It is important to note that this premise differs from that of previous studies that tried to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, since those studies argue that a distinction is possible to some extent (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Arbeit and Blatt, 1973; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014). Although some researchers note problems and inaccuracies with the distinctions between authentic and fabricated suicide notes (Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999; Shapero, 2011), none of them opted for the alternative hypothesis that no distinct linguistic characteristics are present in either authentic or fabricated suicide notes. This lack of support for an alternative hypothesis could be because the present study makes a clear distinction between the concepts of *differences* and *distinctiveness* – something that has not, to my knowledge, been done in previous studies. Of course there will be some differences between the linguistic features of authentic and fabricated suicide notes, but *differences* do not necessarily equate to *distinctiveness*, especially if one considers the fact that delivering a verdict on the authenticity of a suicide note could have very serious consequences. The concept of something being *different* refers to two or more things not being the same, while the concept of something being *distinct* refers to a noticeable difference. It seems quite difficult to separate these two concepts based on their definitions in everyday use, unless one argues that when something is distinct, it is also perceptually salient (Hunt, 1995), meaning that it is easily perceived and remains in conscious perception. For example, if one were asked to spot the odd object in a category such as “cutlery”, and were given four objects, a spoon, a knife, a fork, and a trumpet, it would be easy to identify the trumpet as odd (or distinct) since it does not fit into the category and is therefore perceptually salient.

In the present study, the concepts of *difference* and *distinctiveness* are understood as follows:

Keeping the definition used above, a *difference* refers to two or more things not being the same (either individual suicide notes or entire classifications such as *authentic* and *fabricated*). A *distinction* refers to two or more classifications of suicide notes being *unique*. Two important aspects must be noted here. Firstly, the concept of single suicide note is separated from the concept of suicide note classifications. This is done because a distinction between single suicide notes within one classification would no longer indicate distinctiveness in terms of that classification. For example, if there are two authentic suicide notes with linguistic characteristics unique to each, they would no longer be distinct in terms of authentic suicide notes in general. Such a discovery

would mean that every suicide note is unique and that no comparisons between suicide notes (authentic or fabricated) are possible. Thus, in order for authentic suicide notes to be distinct from fabricated suicide notes, these notes (as a corpus) would have to all contain similar characteristics that are unique to them when compared to a corpus of fabricated suicide notes. Secondly, the concept of *uniqueness* is paramount. If one wants to prove that certain linguistic characteristics are distinct in terms of a suicide note classification, one has to prove that they are also unique to that classification. Thus, if it is possible to draw a distinction between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, then it should also be possible to identify linguistic characteristics unique to *only* authentic or fabricated suicide notes. Then, and only then, would one also be able to classify a single suicide note as either authentic or fabricated.

Thus, for the purposes of this study, *differences* refer to two or more suicide notes or suicide note classifications not being the same, while *distinctiveness* specifically refers to unique differences between classifications. If it were true that distinctive linguistic characteristics existed that one could use to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, the following would also be true:

1. There would be linguistic characteristics unique to only authentic or fabricated suicide notes.
2. Each individual suicide note within a classification would contain these unique characteristics. Thus, two authentic suicide notes would both contain similar linguistic characteristics not found in a comparison of two fabricated suicide notes. This means that the linguistic characteristics of the authentic suicide notes would differ from those of the fabricated suicide notes, but simultaneously correspond across the authentic suicide notes.

I use the following example as a further illustration of the arguments above:

All zebras belong to the subgenus *hippotigris*, just like all suicide notes (authentic or fabricated) belong to the text genre of *suicide notes*. In the case of zebras, the subgenus is divided into different subspecies: *Equus quagga boehmi*, *Equus quagga selousi*, *Equus quagga borensis* etc. Similarly, suicide notes are subdivided into the classifications of authentic suicide notes, fabricated suicide

notes and parasuicide notes.² Zebras and suicide notes also both have *general characteristics* that could indicate *differences* between subspecies or corpora. For example, zebras all have different ages and are either male or female. Similarly, authentic suicide notes, fabricated suicide notes and parasuicide notes include general linguistic characteristics such as the use of specific adjectives, verbs or pronouns in a particular corpus. Thus, one could state that the authentic suicide notes in a specific corpus include a higher frequency of adjectives compared to the fabricated suicide notes in a specific corpus.

However, what makes the distinction of zebra subspecies different from the distinction of the subcategories of suicide notes and what illustrates the concepts of a *difference* between classifications compared to *distinct* classifications, is the fact that zebras have *unique* characteristics (apart from their general characteristics) that can be used to indicate distinct differences between subspecies. Bard (1997) notes that the stripes of each zebra subspecies are unique after a certain age. Thus, one subspecies can be distinguished from another based on the stripe patterns shared by a particular subspecies. Furthermore, individual zebras also have stripe patterns that are unique to individual zebras (Muoria, Muruthi, Kariuki, Hassan, Mijele and Ouge, 2007). This means that each zebra subspecies and individual zebra boasts a unique stripe pattern that not only distinguishes them from other animals and subspecies of zebra, but also from other individual zebras. In the case of suicide notes, linguistic *differences* between the linguistic characteristics of authentic suicide notes, fabricated suicide notes and parasuicide notes have been noted in various studies (Handelman and Lester, 2007; Shapero, 2011; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014). However, to my knowledge, no *unique* linguistic characteristics have been noted concerning either a specific classification of suicide notes or a single suicide note. This means that while one could argue that corpus A is different from corpus B based on general linguistic characteristics, it is not possible to identify distinctive linguistic characteristics that are unique to all authentic suicide notes or fabricated suicide notes. This means that it will also be impossible to accurately authenticate a single suicide note.

² It should be kept in mind that only notes written by suicide completers can be called “suicide notes”. Notes written by suicide attempters should be referred to as “parasuicide notes” (Leenaars, Lester, Wenckstern, McMullin, Rudzinski and Brevard, 1992: 333).

If any distinct linguistic characteristics are identified in a single suicide note, for example the author misspells “mistake” as “misteak” throughout the note, these can only be used for author identification if other writings of the same author are available for comparison. Such a distinct linguistic characteristic will not reveal anything about the authenticity of the suicide note in general.

Thus, when previous studies claim success in distinguishing between authentic and fabricated suicide notes (see for instance Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Osgood and Walker, 1959; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960; Arbeit and Blatt, 1973; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Leenaars, 1988; Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999; Shapero, 2011 and Ioannou and Debowska, 2014), they are in reality only indicating the differences between the corpora in their respective studies. This argument is supported by the fact that there is no single list of linguistic characteristics available that unequivocally distinguishes between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. As discussed in Chapter 5, if one consolidated all the linguistic characteristics of both authentic and fabricated suicide notes identified by previous studies into two lists, one would simply have two lists of possible linguistic characteristics – one concerned with authentic suicide notes and one concerned with fabricated suicide notes. These lists could not be used to distinguish between the notes since the lists contain differences, not distinctive characteristics. This brings me to a critique of suicide note comparison studies in general. As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, every study leads to different results. This is due to the fact that every study uses different corpora, methods or both. If there were distinct linguistic characteristics present in either authentic or fabricated suicide notes, would one not expect these characteristics to correspond across corpora or methods to some extent? In addition, if there are characteristics that correspond across studies or methods, are these *unique* to a specific classification of suicide notes, either authentic or fabricated? The present study argues that these scenarios are unlikely based on the premise that no such unique (distinctive) linguistic characteristics exist in terms of suicide notes. To support this argument, the present study analyses the corpora (from previous studies and corpora unique to this study) from an appraisal theory perspective – a perspective not applied before. If the results are study specific it suggests that the possibility of identifying distinctive linguistic characteristics and generating a subsequent list of criteria according to which distinctions across classifications can be made is unlikely, and that this study, like previous studies, can only aim to potentially identify differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

The verdict is also still out on whether one can successfully analyse a *single* suicide note to determine whether it is authentic. Fincham et al (2011: 86) argue that comprehensive analyses of suicide notes have not translated into indisputable results or answers and have only provided limited insights into the causes of suicide. Fincham et al (2011: 86) blame these lacklustre findings on methodological weakness such as small corpora and the fact that most findings have been restricted to the notes themselves, thereby excluding potentially important contextual data.

The present study agrees with the critique of Fincham et al (2011). However, using small corpora to test hypotheses and methods is the most realistic approach since in a real-life situation, a forensic linguist will probably be analysing a single suicide note and will not necessarily have access to other contextual data. It is also important to note that previous studies have used small corpora (Arbeit and Blatt, 1973; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Leenaars, 1988; Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999; Shapero, 2011; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014) and therefore the present study continues this practice in order to be able to compare the results to those of previous studies.

Lester (2014: 78) echoes the concerns of Fincham et al (2011) by stating that fabricated suicide notes should rather be analysed to determine the opinions and myths that people have about suicide and suicidal behaviour. Furthermore, Lester (2014: 78) objects to studies that compare authentic and fabricated suicide notes, arguing that authentic suicide notes must be compared to “letters and notes written by these suicides at an earlier time when they were not suicidal”. Only then can one observe how a person’s psychological state has changed from the nonsuicidal period to the suicidal period (Lester, 2014: 78).

Secondly, the present study is interdisciplinary. The focus of this study is mainly a linguistic analysis, but perspectives from psychology and deception detection form an integral part of the context. Not only is forensic linguistics an interdisciplinary field of research, but in order to effectively conduct any complete study of suicide notes, linguistic or not, one needs to acknowledge that suicide notes and psychology are inseparable. It is also important to acknowledge that authenticating suicide notes, or any document for that matter, relates to the field of deception detection. Fabricated documents, including fabricated suicide notes, are forms of deceptive discourse production. However, there is a big difference between real-life unsolicited fabricated suicide notes and fabricated suicide notes produced through the instruction of a researcher. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, but it is worth noting that there are

certain issues concerning comparisons between the fabricated suicide notes included in this study and the authentic suicide notes, which further complicates an attempt to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes from a linguistic perspective.

Thirdly, this study analyses the notes from an appraisal theory perspective. This has not been attempted in previous research on suicide notes. Appraisal is suited to this study since it has a strong focus on attitude and emotions, and it offers a discourse analytic approach rather than a corpus-based approach. Scherer (1999: 637) mentions that a central principle of appraisal theory is the claim that “emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a person’s subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event on a number of dimensions or criteria”. Suicide notes are texts that exhibit a high percentage of emotional expressions and evaluation, and are therefore suitable texts to be analysed from an appraisal theory perspective. Leenaars (1988: 45) argues that many emotional states are found in suicide notes, ranging from hostility to vengefulness, aggression, depression, guilt and self-criticism. Appraisal theory is categorised under discourse analytic approaches by Oteíza (2017), since the appraisal framework “aims to provide a comprehensive theoretical and descriptive systematisation of the linguistic resources that can be used to construe the value of social experience” (Oteíza, 2017: 458). Since the present study focuses on handwritten or typed suicide notes, an approach that is discourse analytic oriented and focuses on the individual’s emotions and evaluations is deemed appropriate. However, the present study also argues that appraisal theory is not an effective method of analysis. Just because the theory is *appropriate* does not mean that it can be used *effectively* to analyse data. In the present study, the critique of appraisal theory’s subjectivity and effectiveness, or lack thereof, is central to the discussion.

In Chapter 2, various studies concerning both authentic and fabricated suicide notes are discussed. As mentioned already, the value of the present study is the fact that it offers some new and original data and the perspective of this study is an alternative to the approaches used in previous studies of the same nature. It could be argued that the present study considers aspects of suicide notes that have not been analysed in a similar manner in previous studies and, furthermore, the present study differs from previous studies in authentic and fabricated suicide notes since it includes additional South African corpora for comparison (discussed in Chapter 5). Another very important distinction is the inclusion of two separate corpora of fabricated suicide notes. This solves the problem of a

single homogeneous corpus of fabricated suicide notes as the only fabricated suicide note corpus for comparison (see references to the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpus of fabricated suicide notes in Chapter 2).

1.4 Research hypothesis

It is important to note that the aim of the present study is not to test the validity of previous studies using their methodologies, nor to prove that the results of previous studies are incorrect. The aim here is to prove that the *hypothesis* of previous studies (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Osgood and Walker, 1959; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960; Arbeit and Blatt, 1973; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Leenaars, 1988; Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999; Shapero, 2011; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014) that authentic and fabricated suicide notes include distinguishable characteristics, is incorrect. This does not mean that the results of these previous studies are unreliable, but it does mean that one needs to interpret them for what they are: indications that differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes as well as authentic and parasuicide notes exist, but that these differences do not mean that the corpora can be distinguished from each other or that these differences can be extrapolated to the genre in general (or larger community) of those who write suicide notes or fabricate suicide notes.

The present study is therefore based on the hypothesis that it is not possible to verify a suicide note found at a crime scene as authentic, based on distinctive linguistic features, because such features are also not present in corpora of authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

This hypothesis is tested in two ways:

1. Analyses are performed on the selected corpora to determine whether any distinctive linguistic characteristics are present that can be used to accurately distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide note corpora.
2. A single suicide note from both the authentic suicide note corpora and fabricated suicide note corpora are tested to determine whether any distinct characteristics are present that could be used to authenticate these notes.

1.5 The corpora

The corpora for this study consist of suicide notes from various sources. Most of the sources are suicide notes collected between 1983 and 1988. The Shneidman and Farberow corpus consists of the oldest set of notes (1944–1953), while the Grundlingh corpus consists of the newest set of notes (2006–2013). The Grundlingh corpus of South African suicide notes was obtained from the Pretoria Magistrates Court in Pretoria, South Africa. Permission and ethical clearance to use the suicide notes in the Grundlingh corpus and the other suicide note corpora were obtained through the researchers who provided them as well as the University of South Africa (REC-240816-052) and the national office of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (RSA) (HRD/11/16) on 31 May 2017 and 20 June 2017, respectively. The ethical clearance permissions from the University of South Africa and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development are attached after the appendices at the end of this thesis. Furthermore, the sensitive nature of the data in the present study prohibits the researcher from attaching the complete corpora as appendices at the end of the thesis. However, short extracts from the corpora have been included without any identifying information. Furthermore, sections of the suicide notes that are in the public domain (these are the suicide notes published by Shneidman and Farberow, 1957, and Leenaars, 1988) are only included when necessary and contain no identifying information. The completed corpora provided by Dr Lester and Dr Black can be obtained through personal correspondence with the aforementioned researchers.

At this point questions might arise about the purpose of undertaking a study that deals with such sensitive data. What is the point of analysing data that cannot be openly shared with other researchers? Dickson-Swift, James and Liamputtong (2008: 6) argue that researchers need to undertake research in sensitive topics so the understanding of many issues that affect people in today's society can be enhanced. They state that "the decision to avoid research on sensitive topics could be seen by some researchers as evasion of responsibility" (Dickson-Swift et al, 2008: 6). This is a well-known argument in psychology formulated by Sieber and Stanley (1988) and it is particularly relevant to the present study:

Sensitive research addresses some of society's most pressing issues and policy questions. Although ignoring the ethical issues in sensitive research is not a responsible approach to science, shying away from controversial topics, simply because they are controversial, is also an avoidance of responsibility (Sieber and Stanley, 1988:55).

This brief reminder supports two decisions made in the present study: (1) to undertake research on a topic that has a real effect on people's lives and has been one-sidedly researched in the past, and (2) to not ignore the ethical issues or test the ethical limits that accompany this kind of sensitive research. Therefore, the way in which the data is handled in the present study ensures the responsible approach to science emphasised by Sieber and Stanley (1988). More importantly, this study adheres to the ethical conditions of use set out by the University of South Africa and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. This study is also conducted in line with the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (also known as POPI).

Originally, the Grundlingh corpus included suicide notes written in Afrikaans, English and other African languages, as well as one suicide note written in French. Since the researcher is bilingual in Afrikaans and English and translating a suicide note affects its integrity as far as a linguistic analysis is concerned, only the Afrikaans and English suicide notes are considered in the present study.

The five sets of corpora analysed in this study are:

1. The Shneidman and Farberow corpus (SFC)
2. The Lester corpus (LSC)
3. The Leenaars corpus (LNC)
4. The Black corpus (BC)
5. The Grundlingh corpus (GC)

The corpora are named after the individuals who collected the suicide notes. Each corpus of suicide notes was chosen to shed light on the language use of suicide completers and suicide fakers. For the purposes of this study, a suicide completer is someone who successfully ended his or her own life. A suicide faker is someone who did not try to commit suicide in any way and wrote the suicide note to deceive others or under the instructions of someone else. The LNC, BC, LSC and GC contain suicide notes written by both men and women who completed the act of suicide. The BC and SFC contain the suicide notes of both suicide completers and suicide fakers. Thus, the corpora in the present study are divided into two main categories: authentic suicide notes and fabricated

suicide notes. Each of these main datasets are subdivided into eight specific datasets discussed in Chapter 4.

Previous studies on suicide notes have considered the characteristics in the notes of suicide completers and suicide fakers, but have not compared different fabricated suicide corpora with different authentic suicide note corpora in a single study, nor considered the possibility that the suicide notes might be linguistically indistinguishable (see for instance Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Osgood and Walker, 1959; Arbeit and Blatt, 1973; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Leenaars, 1988; Black, 1993; Shapero, 2011). In the current study, the infamous fabricated suicide note corpus compiled by Shneidman and Farberow (1957) and the fabricated note corpus compiled by Black (1993) are both included for comparison with the authentic suicide notes. The use of these two different sets of fabricated notes makes for a combined corpus of fabricated suicide notes that has not previously been used for comparative purposes.

For the purposes of this study, the suicide notes are limited to letters found at a crime scene (handwritten and/or typed). Notes distributed by means of e-mail, short message services (SMS or WhatsApp) or social media were not considered. The language medium was also restricted to letters written in English, except in the GC, which includes Afrikaans suicide notes.

1.6 The analysis

In this study, the linguistic analysis is considered from the perspective of appraisal theory. The corpora are analysed to identify the appraisal categories present in the different corpora and the analysis is mainly based on the appraisal categories suggested by Martin and Rose (2003) and Martin and White (2005). The notes of both men and women are analysed but gender differences in the suicide notes are not considered since an investigation of such differences does not form part of the aim of the present study. The three main sets of corpora discussed in section 1.5 (i.e. the notes from suicide completers, attempters and fakers) were chosen to ensure that various comparisons between the different corpora are possible. For the purposes of this study, the authentic suicide notes from the different corpora are compared to each other and to the fabricated suicide notes. The fabricated suicide notes are also compared to one another. These various comparisons assist in determining whether any distinctive linguistic characteristics are present in any of the corpora.

1.7 Structure of the chapters

The present study consists of six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter provides a literature review of the research that has been done on the linguistic analysis of suicide notes and argues for the benefits of an interdisciplinary study. Chapter 2 further indicates how the present study could contribute to existing research. Chapter 3 not only offers a critical discussion of appraisal theory but also provides linguistic criteria for the purpose of distinguishing between the three types of suicide note. In Chapter 4, the analyses of the corpora are discussed, while Chapter 5 includes the results of the analyses. Chapter 6 provides the conclusions and recommendations. All appendices are included at the end of the thesis.

1.8 Conclusion

This introductory chapter emphasised the contribution that the present study can make in terms of forensic linguistic analyses for the investigation of suicide notes. The present study is of particular importance since it considers an alternative perspective that has not been considered in previous research. By hypothesising that there are no distinctive linguistic features to separate authentic from fabricated suicide notes, the present study provides an opportunity for future researchers to explore this premise further through other corpora or studies. It was also argued that a study based on the linguistic analysis of sensitive data (similar to the one proposed here) cannot function in isolation and that knowledge and research in other disciplines such as psychology and deception detection should be considered or at least acknowledged. Furthermore, it was suggested that any research into the complex concept of suicide should be approached with caution. The small sets of data that are characteristic of studies focusing on suicide notes cannot be used to generalise about a population as a whole and cannot be used to draw conclusions on the mental health or intent of the individuals who wrote the letters.

The next chapter contains a literature review which discusses previous studies on suicide notes and further illustrates the value of the current study as a contribution to existing research.

Chapter 2

Literature review: interdisciplinary insights into suicide note analyses

2.1 Introduction

This chapter considers and investigates relevant research and arguments from both psychology and deception detection in order to indicate how they relate to the linguistic analysis of suicide notes. Furthermore, the present chapter illuminates how using appraisal theory and approaching the analysis of suicide notes from an alternative hypothesis that argues for no evidence of linguistic distinctions between suicide notes, contributes to studies in suicide note analysis and forensic linguistics.

The following statement by Fincham et al (2011) guides the structure of this chapter and provides a point of departure for a discussion concerning the interdisciplinary nature of the present study:

Psychiatry and psychology are the disciplines that have been most concerned with the study of suicide and its prevention and given the methodological basis of these disciplines, it is not surprising that until recently suicide notes have largely been studied with the help of quantitative methods and with an eye towards the discovery of generalisable rules (Fincham et al, 2011: 85).

The above statement includes references to various important concepts that are discussed and investigated in the present study and are relevant to this literature review. Firstly, Fincham et al (2011) emphasise the fact that suicide notes have largely been studied from a psychological perspective. This supports the argument for incorporating research and knowledge from psychology and for an interdisciplinary view of suicide note analyses. Secondly, they mention that the main aim of suicide note studies has been the discovery of generalisable rules. These rules have been used to study differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes (Black, 1993; Shapero, 2011; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014), differences between authentic and parasuicide notes (Leenaars et al, 1992), and differences between the suicide notes produced by different nationalities (Zonda, 1999; Leenaars, Sayin, Candansayar, Leenaars, Akar and Demirel, 2010). It is precisely the presence of generalisable rules, or rather the lack thereof, that is of importance in the present study. As discussed in Chapter 1, this study hypothesises that there are no distinctive


linguistic characteristics (or generalisable rules) that could distinguish an authentic suicide note from a fabricated suicide note. The best a researcher could hope for is to identify linguistic differences between two corpora of suicide notes within a particular study, but these differences would not be generalisable to all suicide notes from all suicide note writers. Thirdly, the reference to “quantitative methods” is also relevant in the present study. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are employed here, but since specifically quantitative methods have been used in interdisciplinary studies of suicide notes in the past (Handelman and Lester, 2007; Jones and Bennell, 2007), such methods are deemed particularly appropriate for the present study. Chapter 4 will offer a more detailed discussion of both the quantitative and qualitative methods employed in the present study but taking note of the main method of analysis here is crucial since the discussion of previous studies on suicide notes in section 2.2.3 emphasises the use of quantitative methods in suicide note analysis and provides an opportunity for the present study to not only compare results but also critique the reliability of such methods when used with corpora of limited size.

Psychology and deception detection and how they relate to the analyses of suicide notes are considered first. The second half of this chapter provides a brief overview of previous linguistic studies in suicide note comparisons and considers the benefits of attempting an analysis from an appraisal theory perspective.

2.2 Psychology, deception detection and linguistics

Research in both psychology and deception detection includes a history of interdisciplinary studies that have incorporated linguistic perspectives or have focused on linguistic analyses (Soames, 1984; Levitan, Maredia and Hirschberg, 2018). The links between linguistics and psychology may be better known to readers than the links between linguistics and deception detection. Nonetheless, both are relevant in the present study and are discussed here. For the purposes of clarity, it is emphasised once more that the present study considers the influences of both psychology and deception detection on the linguistic analysis in the present study. However, these links are conceptualised in a particular way in this research. Figure 2.1 offers an illustration of how the various concepts discussed here are connected in terms of this study.

Figure 2.1: The connections between important concepts in the present study



Psychology (and cognition) is seen as the overarching discipline, providing the background against which suicide notes may be analysed and interpreted. The argument (continued in Chapter 3) is that neither psychology and language nor cognition and language function separately from each other. This means that when analysing any linguistic text, especially in terms of the author's possible attitudes or evaluations, one has to take the psychological and cognitive aspects of language into account. This is even more important when one is attempting to analyse a genre such as suicide notes. It is important to note that there is a difference between the concepts of *psychology* and *cognition*. Firstly, it should be emphasised that the present study uses the term “psychology” to refer to human psychology, which differs from animal psychology (Henrique, 2004: 1216–1218). Secondly, defining psychology is quite difficult. Henrique (2004: 1207–1208) notes that the field is strangely both a coherent entity (as evident through academic courses, degrees and associations) and simultaneously fragmented at the theoretical level, since it was founded on three different subject matters (the “consciousness”, the “unconsciousness” and “adaption”). Nonetheless, Henrique (2004) proposes that human psychology can be defined as the scientific study of the mind and behaviour. On the other hand, cognitive science can be defined as the scientific interdisciplinary study of the mind and its processes (Friedenberg and Silverman, 2006: 2). The distinction between the terms *psychology* and *cognition* is further emphasised based on the

fact that in linguistics, these two fields relate to different areas of research: psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics.

In Figure 2.1, psycholinguistics is indicated as one of the areas related to psychology that is also of importance in the present study. Psycholinguistics is an established interdisciplinary field that mainly considers how the mind equips human beings to handle language (Field, 2013: 472). Research in psycholinguistics explores concepts such as language storage and retrieval (Bybee and Hopper, 2001; Rastle, 2007), language use (Brown and Yule, 1983; Johnson and Mullenix, 1997; Levelt, 1999) and language acquisition (Werker and Tees, 1984; Chomsky and Lasnik, 1993). Language use, specifically in terms of the writing process, is of specific relevance here. This is discussed further in section 2.2.1.

A second field of research related to psychology and relevant to the discussion here is deception detection. It should be emphasised that studies in deception detection have also explored the advantages of linguistic theories and perspectives, specifically in determining whether a spoken or written utterance is a lie (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry and Richards, 2003; Hancock, Curry, Goorha and Woodworth, 2007; Feng, Banerjee and Choi, 2012).

Thus, the present study can be divided into two main approaches. One approach is discussed in this chapter and considers how perspectives from psychology, psycholinguistics and deception detection are relevant when one aims to conceptualise suicide notes in terms of a forensic linguistic analysis. The second approach, discussed in Chapter 3, considers how cognition specifically is linked to both systemic functional linguistics (SFL) and appraisal theory. Thus, in both approaches the main focus remains a linguistic one, but other related aspects from both psychology and cognitive science are considered since this study argues for an interdisciplinary perspective.

In the following sections, each discipline is investigated individually. This allows for a more in-depth discussion of the relevant research. From the summary above, it should be apparent that neglecting to consider the abovementioned disciplines would lead to serious shortcomings in any studies aimed at analysing suicide notes, even if that analysis is linguistic in nature.

2.2.1 Psychology, linguistics and suicide note analyses

Garnham, Garrod and Sanford (2006: 1) note that the interest in language before the late 19th century was not psychologically oriented. However, from the 1960s, psycholinguistics as we know it started to emerge. Chomsky's Universal Grammar is one of the major theories that paved the way for a partnership between psychology and linguistics (McCauley, 1987; Segalowitz, 2001; Garnham et al, 2006), even though this partnership was labelled "inherently flawed" (Segalowitz, 2001: 3). Segalowitz (2001: 5–7) attributes the rocky relationship between psychology and linguistics to divergent theory building criteria and approaches to explanations in the two disciplines, as well as divergent approaches to biology and the environment. Despite these initial problems, psycholinguistics continues to exist as a multidisciplinary field that draws upon theoretical linguistics, speech science, phonetics, computer modelling, discourse analysis and pragmatics (Field, 2013: 473).

The present study incorporates psycholinguistics because it considers the discourse of suicide notes from a psychological perspective. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a suicide note might not be a reliable source for determining the mental states of individuals, but the linguistic content of the notes can still indicate how a suicidal individual's psychological state has changed over time (when compared to other writings before the suicide), or what opinions or myths people have about suicide (when analysing fabricated suicide notes) (Lester, 2014: 78). Furthermore, a linguistic analysis of suicide notes can reveal certain emotions that might be culture specific (Leenaars and O'Connor, 2004; Hafez, 2006; Leenaars et al, 2010), or that occur more often within a specific gender (Canetto and Lester, 1999; 2002; Lester, Haines and Williams, 2010) or age group (Leenaars, De Wilde, Wenckstern and Kral, 2001; Lester et al, 2010; Freuchen and Grøholt, 2015).

Although no two people who die by suicide are the same, research has revealed that there are certain emotions often present in suicidal individuals. The stigma surrounding suicide in many cultures often causes those who are suicidal to feel guilt, anger, denial or shame (Silverman, 2011: 10), while depression is also listed as a major cause of suicide (Rihmer, 2011). This means that individuals, who die by suicide for different reasons, could include references to similar emotions in their notes. Through a linguistic analysis of these texts and by leaning on psychological explanations, it is possible to identify these similarities and differences between suicide note corpora, even though they cannot be used to unequivocally distinguish between authentic and

fabricated suicide notes. Black (1993: 702) argues that evaluating the importance of the differences observed in the content of suicide notes is difficult and that only a few of the differences have direct clinical relevance. Although some of the differences could be grouped together to provide a sense of the concerns of the suicidal individual, the comparison of authentic and fabricated suicide notes provides only limited insight into the suicidal state (Black, 1993: 702). Based on these observations I argue that limited distinctions between the suicidal state of a suicidal versus nonsuicidal person equates to limited possibilities concerning a linguistic distinction between the notes.

A concept in forensic linguistics that is linked to psycholinguistics and relevant in the present study is the concept of an “idiolect”. In terms of a forensic linguistic analysis, an assumption is made that each individual has an idiolect that can be identified separately from his or her dialect or sociolect (Coulthard et al, 2011: 536). This idiolect is based on word choices that an individual makes on an unconscious level. Coulthard (2004) mentions that a forensic linguist approaches the analysis of questioned authorship from the theoretical position that “every native speaker has their own distinct and individual version of the language they speak and write ... and the assumption is that idiolect will manifest itself through distinctive and idiosyncratic choices in texts” (Coulthard, 2004: 1). Although no authorship identification is attempted in the present study, this statement by Coulthard has significant implications when one tries to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Based on Coulthard’s statement, one can argue that it is not possible to successfully distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes because each suicide note writer has a unique idiolect.

Khul (2003: 25), supporting the theories of Hermann Paul (1846–1921), argues that language resides in idiolect and is therefore not only idiosyncratic but also creative, spontaneous and undergoing continuous change and variation. Paul (1920/2015: 55) argues that individuals actively and passively participate in the language material of the community to which they belong. This means that individuals do not use everything they hear and understand. In addition, different individuals will prefer different things, even among the language material that all individuals use. According Paul (1920/2015: 55), this is the basis of divergence between even the most similar idiolects. Thus, language change in and between individuals takes place partly based on their own spontaneous linguistic activities and partly because of the influence of others. While a person’s

idiolect could change slightly over time, Paul (1920/2015: 55–56) argues that major changes in an idiolect are unlikely later in a person's life since a person's idiolect is probably formed very early during the initial language acquisition stage.

Thus, while certain emotions might seem characteristic of authentic or fabricated suicide notes, these characteristics will differ from study to study and corpus to corpus since each corpus consists of different individuals with distinct idiolects that influence the way they express themselves.

Another argument that is particularly relevant to the present study is situated within the psycholinguistic perspective on writing. When an author writes a text (any text), that author has the opportunity to plan and self-monitor. This means that an author can conceptualise an idea and after converting it to linguistic form, check for accuracy, clarity and appropriacy (Field, 2013: 478). To some degree, this corresponds with the stages a speaker progresses through when assembling a sentence or utterance (Levitt, 1999; Field, 2013). However, the main difference is that the writing process emphasises both planning and monitoring which leads to a more precise, concise and polished product than a spoken utterance (Field, 2013: 478). This does not mean that written messages will never contain mistakes, but it does suggest that since an individual has more time to write a message compared to assembling an utterance on the spot, a written message is usually more polished than an utterance. By “polished and precise”, I mean that most mistakes have been corrected or corrections have been attempted. Thus, the phrase does not mean that there are no mistakes, but that the writer has made an attempt to edit, change or amend some aspects in order to deliver a more concise message.

The argument that a written text is a precise and polished product achieved through careful planning and self-monitoring is relevant in the present context for two reasons. Firstly, all the suicide notes in the present study (both handwritten and typed) qualify as written discourses. Jahandarie (1999: 149) defines a written discourse as solitary, permanent and planned. According to Jahandarie (1999: 136), the writer and reader are always separated by both time and space in a piece of writing. Furthermore, written words, in contrast with spoken discourses, are lasting since they are preserved until the medium on which they are written (or typed) is destroyed (Jahandarie, 1999: 134). Finally, and most importantly, Jahandarie agrees that writing (or typing) is exact and precise. Since a writer has more time to think, he/she can formulate a more exact and correct expression of ideas and, since a written text is relatively durable, a writer has more incentive to

“endeavour for enhanced accuracy and validity of statements” (Jahandarie, 1999: 146). Therefore, based on the observations on writing from a psycholinguistic perspective, all the texts that form part of the data in the present study are also considered polished products, meaning that the authors probably took the time to correct mistakes and formulate more exact expressions of ideas.

One could argue that the emotional context in which the suicide notes, specifically the authentic notes, were written might influence the planning and self-monitoring processes of the authors. That is not necessarily true. Suicide is often considered an act that is planned since no one can, theoretically speaking, accidentally die by suicide. Cholbi (2007: 155) notes that most philosophical analyses of suicide argue that a death should only be labelled a *suicide* when it was intended that the actions of the victim should cause death. Thus, if someone looks down the barrel of an “empty” gun and consequently shoot themselves in the face, it would not be a *suicide* but an *accidental death* (Cholbi, 2007: 155). However, Cholbi notes that some suicidal behaviours exhibit features that cannot be labelled intentional self-killing,³ nor genuinely accidental, and explains it as follows:

... severely addicted drug users may recognise that the dose they are about to take may lead to a fatal overdose, but be willing to take such a risk in pursuit of an ever more intense high. Conversely, agents may believe wholeheartedly that death is the best means to the satisfaction of an end to which they are less than wholeheartedly committed – for example, when a patient with a painful illness acknowledges that death is the best way of bringing the suffering to an end, yet agonises over whether to seek doctor-assisted suicide because he or she cannot decide whether continued life would in fact be worth living (Cholbi, 2007: 155).

Cholbi (2007: 156) refers to these deaths as “NINA⁴ self-killings”. Thus, it appears there are deaths that are neither intentional nor accidental. In the case of completed suicides accompanied by suicide notes, an argument can be made that these deaths and notes are planned. In all these cases, the individuals wrote suicide notes, suggesting that they had at least consciously thought about dying by suicide. For fabricated suicide notes, the situation might be slightly different since a person might decide to write the note after committing a specific crime. However, in the case where someone writes a suicide note in order to disappear or fake their own death, it might take more planning. Either way, once the individual has decided on suicide as a cover-up for whatever purpose, the writing of the suicide note is a conscious process. Although there are instances where an individual decides to die by suicide only an hour before the act (Williams, Watts, Macleod and


³ *Intentional self-killings* and *suicide* refer to the same concept (Cholbi, 2007: 155).

⁴ NINA: neither intentional nor accidental.

Mathews, 1997), that person still had to consciously decide to take their own life. Hustvedt (2013: 105) emphasises that death by suicide cannot occur before a child “has developed the capacity for reflective self-consciousness”. This means that a person cannot die by suicide unless that person is able to conceive themselves as “an other in time” and consciously decide to end their lives. Therefore, while an argument could be made for people dying through intentional actions, accidents or neither (Cholbi, 2007), no valid argument can be made for someone accidentally writing a suicide note. In order to commit suicide or attempt suicide, a person must make a conscious decision to do so (Hustvedt, 2013: 106). If that same person writes a suicide note, the writing of the note is directly linked to the decision to commit suicide. In the case of a real suicide or attempted suicide, the writer of the suicide note will consider this his or her last communication to friends and family (Leenaars, 1988: 41) and therefore probably take great care to construct the content of the suicide note to express exactly what he or she wants to say. In the case of a fabricated suicide note, a similar argument can be proposed. If someone committed a crime and wanted to make it look like a suicide (refer to the cases discussed in Chapter 1) or wrote a suicide note in order to fake their own death (Lester and Yang: 2015), that individual would either take great care convincing the reader(s) that the text is an authentic suicide note or simply write down a short message in order not to reveal too much. Either way, whether authentic or not, a writer of a suicide note will plan and self-monitor what they are trying to communicate.

With reference to handwritten suicide notes, there are two types of suicide note found in the South African corpus: those with corrections (i.e. words that have been scratched out or rewritten) and those without corrections. Olive, Alves and Castro (2009: 759) emphasise that writing any text requires certain high- and low-level cognitive processes. While the planning processes are required to generate and organise ideas, the revising stage includes reading the text with the aim of evaluating it and editing the text when problems or mistakes are found. I am certainly in no position to offer an opinion on the possible thought processes of those who wrote the suicide notes in question, but it is obvious that at least the notes with corrections indicate a revision stage which suggests a conscious attempt to deliver a polished product. Figure 2.2 represents an extract of one of the handwritten authentic suicide notes from the South African corpus that offers visual proof of the conscious attempt of the writer to edit the note.

Figure 2.2: An example of corrections made by the writer of an authentic suicide note



This supports the standpoint that a suicide note is not necessarily an unedited reflection of the mindset of the writer, but may likely be an edited account of an individual's thoughts.

The discussion thus far has provided arguments and evidence suggesting that suicide notes are not texts that necessarily reflect the spontaneous thoughts and feelings of the writer, but are more likely planned and precise communication. The existence of an idiolect for each individual further challenges the idea that a group of linguistic characteristics shared by different writers and unique to that group may be present in a single corpus or be used to distinguish between corpora. The next section considers the link between deception detection and a linguistic analysis of suicide notes.

2.2.2 Deception detection, linguistics and suicide note analyses

Deception detection is a critical problem that has been studied in psychology (Granhag and Strömwall, 2001; Granhag and Hartwig, 2008; Stewart, Wright and Atherton, 2018) and computer science (Rubin, 2010; Pérez-Rosas and Mihalcea, 2015). However, increased interest in the field has been shown by researchers working in natural language processing and those with an interest in linguistics (Levitan et al, 2018: 1941).

In the present study, concepts related to deception detection and the accuracy of deception detection are especially important for two reasons. Firstly, when one tries to differentiate between authentic and fabricated suicide notes it means that a suicide note described as "real" or "genuine" (or "authentic") is distinguished from a suicide note described as "false" (or "fabricated"). Therefore, a fabricated suicide note is seen as a form of deception – it is considered a lie. Secondly, if deception detection is accurate it would mean that one should be able to identify deception (or falsifications in terms of suicide notes) and therefore distinguish between a truthful and a deceptive

text. However, if deception detection is not accurate it means that distinguishing between a truthful and a deceptive text would be difficult. I consider suicide notes as deceptive texts and the accuracy of deception detection separately below.

Granhag and Strömwall (2004: 3) state that most people not only lie frequently but are often forced to reflect upon and make decisions about questions of truth and deception. In some cases, determining deception is nonsensical. For example, finding out if a compliment from a friend is true or not. In other cases, trying to determine deception is critical, for example threats of violence or terrorist attacks, and interviews with criminals or suspected criminals (Granhag and Strömwall, 2004: 3). In the context of the present study, considering the possibility of identifying deception in a suicide note and possibly classifying the note as an authentic suicide note or real-life fabricated suicide note,⁵ would be considered of great importance in criminal investigations. In fact, it is argued that any attempt to distinguish between authentic and real-life fabricated suicide notes should be done from a deception detection perspective. The reason for this is simple: as stated above, real-life fabricated suicide notes are examples of deceptive texts since the person who writes the note is trying to deceive the reader by attempting to make the note seem genuine. The purpose could be to cover up a murder or to fake their own death.

However, I am not convinced that authentic suicide notes are entirely truthful either. I refer back to the argument by Yang and Lester (2011) in Chapter 1, where it was stated that authentic suicide notes and suicide notes written by attempters might not include true representations of a suicidal mind but a consciously constructed (or intentionally altered) self-image. This does not mean that individuals who write authentic suicide notes are liars or consciously trying to deceive the addressee(s), but it does suggest that we cannot assume that the self-image portrayed in the authentic suicide notes is genuine. Oyserman, Elmore and Smith (2012: 76) argue that how others see the “self” matters. Therefore, people do generally incorporate what they think others might think of them in their self-image (Oyserman et al, 2012: 76). In terms of an authentic suicide note, it would therefore not be far-fetched to expect a writer to try and preserve his or her positive self-image by constructing their self-image in a certain way (Yang and Lester, 2011: 76). Based on this

⁵ At this point it is necessary to distinguish between two types of fabricated suicide note. For the purposes of this study and this chapter, a “real-life” fabricated suicide note refers to a suicide note that has been verified as fabricated in a real-life crime investigation and not elicited by a researcher for the purposes of analysis. The latter will be referred to as “experimental” fabricated suicide notes.

information, it appears that both authentic and real-life fabricated suicide notes include some sort of deceptive information.

This also means that the data in the present study differ from data used in other studies in deception detection. For example, Afroz, Brennan and Greenstadt (2012) considered deception detection in online writing style, while Feng, Xing, Gogar and Choi (2012) focused on deceptive product reviews and Levitan et al (2018) investigated linguistic deception in interview dialogues. These studies claim to include data that indicate a definite difference between truthfulness and deception in writing. In the present study, no such claim can be made based on the argument that both authentic and real-life fabricated suicide notes are deceptive, albeit for different reasons. For the purposes of the present study, the definition of *deception* proposed by Vrij (2000) and used by Granhag and Strömwall (2004) is relevant. According to Vrij (2000: 6), deception can be defined as either a successful or an unsuccessful deliberate attempt to create a belief in another person that the liar considers to be untrue. It is also important that such an attempt must take place without forewarning. This means that the person being lied to must not have any indication that a lie is about to be told – if they expect a lie then the deception is no longer successful. Granhag and Strömwall (2004: 5) emphasise that unintentionally misremembering something is not considered deception, since deception implies intention. They also note that acts of deception can be categorised into falsifications (a complete contradiction to the truth, also known as an outright lie), distortions (lies that are altered to fit the liar's goals) and concealments (these lies refer to someone claiming that they do not remember something or do not know something) (Granhag and Strömwall, 2004: 5).

In the case of suicide notes, an argument can be made that real-life fabricated suicide notes are examples of falsifications, while authentic suicide notes might be considered distortions. The purpose of a real-life suicide note is to deceive and therefore the person writing it will consciously (or intentionally) try to deceive or lie to the possible addressee(s). However, the purpose of an authentic suicide note is not necessarily to deceive. When someone alters their self-image in an authentic suicide note, the purpose might be to emphasise the positive aspects of themselves, wanting to leave the addressee(s) with a positive image of them. Thus, while the deception in authentic suicide notes might not be based on a conscious decision, the writers are still, by altering their self-image, being deceptive and are distorting or altering some information in order to

preserve their self-image. There is of course no way to know whether all authentic suicide note writers are distorting their self-image, but the fact that it could be true means that one cannot consider authentic suicide notes to be completely truthful. Thus, authentic suicide notes are distortions to some extent, but they are not necessarily intentionally deceptive. Defining authentic suicide notes in terms of deceptive texts is problematic, since it suggests that no true baseline for establishing truth in suicide note comparisons is possible based on the fact that authentic suicide notes are also deceptive.

Another important aspect to consider here is the distinction between “real-life fabricated suicide notes” and “experimental fabricated suicide notes”. This distinction is important since it concerns the present discussion, specifically in terms of what constitutes deception. As mentioned above, a real-life fabricated suicide note refers to a suicide note that has been verified as fabricated at a crime scene, while an experimental fabricated suicide note is elicited by a researcher in an experimental setting, specifically for research purposes. The argument is that there are various problems with experimental fabricated suicide notes that might influence the possibility of distinguishing them from authentic suicide notes. The first problem concerns the *mindset* of the fabricated suicide note writer. Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor and Firth (2007: 48) state that deception is socially rooted. This means that processing deception is modified by our moral perception. Our moral perception, in turn, depends on “the existence or expectation of interactive consequences for our actions, negative or positive (Sip et al, 2007: 48). Thus, without any consequences for the deceiver and the deceived (which is the case in experimental settings), one cannot achieve a valid representation of deception or the process involved in deceptive acts. In terms of fabricated suicide notes produced by participants in a study, an argument can be made that these notes cannot reflect true deception, as would be the case in a real-life situation where an individual has to cover his or her tracks in order to avoid going to jail or being found out. Thus, someone instructed to write a fabricated suicide note in an experimental setting will most likely produce a fabricated suicide note that does not reflect true deception. It should also be noted that a person writing a suicide note in an experimental setting will not experience the same emotions as someone who has to write a fabricated suicide note. What I mean by this is that a person who plans a murder or disappearance and accordingly writes a real-life fabricated suicide note, or someone who kills another person and then decides to write a suicide note on the spot, is in a very different emotional state to someone who is asked to do so by a researcher. A second issue which is linked to the first is the fact that

asking someone to write a suicide note as if it were the note that they would leave behind, could potentially influence the cognitive state of the fabricated suicide note writer. Osgood and Walker (1959), Ho et al (1998) and Gregory (1999) all claim that plotting to die by suicide or thinking about dying by suicide, even in an experimental setting, increases your cognitive energy to the extent that it is close to that of an actual suicidal individual. This means a person asked to write a suicide note could possibly have increased suicidal ideation and even adopt a suicidal state. This suggests that fabricated suicide notes (real-life and experimental) might reflect a suicidal mindset, making it difficult to distinguish them from authentic suicide notes. In terms of the present study, one could argue that a person with a suicidal mindset might reference specific emotional states or make use of certain appraisals, and if a non-suicidal person can adopt this mindset, even if only to some extent, it would be difficult to differentiate between any authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

It seems a solution to the problems above would be to gather a corpus of real-life suicide notes and analyse them rather than making use of fabricated suicide notes produced in an experimental setting. Unfortunately, this is not a realistic solution. Apart from the four cases mentioned in Chapter 1 that contain possible real-life fabricated suicide notes, very few real-life cases have been documented (Clarkson, 2013; Venter, 2015). Acinas, Robles and Peláez-Fernández (2015: 70) argue that the probability of someone writing a suicide note in order to cover up a murder is remote and such issues are usually clarified through police investigations. Although it is entirely possible that many real-life fabricated suicide notes exist, finding them and combining them into a corpus seems unlikely. However, this does not mean that it should not at least be attempted in future research.

In the present study, no real-life fabricated suicide notes were available for analysis. Therefore, this study made use of the experimental fabricated suicide notes used in previous studies. Although it might seem unfortunate to use the unreliable fabricated suicide notes from previous studies, analysing those corpora is a necessary part of the present study. The best way to test the hypothesis in the present study that there are no linguistic characteristics that can be used to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, is to reanalyse the data in previous studies claiming that distinctions are possible.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the fabricated suicide notes in the present study were originally produced in studies by Shneidman and Farberow (1957) and Black (1993). Shneidman and Farberow (1957: 4) built a suicide note corpus consisting of 721 authentic suicide notes from the Los Angeles Coroner's Office. All the notes were written between 1944 and 1953. In order to collect control data which the authentic notes could be compared to, Shneidman and Farberow (1957: 5) asked "certain individuals, carefully matched with the genuine suicide-note writers, to write the suicide note they would leave if they were going to take their own lives". In total, 33 fabricated suicide notes were obtained. According to Black (1993: 699), there is a critical methodological problem in the original comparison of authentic and fabricated notes by Shneidman and Farberow (1957). For ethical reasons, Shneidman and Farberow selected the note writers for the fabricated notes based on the results of personality tests and the participants' psychological history. They therefore eliminated any individuals who might have been adversely affected by the task of writing a simulated suicide note. Black (1993: 699) has the following to say regarding the method of preselection used by Shneidman and Farberow:

This confounded the state of being not suicidal with that of psychological stability; any observed differences between the genuine notes and those written by the simulators might have been attributable to differences in history of depression and stability rather than the assumed suicidal versus nonsuicidal state of mind.

As Black (1993: 699) states, this problem can only be remedied by collecting new samples of both authentic and fabricated suicide notes without the use of preselection.

Black's corpus of 77 authentic suicide notes (54 written by men and 23 written by women) was obtained from the Coroner's Office in the San Francisco Bay area. All the notes are dated between 1985 and 1986. The suicides were all committed by Caucasian adults aged 18 years and older. The fabricated notes were written by unpaid volunteers solicited from community groups. According to Black (1993: 699), the volunteers were "matched person for person with the GNWs [genuine note writers] according to sex, age group and occupational level".

However, both these corpora suffer from the flaws discussed above: both corpora are experimentally produced, meaning that the fabricated suicide notes do not reflect the mindset of a writer in a real-life scenario and the notes also cannot reflect true deception since there are no real consequences for the fabricated suicide note writer in terms of being caught or found. Another

issue is the fact that these fabricated suicide notes, just like real-life fabricated suicide notes, might include suicidal ideation, meaning that they will respond to authentic suicide notes to some extent.

Thus, in terms of deception detection and suicide notes, there seems to be two problems concerning the distinction between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Firstly, authentic suicide notes can also be deceptive, meaning that no true baseline for establishing truth versus lies in terms of suicide notes is possible, even if real-life fabricated suicide notes could be verified and used. Secondly, the fabricated suicide notes in experimental studies are not true, real-life deceptive texts and therefore make a comparison with authentic suicide notes problematic.

A counterargument is that the goal should not be to identify *deception* in fabricated suicide notes, but to identify a lack of *suicidal intent* in fabricated suicide notes. However, this argument is invalid. As mentioned in Chapter 1, suicidal intent can allegedly be determined through a psychological assessment of an individual before their death. Thus, in order for any accurate conclusions to be drawn concerning intent in suicide notes, the researcher would need access to information concerning the psychological state of the suicide note writers (both authentic and fabricated). Black (1993: 699) claims that not preselecting the individuals who produce fabricated suicide notes will lead to a clearer difference between an assumed suicidal and nonsuicidal mind in those notes, but I argue that such distinctions cannot be made based purely on a linguistic analysis of suicide notes, or even a purely psychological assessment of the suicide note writers. Although studies in neurobiology and molecular psychiatry have found that the brain structure and brain activity of a suicidal person can differ from someone who claims to be nonsuicidal (Monkul, Hatch, Nicoletti, Spence, Brambilla, Lacerda et al, 2007; Fan, Wu, Yao and Dong, 2013), studies considering the prediction of suicide have found that it is quite difficult to accurately determine suicidal intent in most situations (Harriss and Hawton, 2005; Freedenthal, 2008). Therefore, I find it unlikely that suicidal intent would be identifiable in a suicide note (authentic or fabricated) if it is not necessarily identifiable through psychological tests and assessments before a victim dies by suicide.

The discussion thus far might make it seem that the criticism is mainly directed towards deception detection in suicide note studies. This is true. Through a critical discussion on deception detection and its use in suicide note analysis, it becomes clear that it is not only crucial to consider suicide notes from a deception detection perspective, but also to consider how complicated and unreliable

suicide notes are in terms of deception. It is also important to acknowledge the fact that the accuracy of deception detection in general is often disputed and the pitfalls of deception detection is a topic of many research studies (see for instance Wolpe et al, 2005; Greely and Illes, 2007; Sip et al, 2007; Spence, 2008; Porter and ten Brinke, 2010). This observation is important since concluding that deception cannot necessarily be identified through brain activity strongly suggests that the accurate identification of deception in written texts, especially texts as complicated as suicide notes, seems unlikely.

Deception detection as a discipline is often a focus area within both psychology and neuroscience. Wolpe et al (2005) note that modern technologies in neuroscience allow a third party to bypass the peripheral nervous system and gain direct access to a person's thoughts, feelings, intention, or knowledge (Wolpe et al, 2005: 39). This does not mean that we can read other people's thoughts, but one application that has been attempted is the development of reliable brain-imaging that could be used as lie-detection technology (Wolpe et al, 2005: 39). In the United States, a significant amount of funds has been dedicated to lie-detection strategies for use in criminal and terrorist investigations, and universities and private companies have tried to develop lie-detection technology, specifically focusing on fMRI, EEG and near infrared light to access brain function (Wolpe et al, 2005: 39).

According to Wolpe et al (2005: 40), the use of fMRI (or functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) for lie detection has attracted attention because of the novelty of the physiological parameters being measured. It is worth noting that previous methods of lie detection such as the polygraph also measured certain physiological parameters, but it is argued that physiological data in the polygraph test signify the activity of the automatic nervous system, meaning that arousal might not only occur during deception but also during anxiety in general (Wolpe et al, 2005: 39). A very important aspect of testing any means of lie detection is the development of standardised protocol to generate the behaviour of deception (Wolpe et al, 2005: 40). These tests usually refer to the Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) that are normally used in lie detection to create a baseline for truthful reactions against which deceptive reactions can be measured (Wolpe et al, 2005: 40). During these tests, various questions that will elicit a truthful answer or a neutral physiological response are asked in order to establish a base from which deception can be measured. The argument is that an individual who knows the truth but is denying

it (or has “guilty knowledge”) will physiologically respond in a specific way to a question relating to a situation or event. This response is thought to be unconscious and uncontrollable, and therefore an accurate measure of deception (Wolpe et al, 2005: 40). However, both these tests have received criticism. CQT is criticised for its inability to standardise the selection of the control questions while GKT is mainly criticised because a successful test requires reliable and specific crime-related information that is known only to the investigators and the perpetrator (Wolpe et al, 2005: 40). In the present study, establishing something similar, such as “truthful linguistic features” in an authentic suicide note from which deception could be measured, would also be unreliable since, as mentioned above, authentic suicide notes are also considered deceptive texts.

Furthermore, Sip et al (2007: 49) note that it has been demonstrated through research that the cognitive processes involved in social interactions, such a deception, are mapped onto a wide range of both cortical and subcortical networks, and that the activation of a specific region in the brain is not always associated with a single cognitive process. Sip et al (2007: 50) argue that deception is a very complicated and cognitively demanding process that relies on various high-level functions, including decision-making, response monitoring and mentalising. Although studies have indicated similar patterns of neural activity when deception is taking place (see Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson and Yurgelon-Todd, 2003; Nunez, Casey, Egner, Hare and Hirsch, 2005; Abes, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh and Fuji, 2007), Sip et al (2007: 50) warn that those brain regions are also activated during any performance of tasks that involves the same cognitive processes in the absence of deception. Thus, Sip et al (2007: 50) state that even if deception reliably activates particular brain regions, one cannot logically conclude that the activation of that brain region always correlates with deception taking place.

At this stage of the discussion on psychology, psycholinguistics and deception detection, various problems with suicide notes that support the argument that authentic suicide notes and experimentally produced fabricated suicide notes⁶ cannot be distinguished in terms of linguistic characteristics have been illuminated. Firstly, the fact that an argument can be made for both types of suicide note being polished and planned written products reflecting the idiolect of an individual suggests that suicide notes are not necessarily spontaneously produced texts. On the contrary,

⁶ Note that from this point onwards the term *fabricated suicide notes* always refers to those notes that have been experimentally produced, unless indicated otherwise.

suicide notes are probably carefully crafted texts with the purpose of either reflecting a favourable image of the note writer (in the case of authentic suicide notes and parasuicide notes) or obscuring a crime (in the case of real-life fabricated suicide notes). And furthermore, each suicide note will reflect an idiolect that does not correspond with those of other suicide note writers. Therefore, analysing either authentic suicide notes, parasuicide notes or fabricated suicide notes linguistically can at best reveal linguistic characteristics that are specific to a corpus in a particular study and cannot be extrapolated to a single type of suicide note or group of suicide notes. Secondly, all genres of suicide notes are types of deceptive text. The problem with this is that no baseline for truthfulness can be determined using authentic suicide notes and, therefore, a comparison between authentic and fabricated suicide notes (real-life or experimentally produced) is unlikely to reveal deception through a linguistic analysis.

The last section of this chapter considers previous studies that compared authentic suicide notes and fabricated suicide notes. The purpose is to provide a summary of the methods and results from previous studies in order to support the argument for a fresh perspective on suicide note comparisons and the use of appraisal theory to demonstrate that no distinguishable linguistic characteristics exist in authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

2.2.3 Linguistics and suicide note analyses: previous studies

From the discussion in Chapter 1 and the information included in this chapter, it should be apparent that studies analysing or comparing suicide notes are not a novel concept. Let us consider the arguments and results of these studies in chronological order. A table (Table 2.1) that summarises the studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes is included below the relevant discussions.

2.2.3.1 Comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes: an overview

Early studies in suicide note analysis (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Osgood and Walker, 1959; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960) include a greater focus on psychology and psychological categories that the researchers claim are present in authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Among these early studies, the one conducted by Shneidman and Farberow is the most well-known and is still often cited in present-day research.

The purpose of the Shneidman and Farberow's (1957: 3) study was to "describe an experimental approach in the investigation of psychological factors in suicide and to report a few tentative results". The data they used consisted of psychiatric histories, psychological test results and suicide notes. As mentioned before, Shneidman and Farberow (1957: 4) collected 721 authentic suicide notes from the Los Angeles Coroner's Office. In order to compare these notes to control data, they asked pre-selected volunteers to write "the suicide note they would leave if they were going to take their own lives" (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957: 5). Thirty-three fabricated suicide notes were obtained and formed the notorious Shneidman and Farberow fabricated suicide note corpus. Although this corpus has been critiqued (Black, 1993), I do not believe that all the limitations concerning this corpus have been discussed or considered, since the corpus is still used in fairly recent published studies (Shapero, 2011; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014). The main problem with this corpus of suicide notes lies in its homogeneity; all the note writers were Protestant, Caucasian males (native-born) between the ages of 25 and 59 (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957: 35). A second issue, as mentioned earlier, is the fact that the note writers were pre-selected in order to eliminate those who might be negatively affected by the task and, thus, the writers do not reflect a true, heterogeneous, realistic sample. Thirdly, the fabricated suicide notes were written under instruction. This means that the fabricated suicide note corpus used by Shneidman and Farberow, and used in many other studies (including the present study), is not representative and is not naturally produced. Ho et al (1998: 467) claim that comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes would not provide insights into the suicidal mind, since the fabricated note writers were asked to imagine that they were going to kill themselves, thereby possibly increasing their suicidal state of mind. The last two arguments are relevant to all studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

Nevertheless, Shneidman and Farberow (1957) claim that their results indicate that the authentic notes contained more instances of discomfort (226 instances compared to 137 instances in the fabricated notes) and neutral statements (78 instances compared to only 13 in the fabricated notes). Neither the authentic notes nor the fabricated notes contained a significantly higher number of expressions illustrating relief (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957: 38).

In a 1959 study involving the content analysis of suicide notes, Osgood and Walker theorised that an individual who writes a suicide note, and is committed to the act of suicide, is "functioning

under heightened motivation”. Therefore, the structure and content of an authentic suicide note should differ from both ordinary letters and fabricated suicide notes (Osgood and Walker, 1959: 58). For their data, Osgood and Walker made use of 100 authentic suicide notes of at least 100 words per letter, 69 ordinary letters and the Shneidman and Farberow corpus of 33 authentic and 33 fabricated suicide notes. Accordingly, Osgood and Walker (1959) compared the authentic suicide notes with the ordinary letters and found the following to be significant: (1) Suicide notes generally display greater stereotypy, which means that the writers of the suicide notes tend to use shorter and simpler words. (2) Their vocabulary is less diversified. (3) They use more repetitive words. (4) They use more simple action expressions (nouns and verbs) with fewer discriminative qualifiers (adjectives and adverbs). (5) The suicide note writers also use more “allness” terms – i.e. terms that permit no exceptions, for example “always”, “never”, “everything”, “no one”, “completely” etc. (6) Suicide notes also contain higher distress-relief quotients, a higher frequency of evaluative terms and a smaller proportion of positive evaluative assertions. (7) Lastly, suicide notes display a demanding, commanding and pleading nature when compared to ordinary letters.

When Osgood and Walker compared genuine suicide notes with fabricated suicide notes they found that it was not possible to distinguish significantly between the notes based on most of their measures (Osgood and Walker, 1959: 66). They speculate that this is because a non-suicidal person is able to “intuit the superficial content of suicide notes – the distress-expression, the use of evaluative terms, and the decrease in positive evaluative assertions” (Osgood and Walker, 1959: 66). It is important to note that already in 1959, the Osgood and Walker study hints at a hypothesis that is possibly similar to the one proposed in the present study. Nonetheless, Osgood and Walker note that there are more positively toned terms and concrete terms in the authentic suicide notes. They also note that the writers of the fabricated suicide notes fail to reflect the demanding, commanding and pleading style and the evaluative ambivalence towards the self and others that is present in the authentic suicide notes (Osgood and Walker, 1959: 66). Osgood and Walker (1959: 66–67) admit that their study can be criticised by claiming that determinants other than motivation are responsible for the results. However, at the time they still believed that the results could have implications for psycholinguistic theory and for stylistics.

Gottschalk and Gleser (1960) too analysed the content of suicide notes, comparing authentic and fabricated suicide note corpora. They used the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpora of 33

authentic and 33 fabricated suicide notes for their analysis. Their aim was to investigate the personality characteristics of persons who commit suicide based on a comparison of the words used in the authentic and fabricated suicide notes (Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960: 195) and categorising the notes according to both a grammatical and a psychological system (Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960: 196). The grammatical categories they used included adjectives (and articles), adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, interjections, substantives and verbs. The psychological categories included words denoting feeling or motivation, words indicating a perceptual process and reflective or cognitive processes, words indicating activity or movement (particularly involving the neuromuscular system), words indicating some relationship in time or space, words indicating some measure of quantity, words indicating some other quality of an object and words indicating negation, among other things. Gottschalk and Gleser (1960: 196) explain their categories as follows:

A grammatical classification mainly indicates how a word is used in a sentence according to one or another linguistic convention. Our 'psychological' classification of words attempted to highlight, regardless of part of speech, the emotive, cognitive, perceptive and motor processes conveyed by words as well as the objects denoted, concrete or abstract, animate or inanimate, personal or impersonal.

Gottschalk and Gleser's (1960) explanation of their categories suggest that they view grammar as distinct from psychological factors. In the present study, the opposite view is investigated, since the principles that underlie SFL see grammar and the expression of meaning and feeling as integrated. This is one illustration of how the present study adds new insights to suicide note analysis studies and challenges research that has been done in the past. Gottschalk and Gleser (1960: 202) found that authentic suicide notes can be distinguished from fabricated suicide notes on the basis of the high percentage of references to other people and things. They hypothesise that this is because individuals who choose to write a suicide note are characterised by the tendency to "make a final act of verbal communication and an apparent need to maintain contact with those objects from whom they are separating" (Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960: 202). They also found that the authentic suicide note writers make more references to places or spatial relations than the fabricated note writers. Gottschalk and Gleser (1960: 203) suggest that this is because an actual suicidal individual has the intention to separate permanently from the world of the living. They come to the conclusion that authentic suicide notes differ in their verbal content from fabricated

suicide notes, since a genuine suicidal individual uses a “rather telegraphic effort” to communicate with a loved one or another individual, which is not present to the same extent in fabricated suicide notes (Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960: 203).

The studies referred to thus far illuminate possible issues and questions that need to be discussed. Firstly, all three studies make use of the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpus of fabricated suicide notes. As discussed already, this corpus of fabricated suicide notes is not a particularly reliable corpus for comparison studies since it is homogeneous and was produced in an experimental setting by pre-selected participants. Therefore, one may argue that the use of such a flawed corpus decreases the accuracy of the results in these studies. Secondly, all the studies, although approaching the notes from a mainly psychological perspective, report different results. This supports the argument by Fincham et al (2011: 86) that small sample sizes and a lack of contextual data produce lacklustre findings. It also suggests that the results are study specific. As emphasised in Chapter 1, this means that a study using corpora or methodologies different from other studies will produce different results. So, while the studies claim that differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes are identifiable, these differences are specific to a particular study, do not correspond across studies, and can therefore not be extrapolated to the larger community of those who write suicide notes or exhibit possible suicidal intent; at least not at this point. The fact that these studies do not record characteristics of suicide notes (authentic or fabricated) that appear across studies and are always present in a corpus of authentic or fabricated suicide notes suggests that the hypothesis in the present study is a valid one. In fact, as mentioned, Osgood and Walker already hinted at a similar hypothesis in their 1959 study. Thirdly, from the explanation of the categories used by Gottschalk and Gleser (1960: 196), it is apparent that they suggest that grammar is unrelated to expressions of meaning. This argument is in conflict with SFL⁷ that forms the basis for the theory in the present study. It confirms that in the study by Gottschalk and Gleser (1960), SFL was not considered a valid underlying theory for the analysis of suicide notes and it therefore strengthens the motivation for applying a new theory, specifically SFL, in the present study.

A study that focused on the difference between authentic and fabricated suicide notes by Arbeit and Blatt (1973) offered a novel approach to suicide note analysis. Arbeit and Blatt decided to

⁷ Systemic functional linguistics is discussed in detail in Chapter 3

make use of participants to determine whether they would be able to correctly distinguish between the notes of suicidal and nonsuicidal people. The participants were asked to use a list of criteria to make distinctions between the notes. This list was derived in part from previous studies on suicide notes (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960) as well as from general suicide literature and the intuition of the researchers (Arbeit and Blatt, 1973: 287). The participants ranged from undergraduates in psychology to practising clinicians (both psychiatrists and psychologists). By assessing each of the notes (authentic and fabricated), a list of 35 factors was used to judge the suicide notes. The factors included “hatred of others”, “cause of unhappiness in others” and “self-blame” (Arbeit and Blatt, 1973: 288). Participants had to rate each note according to the indications and contraindications of suicide present. A group of 13 participants (14% of the total number of participants) was ultimately able to make a fairly accurate distinction between some of the authentic and fabricated suicide notes based on their experience and training in psychology. However, their accuracy rate was far from any percentage necessary to prove that this method is an effective one. It is worth noting that some of the 35 factors suggested by Arbeit and Blatt (1973: 288) include concepts that align with the categories used in appraisal theory. For example, Arbeit and Blatt (1973: 288) listed “hatred of others”, a “sense of despair” and “positive affect” among their factors. However, Arbeit and Blatt did not consider the suicide notes in their study from a linguistic perspective, nor did they employ appraisal theory, as is the case in the present study.

Another study of particular importance was conducted by Edelman and Renshaw (1982). These researchers refer to the studies of both Osgood and Walker (1959) and Gottschalk and Gleser (1960), among others, before suggesting another method for distinguishing between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. According to Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 104–105), there are basic problems evident in previous studies that have attempted to distinguish between suicide notes:

First, though significant differences are found between genuine and simulated notes on a variety of content measures, no attempt is made to provide a statistically significant multivariate model which provides a quantitative and predictive toll for accurately and consistently making discriminations ... Second, though several of the measures have a theoretical base in either psychological research or traditional grammar, no unified theory of discourse analysis methodology is generated or used. Again, discriminations are made in a somewhat piecemeal fashion where the subjective judgement of the researcher or clinician must be used to make decisions both in terms of what measure to use and when to use it. Third, in none of the studies does a consistent language profile emerge which would provide a unified theoretical view of the suicidal person.

Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 105) suggest that the problems they identified can be dealt with by firstly establishing a language analytic system that can provide reliable and coherent views of the relations among its measures. Secondly, they suggest forming research strategies “around the idea of uncovering the multivariate predictiveness of these measures in their ability to make discriminations between genuine and simulated notes”. According to Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 105), both psychologists and communication scholars have come to view discourse analysis as a viable tool for analysing the underlying structure of verbal messages. Furthermore, they claim that modern approaches to discourse analysis concentrate on the aspects of language which are indicators of a certain state and that advances in multivariate techniques (such as multiple discriminant analysis) make it possible to assess, statistically, the ability of variables to discriminate between such states as suicidal versus non-suicidal discourse. They argue that a combination of discourse analysis and multivariate techniques is a viable alternative for distinguishing between suicide notes (Edelman and Renshaw, 1982: 105).

For their analysis, Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 105–106) made use of the analysis system, Syntactic Language Computer Analysis, Version III (SLCA-III). This system consists of a unified set of language categories into which the words of a message are placed. The system uses traditional grammatical categories, concentrating on the differing aspects and functions of these categories “within the analysis of the message as a whole rather than specific content categories” (Edelman and Renshaw, 1982: 106). The system then derives a “map” of the individual’s cognitive states by examining the individual’s verbal behaviour.

Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 107–108) structured their study in two ways. Firstly, they attempted to replicate the findings of other researchers and, secondly, they took all SLCA-III variables and attempted to develop a multivariate model that would indicate which SLCA-III variables were the best predictors of genuine and simulated suicide notes and which could provide the best profile of suicidal individuals (who write suicide notes). They also made use of the 33 authentic and 33 fabricated suicide notes from the Shneidman and Farberow corpus (1957). Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 110) conclude that the SLCA-III can be a valuable tool for diagnosing suicidal states in a sample of writing. They also claim that their study provided “a much more precise language profile as an indicant of the suicidal state than is available in previous studies” (Edelman and Renshaw, 1982: 112). They note the following distinctions between authentic and fabricated suicide notes:

(1) In authentic suicide notes there is an increase in the cognisance of objects. (2) There is an increase in the modification of objects and actions or states of objects in the authentic suicide notes. Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 112) state that the modification appears to be negative and that it would seem that “the cognitive preoccupation with concreteness is accompanied by negations of those objects and the actions or states they have”. (3) In the authentic suicide notes, specific people, places and things are negated, as well as the concept “you”. However, generalised others (“they” and “them”) are cognised in a more positive manner. (4) They also note that the authentic suicide note writers exhibit a stronger sense of alienation from the world. (5) There is similarly a decrease in the use of future references in the authentic suicide notes. Ultimately, Edelman and Renshaw (1982: 113) believe their study, based on the results, broke new ground in terms of applying discourse analysis to a variety of psychological and pathological areas.

Although I agree with Edelman and Renshaw (1982) regarding the use of computer analysis to provide more accurate results for word counts and grammar categories, an argument can also be made that in a genre such as suicide notes, all words that could indicate cognitive states must be analysed in the context of the letter. A word that may seem positive on its own could in fact be used in a negative way. For example, if someone wrote “I used to be so happy” a computer might count the word “happy” as a positive feeling, while the statement as a whole indicates that the author is actually expressing a negative feeling. Therefore, I suggest that the human element should not be eliminated in the analysis of suicide notes. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the fact that Edelman and Renshaw relied on the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpora of authentic and fabricated suicide notes casts doubts on the accuracy of their results.

Like Edelman and Renshaw (1982), Leenaars (1988) criticised previous studies on suicide notes, claiming that these studies have “primarily included classification analysis and content analysis” and that only a few studies have “utilized the theoretical-conceptual analysis despite the belief, since the first formal study of suicide notes, that such contributions offer a rich potential” (Leenaars, 1988: 52). Leenaars suggests using what he terms a “protocol analysis” when analysing suicide notes. However, Leenaars (1988: 53) identifies one problem with this approach when he states that there is a lack of control over extraneous variables and that the large number of potentially important antecedent variables are therefore in danger of being misinterpreted

regarding their relationships. A solution to this is to explicitly formulate one research hypothesis as well as several “control” hypotheses that specify the antecedent variables (Leenaars, 1988: 53).

Protocol sentences were identified based on the work of ten suicidologists and were subjected to logical and empirical procedures. In his study, Leenaars (1988: 59) used individuals with a postgraduate degree in psychology and who were in clinical practice to “judge” and verify whether the classes of content described by the individual protocol sentences did, in fact, occur in the authentic and fabricated suicide note corpora compiled by Shneidman and Farberow (1957). Based on their analysis, Leenaars (1988: 60) makes the following observation:

It has been noted that if one attempts to describe the content of genuine and simulated suicide notes, it becomes evident that individuals under both conditions very frequently describe their behaviour as highly similar in some critical respects and as significantly different in others. When a high frequency count occurs in both the real and simulated conditions, there is of course no statistical difference between them. Nonetheless, such high frequency data in the genuine notes is worth noting because it clearly provides us with pertinent descriptive information, although not based on significant differences and should be evaluated as such.

Based on the analysis of all the protocol sentences, Leenaars (1988: 197–198) concludes that the characteristics of an authentic suicide note are: (1) The note indicates that the individual wishes to die; that is, “the suicide is accomplished due to some relative weakness in the capacity for developing constructive tendencies”. (2) The individual communicates flight from pain, incurable disease, a violent death, anticipated rejection and the like. However, other motives are also mentioned, indicating that the individual might be experiencing more than one problem at the same time. (3) The following emotional states are evident: pitiful forlornness, deprivation, distress and/or grief. (4) Evidence of adult trauma is communicated (poor health) or there has been rejection by a spouse. (5) The person writing an authentic suicide note seems to be “figuratively intoxicated or drugged by one’s overpowering emotions and constricted logic and perception”. (6) The writers exhibit a poverty of thought – expressing only permutations and combinations of grief-provoking content. (7) The communication in the notes suggests that the writer’s personality is not adequately developed – it is “weak” and narcissistic.

In conclusion, Leenaars (1988: 198) states that the psychological state of suicide had been relatively constant over the 40 years prior to the research and that the findings in the study are still “as applicable today as they were 40 years ago”.

Although I agree with Leenaars’ statement that the high frequency of particular characteristics in a corpus does not equate to statistical significance between the corpora (Leenaars, 1988: 60), I am of the opinion that Leenaars’ statement about the psychological state of suicide being “constant” over time might be misguided. O’Connor and Nock (2014) admit that psychological factors play an important role in research on suicide, but argue that studies have mostly focused on the psychology of suicide ideation and suicide attempts rather than deaths by suicide (O’Connor and Nock, 2014: 73). Furthermore, O’Connor and Nock (2014: 74–75) note that there has been a definite shift in psychological theories on suicidal behaviour. Earlier studies focused on individual psychological factors of suicide but did not account for the fact that most people who have thoughts of suicide do not attempt suicide. Thus, there has been a shift in the basic premise of suicide based on psychological factors. While Shneidman (1985) argued that a combination of stress, psychological pain and perturbation results in suicide risk, O’Connor (2011) suggests phases of suicidality consisting of premotivational, motivational (ideation and intent formation) and volitional (behavioural enaction) components (O’Connor and Nock, 2014: 74). Furthermore, O’Connor and Nock (2014: 81) argue that more psychological research is needed to understand the suicidal mind and they state that there is still a tendency to generalise findings when the focus should be on “the differential effects of psychological factors of suicide risk as a function of age, culture, and ethnic origin” (O’Connor and Nock, 2014: 81).

Thus, while Leenaars’ statement might have been acceptable in 1988, it cannot be accepted today.

The 1990s produced two studies comprising suicide note comparisons that are relevant to the present discussion. The first is a study by Black (1993). Black compared authentic and fabricated suicide notes as well, but used another set of both corpora that he collected himself. Black’s corpora have already been discussed earlier in this chapter and his fabricated suicide note corpus is the second to be included in the present study. In Black’s study, the set of authentic and fabricated suicide notes was analysed using content analysis that focused on the thought units in the notes rather than the words. Black (1993: 700) defines a thought unit as “the expression of a single thought” not limited by punctuation. The concept of “thought units” is especially relevant

in the present study. Although SFL is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, it is worth mentioning that a central aspect of SFL, based on the perspectives of scholars from the Prague School of Linguistics, is the idea that no element in a language can be studied in isolation. Each element has to be examined in relation to all others coexisting with it (Young, 2013: 626). This view supports the argument in Black's study as well as the present study that thought units should be analysed, rather than individual words.

For Black's (1993: 700) content analysis, six categories were used: whole-note evaluations; affect; textual content; thought process; values; and residual characteristics. Once again, it appears that a concept from appraisal theory (affect) is included, but no further mention of appraisal theory or the discussion of any other appraisal theory categories is present in the study. However, Black does mention that affect was divided into the categories of "depression; hostility – intrapersonal; hostility – interpersonal; hostility – impersonal; joy; and love" (Black, 1993: 700). Although some of these concepts do correspond with affect in appraisal theory, it is not clear whether Black is in fact referring to appraisal theory as a method of analysis.

Black found certain similarities in the results of his analysis and the analysis by Shneidman and Farberow (1957) of their set of authentic and fabricated notes. For example, Black also found that authentic notes tend to be significantly longer than fabricated notes. Furthermore, Black (1993: 701) found that authentic suicide notes tend to have the following characteristics: give instructions about final affairs, provide more factual information, include religious ideas and are usually dated (i.e. include a date on the note). Fabricated suicide notes, on the other hand, seem to include affect (depression), justification for the act, reasons for suicide (this may include life being too hard or other individuals being the cause) and no references to the afterlife.

A big difference between the findings of Black (1993) and those of Shneidman and Farberow (1957) is the fact that the fabricated notes contained more thought units illustrating depression. This is, according to Black (1993: 701), due to the method Shneidman and Farberow used to select the note writers for the fabricated notes mentioned above. Black (1993:701) states the following:

The evidence indicates that the preselection procedure confounded the lack of suicidal ideation with an enhanced ability to role play the suicidal state through the selection of adaptable, psychologically healthy individuals as SNWs (Simulated Note Writers).

The remark by Black emphasises the risk of analysing a set of homogenous suicide notes written by a preselected group of individuals. However, Black's own corpus of fabricated suicide notes is not without fault. As mentioned already, any experimentally produced corpus of fabricated suicide notes will not yield reliable results since the authors are writing the notes under instruction and in a controlled environment – which is different from real-life situations. In fact, the only resemblance to a real-life situation that an experimentally produced fabricated suicide note could have, would be in a scenario where a person is forced to write their own suicide note before being killed by another individual. This only refers to a single scenario that could point to a fabricated suicide and does not consider situations where the suicide note is written by the killer or the person who wants to disappear without actually dying by suicide. While Black is commended for collecting an alternative, heterogenous corpus of fabricated suicide notes, these notes still do not reflect the real-life situations necessary to verify the fabrication of a suicide note in a real forensic linguistic investigation. Having said this, I would like to emphasise that Black (1993: 702) is also critical of suicide note comparison studies in general, stating that although authentic and fabricated suicide notes contain differences, the difficulty is in interpreting the differences. Furthermore, Black (1993: 702) notes that Shneidman and Farberow's (1957) study is based on the assumption that any observed differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes are important and informative – an assumption that is not necessarily valid or based on evidence.

Like Edelman and Renshaw (1982) and Leenaars (1988), Gregory (1999: 129) claims that the information in a suicide note could reflect the state of mind of the individual who wrote the note, but theorises that it should be possible to determine how the features of life, which are either consistent or inconsistent with a suicidal individual, manifest themselves in the language of suicide notes. Similarly, Gregory (1999: 129–130) made use of the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpus of authentic and fabricated suicide notes and hypothesised that it would be possible to “identify a number of linguistic features which, in combination, would allow discrimination between the two groups of notes” (Gregory, 1999: 130). Gregory (1999: 134–135) went on to criticise previous research that dealt with the linguistic features of authentic and fabricated suicide notes, claiming that the findings in previous research are “completely without structure”. According to Gregory, this is because previous studies have not taken a multivariate approach (such as the one attempted in the Edelman and Renshaw (1982) study). He argued that his study would build on the findings of previous research by devising a multivariate model of the suicidal

individual. Gregory (1999: 136–139) focused on nine variables in total. These are the percentage of nouns, the percentage of verbs, average speech length, total number of words, percentage of cognitive process verbs, positive affect, left instructions, reasons or explanations given and locus of control.

Gregory (1999: 140) used smallest space analysis (SSA) to analyse the data, with the nine variables as focus. He found that the group of variables associated with note content were locus of control, reason/explanation, positive affect, left instructions and total words, while a second group of variables was more indicative of the structure of the note: sentence length, nouns, verbs and cognitive process verbs. Gregory (1999: 142) then attempted a partial order scalogram analysis (POSA) to discriminate between the authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Gregory (1999: 142) explains the difference between SSA and POSA as follows:

For POSA to work effectively a number of preliminary criteria needed to be met. In contrast to SSA which is based upon correlations, and the similarity between variables, POSA utilises profiles and is based upon differences in these profiles across subjects (a profile being simply a sequence of values attained by each note from variable 1 to variable n, where n is the last variable in the series). It is therefore essential to maintain a common order in the variables, ensuring that they all vary in the same direction as well as minimising the total number of possible profiles which may be achieved within the data set.

Gregory (1999: 142) used the distinct groups of variables identified by the SSA as comparisons in the POSA. The analysis indicated that authentic suicide notes contained an external locus of control and either specific or no reasons/explanations for the decision. These notes were also longer with an increased positive emotional content that included instructions. The fabricated suicide notes generally included an internal locus of control and general reasons/explanations for the action. These notes were shorter with little expression of positive affect and no instructions for the survivors (Gregory, 1999: 143–144). However, Gregory (1999: 145–147) found that when the four variables that are indicative of the structure of the notes are run through a POSA, the analysis is not able to discriminate accurately between the notes. Thus, only the five variables associated with the note content are effective discriminators of authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

Gregory (1999: 153) warns that when discriminating between suicide notes, the model of analysis used in his study should not be extended to real-life scenarios without considering the state of mind of the note writer. According to Gregory and as discussed in this chapter, a person who wants to

make a murder appear as a suicide (i.e. a fake suicide note writer) is likely to give a fabricated suicide note much thought. As mentioned earlier, Gregory (1999: 153) speculates that “the cognitive energy of an individual plotting to kill would be increased and therefore closer to that of a suicidal individual, than a normal, well balanced and non-depressed individual”. It is also correctly emphasised that the significance of a suicide note is likely to be very small in comparison with alternative sources of information and evidence in an investigation.

Gregory’s study (1999) is of importance since it corresponds to some perspectives in the present study. He is rightfully critical of suicide note analyses and emphasises the fact that the method he used should not be applied in real-life situations without considering the state of mind of the suicide note writer. This again supports the view of an interdisciplinary approach to suicide note analyses and emphasises how difficult the analyses of suicide notes can be.

Another important point by Gregory is the fact that the significance of a suicide note at a crime scene is very small. Researchers might be drawn to the analysis of suicide notes for many reasons, but the fact is that for forensic linguistic purposes, analysing a suicide note (especially a possibly fabricated one) is a very rare occurrence and should be acknowledged as such. Klonsky, May and Saffer (2016: 308) note that suicide accounts for 1.4% of all deaths worldwide and that around 800 000 people die by suicide every year. However, if one calculates a percentage of people who die by suicide based on the estimated 7.7 billion people in the world in 2018, then 800 000 people is roughly 0.01% of people per year. This is not to say that suicide is not a serious behaviour – 800 000 people per year certainly reflects many lives lost to a single cause. Having said that, not all those individuals will leave a suicide note behind. Paraschakis, Michopoulos, Douzenis, Christodoulou, Koutsaftis and Lykouras (2012: 344) estimate that between 3 and 42% of all suicide victims leave a note. This number varies greatly since no consensus has been reached on the average number of people who leave suicide notes (for example, see the estimations by Leenaars (1988) and Barr et al (2007) in Chapter 1). If one considers both ends of this scale and uses the estimate of 800 000 deaths by suicide proposed by Klonsky et al (2016), 3% amounts to a possible 2400 suicide notes and 42% amounts to a possible 336 000 suicide notes. Having access to even the estimated 2400 suicide notes would certainly make a huge difference to suicide note studies, but the fact is that not all these notes will be found, kept or made available for research. This is due to issues such as families often wanting to keep the suicide notes, the fact that some suicide

notes are not written in a dialect that the police or researcher can understand, or, in some cases, the geographical distance between researchers and police stations/magistrates offices which makes the collection of suicide notes difficult. Furthermore, ethical considerations or restrictions also hinder the collection of such data. Thus, Gregory's study (1999) certainly revealed some important aspects concerning suicide analyses and advocated for a more linguistically oriented approach to these analyses.

Shapero (2011) is another researcher who adopted a linguistic approach to suicide note analyses. Shapero (2011: 48) mentions that linguistic studies of suicide notes are few in number and usually decades old (Osgood and Walker, 1959; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Gregory, 1999) and nearly all of them revolve around the set of suicide notes collected by Shneidman and Farberow (1957).

Shapero used both authentic suicide notes (a corpus of personally gathered suicide notes as well as the genuine notes in the Shneidman and Farberow corpus) and fabricated suicide notes (the Shneidman and Farberow corpus) and non-suicide related texts (a sub corpus of the British National Corpus) to compare "the topics used in real and fabricated suicide notes". However, Shapero (2011: 2) admits that because of certain limitations concerning suicide notes, the focus of the research shifted to become "more interested in defining the typical suicide note and less concerned with establishing the borderline between the fake and the real". This statement again supports various arguments made in the present study that distinguishing between authentic and fabricated suicide notes is not a feasible aim.

Shapero (2011) gives a detailed account of each of the most important linguistic studies performed on suicide notes, emphasising their successes and their flaws, and then goes on to sum up previous linguistic studies of suicide notes as follows (Shapero, 2011: 71):

Where the existing literature does report the use of grammatical analysis, it tends to use a conventional model of grammar that is unsophisticated and devoid of a sound accompanying theory: other models could be considered. It is also possible that the various classifications of words might be improved upon.

Using a theory such as the one proposed in the current study could therefore be beneficial, since it approaches the linguistic study and analysis of suicide notes from an alternative perspective.

Shapero (2011: 156–159) comes to the conclusion that, in general, there seems to be certain features that are more likely to occur in an authentic suicide note than in a fabricated note. Some of the features of the authentic suicide notes include the presence of postscripts, dates and addressees, expressions of “love”, “fault” and “goodbye”. From Shapero’s study it also appears that “oddness” (odd expressions or word use) is more common in fabricated notes. Further, by examining the lexis of suicide notes, Shapero (2011: 210–211) found that they would appear to be closer to spoken texts than written texts.

Ioannou and Debowska (2014) examined authentic and fabricated suicide notes focusing on what they call “the measures of content” to differentiate between the two. They also used the 33 authentic and fabricated notes from the Shneidman corpus for their analysis. Ioannou and Debowska (2014: 09) performed a content analysis on both sets of notes and then analysed the data using SSA. According to Ioannou and Debowska (2014: 10), this type of analysis “allows a test of hypotheses concerning the co-occurrence of every variable with every other variable”. The SSA represents occurrences of variables as distances in a geometrical space and computes association coefficients between all variables (Ioannou and Debowska, 2014: 10). These researchers found that the core of all suicide notes is constructed from three variables: expressions of love, positive construction of partner and apologies. They thus conclude that the themes in authentic suicide notes are the following: planned escape, negative affect and self-mitigation, positive affect and failed relationship and lack of self-acceptance. The themes in the fabricated suicide notes were identified as “escape”, “positive affect and self-blame” and “purposeless life” (Ioannou and Debowska, 2014: 02).

Once again, references to concepts in appraisal theory are made (“positive affect” and “negative affect”) but appraisal theory is not discussed nor mentioned as a theory that underlies the analysis.

Grundlingh (2018) also attempted to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes by identifying possible legitimacy markers in authentic suicide notes and is the first to use appraisal theory in the same way it is used in the present study. Grundlingh (2018) made use of some of the data (99 notes in total) in the present study, but hypothesised that legitimacy markers of authentic suicide notes can be identified. Furthermore, Grundlingh (2018) used measures of association (Hedges’ *g*) to determine whether certain appraisal categories are used more often in authentic or fabricated suicide notes. Grundlingh (2018: 7) found that the small corpora made generating

reliable results difficult and notes that the results generated are not sufficient to draw definitive conclusions. Nonetheless, she did find that “trust”, “negative appreciation” and “propriety” are possible legitimacy markers of authentic suicide notes and can be used to distinguish authentic and fabricated suicide notes (Grundlingh, 2018: 9). Although it appears that the study makes a contribution to linguistic analysis by suggesting that other methods for analysing suicide notes are possible, the study is not able to definitively prove that there are distinctive differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

The discussion in this section illuminates various aspects of suicide note analyses that need to be addressed. Firstly, studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes have relied heavily on the corpora produced by Shneidman and Farberow (1957). This is worrying, since suicides, suicidal intent and attempted suicides are linked to various factors such as social environments and sociodemographic composition (Crosby, Han, Ortega, Parks and Gfroerer, 2011), religion (Stack and Kposowa, 2011), physical illness (Stenager and Stenager, 2000) and even body weight (Gunnell and Thomas, 2011). Thus, the thoughts and feelings or reasons for suicide expressed in corpora from 1957 are unlikely to be the sum of all suicidal thoughts up to the present. I therefore suggest that new corpora of suicide notes should be constantly collected in order to verify suicidal ideation over a period of time.

Secondly, as mentioned before, every study uses different methods and reports different results. This strengthens arguments that methods should be tested and retested with various corpora in order to determine their accuracy (Drost, 2011). However, this might be unrealistic in terms of suicide note analyses. As mentioned in Chapter 1, suicide notes are sensitive texts and their distribution is often guided by ethical guidelines. Therefore, sharing suicide note corpora between researchers is not necessarily an achievable goal. This means that studies will continue to use different corpora and achieve different results. However, using the same corpora and method might not equate to the same results. Note that both Gregory (1999) and Ioannou and Debowska (2014) make use of the same method, SSA, but different variables. This leads to different results in these two studies, emphasising the need to replicate studies exactly in order to determine the accuracy of a method.

Testing the methods from previous studies on the corpora in the present study is not attempted for two reasons. Firstly, the present study hopes to indicate that different methods and corpora will

continuously lead to new results and therefore a new theory and method for analysis is proposed here. Secondly, the present study hopes to indicate that small corpora, and existing corpora that have been used in previous studies, are not necessarily useful in establishing the distinct linguistic characteristics of a particular suicide note corpus or useful in distinguishing between suicide note corpora. Thirdly, and linked to the statements above, the results of these previous studies suggest that distinguishing between suicide notes is a very complex task and one that is probably not possible with any certainty. The present study is an attempt to prove this.

The table below provides a brief summary of the studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

Table 2.1: A summary of previous studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes

Researcher(s)	Date of study	Corpora used	Main perspective	Method
Shneidman and Farberow (S&F corpus)	1957	33 authentic suicide notes + 33 fabricated suicide notes	Psychological	Discomfort-relief quotient (DRQ)
Osgood and Walker	1959	100 authentic suicide notes + 33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus + 69 ordinary letters	Psycholinguistic	Categorised each word in letters as either <i>grammatical</i> (adjectives, conjunctions, verbs etc.) or <i>psychological</i> (based on descriptive/expressive functions)
Arbeit and Blatt	1973	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus	Psycholinguistic	Used human judges to rate suicide notes based on 35 factors derived from features identified in other studies, suicide

				literature, and the researchers' intuition.
Edelman and Renshaw	1982	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus	Discourse analytic	Syntactic Language Computer Analysis
Leenaars	1988	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus	Psychological	Protocol sentences
Black	1993	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus + 77 authentic suicide notes from own corpus + 77 fabricated suicide notes from own corpus	Psycholinguistic	Content analysis through <i>thought units</i>
Gregory	1999	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus	Linguistic	Multivariate approach and smallest space analysis (SSA)

Shapero	2011	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus + 286 authentic suicide notes from own corpus	Linguistic	Corpus analysis and content analysis
Ioannou and Debowska	2014	33 authentic suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus	Linguistic	SSA
Grundlingh	2018	33 authentic suicide notes from the Leenaars corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from S&F corpus + 33 fabricated suicide notes from the Black corpus	Forensic linguistic	Effect sizes (Hedges' <i>g</i>)

The discussion concerning previous studies that considered the differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes illustrates that questions surrounding the ability to distinguish between the two types of corpus have been asked in the past. Furthermore, these studies also support earlier arguments that the results obtained in terms of possible characteristics concerning the language use in authentic and fabricated suicide notes will be study specific, since each study makes use of different data and/or different methods. This is explored later in this thesis.

2.2.4 Linguistics and suicide note analyses: appraisal theory and the possibilities

The last section of this literature review is dedicated to a brief overview of arguments that support the use of appraisal theory in the present study. A detailed discussion of appraisal theory follows in Chapter 3.

From the discussions in the chapter thus far, four things have become apparent. Firstly, suicide notes should always be considered from a psychological perspective, even if a linguistic analysis is attempted. Secondly, perspectives from psycholinguistics offer possible new insights into suicide note production and theorising about suicide notes. Thirdly, deception detection is central to the concept of suicide note analysis, and fourthly, although previous studies have attempted suicide note analyses from both psycholinguistic and linguistic perspectives, none was based on appraisal theory.

If a distinction between the different classifications of suicide notes were possible, then appraisal theory could be a suitable theory for analysis based on the following:

1. As is evident from the discussion in section 2.2.3, some previous studies that analyse suicide notes have already made references to concepts found in appraisal theory, although the theory was not used nor discussed in the research.
2. Appraisal theory is often used to analyse written texts thought to express a particular stance, or attitudes and emotions (Mei and Allison, 2003; McKinley, 2018; Nuraisiah, Nababan and Santosa, 2018). Furthermore, appraisals can also be considered from a psychological perspective. Appraisals are often viewed as *psychological aspects* of situations that could distinguish one emotion from another, rather than *triggers* that elicit emotions (Clore and Ortony, 2013). Thus, both linguistic and psychological perspectives on appraisal seem appropriate in terms of a linguistic analysis of suicide notes. In fact, it is the psychological concept of appraisal in suicide studies that led to the attempt of a linguistic appraisal analysis of suicide notes in the present study.

In a 2008 study by Johnson, Gooding and Tarrier, a theoretical model of suicide referred to as the Cry of Pain model (Williams, 1997; Williams, Crane, Barnhofer and Duggan, 2005) was critically examined with the aim to determine the robustness of the model in terms of assessing suicide risk in schizophrenic patients (Johnson et al, 2008: 56). Although the Cry of Pain model has many

strengths, Johnson et al (2008) propose modifications to the model. The modifications suggested by Johnson et al (2008: 64) include an appraisal system. Like the present study, Johnson et al (2008: 66) view appraisals as “valuation judgements that involve attention, interpretation, and inference”, and note that beliefs and attitudes are incorporated into the appraisal system. They mention that appraisal is important from a psychological perspective since it influences the degree to which events and experiences are viewed as either stressful, challenging, or an opportunity (Johnson et al, 2008: 66). Thus, in terms of the Johnson et al study (2008), appraisal could determine how an individual with schizophrenia copes with the illness and what their risk for death by suicide might be. Johnson et al (2008: 66) state that three types of appraisal are considered important:

... appraisal of the current situation, appraisal of historical factors, and appraisal of the future. Impacting on each of these levels is appraisal of personal attributes (personal agency) and the agency of others (e.g. possible rescue and allocation or availability of social resources). The appraisal process can operate at both an explicit (i.e. effortful and aware) and an implicit (automatic and without awareness) level.

In terms of the current situation, people with schizophrenia might perceive their treatment or condition as negative and traumatic and they might also associate these negative feelings with past events. In terms of future events, patients might not see hope for recovery (Johnson et al, 2008: 67–68). It is also noted that patients might have a very negative self-perception and negative expectations of interactions with others as well as a lack of emotional resilience. All these negative appraisals increase the patient’s risk of dying by suicide (Johnson et al, 2008: 68).

Based on these observations by Johnson et al (2008), one could argue that if appraisals are present on both conscious and subconscious levels before a person dies by suicide, appraisals might also be identifiable in a product of a suicide, namely a suicide note. And, if certain appraisals are common for people with possible suicidal intent, the appraisals for those with less suicidal intent (fabricated suicide note writers) might be different. An important note concerning these statements is the following: just because authentic and fabricated suicide notes might include different frequencies of various appraisal categories, it does not mean that the suicide notes can be distinguished from each other. Thus, the hypothesis remains the same and argues that there are no distinctive linguistic characteristics that could be used to distinguish between authentic, fabricated and parasuicide notes. However, the study by Johnson et al (2008) does ignite speculations that a linguistic appraisal theory might be useful for identifying appraisal categories in different suicide

notes. The argument behind this is the fact that in both appraisal theories (linguistic and psychological) the researcher has various categories to his/her disposal that could indicate the evaluation of attitudes of the writer or patient.

A further discussion of these arguments and appraisal theory is included in the next chapter.

2.3 Conclusions

This chapter provided some important arguments for an alternative perspective on suicide note analysis and emphasised the need for an interdisciplinary approach to suicide note research. I will consider each of these separately.

Firstly, research in psychology provides us with insights concerning the presence of certain emotions in suicide notes. Even though the presence of these emotions cannot necessarily assist in distinguishing between suicide notes from the perspective of a linguistic analysis, it does offer the opportunity to identify the emotions expressed within the comparison of two or more specific suicide note corpora. The psycholinguistic concepts of *idiolect* and *writing* offer support for the present hypothesis that one cannot identify distinct linguistic characteristics in suicide note corpora that could be used to distinguish between authentic, fabricated and parasuicide notes. The presence of an idiolect suggests that the linguistic characteristics of each suicide note will be unique to that writer and that group-specific linguistic features are unlikely to exist. Furthermore, since written texts are polished products subject to monitoring and possible editing, a suicide note might not reflect the spontaneous emotions and thoughts of the suicide note writer. Thus, it appears that in terms of suicide note analysis the texts are better suited for authorship identification in a forensic linguistic investigation.

Secondly, it is clear that suicide notes should always be considered from the perspective of deception detection since all suicide notes are possibly deceptive texts. Having said this, the fact that all suicide notes are possibly deceptive means that comparing authentic, fabricated and parasuicide notes in order to determine deception would be impossible. Furthermore, the fact that experimentally produced suicide notes do not include true deception further complicates any comparisons between such corpora.

Thirdly, previous studies comparing and analysing suicide notes have not made use of appraisal theory, even though some refer to concepts or categories that are found in appraisal theory. This supports the argument that an alternative perspective on suicide note comparisons and analyses is necessary. As mentioned above, the aim of the present study is not to indicate that suicide notes can be distinguished based on appraisal categories, but to show the opposite – that even appraisal categories, which form part of probably one of the most meaningful theories to approach the analysis of suicide notes with, are not able to successfully distinguish between suicide notes since no such distinction is possible. This last argument is supported by, among other things, the fact that researchers such as Osgood and Walker (1959), Black (1993), Gregory (1999) and Shapero (2011) also had doubts about the effectiveness and accuracy of distinguishing between authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

Chapter 3 includes an in-depth discussion of appraisal and appraisal theory and its relevance in the present study.

Chapter 3

Appraisal and appraisal theory

3.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the suitability of linguistic appraisal theory as a theory of analysis in the present study. Arguments for the inclusion of linguistic appraisal theory and a discussion of its pitfalls are included. Furthermore, the concept of *appraisal* is critically examined from both a psychological and linguistic perspective. These discussions assist in understanding why appraisal theory is well suited for an interdisciplinary study such as the one attempted here but also emphasise the difficulties with appraisal theory and subsequent analyses.

The reason for considering appraisal theory directly relates to the testing of the hypothesis of the present study, namely, that there are no linguistic characteristics that can be used to distinguish between authentic, fabricated and parasuicide notes. The argument is that if the hypothesis of the present study is *incorrect*, appraisal theory categories would be able to indicate distinct differences between authentic, fabricated and parasuicide notes. Note that this chapter is only concerned with a discussion of appraisal theory as a suitable linguistic theory, while Chapter 4 considers the use of appraisal categories in the method proposed for the present study.

3.2 Appraisal: the psychology

Once again, the perspectives in this chapter are rooted in different, yet interrelated, disciplines. The focus will be on linguistic appraisal theory but a discussion on the general psychological and cognitive aspects of appraisal precedes it. The reason for this is to ensure that the cognitive aspects of appraisal are taken into account since some of them are very much relevant to linguistic appraisal theory, as will become apparent through the discussion below.

Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer and Frijda (2013: 119) state that the theoretical approach referred to as *appraisal theory* is a systematisation of ancient ideas about emotion as proposed by Sartre (1939), Aristotle (1954), Hume (1969) and Spinoza (1989), and that a number of variants of appraisal theory have been proposed (mostly focused on emotions and cognition) together with concrete predictions and empirical testing (Moors et al, 2013: 119). The basic premise of all appraisal

theories is that “emotions are adaptive responses, which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that are significant for the organism’s well-being” (Moors et al, 2013: 119). In an earlier discussion by Bippus and Young (2012), they note that appraisal theory “is based on the assumption that emotions serve an adaptive function, and that appraisals play a critical role in the generation and differentiation of emotions” (Bippus and Young, 2012: 177). Both these statements emphasise not only the adaptive function of emotions, but clearly propose that the concepts of *appraisal* and *emotions* are connected.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is important to note that the concept of *appraisal* has links to research in both psychology and linguistics. The psychological aspects of appraisal are considered first before the linguistic aspects of appraisal are discussed. A central argument of the present chapter, and one that has been alluded to in Chapter 2, is the fact that no communication (verbal, written or nonverbal) can take place separately from cognition. Thus, to a great extent our cognition allows us to speak, write and express evaluations of ourselves, others or objects (Sypher and Higgins, 1988; O’Looney, Glynn, Britton and Mattocks, 1989; Reitter and Lebiere, 2011; Forgas, 2014). In fact, Sypher and Higgins (1988: 2) claim that the use of mental shortcuts or heuristics allows us to make quicker judgements and that our cognitive processing can be overridden or interrupted by affect, meaning that affect might initiate cognitive activity. Forgas (2014) also agrees with arguments supporting links between cognition, communication and appraisal, stating that interpersonal communication is imbued with affect and that every social encounter influences our affective state. This, in turn, affects how we feel, which plays an important role in how we communicate and use language (Forgas, 2014: 63). These statements support the idea that linguistic appraisal theory cannot be considered without discussing appraisal theories rooted in psychology or studies that focus on the cognition behind emotions.

Conway and Bekerian (1987: 145) note that the idea of emotions being experienced within the context of social situations had received little attention before their study. They argue that although one might expect someone to be happy at a wedding and sad at a funeral, it does not mean that in any particular situation a person will actually experience an anticipated emotion. However, if some emotional experiences can be predicted through situational knowledge, such knowledge could be an important component of emotional experiences (Conway and Bekerian, 1987: 145). Similarly, Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988: 1) argue that emotions are complex and involve feelings,

experiences, physiology, behaviour, cognition and conceptualisations, and they also argue for a connection between emotions and the situations in which they occur. Ortony et al (1988: 1) state that “emotions arise as a result of the way in which the situations that initiate them are construed by the experiencer”. Thus, it seems that emotions not only have many facets, but the context in which they occur is also an important aspect to consider when trying to distinguish or interpret them. In terms of the present study, it is definitely appropriate to consider the context in which the communication in the suicide notes occurred when trying to identify emotions or evaluations. In the case of authentic and parasuicide notes one might expect to find more words referring to sadness, depression, guilt or hopelessness, since these are all considered frequently experienced emotions or mental states in those who commit or attempt to commit suicide (Rihmer, 2011; Silverman, 2011). However, Osgood and Walker (1959: 58, 66) note that even in fabricated suicide notes one could expect to find the “typical” content of suicide notes such as distress-expression and a decrease in evaluative assertions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Ho et al (1998: 467) argue that asking someone to imagine writing a suicide note may increase their suicidal ideation and consequently they may be able to adopt the state of the suicidal person in some respects (Osgood and Walker, 1959: 66). Therefore, even though the context of the suicide notes is taken into account it might still not be easy to characterise or identify distinct emotions that separate these corpora.

In their study, Ortony et al (1988: 1–2) propose a specific way to characterise emotions. They state that their characterisations are “intentionally cast in terms that are as independent of emotion words as possible” (Ortony et al, 1988: 1) and argue that their decision is based on the fact that “the structure of the emotion lexicon is not isomorphic with the structure of emotions themselves” (Ortony et al, 1988: 1–2). This means that the two structures (of emotion words and emotions themselves) are not similar. Furthermore, they state that any theory about emotions has to be a theory about the kinds of things that emotion words refer to and not about the words themselves (Ortony et al, 1988: 2). The theory and organisation of emotion types proposed by Ortony et al (1988) neglect the physiological, behavioural and expressive components of emotion, but they argue that this is because their theory asserts that emotions arise as a result of certain kinds of cognitions and that the physiological, behavioural and expressive aspects of emotions presuppose this first, cognitive step. Thus, Ortony et al (1988: 2) view cognition as the birthplace of emotions. This is in contrast to Sypher and Higgins’s (1988: 2) view that affect initiates cognition, but

nonetheless advocates for a strong link between cognition and emotion – irrelevant of whether cognition initiates emotions or the other way round. However, I support the arguments by Ortony et al (1988) that cognition births emotion, based on various theories which confirm this (Frijda, 1986; Russel, 2003; Frijda, 2007; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 2014). Oatley and Johnson-Laird (2014: 134–135) note that there are four separate theories that advocate for a cognitive start to emotions: the action-readiness theory of emotions (Frijda, 1986; 2007), the componential theory (Ortony et al, 1988), the core-affect theory of emotions (Russel, 2003) and the communicative theory of emotions (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987; 2011). All four of these theories are representative of cognitive approaches to emotions and, more importantly, they all postulate that emotions are caused by appraising events in relation to concerns (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 2014: 136–137). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence for the argument that cognition creates emotion.


Ortony et al (1988: 3) note that the importance of cognition in producing emotions and the impact of the situation in which the emotion is experienced are both especially evident in literature. Writers of literature are able to produce in readers an awareness of a character's affective states by characterising and describing a situation whose construal is assumed to give rise to these affective states. This means that a writer does not always need to state what emotions a character is experiencing, since the described situation contains the “eliciting conditions for a particular emotion” and therefore the experience of that emotion can be inferred (Ortony et al, 1988: 3). For the present study, these statements should also be taken into account. Although a suicide note differs from a novel in terms of aspects such as genre and structure, I argue for some similarities based on the explanations by Ortony et al (1988). Firstly, in a suicide note the author also strives to provide the reader with an awareness of his or her affective states by describing the situation or reason for the suicide. Secondly, the author of a suicide note similarly does not have to state emotions explicitly since a description of the situation could lead to the emotions or the experience of the emotions being inferred by the reader. These arguments once again support the idea that *thought units* rather than individual words should be analysed in the present study, since thought units should include the necessary context in order to infer an emotion. It should be noted that in the present study a thought unit is not limited to a single thought as described by Black (1993), but could include multiple thoughts. The discussion of the methodology in Chapter 4 reflects this.

Ortony et al (1988: 6) mention that emotion has been studied from the perspectives of both arousal and appraisal (Arnold, 1960; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Mandler, 1975), but claim that these studies have not considered how appraisal and arousal interact to produce emotion and have primarily focused on emotion words (Ortony et al, 1988: 6). In the present study, the linguistic appraisal theory employed takes more than just the words into account. As will become apparent in section 3.3, while appraisal theory considers emotion words important indicators of appraisals, the theory also considers the mental or cognitive states in an utterance that includes an emotion word before an appraisal is labelled.

What makes Ortony et al's (1988) theory of emotions particularly relevant to the present study is not only the fact that they approach emotions from a cognitive and situational perspective, but also that they propose a global structure of emotions that correlates with what they call an "appraisal structure" consisting of goals, standards and attitudes that constitute the criteria for evaluating events, the actions of agents, and objects respectively (Ortony et al, 1988: 13, 34).

Figure 3.1 below is a visual representation of Ortony et al's (1988) global structure of emotion types (also referred to as the OCC model). Ortony et al (1988: 18) argue that emotions are valenced reactions and that a particular reaction is always a reaction to one of the following: consequences of events, actions of agents or an interest in aspects or properties of objects.

Figure 3.1: The global structure of emotion types copied from Hopfensitz (2006), based on the illustration by Ortony et al (1988: 19)



Ortony et al (1988: 19) state that the three main branches correspond to the three ways of reacting to the world. They argue that these reactions (pleased, displeased, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking etc.) are experienced as emotions depending on how intense they are in terms of desirability, praiseworthiness and appeal (Ortony et al, 1988: 20, 34).

At this stage, it is appropriate to point out some similarities between the structure of emotion types and the appraisal structure proposed by Ortony et al (1988) and the appraisal theory used in the present study. Firstly, the structure of emotion types illustrated in Figure 3.1 suggests that there

are three main branches of emotion, that these emotions may be positive or negative and that the reaction can be focused on the “self” or on “others”. In terms of the linguistic appraisal theory included in the present study, “attitude” is a subsystem of evaluative meanings divided into “affect”, “judgement” and “appreciation” (Martin and White, 2005; White, 2015). A closer inspection of these three subcategories reveals that *affect* correlates with the reaction to the consequences of events, *judgement* correlates with the reaction to the actions of agents, and *appreciation* correlates with the reaction to aspects of objects. By “correlates”, I mean that expressing an attitude about something in terms of affect, passing a judgement on someone and evaluating objects in linguistic appraisal correspond to the reactions that Ortony et al (1988: 19) argue are responsible for emotions. Secondly, the fact that reactions, and therefore emotions, can be either positive or negative is also noted in linguistic appraisal theory (Martin and Rose, 2003). Thirdly, the focus on the “self” versus a focus on “others” suggested by Ortony et al (1988: 19) has particular relevance in the present study. In Chapter 4, a detailed explanation follows concerning the categories used in the present study. However, it is worth mentioning that based on the genre of texts (suicide notes), a distinction is made between appraisals directed at the author themselves (corresponding to the idea of “self”) and appraisals directed at other people (corresponding to the idea of “other”). Lastly, Ortony et al (1988: 20) also note that reactions can be more intense or less intense, an argument supported by the subdivision of “graduation” in linguistic appraisal.

Clore and Ortony (2013: 338) note that the OCC model is an appraisal account that focuses on structure and is therefore a descriptive model, not a process model. They argue that the OCC model “specifies the features of the prototypical situations represented by each kind of emotion, but says nothing about how appraisals are made” (Clore and Ortony, 2013: 338). In terms of linguistic appraisal, the theory is described as a “framework” that allows for analyses of the meanings by which texts convey positive or negative evaluations, strengthens or weakens attitudinal utterances or by which speakers or writers “dialogistically engage with prior speakers or with potential respondents to the current proposition” (White, 2015: 1). Therefore, linguistic appraisal is also considered a descriptive model or, as Oteíza (2017) states, a “comprehensive theoretical and descriptive systematisation of the linguistic resources that can be used to construe the value of social experience” (Oteíza, 2017: 458).

It should again be made explicitly clear that cognitive appraisal and linguistic appraisal are two separate theories, however the similarities in terms of a focus on emotion, evaluation and cognition cannot be ignored. This is not to say that linguistic appraisal theory is necessarily a direct result of research concerning cognitive appraisal theories, but it does suggest some influences and emphasises that a linguistic appraisal theory cannot be fully understood without references to cognitive appraisal.

3.3 Appraisal: the linguistics

This section discusses linguistic appraisal theory from a systemic functional linguistic (SFL) perspective before focusing on linguistic appraisal in more detail and considering why the theory is appropriate in the present study. A separate subsection considers the pitfalls of linguistic appraisal theory and analyses based on the theory. Continuing the interdisciplinary focus of the present study, this section will consider connections between the linguistic and the psychological aspects of both SFL and linguistic appraisal theory. Some connections have already been briefly discussed in section 3.2, but these connections become especially relevant in the present section.

A discussion of a timeline illustrating the development of appraisal research and theories supports the reasoning proposed in this chapter. Section 3.2 considered the possible cognitive influences on linguistic appraisal, but it is important to note that some concepts in linguistic appraisal developed long before cognitive appraisal theories and therefore it appears that linguistic appraisal theory, which is the focus here, is influenced by both specific linguistic theories and general cognitive appraisal theories. According to Scherer (1999: 637), two individuals are credited with the development of the first cognitive appraisal theories, Magda Arnold (1960) and Richard Lazarus (1966; 1984; 1991). Arnold was apparently the first to use the term “appraisal” to explain the elicitation of differentiated emotions, while Lazarus argued that both stress and emotion are elicited by a two-stage process of appraisal he termed “primary appraisal” and “secondary appraisal” (Scherer, 1999: 637). Lazarus also acknowledged the dynamic nature of appraisal arguing that reappraisals of objects or events are possible based on new information or re-evaluation (Scherer, 1999: 637). Thus, the term *appraisal* and its general definition reflecting the concepts of *evaluation* and *emotions* already existed in the 1960s. However, other concepts related to linguistic appraisal theory can be linked to the Prague School of Linguistics founded in the 1920s (Young, 2013: 625). There are four central tenets of this school that provide the roots for

SFL (early and current) and consequently also for appraisal theory. These four tenets are: (1) The view that language is a network since aspects and features of language do not exist in isolation but are related to each other. (2) The view that language is a system composed of subsystems consisting of levels or strata. (3) The emphasis on the ability of language to reveal different meanings and purposes of language, illustrating its functional nature. (4) The view that the form or structure of a language is rooted in the meanings that people aim to convey when either speaking with each other or writing to each other (Young, 2013: 625). These central principles combined with the work of M. A. K Halliday (1994) (discussed in section 3.3.1) may be considered partly responsible for the emergence of linguistic appraisal theory (White, 2015: 1). Since linguistic appraisal theory emerged during the 1990s and 2000s (White, 2015: 1), an argument that the theory is influenced by cognitive perspectives from the 1960s and 1990s, as well as linguistic perspectives from the 1920s and 1990s, seems plausible.

To some it might appear that the researcher is advocating for a mainly psychological view of linguistic appraisal or SFL, and possibly confusing concepts in SFL with concepts in generative grammar. This is not true. Firstly, it has been made clear that the present study is based on linguistics. However, it would be irresponsible to ignore the psychological influences on language, especially in a study that focuses on an analysis of suicide notes – a genre of texts with an obvious psychological connection. Secondly, a clear distinction between SFL and generative grammar (Chomsky, 1980) is noted. Whereas generative grammar raises questions about the abstract workings of the mind of an individual, SFL raises questions about how people carry out their lives in interaction with each other in various social settings (Young, 2013: 626). Thus, SFL leads to social rather than psychological explanations of language. Thirdly, a clear distinction has been made between cognitive appraisal theories and linguistic appraisal theory, although similarities in terms of the structural aspects of the frameworks and in terms of concepts have been noted. At first it might appear that SFL is more easily distanced from psychology than appraisal theory, based on the fact that SFL has its roots firmly in linguistic theories. However, this is not necessarily the case.

A strong supporter of the interdisciplinary discussion on linguistic theories is Butler (2003). Butler argues that in order to comprehend language, a highly complex and multifaceted phenomenon, we need to look beyond individual models such as SFL, cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics,

and engage in dialogue which will “help us to achieve a better understanding and integration of many facets of human linguistic ability” (Butler, 2003: 186). However, in Halliday’s (1978) book *Language as social semiotic: the social interpretation of language and meaning*, Halliday (1978: 38–39) distances himself from psychological modes of language explanation, stating that he is not interested in the boundaries between disciplines and that he views linguistics as a branch of sociology. Therefore, “language is a part of the social system, and there is no need to interpose a psychological level of interpretation” (Halliday, 1978: 39). Butler (2003: 186) argues that these statements have led to the anti-psychological stance of many SFL linguists. Nonetheless, Butler notes that in recent years Halliday and his colleagues have shown more interest in relating the SFL view of language to brain functioning (Butler, 2003: 186). However, Butler (2003: 186) states that researchers such as Halliday and Matthiessen (1999) still reject the models put forward by classical cognitive science, opting for “an approach which prioritises the sociosemiotic nature of language and adopts a phenomenological view of cognition”. Butler (2003: 189) summarises Halliday and Matthiessen’s approach as follows:

Halliday & Matthiessen’s angle on cognitive science is, then, to interpret the language of cognitive science texts as indicating the way in which cognitive scientists see their own discipline, and to imply that analysis in terms of reifications such as ‘information’, ‘representation’, and indeed ‘mind’ and ‘cognition’, is inferior to the folk model because it effaces the Sensors (the human beings doing the thinking, knowing, understanding, caring, and the like) and so is “remote from our everyday experience with sensing” (Butler, 2003: 189).

Thus, Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 602) view language in terms of embodiment and therefore as something that is able to create meaning because it is related to our material being (referring to ourselves and our environment) in three distinct ways. Firstly, the processes of language take place in physiological, neural and physical space and time. Secondly, language is a theory about the material world, and thirdly, language is a metaphor for the material world (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999: 602).

In contrast to Halliday and Matthiessen, Fawcett (1980; 2008) specifically advocates for a cognitive model of SFL, and explicitly states that his model is a model of *interactive* minds and is cognitive-interactive in nature (Fawcett, 1980: 6). Butler (2003: 197) notes that Fawcett’s conceptualisation of what is known as the “Cardiff model” is based on an early stage development within the framework of natural language processing (NLP), where the aim was to construct a

computer-based system for the production and understanding of texts. This project led to a model of SFL that discards the dichotomy between “cognitive” and the “interactive”, as well as between the “social” and the “cultural” (Butler, 2003: 197). Furthermore, Butler (2003: 203) refers to research at the University of Leuven and Ghent University where linguistic categories are described in terms of form-function relations, and explicit attempts are made to integrate functional and cognitive perspectives using corpus data and by adopting a usage-based orientation.

Similarly, Bateman (2017: 21) notes that “increasingly robust cognitive models of the information that is constructed and maintained during discourse comprehension have been developed and supported experimentally”. Bateman (2017: 21) also states that “it is striking that many of the constructs argued for in psycholinguistics correspond to certain configurations posited to be at work during the temporal dimension of a text’s unfolding” (referred to as *logogenesis* in SFL).

Thus, connecting principles and concepts in SFL with cognitive-based theories found in other linguistic fields such as cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics is not a stretch of the imagination. However, in the present study the discussion of how concepts in linguistic appraisal correspond to certain concepts in cognitive appraisal theories is of greater concern. Therefore, SFL will be discussed as a purely linguistic theory and as one of the main building blocks for linguistic appraisal theory.

3.3.1 Systemic functional linguistics

Bartlett and O’Grady (2017: 1) state that SFL is unique amongst linguistic theories since it attempts to account for the structural, social and developmental features of language within a single, and complex, framework. As mentioned above, Young (2013: 625) notes that the roots of SFL can be traced back to the principles of the Prague School of Linguistics. These principles emphasised concepts central to SFL, such as the idea that no element in any language can be studied in isolation but that each element must be examined in relation to all others coexisting with it. This point is reiterated by viewing language as a system of interrelated linguistic values and not the sum of minute, unconnected phenomena. Furthermore, the different levels or strata of language are emphasised by focusing on the functional nature of languages (Young, 2013: 626). It is based on these principles that Halliday (1985; 1994) introduced the concept “systemic functional linguistics”, a new approach to the study of grammar. SFL differs from the studies of grammar

that precede it, since it contradicts the traditional view of language as a set of rules for specifying grammatical structures (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008; also see the discussion on universal grammar in Chomsky, 1972). Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 14) emphasise that SFL offers a perspective through which language is understood as “a resource for making meanings and hence grammar is a resource for creating meaning by means of wording”.

In their 1999 book *Construing experience through meaning: a language-based approach to cognition*, Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 1) emphasise that their research in the book is specifically concerned with how human beings construe experience and that to them, experience is not only a resource but also a potential for understanding, representing and acting on reality. Furthermore, they state that they do not treat experience as “knowing” (having the form of conceptual taxonomies, schemata or scripts) but as “meaning” (something construed in language):

In other words, we are concerned with the construal of human experience as a semantic system; and since language plays the central role not only in storing and exchanging experience but also is construing it, we are taking language as our interpretative base (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999: 1).

Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 3) argue that in order to construct a “meaning base” (or interpretative base) in a language, one must use a systemic grammar. They describe a systemic grammar as one of the functional grammars, and note that this means that a systemic grammar is semantically motivated, or “natural”. In contrast, formal grammars are autonomous and semantically arbitrary (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999: 3). Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 3–4) also note that in a systemic grammar, every category is based on meaning and has a semantic and formal lexicogrammatical reactance. They emphasise that the term “category” in systemic grammar is used in the general sense of “an organizing theoretical concept” and not in the sense of “class” as in formal grammars (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999: 3). Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 15) concur and emphasise that unlike a “grammar as rule” theory, SFL takes a “resource perspective” and is designed to display the overall system of grammar rather than only fragments. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 4) note that when grammarians state that all texts are equal (i.e. a view that all texts within a specific genre are equal in terms of linguistic characteristics), they are thinking of the texts as *specimens*. However, if one views texts as *artefacts* they are no longer equal. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 4) state that every text that exists gets its meaning by

selecting from the same meaning-making resources, but the way these resources are deployed is what distinguishes any one text from another.

From the discussion thus far, some central concepts in SFL have been illuminated. Firstly, within an SFL perspective, language is a **network of systems**. J. R. Firth, founder of the London School of Linguistics and one of Halliday's professors, placed specific focus on the relational nature of language. Firth also insisted that **meaning** is central in linguistic explanation and that language expresses various central functions in a variety of **situational contexts** (Young, 2013; Bateman, 2017). Based on Firth's research, Bateman (2017: 14) actually refers to SFL as an "in contexts form of linguistic activity". Secondly, the discussion has emphasised language as a **social** phenomenon, leading to a social view that involves the examination of the **functional** nature of language (Young, 2013: 626). Based on these descriptions and concepts, Young (2013) describes SFL as follows:

SFL is a perspective for describing language both externally as a social and cultural phenomenon and internally as a formal system for expressing meanings. It does so through a theory designed not only to explain how people interact with each other through language, but to provide a methodology for the analysis of many types of discourse (Young, 2013: 627).

Young notes that theoretically, SFL argues for a functional organisation of language (referred to as metafunctions) and claims that these functions underlie and generate the structures of language (Young, 2013: 627). This is referred to as the "linguistic" component of SFL. In terms of its "functional focus", SFL allows researchers to examine any visual or verbal text, analyse it and explain *why* the text means something or *how* the texts mean something. This is precisely why SFL is a suitable linguistic theory in the present study. When analysing suicide notes, one needs a robust theory that supports the complicated nature of these texts. SFL's "systemic" component is illustrated in the fact that researchers view language as a system of choices and allows for explanations of choices made in particular situations or instances (Young, 2013: 627). According to Young (2013: 627), systemicists therefore study what language *does* and not what language *is*.

An important aspect of SFL is the focus on the "clause" rather than the "sentence" as a unit of analysis. Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 15) note that in systemic theory, a clause is "a unit in which meanings of three different kinds are combined". According to Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 15), these three distinct structures, which express one kind of semantic organisation each, are mapped

onto one another to produce a single wording – referred to as *metafunctions*. The metafunctions are distinguished as (1) the ideational metafunction, (2) the interpersonal metafunction and (3) the textual metafunction (Eggins, 2004; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004; Bavali and Sadighi, 2008; Matthiessen, Teruya and Lam, 2010). Each of these metafunctions are explored separately below.

Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 29) note that by naming things, we construe them into categories and we construe categories into taxonomies. They explain this as follows:

So we have *houses* and *cottages* and *sheds*, which are all kinds of *building*; *strolling* and *stepping* and *marching* and *pacing*, which are all kinds of *walking*; *in*, *on*, *under*, *around* as relative locations and so on – and the fact that these differ from one language to another is a reminder that the categories are in fact construed in language (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29).

They state that these categories can be configured into complex grammatical patterns such as “marched out of the house” and note that figures can be built up into sequences related by time, cause, or the like (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29). Therefore, they claim that there is no facet of human experience that cannot be transformed into meaning and argue that language therefore provides a theory of human experience (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29). Certain resources of the lexicogrammar are dedicated to the function of transforming experience into meaning which is referred to as the **ideational metafunction** – distinguished into an **experiential** and **logical** component (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29). Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 15) agree that the ideational metafunction is concerned with the grammatical resources available for construing our experience of the world around and inside us. They state that a clause, in its ideational function, is a means of representing patterns of experience or building a mental picture of reality (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 15). This metafunction, and specifically its **experiential** subfunction, is analysed in terms of the transitivity system. Young (2013: 628) explains that the transitivity system is a structural term “to account for how processes, participants and circumstances, which make up the experiential subfunction, are realized”. Young (2013: 628) also notes that the transitivity system permits a speaker or writer to express the ways in which experiences are represented and conveyed through different process types such as material or action, as well as mental and relational.

The *material* process, or the process of *doing*, includes actions, activities and events. Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 15) note that certain structural configurations, including *process*, *actor* and *goal*, as well as *process* and *range*, characterise a material clause. They state that there is always an actor

“which can be realized by a nominal group or even a non-finite clause” (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 15) and one can determine whether a process is “directed” (i.e. has a goal) or not. To illustrate this, an example from one of the suicide notes included in the present study is used.⁸ In the statement “I’m going to miss you, X”, a researcher could identify the process realised through the verb “miss” as an action process and identify two participants: the actor (the one carrying out the action – “I”) and the goal (the person receiving the action – “X”), meaning the process is directed.

On the other hand, the *mental* process means construing sensing, perception, cognition, intention, and emotion. Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 16) describe this as a process of consciousness involving “a participant endowed with consciousness and typically a participant entering into or created by that consciousness”. This is configured as *process*, *senser* and *phenomenon*. The senser is realised by a nominal group and denotes a person or being endowed with consciousness (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 16). For an example, one could argue that in the example sentence “I know this is a dirty trick, but I can’t think of any other way”, the “I” refers to the senser. However, in this example the participant(s) created by the consciousness are not directly referred to, as would be the case with an example such as *She saw them crossing the road* (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 16). Having said that, in the example used here, “I know this is a dirty trick, but I can’t think of any other way”, the pronoun “this” could be seen as an event (referring to the act of suicide) created by the consciousness of the senser. A reference to an act of suicide can also be viewed as the phenomenon, even though it is indirectly referred to, and the verbs “know” and “think” would indicate the process of consciousness or conscious knowledge and thoughts.

In terms of the *relational* process, Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 16) state that it serves to characterise and identify:

If ‘material’ process is concerned with our experience of the material world and ‘mental’ process is concerned with our experience of the world of our own consciousness, both of this outer experience and this inner experience may be construed by relational processes; but they model this experience as ‘being’ or ‘having’ rather than as ‘doing’ or sensing’.

Thus, the relational process is concerned with the relationship between two things or concepts. Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 16) argue that relational processes are expressed in either “attributive” or “identifying” modes. In terms of the *attributive* mode, an attribute is ascribed to an entity. In

⁸ All the examples from this point forward, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from the authentic suicide notes that form part of the corpora in the present study.

another example from the present corpora, the statement “X, you are a good kid” includes the entity (or carrier) “X”, the verb “are” signifying an attribute relational process, and the words “a good kid”, which is the attribute. In an *identifying* mode, one entity (the identifier) is used to identify another (identified) (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 16). In a statement such as “It is a disease like cancer”, “it” (referring to depression) is the identified element, while “is” represents an identifying relational process, and “a disease like cancer” is the identifier.

Other processes also mentioned by Bavali and Sadighi (2008) include the *behavioural*, describing both physiological and psychological behaviour such as smiling, laughing, breathing etc. Behavioural processes usually only have a single participant – the “beholder” (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 16). Another is the *verbal* processes of “saying”, covering any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning and including a sayer, a verbal process and a receiver (Bavali and Sadighi, 2008: 16). A final process refers to the *existential* process, which shows that something exists or happens. Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 17) note that words such as “be”, “exist” or “arise” are verbs expressing existence. Thus, a sentence like “so I wouldn’t be hurting over you” includes the existent “hurting over you” and the existential process illustrated by the verb “be”.

Young (2013: 628) states that the **logical** subcategory mainly deals with the ways in which clauses are connected and notes that clauses are connected through a system describing the interdependency between them, or by a system that describes the type of meaning relationship between linked clauses. For example, the sentence “I truly wish this could all have ended in a different way, but that was just not to be” illustrates a relationship of expansion – that is, that information is added to the original sentence through the use of the conjunction “but”. Thus, it is through the word “but” that the logical subfunction is realised (Young, 2013: 629).

In terms of the **interpersonal metafunction**, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 29) note that while construing, language is also “enacting” our personal and social relationships with other people around us. They argue that a clause not only represents some process but is also a proposition or proposal we use to “inform or question, give an order or make an offer, and express our appraisal of and attitude towards whoever we are addressing and what we are talking about” (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29). Young (2013: 629) concurs that interpersonal meanings are realised in terms of mood choices such as statements, questions and commands, but also notes that interpersonal meanings are realised through modal operators such as “might”, “could” and

“should” and adjuncts like “probably” and “usually”, to name a few. According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 29), the term *interpersonal* metafunction suggests that it is both *interactive* and *personal* and can be described as “language as action” compared to the ideational metafunction, which would be “language as reflection”. They state the following concerning these two metafunctions:

The distinction between two modes of meaning is not just made from the outside; when the grammar is represented systematically it shows up as two distinct networks of systems (Halliday, 1969; cf. Martin, 1990, on intrinsic functionality). What it signifies is that (1) every message is both about something and addressing someone, and (2) these two motifs can be freely combined – by and large, they do not constrain each other (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29–30).

Young (2013: 629) notes that appraisal theory is actually an extension of the interpersonal metafunction of SFL. Young (2013: 629) only briefly refers to three subcategories of appraisal, explaining that *appreciation* refers to the ways in which speakers or writers express their likes or dislikes and evaluations through either lexical choices or whole clauses. *Affect* is described as the expression of emotions and feelings, typically through the use of adjectives that express attitudes towards either a person, event or object, while *judgement* accounts for people’s judgements in terms of both social values and ethics (Young, 2013: 629). Appraisal and its categories are discussed in more detail in subsection 3.3.2, but this explanation by Young already indicates the connection between SFL and appraisal theory.

Finally, grammar also shows up as a third mode of meaning which relates to the construction of text. This is referred to as the **textual metafunction** (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 30). Bavali and Sadighi (2008: 17) mention that the textual metafunction consists of the subfunctions *theme* and *rheme*, and creates a representation of both ideational and interpersonal meanings as information that can be shared by speakers and listeners (and in the case of the present study, writers and addressees) in text unfolding in context. Young (2013: 629) agrees and states that the textual metafunction ensures that the utterance achieves relevance in a context through resources such as the use of cohesive features (ellipses, reference, conjunction, collocation and thematic development) which connect different parts of texts, either structurally or lexically. For example, in the sentence “I truly wish this could all have ended in a different way, but that was just not to be” there are certain features that indicate how the statements are connected to each other and to the situation. Firstly, the use of the pronoun “this” connects the statement with the broader context,


referring to the act of suicide. Secondly, the use of “but” not only adds information to the sentence, but also indicates to the reader that a contrasting situation or statement is posited here.

Young (2013: 629) concludes that each of the metafunctions, as discussed above, are realised in distinctive structures of the clause complex. While the ideational content is realised by nominal and verbal groups as well as conjunctions, the interpersonal content relies on mood choices, modal operators and sentence adjuncts. Textual cohesion is achieved through both lexical and grammatical choice of reference (Young, 2013: 629).

Apart from the general theory of SFL and the metafunctions at work within the theory, one also needs to consider other aspects relevant to SFL. Young (2013: 631) notes these as the context of situation and register, as well as the context of cultures and genres.

Butt, Fahey, Feez, Spinks and Yallop (2000: 3) argue that text always occurs in two contexts. They visualise these contexts as “one within the other” (see Figure 3.2). According to Butt et al (2000: 3), the outer context refers to the *context of culture* and is very important in shaping meanings. They argue that culture influences aspects of behaviour such as forms of address, ceremonies and politeness and state that “the context of culture is sometimes described as the sum of all the meanings it is possible to mean in that particular culture” (Butt et al, 2000: 3). Within the context of culture, both speakers and writers use language in many specific situations. Each of these situations is an inner context, referred to as the *context of situation*. Butt et al (2000: 3) explain that the combination of context of culture and context of situation results in both the differences and similarities between languages.

Figure 3.2: An illustration of text in context (based on the figure used by Butt et al, 2000: 4)



Butt et al (2000) and Young (2013) mention that from an SFL perspective the *situational* differences between texts can be accounted for by three aspects (or parameters) of context: field, tenor and mode (of discourse). Young (2013: 631) argues that since SFL is rooted in a social view of language, it necessitates “a focus on how people communicate and interact with each other using language ‘to get on with life’”, and states that the three parameters of context illustrate the interplay of the dialectical relationship between language and society.

The *field* of discourse refers to what is talked or written about, or in other words, what is happening discursively (Butt et al, 2000; Young, 2013). Thus, field refers to the role that language plays in a particular happening or event and accounts for the experience or content that receives focus in the particular situation (Young, 2013: 631). In order to identify or understand field, one could ask: What activity is taking place? *Tenor* accounts for the relationship between speaker and hearer or writer and reader (Butt et al, 2000: 5). Young (2013: 631) expands this definition as follows:

Tenor accounts for the types of interactions between the addressers and the addressees and between the addressers and the content, the position that speakers and writers adopt both in terms of information being conveyed as well as interactions shared with audiences.

According to Butt et al (2000: 18), the following questions can be asked to identify tenor: What is the relationship between the interactants? Is there a social distance between them? Is the relationship between them equal or not? *Mode* concerns the nature of the language itself and refers to the kind of text that is being made (Butt et al, 2000; Young, 2013). Thus, it refers to whether the language is spoken or written or spontaneous or planned, and whether the text is a newspaper article, an academic essay or a recipe.

Butt et al (2000: 5) state that only one parameter of the context of situation needs to be different in order to create a substantially different text. These authors mention that these three parameters affect our language choices because they reflect the three main functions of language: (1) to talk about what is happening, will happen and has happened, (2) to interact and/or express a point of view, and (3) to turn these outputs into a coherent whole (Butt et al, 2000: 5). Young (2013: 631) agrees with Butt et al (2000) that the parameters of the context of situation reflect the main functions of language and links the parameters with the metafunctions discussed earlier. According to Young (2013: 631), the field of discourse is realised through the ideational metafunction, specifically through the experiential subfunction, since it concerns the participants and the

circumstances in language. Tenor is expressed through the interpersonal meanings (mood, attitudinal and modality choices, and appraisal) since it accounts for the relationship between interactants. Mood influences the textual selections through cohesion, coherence and thematic patterns because it accounts for whether the interaction is spoken or written (Young, 2013: 632).

According to Butt et al (2000: 9), when texts share the same context of situation, they share the same experiential, interpersonal and textual meanings. This means that the texts also belong to the same *register*. Furthermore, because certain texts have the same meanings (based on the fact that they belong to the same register), they also share patterns of lexicogrammar (Butt et al, 2000: 9). Young (2013: 632) is of the opinion that register “delineates different functional varieties that every society has”, ranging from recipes, to lectures and to novels, and states that each of these functional varieties “is a particular discursive realization in different situations, a realization in terms of choices available in that situation”.

A final important concept in SFL that requires some discussion and which relates to the *context of culture*, is *genre*. According to Butt et al (2000: 9), texts that share the same general purpose in a culture will often share the same obligatory and optional elements, meaning that they belong to the same genre (or text type). Young (2013: 632) states that genres and generic analysis focus on the overall purpose of the text and “the ways we get things done through language”. Considering genre broadens findings available in the SFL framework since it explicitly illustrates the purposeful activity that a text accomplishes (Young, 2013: 632). Eggins (2004: 58) notes that as certain contextual combinations become stable, the ways of interacting within those contexts also become habitualised. Eventually these interactions become institutionalised as genres. Thus, “genres develop as ways of dealing linguistically with recurrent configurations of register variables” (Eggins, 2004: 58).


Figueiredo (2010: 128) offers an explanation of the difference between *register* and *genre* that elaborates on the statement by Eggins (2004). Figueiredo (2010: 128), referring to Martin (2001), states the following:

Genres create meaning by shaping the register variables – by conditioning the way field (what is going on in a given situational context), tenor (how people relate to one another within a situated event) and mode (the medium and the channel chosen for communication during the event) are combined in recurrent forms in a certain culture.

Thus, the combination of the register variables (field, tenor and mode) and the linguistic choices accompanying each of these variables progress in stages, producing a goal-oriented structure that characterises genres (Figueiredo, 2010: 128).

Figure 3.3 below is an illustration of how the SFL concepts discussed here relate to each other. Firstly, it illustrates that the context of culture is the bigger, overlapping context in which speakers and writers use language in specific ways within specific situations. Secondly, the parameters of the context of situation link with the three metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal and textual. These metafunctions are all connected and mapped onto one another (indicated by the overlapping squares). Finally, each metafunction has its own subfunctions and their meanings are realised through different aspects of the text.

Figure 3.3: An illustration of the links between SFL concepts



To summarise the discussion in this subsection, one could state the following:

1. SFL contradicts the traditional view of language, which argues for a set of rules that specifies grammatical structure. Thus, SFL tries to account for the structural, developmental and social features of language and is essentially a descriptive framework that explores and analyses language as a social and cultural phenomenon, as well as a formal system for expressing meanings.
2. Language is understood as a resource for making meanings – specifically the clause, which combines three different kinds of meanings (or metafunctions).
3. Since SFL views language as a system composed of subsystems, levels and strata, the framework aims to display an overall system of grammar rather than fragments of grammar.
4. Contexts form an important part of the SFL framework since they form a bridge between the social world and the texts.

As mentioned earlier, the interpersonal metafunction or interpersonal mode of meaning is especially relevant in the present study. Eggins (2004: 12) notes that whatever we use language for, we are “always expressing an attitude and taking up a role”. Thus, when we write or speak we are expressing meanings about our relationships with other people and our attitudes toward each other. Martin and Rose (2005: 1) claim to offer new approaches to the notion of an interpersonal mode of meaning and state that the “tools” of appraisal they developed based on the research in SFL can be usefully applied to both spoken and written texts (Martin and White, 2005: 7). Their aim is to extend the SFL account of interpersonal meaning by attending to three axes along which the speaker’s or writer’s intersubjective stance may vary (Martin and White, 2005: 1). These three axes are distinguished as affect, modality and intensification or vague language. Affect refers to the means by which a writer or speaker positively or negatively evaluates any entities, happenings or state of affairs their texts are concerned with (Martin and Rose, 2005: 2). In terms of modality, specifically epistemic modality and evidentiality, Martin and Rose (2005: 2) extend traditional accounts by attending to both issues of speaker and writer certainty, commitment and knowledge, as well as attending to questions of how the so-called “textual voice” positions itself with respect to other voices. Finally, Martin and Rose (2005: 2) provide a framework for describing how

speakers or writers increase and decrease the force of their assertions and sharpen or blur semantic categorisations.

Each of these axes is discussed separately in the subsection that follows.

3.3.2 Linguistic appraisal

Before moving on to a discussion of linguistic appraisal theory, an important distinction emphasised by Martin (2017) should be included here. Martin (2017: 22) notes that “appraisal theory” is actually not a *theory* but a *description*. He states that SFL is the theory and appraisal is “a description of resources for evaluation in English”. Thus, even though the term “appraisal theory” is often used, it should actually be referred to as simply “appraisal” or perhaps “appraisal description”. However, in the present study a distinction is made between appraisal in psychology and appraisal in linguistics. Therefore, the term “linguistic appraisal” will be used here in order to decrease the possibility of confusion.

As mentioned in section 3.3.1, linguistic appraisal (referred to as LA from this point forward) provides some of the mechanisms by which the interpersonal metafunction in SFL operates. White (2015: 1) states that the LA framework “present[s] speakers/writers as revealing their feelings, tastes, and opinions with greater or lesser degrees of intensity and directness, as construing propositions as more or as less contentious or warrantable, and as thereby aligning or disaligning with value positions in play in the current communicative context”. This definition combines the three axes briefly mentioned in the previous section and which are discussed here. However, before any of the specific LA concepts are considered in more detail, a brief look at the history of LA within SFL is necessary in order to illustrate how the framework evolved.

Martin (2014: 6) refers to the “orientation to stratification” of SFL discussed in section 3.3.1, emphasising that this orientation led to various levels of analysing language and allowed for the development of LA (Martin, 2014: 9). Martin (2014: 6) starts discussing LA within SFL by specifically referring to Halliday’s (1961, 2002) illustration of the levels of language (Figure 3.4). Here one sees the emergence of the concept of *context* as a third stratum within linguistics. This elaborated on Hjelmslev’s (1961) two-level complementarities in language: context/expression and form/substance. Later, Matthiessen and Halliday (2009) replace *context* with the term

semantics (see Figure 3.5) resulting in a “tri-stratal model with a stratified ‘content plane’” – often illustrated with co-tangential circles (Martin, 2014: 6).

Figure 3.4: The levels of language proposed by Halliday (1961/2002)





Figure 3.5 below includes some concepts worth defining. Firstly, the concepts *content* and *expression* are derived from the work of Hjelmslev (1947, 1961), who argued that language is not a simple system of signs but is a stratified system of signs with a content plane and an expression plane. Badir (2006) argues that, as a general rule, expression forms are visible in the object, whereas signification resides in the content form. Badir emphasises that one must always analyse a semiotic object (such as a text) uniformly, meaning that “neither expression nor content can be given predominance; they must be analysed together” (Badir, 2006.) Secondly, within SFL, *lexicogrammar* describes the continuity between grammar and lexis. Liu and Jiang (2009: 62) explain that lexicogrammar views the lexicon and grammar as “two inherently connected parts of a single entity”. This challenges the traditional view of postulating separate domains of lexis and syntax. Thus, according to lexicogrammatical perspectives, a grammatical structure can be lexically restricted and lexical items are often grammatical in nature, since the use of a lexical item can have grammatical implications (Liu and Jiang, 2009: 62).

Figure 3.5: SFL’s stratified model of language proposed by Matthiessen and Halliday (2009)



According to Matthiessen (2007: 765), SFL started with an account of the lexicogrammatical subsystem of language. Since the Firthian tradition⁹ that preceded SFL focused mainly on the outer strata of language in context, Matthiessen (2007: 766) states that Halliday’s (1961) focus on lexicogrammar “‘filled in’ an area of language in the evolutionary development of the contextual and functional approach to which he was contributing”. Matthiessen also notes the following:

Consequently, lexicogrammar was interpreted in the ‘environment’ of other linguistic systems and of context from the start ... In the development of accounts of lexicogrammar, the understanding of this system has always been contextualised by work on other subsystems – and recontextualised by new developments in accounts of these subsystems (Matthiessen, 2007: 766).

The contextualisation of lexicogrammar described by Matthiessen (2007) is illustrated with the circles in Figure 3.5. Matthiessen (2007: 766) argues that a focus on lexicogrammar made it possible to see that an approach to language has to be probabilistic (taking text as evidence), that prosodies can be modelled systematically, and it opened a way to move from system-structure theory to systemic theory. Furthermore, it allowed for the development of the theory of metafunctions and provided a basis for not only engaging with language as a system, but also for thinking about language holistically (Matthiessen, 2007: 766).

Thirdly, the concept of *semantics* is also of particular importance here. Martin (2014: 7) argues that work on semantics in SFL has regularly concerned itself with what could be referred to as “clause semantics”, but states that discourse analysts have always wanted to emphasise “the need


⁹ Firth’s theory is understood as a general linguistic description and not a theory of universals for general linguistic description. The Firthian theory consists of two aspects: “Contextual Theory of Meaning” and “Prosodic Phonology” (Oyelaran, 1967: 434).

to move beyond the clause when considering text structure”. Thus, the third stratum is often referred to as *discourse* or *discourse semantics* (Martin, 2014: 7). According to Oteíza (2017: 458), LA is situated at the level of discourse semantics and therefore works at a more abstract level than the lexicogrammar, since LA allows meanings to disperse at the lexicogrammatical level and in a variety of lexicogrammatical systems. Similar to the contextualisation and interpretation of lexicogrammar described by Matthiessen (2007: 766), Oteíza (2017: 458) argues that each level of language (see Figure 3.5) is understood as complex patterns of meaning with each stratum consisting of patterns from the immediately lower level. Based on this, Oteíza notes the following:

This notion is of particular importance when dealing with appraisal, since this allows the turn from a grammatical perspective on evaluation to a complementary perspective founded on the rhetorical effect of evaluative lexis as texts unfold. The appraisal system hence provides a generalisation of diverse lexicogrammaticalisations that brings feelings together in relation to one another, which in turn allow the description of prosodies of evaluation in relation to genre (Oteíza, 2017: 458).


As discussed in section 3.3.1, the concept of *genre* referred to by Oteíza (2017) is important in SFL and is strongly influenced by context. Martin (2014: 11) emphasises a strong relation between language and context, noting that context is privileged as a higher stratum of meaning (see Figure 3.6). According to Martin (2014: 11), the research of Firth (1957a, 1957b) emphasised context as a crucial part of any linguistic analysis needed to account for meaning. Martin (2014: 11) also notes that context in SFL is treated from a supervenient perspective, meaning that context is treated as a higher stratum of meaning.

Figure 3.6: Context as a higher stratum of meaning (adapted from Martin, 2014: 11)



Interestingly, Martin (2014: 12–13) notes that context initially consisted of four variables and not only the three discussed in section 3.3.1, depending on whether one followed the research of Halliday or Gregory. According to Martin (2014: 12), arguments were made for the variables of field, mode, personal tenor and functional tenor. However, a decision was made to rename the abstract level of functional tenor as *genre* and abbreviate personal tenor to tenor. This led to an evolution of the scaffolding for context, with language becoming the expression plane of register and register positioned as the expression plane of genre (Martin, 2014: 13). This is illustrated in Figure 3.7 below.

Figure 3.7: A stratified supervenient model of language and context (adapted from Martin, 2014: 14)



Martin (2014: 17) notes that this stratified approach to context and content created the possibility for work on the language of evaluation. Oteíza (2017: 459) emphasises that LA was initially created in the educational linguistics and literacy intervention context. However, the initial framework for analysing attitudes in discourse (specifically in narratives) was not up to task and therefore the need for a more detailed theory, linguistic appraisal theory, arose (Martin, 2014: 17). This theory is thoroughly described in the 2005 publication by Martin and White and is investigated and considered in the sections that follow.

3.3.2.1 Linguistic appraisal: the categories

Appraisal consists of three interacting domains (or main categories): attitude, engagement and graduation. Each of these categories is divided into subcategories. Martin and White (2005) offer a very detailed discussion of the main and subcategories associated with appraisal. However, the level of analysis attempted in a particular study will depend on the available data and the aim of the research. This means that while a variety of different appraisal categories are available and the level of analysis can be extremely detailed, the aim of the study and the data ultimately determine the appraisal categories that are considered. For example, an appraisal analysis of a novel should consider a multilayered analysis using all the categories and accompanying factors LA has to offer if the aim is an in-depth account of appraisal in general. However, if the aim is simply to assess attitude, then only considering those categories is appropriate. A more detailed discussion on the use of LA categories in analyses follows in section 3.4. For the purposes of the present study, only the three main categories or domains of LA and their immediate subcategories are considered and discussed. This is due to two factors. Firstly, the limited amount of data available in the present study and the fact that the study compares corpora makes an in-depth analysis using all available LA categories nonsensical. If the corpora in the present study consisted of thousands of texts, a detailed analysis would possibly reveal smaller appraisal details that could be used to indicate meaningful differences between corpora in a comparison. However, since the corpora are small, breaking up the analysis into its smallest components and then comparing the corpora hoping to find meaningful differences or even distinctive characteristics will lead to disappointing results and be of no real significance. Consequently, no usable conclusions can be drawn making the analysis and subsequent results void. Chapter 5 provides enough evidence of this. Secondly, the main domains and immediate subcategories contain enough evaluative characteristics to make them useful in the present study. As indicated in section 3.5, appraisal categories can be adapted to fit the needs of a particular study and therefore only considering the main aspects of LA is more than enough to complete this analysis. Each of the main domains mentioned at the beginning of this section is discussed separately below.

3.3.2.1.1 Attitude

According to White (2015: 2), **attitude** is used to reference the subsystem of evaluative meanings in appraisal by which “addressees are positioned to adopt a positive or negative view vis-à-vis experimental phenomena or propositions about those phenomena”. Oteíza (2017: 460) refers to attitude as a way in which feelings are seen as a system of meanings and notes that this system has three semantic areas: emotions, ethics and aesthetics. These can each be linked to a subcategory of attitude (Martin and White, 2005; Oteíza, 2017). Emotions relate to the subcategory of **affect**, which is the expression of positive or negative feelings (Oteíza, 2017: 460). According to Martin and Rose (2003: 25), affect can be expressed directly or it can be implied, and the semantic resources for construing emotions can be organised by six relevant factors or variables explained below (Martin and White, 2005; Oteíza, 2017).

1. Following the notion that feelings in general are constructed by culture as either positive or negative experiences, feelings are expressed as either positive or negative:

Positive: *I'm happy now [...]*¹⁰

Negative: *I am sad that I cannot call you and say goodbye [...]*

2. A distinction is made between an extralinguistic manifestation of emotion or feelings and an internal experience (Oteíza, 2017: 461). Martin and White (2005: 47) refer to this as a surge of emotion or an ongoing mental process. They note that grammatically this distinction is construed as the opposition between a behavioural process versus a mental or relational process (Martin and White, 2005: 47):

Behavioural process: *We used to laugh, we used to cry.*

Mental process: *I love you.*

Relational process: *[...] I was an invalid[...]*

Referring back to some concepts explored in section 3.3.1, behavioural process refers to any physical expression of an attitude or an emotion and is realised through a behavior (“we” in the

¹⁰ All the examples are taken from the corpora used in the present study unless indicated otherwise.

example above) and a behaviour (“laugh” and “cry” in the example above), while a mental process refers to expressing an emotion or feeling. A mental process needs a senser (“I”) and a phenomenon (“love you”) in order to be realised. Finally, a relational process consists of a carrier or attribute (“I”) and a token or value (“an invalid”).

3. Feelings can be constructed as directed at or reacting to some emotional trigger or they can be a general ongoing mood. Martin and White (2005: 47) note that grammatically, this distinction is made by identifying a mental process versus a relational state:

Mental process (reaction to other): *Your mother and I both loved you so very much [...]*

Relational state (undirected mood): *You know how shitty it is to be depressed and have anger deep inside you.*

4. Feelings can be graded on a scale of intensity – between higher- or lower-valued ends (Martin and White, 2005: 48; Oteíza, 2017: 462):

Low: *I dislike you* [Example not found in the corpora]

Median: *I hate your guts.*

High: *I detest you* [Example not found in the corpora]

5. Oteíza (2017: 462) describes the fifth variable as feelings involving intention rather than reaction in relation to a stimulus that is *irrealis* compared to *realis*. She explains that this implies making a distinction between feelings relating to future (unrealised) states and feelings relating to present (existing) states. According to Martin and Rose (2003: 60) and Martin and White (2005: 48), *irrealis* affect always implicates a trigger or is directed at some external agency and is divided into an inclination or disinclination towards someone or something. In linguistic appraisal, this division refers to *desire* and *fear* respectively (Martin and Rose, 2003: 60). Butler (2003: 490) notes that grammatically, a *realis* affect includes a present participle (-ing), while an *irrealis* affect includes an infinitive with or without “to”. This is also mentioned in Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 425), who state that “*realis*” (imperfective forms) refers to the real or actual mode of non-finiteness (for example: *reaching the monument*), while “*irrealis*” (perfective forms) represents the potential or virtual (for example: *to reach the*

monument). Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 426) note that in general terms “realis” means an act “in progress, actual, present, ongoing, steady state or proposition” and the “irrealis” means “goal to be attained, potential, future, starting and stopping, change of state or proposal”. However, Martin and White (2005) and Oteíza (2017) argue that the distinction between “realis” and “irrealis” is realised grammatically with emotive and desiderative mental processes (see Table 3.1 below).

Table 3.1: The irrealis affect proposed by Martin and White (2005: 48)

DIS/INCLINATION	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
Fear	tremble, shudder, cower etc.	wary, fearful, terrorised etc.
Desire	suggest, request, demand etc.	miss, long for, yearn for etc.

Martin (2017: 31) concurs with the arguments by both Martin and White (2005) and Oteíza when he explains the concepts as follows:

... our [irrealis/realis] opposition derives from the distinction between desiderative and emotive mental processes (*I **wanted** them to win/I **like** them winning*); our [desire/fear] opposition from the distinction between positive and negative expanding purpose clauses (*They played aggressively **so that** they'd win/They played conservatively **lest** they lose*); our [surge/disposition] opposition from the distinction between behavioural and mental processes (*I **cried** when they lost/It **upset** me that they lost*).

Martin (2017: 34) argues that the positive/negative opposition mentioned above is between emotional reactions to things *we want to happen* and things *we don't want to happen* – this is what illustrates “fear” and “desire”. Martin (2017: 34) notes that desire (in terms of surges of desire) suggests verbal process realisations that are graded according to the strength of the feeling they invoke (“suggest”, “request”, “implore”). However, realisations of fear are more complex than suggested by Martin and White (2005). While some research suggests that the irrealis affect is illustrated by specific grammatical aspects (Butler, 2003; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) or implicates an external trigger (Martin and Rose, 2003), Martin (2017: 34) notes that corpus studies (Bednarek, 2008) have indicated that “fear” can be realised with a trigger or triggers already present. Thus, in a statement such as “The noise frightened her”, the trigger (noise) is already present and therefore this emotion would not be irrealis. One suggestion then is to group such

emotions under the parameter of “insecurity” (another LA category discussed later). In the present study, the decision is made to decide the labelling of each emotion expressing “fear” and “desire” individually. Thus, when the expression of fear seems “irrealis” it will have a separate annotation from when it is not.

6. The final variable groups emotion into three major categories that can be either positive or negative: happiness/unhappiness, security/insecurity and satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Martin and White (2005: 49) describe these categories as follows:

The un/happiness variable covers emotions concerned with ‘affairs of the heart’ – sadness, hate, happiness and love; the in/security variable covers emotions concerned with ecosocial well-being – anxiety, fear, confidence and trust; the dis/satisfaction variable covers emotions concerned with telos (the pursuit of goals) – ennui, displeasure, curiosity, respect.

It should be noted that in each category, two distinct aspects of that category are identified. Unhappiness is either expressed as misery, referring to the mood in someone, or antipathy, referring to the feelings directed at someone else. Happiness can be distinguished as cheer or affection. Insecurity consists of disquiet and surprise, while security consists of confidence or trust. Dissatisfaction is either expressed as ennui or displeasure and satisfaction consists of interest or admiration (Martin and Rose, 2003: 61; Martin and White, 2005: 49–51).

Martin (2017: 33) stresses that the words suggested by Martin and White (2005) are “cover terms” for the categories. Thus, words such as “misery” or “cheer” are not lexical items that exemplify the realisation of these discourse semantic features, but are rather “a short-hand for specific appraisal oppositions.” This means that the words “misery” or “cheer” do not need to be specifically present in order for *misery* or *cheer* to be identified. Thus, if someone expressed that they were feeling “happy” or “sad”, these words could be taken to express “cheer” and “misery” respectively.

For the purposes of the current study, the three major categories of emotion are the main focus of the analysis of affect. The categories mentioned above have also been altered slightly from the examples in the Martin and White (2005) text to include thought units often found in suicide notes. Although these categories are generally constant, the genre of the data needs to be considered. For example, the category of unhappiness (misery) includes any thought unit expressing sadness or

feeling down, as well as thought units expressing feelings of depression or despair. For example: “I am sad”, “I couldn’t continue living the way I felt about myself”, “I just saw no need for me.” The category of dissatisfaction (ennui) has also been altered to include any thought units expressing annoyance with another person. These adaptations are further discussed and motivated in section 3.5.

Within attitude, the semantic area of ethics relates to the subcategory of **judgement**. As with affect, judgements can be either positive or negative, but unlike affect, judgements can also be personal or moral (Martin and Rose, 2003: 28). Martin and White (2005: 52) make a similar distinction within judgement, but they view the distinction as **judgements of esteem** versus **judgements of sanction**. Judgement of esteem has to do with **normality** (how unusual someone is), **capacity** (how capable someone is) and **tenacity** (how resolute someone is). Judgements of sanction have to do with **veracity** (how truthful someone is) and **propriety** (how ethical someone is). Oteíza (2017: 462) notes that “esteem” involves admiration and criticism, while “sanction” involves praise and condemnation. Examples from the corpora for each of these distinctions are the following:

Judgement of esteem (normality): *What a fool I was [...]*

Judgement of esteem (capacity): *I was an invalid [...]*

Judgement of esteem (tenacity): *I can no longer endure the pain and agony of life.*

Judgement of sanction (veracity): *I tried my best to prove that with honesty [...]*

Judgement of sanction (propriety): *I will take care of this problem I have caused.*

Very importantly, Oteíza (2014: 462) argues that what counts as appraisal depends on the field of discourse. Thus, the expressions of judgement identified here are specific to the genre of suicide notes and examples from other genres might look very different. Furthermore, while Martin and White (2005: 54) identify certain verbs as separate indicators of judgement (can, will, should), the present study focuses on thought units and therefore verbs and adjectives are often considered together within the larger context of the suicide note.

The third semantic area of aesthetics is linked to the LA subcategory called **appreciation**. Appreciation includes our attitudes about a wide variety of things – from TV shows to public buildings or nature (Martin and Rose, 2003: 33). Martin and White (2005: 56) divide appreciation into our reactions to things (does it please us?/grab our attention?), their composition (balance and complexity) and their value (how innovative, authentic, timely etc. is it?/was it worthwhile?). Again, appreciation can be either positive or negative. According to Oteíza (2017: 463), these three variables are related to Halliday's transitivity mental process of "affection, perception and cognition". Based on this observation, examples from the corpora in the present study could be the following:

Reactions (affection): *You don't focus on trivial things [...]*

Composition (perception): *[...] have compassion for this terrible act [...]*

Valuation (cognition): *It makes you more concerned with the more truthful things.*

Martin and White (2005: 57–58) emphasise that although affect, judgement and appreciation are related, "it is important to distinguish between construing the emotions someone feels (affect) and ascribing the power to trigger such feelings to things". Equally important, positive or negative evaluations of something imply positive or negative judgements of the capacity of someone to create or perform, but a distinction is drawn between judgements of behaviour and evaluations of things (Martin and White, 2005: 58). These are very important observations by Martin and White that are of particular relevance in the present study. As discussed in section 3.5, the subjective nature of an LA analysis often leads to problems. One problem is the fact that it is often difficult to decide objectively whether an appraisal is an example of affect, judgement or appreciation. Martin and White (2005: 60–61) also note that a clear distinction between the subcategories of attitude is not always possible. For example, there are attitudinal lexis that express both affect and judgement at the same time: guilty, proud, embarrassed, resentful, jealous, envious, ashamed and contemptuous. These words "construe an emotional reaction to behaviour we approve or disprove of" (Martin and White, 2005: 61). A second problem, linked to the first, is the fact that a thought unit (at least in the present study) can be an example of multiple appraisals. Martin and White (2005: 58–59) suggest asking specific questions when analysing a text to determine whether a clause can be identified as an expression of affect, judgement or appreciation. These are referred

to as “clause frames”. The following are examples of questions and answers based on Martin and White (2005):

1.

Q: How does a person feel about something? / How does it make a person feel?

A: A person feels *sad, happy, depressed, angry etc* about something / It makes a person feel *sad, happy, depressed, angry etc* that ...

2.

Q: How did it make you feel when a person did X?

A: It was *truthful, untruthful, ethical, unethical etc* for a person or of a person to do that / For a person to do that was *truthful, untruthful, ethical, unethical etc*.

I am adding another question and answer pair to *judgement*, since I feel that the pair suggested by Martin and White (2005: 59) does not refer to judgements of esteem but only judgements of sanction.

3.

Q: How do you perceive a specific person or yourself?

A: This person is / I am *normal, capable, tenacious, weak, unusual etc*.

4.

Q: How does the person feel about something?


A: A person considers something with *pleasure, attention etc*. / A person sees something as *complex, innovative, worthwhile etc*.

Martin and White suggest analysing any possible hybrid realisations by using clause frames and focusing on the nature of the source and target of evaluation. The sources and targets of evaluation are explained as follows:

The source of **affect** is of course conscious participants, including persons, human collectives and institutions ... And the behaviour of these conscious participants is the target of **judgement**. **Appreciation** on the other hand targets things, whether concrete or abstract, material or semiotic (Martin and White, 2005: 59).

They also suggest that hybrids, such as the ones mentioned, be treated as “affectual inscriptions invoking (i.e. implying) judgement or appreciation” (Martin and White, 2005: 68).

To summarise, attitude consists of affect, judgement and appreciation. Affect can be subdivided into three major categories (happiness/unhappiness, security/insecurity, satisfaction/dissatisfaction), each with a positive and a negative distinction. Another two categories (fear and desire) are also suggested as part of the irrealis affect. However, it appears that identifying those categories can be complex. For that reason, both fear and desire are considered in each individual case. If they appear to be irrealis, they are annotated as such. If they appear to have an immediate trigger and are therefore no longer irrealis, they are included in one of the three major realis categories indicated above. Judgement can be seen as either personal or moral, apart from being positive and negative. Another distinction categorises judgement together as either judgement of esteem or judgement of sanction. This distinction is used in the present study and discussed in detail in section 3.5. Appreciation, although related to affect and judgement, refers to a person’s feelings towards objects and not towards people. Appreciation is either positive or negative. Figure 3.8 sums up attitude and its categories.

Figure 3.8: Attitude and its categories

Next, graduation and engagement are discussed. It is worth noting that engagement is included for the sake of completeness, but engagement is not considered part of the analysis in the present study. The reasons for this are considered below.

3.3.2.1.2 Graduation

Martin and Rose (2003: 37) mention that a distinctive feature of attitudes is the fact that they are gradable. This means that we are able to express how strongly we feel about someone or something. According to Martin and White (2005: 136), both attitude and engagement can be seen as domains of **graduation**.

Within the concept of graduation, Martin and Rose (2003: 38) refer to certain linguistic choices as turning up the volume (*extremely gifted*) and other choices as turning down the volume (*fairly*

quick). Martin and White (2005: 135–136) refer to this as “up-scaling” and “down-scaling”. These two axes of scalability can be divided into (1) “grading according to intensity or amount” and (2) “grading according to prototypicality and preciseness” (Martin and White, 2005: 137). In the first instance, the grading is referred to as “force” and in the second instance the grading is called “focus”. These two types of grading are discussed separately below.

According to Oteíza (2017: 463), **force** allows us to intensify or diminish our meanings. Force is divided into “intensification” and “quantification”. **Intensification** is defined as the assessment of the intensity of qualities and processes, and is again divided into the two broad lexicogrammatical classes of “isolating” and “infusing” (Martin and White, 2005: 141). The concept of “isolating” refers to up-scaling or down-scaling realised by an isolated, individual item. This means that a single item is solely, or at least primarily, responsible for setting the level of intensity (Martin and White, 2005: 141). Some examples from the suicide notes in the present study are the following:

1. *I love everyone / I love you a lot.*
2. *I have been humiliated so many times.*
3. [...] *no one really cared [...]*
4. *Thank you very much.*

It is worth noting that in the present study, expressing love for someone is also considered to be an example of force, since loving someone reflects a higher level of emotional investment than liking someone in the author’s opinion.

Two other relevant concepts discussed by Martin and White (2005) are “maximisation” and “lexicalisation”. In terms of intensifications, maximisers are located at the uppermost end of the scale. Thus, maximisers are locutions which indicate that the up-scaling has reached its highest possible intensity (Martin and White, 2005: 142). For example:

1. *Just know that I always loved you.*
2. *The act was totally self-executed.*
3. *You can have my furniture but nothing absolutely nothing is to X.*

On the other hand, lexicalisations are types of intensifier that are classed as “grammatical” items since they are a closed set and have no referential meaning (Martin and White, 2005: 142). For example:

1. *I still love you very much.*

However, Martin and White (2005: 143) note that isolated modifiers that are lexical rather than grammatical can also indicate intensification. They state that these are “delexicalisations” since they are “collocations which are so fixed and formulaic that the intensifying premodifying epithet no longer carries its full semantic load” (Martin and White, 2005: 143). Their examples are the following:

1. *ice cold*
2. *crystal clear*
3. *ridiculously easy*

In terms of “infusion”, Martin and White (2005: 143–144) mention that there are no separate lexical forms conveying a sense of up-scaling or down-scaling, but that the degree of intensity is “conveyed as individual terms in a sequence of semantically related terms contrast in degree of intensity with the other members of that sequence” (Martin and White, 2005: 144). They divide the scaling into indications of quality, process and modality. Examples from Martin and White (2005) are the following:

1. Quality: she performed *competently, skilfully, brilliantly*.
2. Process: *she ambled, she walked, she strode*.
3. Modality: *possible, probable, certain*.

The second division of force, **quantification**, involves scaling with respect to amount and extent (Martin and White, 2005: 148–149). *Amount* refers to size, weight, strength and number, while *extent* covers the scope in both time and space (for example, how widely distributed or how long-lasting something is). Martin and White (2005) note that the semantics involved here are complicated by the fact that “the quantified entity can be either concrete (e.g. *large shark, many*

sharks, nearby sharks) or abstract (*large problem, many problems; a few anxieties, a slight fear; a great success, her many betrayals*)” (Martin and White, 2005: 149). Furthermore, they note that often the abstract entities will convey attitudinal meanings. For example, a statement such as “I have many worries about your performance” could convey affect (Martin and White, 2005: 149). Quantifications intensify or graduate with respect to imprecise reckonings of number (*a few, many* etc), mass or presence (*small, large, bright, heavy* etc) and imprecise reckonings of extent in time and space. The latter is measured with respect to proximity (*near, far, recent* etc) or distribution (*sparse, long-term, wide-spread* etc) (Martin and White, 2005: 151). Finally, quantification can also be conveyed via both isolation and infusion, although employing an isolated term seems to be typical (Martin and White, 2005: 151).

Focus is the second subcategory of graduation and deals with non-gradable resources. Martin and Rose (2003: 41) refer to focus as the sharpening or softening of experiential categories, while Matruglio (2010: 174) describes it as the strengthening or blurring of boundaries between categories. Here is an example taken from Martin and Rose (2003: 42): “We are real policemen now.” In this case, the category of “policemen” is reconstructed to include various degrees of “policeman-hood”. “Policeman” is therefore no longer an either-or proposition but a matter of degree. As already mentioned, focus can up-scale a specification or down-scale a specification. When using words such as “a real father” or “a true friend”, prototypicality is indicated (up-scaling), but when using words such as “they sort of play jazz” or “it was an apology of sorts”, one characterises an instance as having only marginal membership in the category (down-scaling) (Martin and White, 2005: 138), which places it at some distance from the prototype. Martin and White (2005: 138) mention that graduation according to prototypicality is not confined to experiential categories. Some scalar categories are also gradable according to prototypicality, for example: *a genuinely red carpet*. The same can be said for attitudes such as “upset”. For example: *I am kind of upset*.

If one applies the same criteria to the data in the current study, the following are examples:


I’ve been living in pure hell [...]

You’ve been a real champion [...]

Martin and White (2005: 139) note that up-scaling often indicates a positive attitudinal assessment, while down-scaling usually indicates a negative assessment. However, the softening of positive attitudinal terms can occur and usually occurs “when the positive assessment is being construed as potentially problematic for writer-reader solidarity” (Martin and White, 2005: 140).

To summarise, graduation consists of two main categories, force and focus. While force is concerned with intensifying or diminishing our meanings through intensifications and quantifications, force is concerned with up-scaling or down-scaling specifications by sharpening or softening experiential categories. Figure 3.9 offers a summary of graduation and its categories.

Figure 3.9: Graduation and its categories



The next subsection briefly considers engagement before a general discussion of the pitfalls of using LA in linguistic analyses is considered in section 3.4.

3.3.2.1.3 Engagement

According to Oteíza (2017: 464), **engagement** deals with “the interpersonal negotiation of the sources of attitudes”. Engagement essentially describes a dialogic perspective that illustrates the linguistic resources by which a speaker or writer adopts a stance towards the value positions being referenced by the text and with respect to the value positions they address (Martin and White, 2005: 92). Thus, engagement allows us to analyse the origin of attitudes and identify discourse as either more monoglossic or heteroglossic in orientation (Oteíza, 2017: 464). According to White (2015: 5), speakers or writers can indicate their personal investment in a proposition to a greater or lesser degree through certain formulations and can also mark it as “more or as less contentious, agreed-upon, or otherwise dialogistically problematic”.

Martin and White (2005: 93) argue that the aim of the framework of engagement is to provide a systematic account of how positionings or the stance taking by writers and speakers is achieved linguistically. With reference to this statement, they emphasise the following:

The framework groups together under the heading of ‘engagement’ all those locutions which provide the means for the authorial voice to position itself with respect to, and hence ‘engage’ with, the other voices and alternative positions construed as being in play in the current communicative context. In addition, it includes meanings which in the literature have been given such labels as ‘hedges’, ‘downtoners’, ‘boosters’ and ‘intensifiers’ – for example, *somewhat*, *slightly*, *rather*, *very*, *entirely* and *sort of / kind of*, *true / pure* (as in *I’m kind of upset by what you said* and *He’s a true friend*) (Martin and White, 2005: 94).

The locutions mentioned above are discussed under graduation in the previous section. According to Martin and White (2005: 94), locutions grouped under graduation also play a dialogistic role since they enable both speakers and writers to present themselves as either more strongly aligned or less strongly aligned with the value position being advanced by the text. Furthermore, Martin and White (2005: 94) claim that categorical or bare assertions (for example, *the banks are being greedy*) are also intersubjectively loaded and therefore stanced, including overt markers of attitude or point of view.

Two main distinctions within engagement that should be taken note of are “monoglossia” and “heteroglossia”. Heteroglossia is the opposite of what Martin and Rose (2003: 44) call a monoglossic projection. The term “monoglossic” refers to “a single voice”. A single voice means that the speaker or writer presents the current position “as one which has no dialogistic alternatives

which need to be recognised, or engaged with” (Martin and Rose, 2003: 99). Heteroglossia, on the other hand, refers to the notion that “all verbal communication, whether written or spoken, is dialogic. This means that by speaking or writing the individual reveals the influence of, refers to, or takes up in some way, what has been said or written before, and simultaneously anticipates the responses of either actual or potential (or imagined) readers or listeners (Martin and White, 2005: 92).

In order to identify engagement in a text (with specific reference to heteroglossia), Martin and White (2005: 97–98) suggest a taxonomy within which they locate various engagement meanings. The taxonomy they suggest is directed towards identifying particular dialogistic positioning that is associated with certain meanings and describing what is at stake when one meaning is employed rather than another meaning. They identify the following “textual” or “authorial” voices:

1. Disclaim: here the textual voice positions itself at odds with or rejecting some contrary position. A textual voice can either deny or negate (*You do not need to give up bread to lose weight*) or counter an expectation (*Although he ate bread he still lost weight*).
2. Proclaim: the textual voice can set itself against, suppress or rule out alternative positions by representing a proposition as highly warrantable. For example: (concur) *obviously, he is the best*, (pronounce) *There can be no doubt that he is the best*, (endorse) *He has demonstrated that he is the best*.
3. Entertain: here the authorial voice represents the proposition as but one of a range of possible positions. Consequently, it “entertains” or “invokes” certain dialogic alternatives. For example: *The evidence suggests that, I hear, perhaps, in my view, probably* etc.
4. Attribute: in contrast to the “entertain” authorial voice, the “attribute” textual voice represents a proposition as grounded in the subjectivity of an external voice (and not as grounded in its own contingent, individual subjectivity). Here the textual voice also entertains or invokes certain dialogic alternatives: (acknowledge) *X said, X believes, according to X* and (distance) *X claims that, it is rumoured that*.

In terms of bare assertions, Martin and White (2005: 99) note that the communicative context is construed as single voiced – meaning that other voices are not overtly referenced and alternative


positions are not recognised. Thus, bare assertions are monoglossic. Table 3.2 makes the distinction clear between the terms *heteroglossic* and *monoglossic*.

Table 3.2: The difference between heteroglossic projections and monoglossic projections (adapted from Martin and White, 2005)

MONOGLOSSIC (NO RECOGNITION OF DIALOGISTIC ALTERNATIVES)	HETEROGLOSSIC (RECOGNITION OF DIALOGISTIC ALTERNATIVES)
THE BANKS HAVE BEEN GREEDY.	<u>There is the argument though that</u> the banks have been greedy.
	<u>In my view</u> , the banks have been greedy.
	<u>Callers to talkback radio see</u> the banks as being greedy.
	<u>The chairman of the consumers association has stated</u> that the banks are being greedy.
	<u>There can be no denying</u> the banks have been greedy.
	<u>Everyone knows</u> the banks are greedy.
	The banks haven't been greedy.

Apart from the four engagement meanings mentioned earlier, Martin and White (2005: 102–103) also note that heteroglossia can be divided into dialogic contraction and dialogic expansion. Dialogic expansion refers to the degree to which an utterance makes allowances for dialogically alternative positions and voices, whereas dialogic contraction challenges, fends off, or restricts the scope of positions or voices (Martin and White, 2005: 102). For example, by using certain reporting verbs such as “show” or “demonstrates” one adopts a particular stance towards the attributed proposition, indicating that it is believed to be true. However, by using a verb such as “claim” one presents the proposition as either doubtful or open to question. Thus, a statement such as “He demonstrated that ...” is an example of dialogic contraction and “He claimed that ...” is an example of dialogic expansion (Martin and White, 2005: 103). Martin and White (2005: 104–133) argue that the four engagement meanings identified in their taxonomy are used with either dialogic expansion (enterian and attribute) or dialogic contraction (disclaim or proclaim).

In summary (also see Figure 3.10), engagement includes both monoglossic and heteroglossic projections with heteroglossia illustrating either dialogic expansion or contraction using different engagement meanings.

Figure 3.10: Engagement and its categories

As stated earlier, the present study does not take engagement into account for the purposes of the data analysis. The main reason for this is the fact that the present study is not concerned with engagement but more concerned with LA in terms of attitude and graduation. From the discussion in section 3.3.2, two things have become apparent. Firstly, the insistence on considering aspects of psychology within a linguistic study is not as far-fetched as it may appear to some readers initially. LA clearly also considers the psychological aspects of language as important, explicitly distinguishing between words that could indicate mental processes (versus behavioural ones). Secondly, LA is focused on the expressions of attitude and the grading thereof, and therefore includes useful categories that can be used to identify certain emotions or attitudes. As pointed out in Chapter 1 and 2, suicide notes are a unique genre of texts that is written in a specific emotional state – whether authentic or fabricated. Thus, the emotions expressed in suicide notes are of concern here and the main dimensions of attitude and graduation allow one not only to identify these emotions but also to consider how and if they are graded. That is not to say that analysing suicide notes in terms of engagement will not be worthwhile, but in my opinion that would be a

separate study not linked to the purposes of the present one, since this study is only concerned with identifying emotions and not with determining how they are projected.

The next section discusses LA in linguistic analyses in general and considers the pitfalls of an LA framework. The last section is dedicated to discussing the analyses in the present study.

3.4 Using linguistic appraisal for analysis: arguments for and against

From the discussion on LA in the previous section, it is clear that the framework offers useful categories that can be used to identify and describe appraisal in a variety of different texts, suicide notes included. Since the descriptions focus on different aspects of appraisal, namely, attitude, graduation and engagement, they can be used in various types of analysis in different genres. In my opinion, the flexibility of LA is one of its greatest strengths.

As already mentioned in subsection 3.3.2.1, an LA analysis can be adapted based on the purpose of a study. For example, in a study by Mei and Allison (2003), the evaluative wording of claims in English language essays are analysed from an LA perspective, using all three main domains, attitude, graduation and engagement. Salvi and Turnbull (2010) also choose to make use of all three main domains of LA when they assess appraisal as a methodological tool for the stylistic analysis of press articles. However, Munday (2015) examines the application of LA to the analysis of translation, focusing only on engagement and graduation as a means of determining translator and interpreter positioning, and Križan (2016) explores only the frequency of use and occurrence of attitudinal judgement in British advertisements. Similarly, Hurt and Grant (2019) focus only on the analysis of attitudinal judgement when investigating how violent intent is expressed linguistically in texts that include realised and non-realised violent fantasies. These examples not only support the argument that an LA analysis can be adapted based on the aim of a study and its specific data set, but they also support the decision in the present study to focus only on specific appraisal domains and not to include all available appraisal domains and subcategories based on an evaluation of their usefulness and direct relevance.

Although the LA framework includes various appraisal categories and subcategories that are relevant to the analysis of many texts and can be modified depending on the aim of particular studies, LA analysis suffers from two issues – its application to specialised genres and the undeniable presence of subjectivity.

Hommerberg and Don (2015) note a very important point argued by White (2002), which is that appraisal should be seen as an ongoing research project with many issues that still need to be resolved. One such issue is the framework of appraisal that should be seen as “providing a gross generalisation or a basic draft of categories” (Hommerberg and Don, 2015: 162). Therefore, as already mentioned, the context of the situation and of the culture in which the communication is taking place must be taken into consideration when interpreting attitudinal language or assigning categories under appraisal (Hommerberg and Don, 2015: 162). Two issues with the categories in appraisal mentioned by Hommerberg and Don (2015: 162) are the fuzzy boundaries between the judgement of human behaviour and the appreciation of abstract things identified by Ben-Aaron (2005a, 2005b) and the problem of defining the linguistic unit to which the discourse semantic categories should be applied (Martin and White, 2005). This second issue has already been mentioned in the discussion on LA above, and ways to remedy the situation are included in section 3.5.

In their study, Hommerberg and Don (2015: 165) only make use of the domain of appreciation and its subcategories to analyse the language in wine reviews. They also illustrate the flexibility of LA by using a “fine-grained sub-system of Appreciation, specifically developed for the language of wine appreciation” based on the research of Hommerberg (2011). According to Hommerberg and Don (2015: 185), strong arguments can be made for amendments to the appraisal model’s framework of attitude – specifically for analysing the field of sensory perception, and specifically with respect to the register of “winespeak”. They argue that extensions to the original appraisal system are necessary in order to investigate certain types of specific genre (Hommerberg and Don, 2015: 186). Another interesting observation that is discussed in more detail later is the fact that Hommerberg and Don (2015: 186) noted a clear divergence in the annotations by the two independent annotators they used to verify the reliability of their findings. They argue that these discrepancies can be partly explained based on the differences between the two analysts’ previous experience with the text type as well as familiarity with the socio-cultural context. However, these discrepancies also point to differences in the way which individuals view appraisal taxonomies (Hommerberg and Don, 2015: 186) and already hint at the presence of subjectivity.

In a 2014 study by Macken-Horarik and Isaac, the appraisal systems of attitude and graduation are reviewed to assess their validity for analysing evaluation in narratives and the written responses

by students. According to Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2014: 69–70), they take up three challenges in their study. The first is to analyse both explicit and implicit evaluation in narrative texts and to understand how they combine to contribute to reader positioning. The second challenge concerns the different order of evaluations in narrative texts – referred to as “a localized expression of evaluation (a word or wording)” and its relationship to the wider discourse frames (whole texts). Thirdly, the challenge is to account for the cultural and institution-specific nature of evaluation and the impact it has on the elaboration of choices within appraisal (Macken-Horarik and Isaac, 2014: 70). The detailed methodology proposed by Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2015: 87–88), which addresses their challenges and acts as a guide to take account of appraisal in narratives, consists of eight steps that can be summed up as follows:

1. Identify the target of the appraisal and the source. Start by identifying explicit choices (inscribed attitude) and move to implicit choices (invoked appraisal) before identifying choices that graduate attitude (force or focus).
2. Describe the cumulative effect of these choices by considering attitudinal choices that confirm a feeling tone in a text or indicate levels of graduation or contrasts in the choices for graduation.
3. Map syndromes of choices in one part of the text against other parts. According to Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2014: 86), evaluation is not represented through a single choice for affect or judgement, for example, but through syndromes of evaluation in one or more phases of a text.
4. Code choices using appraisal systems.
5. Take note of any cases of double or triple coding – evaluation can sometimes carry an emotional and ethical charge. Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2014: 88) argue that a category such as appreciation “can involve Valuation, which is both aesthetic *and* ethical in implication” (italics used in original).
6. For multi-vocal texts (more than one voice), a decision must be made on how the evaluative choices made by each voice will be weighed. Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2014: 88) note that not all voices will be heard the same, but the text itself will usually offer instructions in how to weigh the significance of one voice over another.
7. Arrange the choices for appraisal at each stage of the text and align them with particular characters.

8. If more than one text in a particular genre or register is examined, compare choices in one text with those in others.

Although the methodology by Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2014) is specific to analysing narrative texts, it does offer some useful tips that can be applied in the appraisal analysis of other genres and should be considered when dealing with LA in general. Firstly, distinguishing between explicit and implied appraisals is crucial, especially when dealing with certain genres such as suicide notes. This is discussed further in section 3.5. Secondly, the idea that appraisal is not only illustrated by single words and that double or triple coding can occur is probably relevant in most analyses considering more than one appraisal domain at a time.

An important remark by Macken-Horarik and Isaac (2014: 90) is that text analysis is a subjective business. However, they argue that this is not an excuse for “avoidance of rigour and the pursuit of a principled methodology that others can follow” (Macken-Horarik and Isaac, 2014: 90).

While I agree that subjectivity should not be used as an excuse to avoid certain theories or analyses, it is important to note that subjectivity is a major issue in LA, especially in LA annotations, and one that should be acknowledged and addressed accordingly. Fuoli (2015) offers some very important insights into the methodological issues and key challenges involved in analysing texts using appraisal categories and annotations. Although the annotation of the data in the present study is discussed in section 3.5, certain issues are worth mentioning here. Fuoli (2015: 2) emphasises that identifying appraisals in a text is an extremely complex and highly subjective task since evaluative meanings “may be conveyed both explicitly and implicitly through an open-ended range of diverse linguistic forms”. Furthermore, the genre and context of the communication in which text is produced and consumed have a major impact on how we interpret the meanings expressed and on how we consequently annotate these meanings. Fuoli (2015: 2) notes that classifying evaluative expressions into the appraisal categories is also a difficult and subjective task since, as stated by Hommerberg and Don (2015), multiple interpretations for certain textual items are possible and the boundaries between the categories are not always clear-cut. It might appear that automatic annotation techniques will eliminate the problem of subjective annotations. Fuoli (2015: 17) does note that there are several freeware programs available to annotate appraisal. The most widely used is known as UAM CorpusTool (O’Donnell, 2008, 2012). According to Fuoli (2015: 17), this tool allows for the annotating of texts based on a coding scheme defined by the user and

includes useful functions such as a statistics module. UAM also includes what is known as “autocoding” – a function that allows users to automatically assign a label to all instances of a certain word or expression in a corpus (Fuoli, 2015: 17). Another option is the CAT annotation tool (Bartalesi Lenzi, Moretti and Sprugnoli, 2012). The advantages of this tool are that it allows for the annotation of discontinuous texts and includes an inter-coder agreement tool to facilitate the calculation of inter-coder agreement scores between independent analysts (Fuoli, 2015: 17). However, Fuoli and Hommerberg (2015: 315) argue that manual annotations facilitate an exhaustive and detailed analysis of evaluation that would not be possible with purely automatic techniques. According to Fuoli and Hommerberg (2015: 325–326), there are three main issues with automatic annotations of evaluation. Firstly, evaluation can be realised by an open-ended range of expressions, meaning that a pre-set list of evaluative forms will not cover all evaluations in a text or corpus. Secondly, context plays a crucial part in decoding evaluative meaning and needs to be taken into account when identifying relevant forms correctly – something that an automatic system cannot do, since it treats words and expressions in isolation from their original co-texts. Thirdly, evaluative items can span multiple words, meaning that automatic methods based on single words or n-grams will not recognise the real boundaries of the evaluations. Fuoli and Hommerberg (2015) argue the following:

Automatic semantic tagging systems are, to date, insufficiently accurate, and often produce false positives and coding errors (see, for example, Murphy, 2013). Therefore, they do not offer a reliable alternative to traditional corpus methods. Conversely, manual corpus annotation allows us to overcome the challenges described above. By manually annotating text, all evaluative expressions can be identified and counted. Identification and classification can be more accurate, as context and co-text are properly accounted for. However, manual corpus annotation is a complex and subjective process, and this poses challenges to achieving transparent, reliable and replicable analyses.

In the present study, the decision was made not to use an automatic annotation tool but to annotate the data by hand. Firstly, the use of corpus tools always requires manual analysis at some stage since appraisals are subjective and immersed in a social and cultural context (Oteíza, 2017: 470). This means, as stated above, that no automatic annotation tool can account for all the possible evaluative meanings. Secondly, suicide notes represent a specific genre of texts not usually the subject of appraisal analysis studies. Thus, a manual annotation of the suicide notes seemed the safest option. Annotating the data using an automatic system could certainly be attempted in future and the results of the two studies could be compared. Thirdly, the present study makes use of

thought units and very specific annotations and also includes many instances of double coding (where one thought unit includes more than one evaluative expression simultaneously). Given these factors, manual annotation seems a better option. Fourthly, the present study uses data from different cultural and language groups. Given the fact that no annotation program currently exists that can annotate appraisals in Afrikaans texts (to my knowledge, at least), manual annotation is the only option. Therefore, in the interest of consistency, annotating the Afrikaans texts manually means also annotating the English texts manually.

The discussion in this section illustrates two things. Firstly, it emphasises how flexible the appraisal framework is and shows that the framework should be adapted to not only further the concept of LA but also to make it user friendly for the analysis of various text genres. Secondly, the discussion points out some key issues concerning appraisal analysis. Most importantly, it indicates that an appraisal analysis through annotations is highly subjective. This issue is also relevant to the present study and is addressed in the next chapter.


3.5 Annotating appraisal categories in the present study

As already mentioned, the present study only considers some of the main domains of appraisal with their immediate categories and subcategories. This decision was made for two reasons. The first is that the current study places greater emphasis on attitude and graduation within LA and it is therefore not necessary to include engagement as an additional category. Secondly, an initial analysis of some suicide notes indicated that when all the subcategories were further subdivided, the statistics became problematic. Therefore, instead of counting one case of intensification and two cases of quantification as separate subcategories, these are grouped together as three cases of graduation – specifically the use of force. If the suicide notes contained a larger number of each of these subcategories it would make sense to divide the categories further. However, the limited length of the texts and the limited amount of suicide notes means that dividing subcategories further delivers ridiculously low counts. Furthermore, these subdivisions of the subcategories do not contribute anything to the present study. Identifying a word or phrase as an example of focus or force is sufficient in order to support the arguments made in the present study.

Figure 3.11 (next page) offers a summary of the categories used in the present study. Based on the domains and categories, a list of annotations were formulated that are specific to the genre of

suicide notes. All the categories used in the annotations are based on the categories suggested by Martin and White (2005), but some specific adaptations are proposed to fit the genre of suicide notes.

Figure 3.11: Appraisal domains and categories used in the annotations




Fuoli (2015) makes several suggestions concerning his stepwise annotation method. Firstly, he suggests three general principles when annotating appraisal. These are the following (Fuoli, 2015: 14–15):

1. All choices should be accounted for.
2. The annotation guidelines should be tested and refined until maximum reliability is achieved.
3. Reliability should always be assessed, and the reliability scores reported and discussed.

In terms of the method, Fuoli (2015: 16) suggests the steps in Figure 3.12. It is important to note that Fuoli (2015: 15) emphasises that not all appraisal analyses necessarily need to cover all the categories of the model, but argues that the annotation scheme (or the list of categories and subcategories used in the annotations) should be defined in relation to the research questions, the goal of the study and the specific features of the texts under study.

Figure 3.12: The steps for annotating appraisal (adapted from Fuoli, 2015))



I consider these steps and the general principles in relation to the present study in the rest of the discussion in this section.

In terms of the present study, the aim has already been defined and discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The argument is that if the hypothesis in the present study is false, and there are distinctive linguistic characteristics that could be used to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, analysing the suicide notes from an appraisal perspective would offer valuable insights and could be used to identify some of these distinctive characteristics. Therefore, based on the genre

of texts being analysed, the present study is particularly concerned with how those who write authentic suicide notes, fabricated suicide notes and parasuicide notes express evaluative language in terms of attitude and graduation.

No annotation software was used in this study. All data were annotated by hand. As already discussed, the specific nature of the annotations and the fact that the present study incorporates Afrikaans suicide notes means that manual annotation is the best option at present. For this reason, both the test-retest and interrater reliability tests were conducted to ensure replicability and transparency in the present study. The annotations in this study were formulated based on a thorough read-through of the data, keeping the original categories and subcategories proposed by Martin and White (2005) in mind. Notes were made when a specific thought unit expressed an evaluation that needed to be adapted from the original model. This ensured that all possible choices for annotations were considered. The next sections discuss the annotation criteria for each category individually.

3.5.1 Annotating affect

As discussed earlier, *affect* is either negative or positive and can be directly stated or indirectly implied. Three realis categories of affect were identified in the previous sections and are also used for analysing the data in this study: happiness/unhappiness, security/insecurity and satisfaction/dissatisfaction. The irrealis category of affect, namely, fear/desire is also considered.

Happiness and unhappiness include four subcategories: happiness (cheer)/happiness (affection)/unhappiness (misery – mood in author)/unhappiness (antipathy – directed at someone else).

With regard to security/insecurity the subcategories are insecurity (disquiet); expressing feelings of being uneasy or anxious/insecurity (surprise); being taken aback/astonished by something/security (confidence)/security (trust); being comfortable with something/someone.

Satisfaction and dissatisfaction are subdivided into dissatisfaction (ennui); being bored or fed up/dissatisfaction (displeasure); being cross or angry/satisfaction (interest); being curious about something or engrossed in something/satisfied (admiration); being satisfied or impressed.

Fear includes indications of being fearful or wary, while desire refers to indications of longing for something/someone.

For the purposes of the present study, *affect* is annotated with the categories included in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Affect categories used in the study

Happiness (cheer): refers to the mood of the author. [+ affect, hap, cheer]	The author expresses feeling cheerful/positive/enthusiastic/motivated/glad etc.
Happiness (affection): feelings directed at someone else. [+ affect, hap, aff]	The author expresses feelings of love towards another/of adoring someone else/of being fond of someone
Unhappiness (misery): refers to the mood of the author. [- affect, unhap, mis]	Feeling down/sad/depressed. “Desire” is included here if it is not expressed as an irrealis affect (and depending on the context).
Unhappiness (antipathy): feelings directed at someone else. [- affect, unhap, anti]	Disliking someone else
Security (confidence) [+ affect, sec, conf]	Being sure of something, confident about something or knowing something
Security (trust) [+ affect, sec, trust]	Being comfortable with someone/something or trusting someone. It can also refer to an author asking someone else to do something for them
Insecurity (disquiet) [- affect, insecurity, disq]	Expressing feelings of being uneasy, anxious or unsure. “Fear” is included here if it is not expressed as an irrealis affect (and depending on the context).
Insecurity (surprise) [- affect, insecurity, surp]	Being taken aback or astonished by something
Satisfaction (interest) [+ affect, sat, int]	Being curious about someone or something

Satisfaction (admiration) [+ affect, sat, adm]	Being impressed or proud
Dissatisfaction (ennui) [- affect, dissat, en]	Expressing boredom or being fed up
Dissatisfaction (displeasure) [- affect, dissat, displ]	Expressing feelings of anger
Fear [- affect, fear]	Being fearful or wary
Desire [- affect, desire]	Missing someone or longing for someone

The aim of the annotations in Table 3.3 is to be as simple as possible (in order to increase the accurate use thereof across texts) but also to include as many options as possible. Certain categories such as *security (trust)* have also been adapted in order to fit into the genre of the texts being analysed. Here, “trust” also includes an author asking someone else for help or asking them (requesting) to do something, be it phoning someone, looking after someone, completing a task etc.

3.5.2 Annotating judgement

Although *judgement* in appraisal is usually viewed as something expressed about other people (Martin and Rose, 2003), for the purposes of this study *judgement* can also include judgements an author makes about himself/herself. Therefore, *judgement* is divided into a positive or negative judgement that is directly stated or implied and refers to another person or the author himself/herself (see Table 3.4)

Table 3.4: Judgement categories used in the study

Judgement of esteem (normality) [judgement, est, norm]	Refers to how normal or unusual someone is
Judgement of esteem (capacity) [judgement, est, cap]	Refers to the physical capabilities or incapacities of an individual. This would

	include any physical activities that the writer might perform such as getting out of bed, raising children etc.
Judgement of esteem (tenacity) [judgement, est, ten]	Refers to the mental capabilities or incapacibilities of an individual. This would include any references to the writer's mental strength or lack thereof, for example quitting a bad habit, continuing with life etc.
Judgement of sanction (veracity) [judgement, sanc, ver]	Refers to how truthful or untruthful someone is
Judgement of sanction (propriety) [judgement, sanc, prop]	Refers to how ethical or unethical someone is

In terms of both *affect* and *judgement*, these expressions are either positive or negative and both the expressions can be either “direct” or “implied”. This means that a person can directly express happiness, misery, judgement of normality etc., or imply these same expressions. Concerning the annotations, a direct statement is indicated with “DIR” before the positive or negative symbol and an implied affect is indicated with “IMPL”. For example, the following two statements from the data in the present study can be interpreted as follows:

I love you = (positive) **direct**, explicit expression of happiness (affection).

You could have helped me out = (negative) **implied** expression of judgement of sanction (propriety).

If one were to annotate them using the annotations discussed thus far, they would look like this:

I love you [**DIR** + *affect, hap, aff*]

You could have helped me out [**IMPL** – *judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd*]

Note the “2nd” added to the last annotation. In terms of *judgement*, a distinction is also drawn between a judgement about another person and a judgement the author makes about himself/herself. Thus, the following tags are added:

1. For a judgement about another individual, the tag “2nd” is used.
2. For a judgement referring to the author, the tag “1st” is used.

3.5.3 Annotating appreciation

Annotating appreciation in the present study is quite simple. A distinction is made between positive and negative appreciation (of things or objects) and it is annotated as either [+ appreciation] or [- appreciation].

3.5.4 Annotating graduation

Again, this category offers a simple annotation in the present study. With regard to the use of *focus* or *force* in a specific text, no distinction is made between the subcategories of these types of graduation. *Focus* and *force* in the suicide notes are investigated by using the tags [grad, focus] and [grad, force].

It is important to note that multiple annotations of a single thought unit are possible. Salvi and Turnbull (2010: 110) also mention this in their study, stating that two or more appraisal resources can combine to deliver the meaning. In their case, they argue that in the sentence: *Since the Prime Minister made his promise in September 2007, the number of migrants employed has risen sharply while the number of Britons has dropped*, negative judgement of the Prime Minister’s behaviour (failing to maintain his promise) is combined with graduation (force) to express attitude (Salvi and Turnbull, 2010: 110). The present study also takes this into account. For this reason, multiple annotations of a single thought unit are possible. For example:

I have always [grad, force] known [DIR + affect, sec, confident], and I told you I hurt everyone or anything I touch [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st].

Providing rules for applying appraisal categories in any analysis is quite difficult, since different analysts will probably not understand or interpret all appraisal categories in the same way (Fuoli, 2015; Fuoli and Hommerberg, 2015). Nonetheless, the following rules were followed in the present study:

1. Similar to Martin and White's (2005: 58–59) “clause frames”, each sentence in every suicide note is considered in terms of its possible expressions of *affect*, *judgement* and *appreciation* and its inclusion of *graduation*. Thus, when a suicide note is read, each thought unit is marked and then the analyst asks “does this express a specific realis or irrealis affect?”, “does this express a particular judgement?”, “does this express appreciation for something?”, “is force or focus used in any way?”.
2. After the appraisal category is roughly determined, additional decisions can be made by asking whether the statement is positive or negative, direct or implied, and whether (in terms of judgement) it refers to the author's action or the actions of others.
3. Thought units were annotated in two ways. Either evaluations were annotated directly next to their expressions, or they were annotated at the end of a thought unit in cases where one expression could be interpreted as multiple annotations. For example:

It doesn't seem like anyone wants to help me [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. I know [DIR + affect, sec, conf] you don't either [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] (Annotations directly next to expressions).

I can no longer endure the pain and agony of life [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis] (Annotation string at the end of a thought unit including multiple expressions).

The discussion in section 3.5.1 provides guidelines for annotating appraisal in the present study and can be seen as the “annotation manual” described by Fuoli (2015). According to Fuoli (2015: 17), an annotation manual is a document that should include “an outline of the annotation scheme, the category definitions, explicit rules for applying the definitions to the data set under study, including detailed instructions on how to unitize instances of APPRAISAL and deal with ambiguous or multifunctional items, and illustrative examples”. Furthermore, Fuoli (2015: 17) argues that such a manual must be context-specific, meaning that the definitions and coding guidelines should be shaped around the characteristics of the texts that are being annotated.

3.6 Conclusion

The present chapter not only reflected on the suitability and value of considering linguistic appraisal categories when analysing suicide notes but also indicated the possible problems and

pitfalls when annotating texts using linguistic appraisal. The considerations discussed here should be read in conjunction with the discussions in Chapter 4, which include information on the two reliability tests performed in the present study. From Figure 3.12, it is clear that these tests form an integral part of any study where appraisal annotations are considered.

Chapter 4

Corpora, methodology and analyses

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 describes three important aspects of the present study: the corpora, the methodology and the analyses. The results are discussed separately in Chapter 5. In order to facilitate a discussion about the results in the present study, an in-depth look at the corpora used and the methodology followed are crucial aspects to discuss before considering the analyses that are included.

Up to this point, the theory or description used to annotate the data has been discussed. However, it is important to note that linguistic appraisal is not a methodology. While appraisal theory seems a plausible theory to use in the analysis of suicide notes and suicide note comparisons, a specific methodology needs to be employed in order to analyse the results of the annotations discussed in Chapter 3.

This chapter explores different but related aspects of the methodology. Firstly, the methodology for determining the reliability of the annotations is discussed and, secondly, the methodology used for the comparisons of the annotations is considered. The software used for each of the aforementioned analyses is also discussed briefly. However, before considering a detailed discussion of the methodologies, one needs to concentrate on the corpora used in the present study and how the corpora are annotated, since corpora always have an effect on the use of specific methodologies and the reliability of the results. The larger part of the discussions concerning the annotations is found in Chapter 3 but certain aspects of the annotations are also discussed here.

4.2 The corpora

The corpora used in the present study are briefly discussed in Chapter 1. Gathering the corpora for the present study proved difficult. Firstly, massive corpora of suicide notes are not available for research since so few people actually leave suicide notes and not all suicide notes found at a crime scene are kept for research purposes. Secondly, owing to the sensitive nature of suicide notes, those who have collected corpora cannot simply publish them in books or articles. In the present study, the corpora were selected in three ways. The first was to consult books that included suicide notes

as appendices. The suicide notes for the Leenaars corpus as well as the Shneidman and Farberow corpus were all collected from published books. The second method used to collect data was to contact researchers who had published studies on suicide notes and suicide note comparisons to find out whether they would be willing and able to share their research. Dr Black and Dr Lester both responded and they shared their corpora for the purposes of this study. A third and final method was to collect my own corpus of suicide notes. This was done through correspondence with the Magistrates Court in Pretoria, South Africa. I contacted the court and explained why I needed the data. After providing proof of ethical clearance and agreeing not to publish full length suicide notes or identify the writers in any way, I was granted two days to collect data directly from the court. The data were collected by working through hundreds of dockets that indicated possible suicide on the docket cover. Incidents identified as “injury to the head”, “gassing” or “hanging” were all considered possible suicide cases. Since I was not allowed to take the dockets out of the court, I took pictures of the letters and retyped them word for word in order to store them on a computer in Word.doc format. The corpora supplied by Dr Black and Dr Leenaars were already in Word.doc format. I also retyped the Leenaars and Shneidman and Farberow corpora from the books in order to have access to everything electronically.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the present study makes use of two main data sets (authentic and fabricated suicide notes), subdivided into eight specific data sets (see Table 4.1). Since the aim of the study was to compare authentic and fabricated suicide notes to determine whether they include statistically significant differences, one could argue that all the authentic suicide notes should be grouped together and compared with the fabricated suicide notes (also grouped together as a single dataset). With any sort of linguistic comparison, more data is always the better option and therefore it is desirable to compare large corpora with each other. However, Reppen (2010: 31) notes that the question of how much data to collect is a difficult one to answer. According to Reppen, there is no “one size fits all” in terms of a corpus and each corpus size will be determined by the aim of the study (Reppen, 2010: 31–32). Having said that, the corpora in the present study are extremely small. Reppen (2010: 32) notes that a “relatively small” corpus contains about 40 000 words. In the present study, the word count for all the suicide notes (authentic and fabricated) is only 344 – much less than even the smaller corpora used in linguistic analyses and comparisons. This demonstrates the first challenge in analysing suicide notes. As discussed in Chapter 1, Fincham et al (2011) criticise studies that analyse suicide notes based on the fact that these studies make use

of such small corpora. However, as also mentioned in Chapter 1, analysing small corpora of suicide notes represents a realistic perspective on the challenges that forensic linguists face. Furthermore, since various previous studies have successfully made use of small corpora (Arbeit and Blatt, 1973; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Leenaars, 1988; Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999; Shapero, 2011 and Ioannou and Debowska, 2014), the present study will too.

There is another problem with grouping the corpora together, which prevents the formation of larger corpora in this study. Firstly, the South African corpora represent two different languages, Afrikaans and English, meaning that the authentic suicide notes from South Africa cannot be grouped together nor grouped with the authentic suicide notes from the USA. Researchers such as Leenaars and O’Conner (2004), Hafez (2006) and Lazarides, Wassenaar and Sekhesa (2018) have indicated that culture plays a very important role in the content of suicide notes and therefore the cultural background of the suicide note writers should be taken into account before suicide notes are grouped. Furthermore, the authentic suicide notes from the USA also do not represent a single culture, since the suicide notes were written at different times (between 1945 and 1988) and by people from different backgrounds. Finally, and most problematic, the fabricated suicide notes represent one set of homogeneous suicide notes and one set of heterogeneous suicide notes. This refers to the fact that one set of notes was written by individuals from the same race, age group and gender while the other set was written by individuals representing different ages and genders (the race of these note writers are unclear). This alone makes it impossible to group these two sets of notes together.

Based on the issues discussed above, the decision was made to keep each smaller set of suicide notes separate. Table 4.1 includes the descriptions and the note counts for each of the corpora used in the present study.

Table 4.1: A summary of the corpora

AUTHENTIC SUICIDE NOTES		
Corpus name	Note count	Compiler
SFC_a	33	E. S. Shneidman and N. L. Farberow (notes dated 1944–1953)
LSC	19	D. Lester (1980s)
LNC	52	A. A. Leenaars (notes dated 1983–1984)
BC_a	74	S. Black (notes dated 1985–1986)
GC_Af	34	L. Grundlingh (notes dated 2006–2013)
GC_En	25	
FABRICATED SUICIDE NOTES		
Corpus name	Note count	Compiler
SFC_f	33	E. S. Shneidman and N. L. Farberow (notes produced in the 1950s)
BC_f	74	S. Black (notes produced in the 1980s)

It is clear from Table 4.1 that the corpora in the present study provide only minimal opportunity for an analysis using linguistic appraisal. Since the present study analyses the corpora using thought units, it means that the number of annotations is reduced compared to a study looking at

individual words such as verbs, nouns or adjectives. The challenge with annotating limited text is only one potential issue with the annotations that needs to be considered. Another issue one should take into account is the reliability of the annotations. These issues are discussed below.

4.3 Determining reliability¹¹

Fuoli (2015) argues that since annotating appraisal is such a highly subjective task, reliability testing is crucial when such annotations are undertaken (Fuoli, 2015: 12). Apart from being subjective, annotating appraisals is also a complex and cognitively demanding task, posing a serious challenge to the reliability, replicability and transparency of any analysis based on such a model (Fuoli, 2015: 12). In terms of reliability, Fuoli (2015: 12) identifies three types: test-retest reliability, internal consistency reliability and interrater reliability. According to Feder (2008), the test-retest reliability type is a statistical technique used to estimate measurement error by repeating a measurement process on the same subject, under similar conditions, and comparing the observations. Fuoli (2015: 12) notes that this is a difficult task if analysts only rely on their own intuitions, rather than on explicit and formalised annotation criteria. A person's knowledge and understanding of the annotations can change over time, leading to inconsistent annotations. The second type, internal consistency reliability, measures the extent to which an analyst is consistent in applying coding guidelines and treating similar textual items the same throughout a text or corpus (Fuoli, 2015: 12). It is particularly difficult to achieve internal consistency in an appraisal analysis since the lack of clarity about identification criteria and the ambiguity of some categories could lead to consistency problems (Fuoli, 2015: 12). In terms of the third type, interrater reliability, Tinsley and Weiss (1975: 359) define it as "the extent to which the different judges tend to make exactly the same judgement about the rated subject". According to Fuoli and Hommerberg (2015: 330), interrater agreement can be used for evaluating the reliability of specific corpus annotation, based on the assumption that data are considered reliable if coders or annotators agree on the categories assigned to units. Fuoli (2015: 13) notes that achieving robust interrater reliability is necessary to ensure both the replicability of the annotation procedure and of the results. However, Fuoli (2015) and Fuoli and Hommerberg (2015) note that achieving a satisfactory level of interrater reliability is especially difficult when annotating appraisal categories:

¹¹ Please note that a statistician assisted with both the reliability testing and the comparison analyses.

APPRAISAL analysis is, as demonstrated above, highly subjective; the analyst's individual knowledge, beliefs and reading position will inevitably affect the annotation process. In addition, the model's often under-specified or ambiguous category definitions leave much room for subjective and even arbitrary decisions (Fuoli, 2015: 13).

To improve both reliability and replicability, Fuoli (2015: 13) suggests defining explicit annotation criteria. He also emphasises that all the decisions made during the annotation process and the context-specific annotation guidelines used should be made available to other analysts. As discussed in Chapter 1, ethical guidelines and limitations prevent the distribution of the data in the current study as part of this thesis. However, if the annotations are requested from the researcher, the data could be shared privately, within the limits as indicated by policy and legislation.¹² Having said that, the context-specific annotation guidelines used in the present study are included as Appendices A and B.

In the present study, two reliability tests were performed. Firstly, interrater reliability tests were performed in order to determine the reliability of the data in terms of their appraisal category annotations. Secondly, a test-retest reliability test was performed to calculate the researcher's accuracy and reliability in annotating the data.

4.3.1 Interrater reliability

The interrater reliability testing took place in March of 2019. The researcher randomly selected 30 short excerpts from the authentic suicide note corpora in the present study. Only 30 excerpts were chosen since the data are sensitive and a large number of the data could not be distributed to the coders due to ethical limitations. The excerpts were divided into two sets, each consisting of 15 excerpts. One set contained only Afrikaans texts while the other contained only English texts. The English texts were taken from the corpora by American suicide note writers. Eleven independent reviewers were asked to annotate each of the 30 excerpts based on the instructions sent to them via e-mail. The e-mail contained a short explanation of what was expected of the coders. The coders were notified that participation was voluntary and that they could choose to withdraw at any time. Coders were also instructed to delete all files from their computer after the annotations were complete since they did not have permission to keep the excerpts from the suicide notes (see Appendices A and B). The annotators had to be fluent in both Afrikaans and English but, owing

¹² Subject to signing a confidentiality agreement.

to the limited number of reviewers available, no other specific demographics (gender, age etc.) were considered here, although all the reviewers had to be educated on a tertiary level. From the start, some challenges with the independent coders and their annotations were noted. Firstly, all communication took place via e-mail since there was no way to gather all the coders for a face-to-face discussion (in my opinion, a face-to-face discussion might have improved the coders' understanding of the annotations). For example, in one case the coder completed all the annotations in an incorrect format and therefore their annotations could not be used. This meant that one coder's annotations had to be eliminated. Secondly, understanding appraisal and understanding how to annotate thought units is something that is not necessarily easy to grasp. Although the annotators ranged in levels of education from honours students to professors, all the annotators struggled to understand some aspects of the annotations – such as taking positive and negative appraisals into account, as well as considering implied and direct judgements, and first and second person directed appraisals. Although guidelines were provided, they did not seem to assist the coders in all instances. As Fuoli (2015: 13) mentions, under-specific and ambiguous categories lead to various annotation problems. An effort was made to make the annotation guidelines as specific as possible, but annotation issues still arose with coders not indicating positive or negative judgement, not indicating implied or direct appraisals and becoming seemingly confused by categories such as judgements of tenacity versus judgements of capacity. Proposed resolutions to these problems are discussed in section 4.4.

In an ideal situation, the interrater reliability testing would consist of multiple retesting and the retraining of the coders. Fuoli (2015: 13) notes that a high level of interrater agreement indicates that the annotation task is well defined and designed, meaning that it is potentially replicable. However, low levels of agreement indicate that the coding scheme is defective or that the coders need to be retrained. In the present study, the limited availability of the coders meant that only a single annotation process by the coders could be completed. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the results of the interrater reliability testing will only indicate how reliable the annotations are from a single test, as no retesting could be done to improve the agreement between the coders and the researcher. This was taken into account when the final annotations of all the data were completed, which is discussed in section 4.4.

For both the reliability testing and the analysis of the comparisons, the SPSS statistics software program was used. In order to analyse the data using the software, all data had to be produced in Excel format. These sheets needed to include the number of texts (or units) being analysed and the number of coders being compared (in both the interrater and test-retest reliability testing). Examples of what the data looked like after being processed for analysis are included in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.

For the purposes of this interrater reliability testing, the original annotations of the 30 excerpts by the researcher (during 2018) were compared to each text annotated by the coders. To do this, the annotations by the researcher in each of the excerpts were identified and each coder's annotations compared to determine their agreement. For example, if the researcher identified three annotations in excerpt 1 ([*affect, unhap, mis*]; [*grad, force*]; [*judgement, est, cap, Ist*]) and coder 1 identified only two of them ([*grad, force*]; [*judgement, est, cap, Ist*]), it was indicated that coder 1 had two categories that agreed with the annotations of the researcher. Figure 4.1 is an example of what the data looked like after the counts had been finalised.

Figure 4.1: An example of the data used to determine interrater reliability

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
1		Annot 0	Annot 1	Annot 2	Annot 3	Annot 4	Annot 5	Annot 6	Annot 7	Annot 8	Annot 9	Annot 10
2	Text 1	3	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	0	2	0
3	Text 2	6	0	3	3	5	2	2	1	3	4	1
4	Text 3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	1	0
5	Text 4	7	3	2	2	4	1	1	3	2	5	2
6	Text 5	5	2	2	4	3	2	1	2	2	5	4
7	Text 6	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
8	Text 7	7	1	2	0	3	3	1	2	2	3	4
9	Text 8	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	1
10	Text 9	3	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2
11	Text 10	2	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0
12	Text 11	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	0	0	1	1
13	Text 12	5	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	1	4	2
14	Text 13	9	4	1	4	4	2	2	4	2	4	2
15	Text 14	11	4	3	3	8	2	2	6	3	6	4
16	Text 15	3	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2

The researcher's number of annotations is indicated under "Annotator 0". Annotators 1 to 10 represent the independent coders. The coders were only identified by numbers to ensure their anonymity.

During the analysis of the coders' annotations, one problem became especially obvious – the coders struggled to decide whether certain appraisals were implied or direct. In order to manage this problem, a decision was made to ignore that part of the annotation. Thus, if the researcher identified a judgement as [*DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd*] and a coder identified the same judgement as [*IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd*], the two annotations would be identified as equivalent. Approaching the annotations for the category of *judgement* in this way may be considered problematic, since it might be construed as an attempt to manipulate the data or an indication that the coders' annotations were interpreted as incorrect. This is not the case. Identifying an author's judgements as direct or implied was not an official aspect of this particular linguistic appraisal category. It was merely an observation by the researcher that provided a second layer of analysis for categories of judgements (and other linguistic appraisal categories). Deciding whether a judgement is direct or implied is not as essential as deciding whether a judgement belongs to *esteem* or *sanction*, or whether it can be categorised under *normality*, or *veracity*. Thus, eliminating that part of the annotation has no effect on the linguistic appraisal category identified by the coder nor does it deny the subjective nature of the annotations. In fact, the arguments by Fuoli (2015) and Fouli and Hommerberg (2015) that annotating a text using LA categories is difficult and subjective were supported during the interrater reliability testing and led to some concerns about the reliability of the annotations. The results in Chapter 5 indicate that the interrater reliability produced very low reliability scores. This is problematic since it means there is no consensus on the annotations that should be used. Since no retraining of the coders or retesting of the reliability took place, an alternative option had to be employed. This option included considering the annotations of each coder (including the researcher) and adjusting the annotation tool accordingly (as one would when coders are retrained). However, instead of retraining the coders and rerunning the tests, each text in each corpus was re-evaluated using this improved version of the tool. These adjustments and further considerations based on the test-retest reliability discussed below are included in section 4.4. This is by no means a foolproof solution, but it does afford one the opportunity to try and increase the correlation between the annotations of the coders and those of the researcher – which is ultimately the point of retraining coders and retesting the improved annotation tool.

4.3.2 Test-retest reliability

As mentioned in section 4.3, test-retest reliability is used to determine the reliability of the researcher's annotations over a specific period. Thus, the researcher would annotate the same texts over a period of time and under similar circumstances to determine whether the annotations remained constant. In terms of the present study, the researcher re-annotated 20 excerpts from the suicide notes in the corpora. Once again, the excerpts were randomly selected and divided into an Afrikaans set (10 notes) and an English set (10 notes). The first set of annotations was performed in 2018 while the retest annotations were performed in March of 2019.

The annotations were analysed and summarised in a similar manner to the interrater reliability testing (see Figure 4.2). In this case, the researcher's 2018 annotations were the benchmark and each text with its 2019 annotations was compared to the 2018 set to determine whether the same annotations were used in each case.

Figure 4.2: An example of the data used to determine test-retest reliability

	A	B	C
1		2018	2019
2	Text 1	14	6
3	Text 2	8	3
4	Text 3	10	7
5	Text 4	8	5
6	Text 5	9	7
7	Text 6	11	7
8	Text 7	14	5
9	Text 8	15	8
10	Text 9	8	6
11	Text 10	5	5

Figure 4.2 only represents the annotations of the English texts. From this figure, one can see that there is a decrease in annotations in the texts annotated in 2019. This again indicates the subjective nature of the annotations and how the annotations could change over time. One reason for this might be the annotator's opinion on what constitutes a thought unit. Another reason might be the annotator's interpretation of a thought unit. These two problems were identified during the test-

retest analysis and addressed when the final annotations on all the data were completed. A discussion on this follows in section 4.4.

4.3.3 Krippendorff's alpha

With both the interrater reliability and the test-retest reliability calculations, Krippendorff's alpha (hereafter referred to as $K\alpha$) was computed to determine the reliability. According to Krippendorff (2011: 1), $K\alpha$ is a reliability coefficient that was specifically developed to measure agreement among observers, coders, judges or raters. It can also be used to measure instruments that draw distinctions among typically unstructured phenomena or assign computable values to them. Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) note that $K\alpha$ can generalise across scales of measurement and it can be used with any number of observers. Furthermore, $K\alpha$ can be calculated with or without missing data and works with any metric or level of measurement (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio etc.). It can also be used with large and small sample sizes (Krippendorff, 2011). Therefore, $K\alpha$ satisfies all of the important criteria suggested for a good measure of reliability (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007: 78) and, for this reason, was considered an appropriate reliability calculation in the present study.

As mentioned earlier, all the analyses in the present study were performed using SPSS statistical software. Like the Kruskal-Wallis analysis that is discussed in section 4.4.2, Krippendorff's alpha runs in SPSS according to a specific syntax. This syntax can be downloaded from the following website: <http://afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html>

According to De Swert (2012), the basic syntax command you need to give in SPSS in order to run the Krippendorff alpha is quite simple: `KALPHA judges = judgelist/level = lev/detail = det/boot = z`. However, one will first need to run the macro syntax by Hayes (2019)¹³ available on the website referred to above. In the syntax command referred to by De Swert (2012), the customisation depends on the specific test. In order to customise the command for the present study, the “judgelist” was replaced with the names of the coders. In this case, ten coders are listed. The level, or “lev” refers to the information on the measurement level of the variable being tested. In the present study, the level is X – which refers to X variables. The section of the command

¹³ The website <http://afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html> is Dr A. F. Hayes' personal website where he provides access to macros he has written himself for both SPSS and SAS.

indicating the “detail” can be set to either 0 or 1 depending on the level of detail one requires. The final part, “z”, determines how much bootstrapping SPSS should perform. According to De Swert (2012: 4), this can be dropped if it is considered unnecessary. Thus, the basic syntax command for the present study is:

```
KALPHA judges = Annot_0 Annot_1 Annot_2 Annot_3 Annot_4 Annot_5
Annot_6 Annot_7 Annot_8 Annot_9 Annot_10/level = 4/detail = 0
```

Although $K\alpha$ is often referred to as a reliability measure, researchers like Gwet (2015) refer to it as an agreement estimate. In fact, there seems to be some confusion about whether $K\alpha$ measures *agreement* or *reliability*. Some researchers (including Krippendorff himself) use both terms with reference to the measure (Krippendorff, 2010; Antione, Villaneau and Lefeuvre, 2014; Krippendorff, 2017). According to Shweta, Bajpai and Chaturvedi (2015: 20), the terms *interrater agreement* (IRA) and *interrater reliability* (IRR) are often used interchangeably although there is a technical distinction between the two terms. IRA refers to the degree to which two or more judges or evaluators assign the same rating to an identical observable situation when using the same scale. On the other hand, IRR is a generic term for rater consistency and refers to “the extent to which raters can consistently distinguish different items on a measurement scale” (Shweta et al, 2015: 20). In order to illustrate this, Shweta et al (2015) use the hypothetical example of ratings assigned to different teachers. This example is included in Table 4.2 below. Shweta et al (2015: 20–21) explain that the agreement measure indicates how frequently the evaluators assign exactly the same rating, while reliability measures the relative similarity between the sets of ratings.

Table 4.2: An example of the differences between agreement and reliability (adapted from Shweta et al, 2015: 20)

	Low agreement		High agreement	
	High reliability		High reliability	
	Rater 1	Rater 2	Rater 3	Rater 4
Teacher A	1	2	1	1

Teacher B	2	3	2	2
Teacher C	3	4	3	3
Teacher D	4	5	4	4
AGREEMENT	0.0		1.0	
RELIABILITY	1.0		1.0	

From the table above it is clear that evaluators who have little to no agreement can still have high interrater reliability. Raters 1 and 2 agree on the performance of the teachers, rating Teacher A with the lowest score and Teacher D with the highest score – even though the scores differ. Therefore, the agreement between the raters is zero but the reliability is perfect. However, raters 3 and 4 agree on both aspects: the absolute level and the relative order of the teachers’ performance. As is evident from Table 4.2, these raters therefore achieve perfect agreement and reliability. Based on the arguments by Shweta et al (2015), it appears that the way $K\alpha$ is employed in the present study and the fact that it measures the extent to which raters assign the same precise value to each observable item, $K\alpha$ appears to essentially be an agreement measure and not a measure of reliability. However, Krippendorff (2010) argues that $K\alpha$ is a statistical measure of agreement designed to indicate reliability (Krippendorff, 2010: 669). This suggests that, at least for $K\alpha$, the agreement measure indicates reliability. This would explain the interchangeable use of these terms in research specifically referring to $K\alpha$.

Krippendorff (2011: 1) states that the general form of $K\alpha$ (or simply α according to Krippendorff’s explanation) is:

$$\alpha = 1 - \frac{D_o}{D_e}$$

Here D_o refers to the *observed* disagreement among values assigned to the units of analysis, whereas D_e refers to the disagreement *expected* when reliability is absent (Krippendorff, 2010; Krippendorff, 2011; Krippendorff, 2017). This is defined as “the total lack of any relationship

between the data and the phenomena of interest” (Krippendorff, 2017). Algebraically, $K\alpha$ can be interpreted as follows:

When the observers, coders or judges agree perfectly, observed disagreement is zero and $K\alpha$ is one ($D_o = 0$; $\alpha = 1$). This indicates perfect reliability. However, when observers, coders or judges agree as if chance had produced the results, $D_o = D_e$ and $\alpha = 0$. This indicates no reliability (Krippendorff, 2011). Krippendorff explains these interpretations as follows:

$\alpha = 0$ occurs when observers are unable to distinguish among units or assign values to them drawn randomly from a collective estimate of the population of data. To rely on data generated by any method, α needs to be far from these two extreme conditions, ideally $\alpha = 1$. For reliability considerations, α 's range is: $1 \geq \alpha \geq 0 \left\{ \frac{-\text{Systematic agreement}}{\pm \text{Sampling errors}} \right\}$ (Krippendorff, 2011: 1).

As is evident in Chapter 5, the results in the present study indicate low to no agreement between the coders and between the researcher's own annotations. This poses concerns regarding the reliability of the annotations in the present study. Since the suggested solution of retraining the annotators and retesting the data could not be followed in the present study (see section 4.3.1 for a short discussion on this issue), alternative solutions to these challenges were implemented. These are discussed in section 4.4 below.

4.4 Comparing the annotations: problems and solutions

While section 4.3 focused on determining the reliability of the annotations, section 4.4 is dedicated to discussing the comparisons of the annotations. Up to this point, it has been repeatedly mentioned that the interrater and test-retest measurements indicated low reliability. This is an obvious concern when the annotations of the corpora are central to the comparisons. The interrater and test-retest reliability were computed before the final comparisons between the different corpora were completed. When the two reliability tests were performed, the researcher noted certain issues that could explain the low reliability scores. Some of these were mentioned earlier in this chapter, but for the sake of clarity, they are repeated here.

Firstly, it became obvious that there was some confusion about implied and direct appraisals. This issue was addressed during the reliability testing by deciding not to consider those sections of the annotations (see section 4.3.1 for the discussion). Secondly, there would appear to have been conflicting views on which thought units express *tenacity* versus *capacity*. In various cases, the

researcher identified *tenacity* and the coders identified *capacity*. I include one example from the reliability tests. The full annotated texts are available in Appendices C and D. In the example below it is clear that the researcher and the coder have different conceptions of what indicates “tenacity” and what indicates “capacity”:

Researcher’s annotation: *I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn’t take the pressure [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]*

Coder’s annotation: *I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn’t take the pressure [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st]*

In the instructions provided to the coders (see Appendix B), judgements of capacity refer to how capable or incapable someone is. The example given explains that if someone is either physically or mentally unable to do something, they would be considered “incapable”. On the other hand, judgements of tenacity are described as indicating how tenacious or weak and undetermined someone is. Again, if someone indicated that they could not physically or mentally continue with something one could say that they are “undetermined”. The problem here is that these two descriptions are too similar for judgements that, in my opinion, describe two different things. Thus, insufficient definitions are most probably the cause of these inconsistencies. To remedy this, a decision was made to rethink the definitions of each of these in the context of suicide notes and recheck every annotation that was initially annotated as either a judgement of capacity or a judgement of tenacity. Before a recheck of the annotations was performed, the concepts of *capacity* and *tenacity* were redefined as follows within the context of this study (also see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3):

1. Judgements of esteem (capacity) refer to the physical capabilities or incapacities of an individual. This would include any physical activities that the writer might perform such as getting out of bed, raising children etc.
2. Judgements of esteem (tenacity) refer to the mental capabilities or incapacities of an individual. This would include any references to the writer’s mental strength or lack thereof, for example quitting a bad habit, continuing with life etc.

Thirdly, it became clear that there were inconsistencies concerning the annotating of graduation. In the initial set of annotations from 2018, the researcher had grouped all instances of graduation together and annotated them as one. For example: I am so very sorry [*grad, force*]. However, in the 2019 annotations the researcher felt that such thought units expressed more than one instance of graduation and should be annotated as such. In the example above, the individual could have said “I am so sorry” or “I am very sorry”, but chose to use both “I am so very sorry” and thus these two forms of graduation need to be acknowledge as separate appraisals. This decision was applied to all the corpora prior to analysing them for comparisons. Thus, the annotations in the data now indicate each instance of graduation with a separate annotation. For example: I am so [*grad, force*] very [*grad, force*] sorry.

Finally, the researcher noticed that with her own 2019 annotations she had missed some thought units she had identified in the 2018 round of annotations. To solve this problem, each corpus was subjected to spot checks in order to try and add potentially missing annotations that the researcher failed to notice during the first round of annotations in 2018. The spot checks were performed by randomly selecting texts to recheck and by searching specific words (angry, hate, sad, terrible etc) that could be associated with specific appraisals to see if they had been annotated.

Thus, although the reliability of the annotations could not be established by retraining and retesting the coders or the researcher, the reliability tests did reveal some issues that the researcher could address before the final comparisons were made. Even though the annotations might still not be as accurate as they could be under ideal circumstances, I do believe that addressing certain problems with the annotations has increased the reliability of the comparisons to some extent.

For the comparisons between the corpora in the present study, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. The appropriateness of this test is discussed in section 4.4.2.

4.4.1 The comparisons

As mentioned in section 4.2, the present study consists of eight corpora for comparison. Six of the corpora represent authentic suicide notes and two of the corpora represent fabricated suicide notes. The aim of the comparisons between the authentic and fabricated suicide notes is to determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the use of the linguistic appraisal categories in these corpora. As explained in Chapter 1, differences do not equate to distinctiveness.

When comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes, one would expect to find differences. For example, when counting the annotations for each appraisal category in the various texts of both the authentic and fabricated suicide notes, it seemed as if the fabricated suicide note writers used more instances of focus, less judgement, and more thought units expressing dissatisfaction – ennui and misery. It also seemed that, overall, fabricated suicide notes are shorter than authentic suicide notes. These observations have to be verified through statistical analyses, but they illustrate the argument that differences will occur when authentic and fabricated suicide notes are compared. However, even if these differences are verified as statistically significant, it would still not mean that authentic and fabricated suicide notes are distinct types of suicide note. It would simply indicate that in the present study, with the specific data analysed and statistical tests employed, there are potential appraisal category differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Thus, even statistically significant differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes do not disprove the hypothesis that there are no distinct linguistic features that could be used to distinguish between authentic or fabricated suicide notes, or to classify a suicide note as either authentic or fabricated. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.

Two types of comparison are made in the present study. The first compares all eight small corpora to each other. The second groups the authentic suicide notes and fabricated suicide notes to create three pooled groups: authentic suicide notes from the USA, authentic suicide notes from South Africa and fabricated suicide notes from the USA. These groups and their identifiers are included in Table 4.3, while the comparisons are explained in Table 4.4.

Table 4.3: The identifiers used for each group

SMALL GROUPS (A)		
Group identifier	Corpus name	Letter count
G 1.1	BC_a	74
G 1.2	LNC	52
G 1.3	LSC	19

G 1.4	SFC_a	33
G 2.1	GC_Af	34
G 2.2	GC_En	25
G 3.1	BC_f	74
G 3.2	SFC_f	33
BIG GROUPS (B)		
Group identifier	Corpus name	Letter count
G 1	Auth_USA	178
G 2	Auth_SA	59
G 3	Auth_USA	107

As mentioned earlier, the argument in the present study is that the corpora cannot be grouped together since each corpus represents a different cultural group or a specific period. However, since effective statistical analysis often relies on larger datasets, a decision was made to run the same tests on bigger groups in order to see if it made a difference. It should be noted, however, that only the results from the comparisons of the smaller groups will be used to draw possible conclusions.

Table 4.4: The comparisons in the present study

TYPE 2 COMPARISONS:	G 1.1 = G 1.2 = G 1.3 = G 1.4 = G 2.1 = G 2.2 = G 3.1 = G 3.2
Resulting in the following comparisons:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from the USA. • Comparisons between the authentic suicide notes from SA.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from the USA and SA. • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from the USA and the fabricated suicide notes from the USA. • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from SA and the fabricated suicide notes from the USA. • Comparison between the fabricated suicide notes from the USA.
TYPE 2 COMPARISONS	$G\ 1 = G\ 2 = G\ 3$
Resulting in the following comparisons:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from the USA and SA. • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from the USA and the fabricated suicide notes from the USA. • Comparison between the authentic suicide notes from SA and the fabricated suicide notes from the USA.

As mentioned earlier, in order to read the data into SPSS, all the categories and annotation counts have to be included in an Excel spreadsheet. To ensure that the category identifications are detailed but as concise as possible, the following category identifiers were used in SPSS:

- Affect, happiness: *Aff_Hap*
 - Affect, happiness, cheer: *A_Hap_Ch*
 - Affect, happiness, affection: *A_Hap_Af*
- Affect, unhappiness: *Aff_Unhap*
 - Affect, unhappiness, misery: *A_Uh_Mis*
 - Affect, unhappiness, antipathy: *A_Uh_Anti*
- Affect, security: *Aff_Sec*
 - Affect, security, confidence: *A_Sec_Con*
 - Affect, security, trust: *A_Sec_Tr*

- Affect, insecurity: *Aff_Insec*
 - Affect, insecurity, disquiet: *A_Ins_Dis*
 - Affect, insecurity, surprise: *A_Ins_Sur*
- Affect, satisfaction: *Aff_Sat*
 - Affect, satisfaction, interest: *A_Sat_Int*
 - Affect, satisfaction, admiration: *A_Sat_Adm*
- Affect, dissatisfaction: *Aff_Dissat*
 - Affect, dissatisfaction, ennui: *A_Diss_En*
 - Affect, dissatisfaction, displeasure: *A_Diss_Dis*
- *Desire*
- *Fear*
- Judgement of esteem: *Judg_Est*
 - Judgement of esteem, normality: *J_Est_No*
 - Judgement of esteem, capacity: *J_Est_Cap*
 - Judgement of esteem, tencity: *J_Est_Ten*
- Judgement of sanction: *Judg_Sanc*
 - Judgement of sanction, veracity: *J_Sanc_Ver*
 - Judgement of sanction, propriety: *J_Sanc_Pro*
- Positive judgement, 1st person : *J_1st_pos*
- Negative judgement, 1st person: *J_1st_neg*
- Positive judgement, 2nd person: *J_2nd_pos*
- Negative judgement, 2nd person: *J_2nd_neg*
- Appreciation: *Appr*
 - Positive appreciation: *Appr_pos*
 - Negative appreciation: *Appr_neg*
- Graduation: *Grad*
 - Graduation, force: *Force*
 - Graduation, focus: *Focus*

Note that the positive and negative judgements directed at the author and others are identified as separate categories.

The final section of this chapter is dedicated to discussing the Kruskal-Wallis test in the present study.

4.4.2 The Kruskal-Wallis test

The Kruskal-Wallis test is defined as a one-way-analysis-of-variance-by-ranks test (also known as an H test) which is used to determine the similarity or difference between three or more independent groups using some variable of interest when either an ordinal, interval or ratio level of data is available (Chan and Walmsley, 1997: 1755). According to Ostertagová, Ostertag and Kováč (2014: 115), the Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric equivalent of the one-way ANOVA. The Kruskal-Wallis test was deemed appropriate for the present study since more than three independent groups were compared, a ratio level of data was available and a nonparametric test was necessary since the data were not normally distributed.

The data in the present study are considered ratio level data since a ratio scale implies the existence of a potential absolute zero value (Fife-Schaw, 2006: 56). According to Fife-Schaw (2006: 56) length, time and the number of correct answers on a test are all good examples of ratio scales, since it is possible to have zero or no length for something, take no time to do something or get zero answers correct on a test. Similarly, in the present study it is possible for a writer of a suicide note to use zero amount of a specific appraisal category in a specific note.

As mentioned above, the data in the present study are not normally distributed. According to Rumsey (2011: 150), a normal distribution refers to values that fall into a smooth (or continuous) curve with a bell-shaped pattern. Even though each normal distribution has its own mean and standard deviation, the basic bell shape is always present and is visible in any graph depicting the distribution (see Figure 4.3). In a normal distribution this shape is always symmetric (meaning that if it were cut in half, the two sides would be mirror images of each other) and the distribution always shows a bump in the middle with two tails going down and out to the left and right side (Rumsey, 2011: 150). According to Rumsey (2011), a normal distribution follows what is known as the empirical rule. This rule states the following:

About 68 percent of its¹⁴ values lie within one standard deviation of the mean ... About 95 percent of its values lie within two standard deviations of the mean ... Almost all of its values

¹⁴ Here the “its” refers to a normal distribution.

(about 99.7 percent of them) lie within three standard deviations of the mean (Rumsey, 2011: 150).

An example of a normal distribution is included in Figure 4.3. In a normal distribution, the mean indicates where the most values are concentrated, while the standard deviation indicates the typical distances that values differ from the mean. The smaller the standard deviation, the less the variability of the values. Thus, if the mean is 90 and the standard deviation is 30, one would be able to calculate the 68th percentile of values (or range) that lie within one standard deviation from the mean by using the following calculation:

$$90 + 1 \times 30 = 120$$

$$90 - 1 \times 30 = 60$$

Thus, 68% of all the values in the distribution would be found between the values of 60 and 120.

Figure 4.3: An example of normally distributed data (taken from Frost, 2019)





Figure 4.3 above is an illustration of what a bell-shaped curve for normally distributed data would look like. The figure illustrates pizza delivery times. The mean is 30 ($\mu = 30$) and the standard

deviation is 5 ($s = 5$). The lines referred to as either $-SD$ or SD indicate the standard deviations to each side of the mean. From this figure, it is clear that the mean of 30 minutes is located in the middle of the curve and that 68% of the delivery times are between 25 to 35 minutes, 95% are between 20 to 40 minutes, and 99.7% are between 15 to 45 minutes. This means that the distribution adheres to the empirical rule and is therefore normally distributed.


However, in the present study the data are not normally distributed. Figure 4.4 provides an example of the distributions in the present study. The figure includes the distribution for all eight groups in terms of the appraisal category *Affect (happiness)*. The distribution for all the categories in all the groups is included in Appendix J.

Figure 4.4: An example of the distribution of the data in the present study



It is clear from Figure 4.4 that not one group reveals a normal distribution. In all the groups, the distribution is skewed – meaning that the two sides of the curve are not mirror images of each other. This becomes even clearer when a boxplot of the data is generated. Figure 4.5 includes the boxplot for the same data included in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.5: An example of a boxplot for the distribution of the data in the present study



In Figure 4.5, the skewed data become even more evident. According to Rumsey (2011: 121), symmetric data will show the median roughly in the middle of the box. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, none of the medians is located in the middle of the boxes. Before continuing, I find it necessary to explain the difference between a *mean* and a *median*. A common way to summarise numerical data is to describe the centre of the data. Rumsey (2011: 75) notes that one would normally want to determine where the middle of the data is or what a typical value in the data is. There are two ways to answer these questions. One is to determine the *sample mean*. A mean (also known as the *average*) is calculated by adding up all the numbers in a data set and dividing the total by the number of numbers in the dataset, n (Rumsey, 2011: 76):

$$\bar{x} = (\sum x_i) / n$$

For example, if one wanted to determine the typical salary that an individual might expect in a certain job, the average salary can be determined using the formula above. Let us assume the average salary for five workers in a similar position is as follows: R15 000, R15 600, R15 680, R16 000 and R25 000. If the mean is calculated, the average salary appears to be R17 456. When

we look at the salaries listed, this amount seems to be higher than the workers currently earn. This is because there is an outlier¹⁵ in the data. The salary of R 25 000 awarded to one individual is about R 10 000 more than the salaries the other workers receive. This one outlier affects the mean. If it is removed, the average salary becomes R15 570 – a more realistic expectation.

A second way to calculate the typical salary in the example used here would be to split the data down the median. This means ordering the numbers from smallest to largest, and choosing the number that is exactly in the middle. If the data contain an even number of numbers, the two middle numbers should be averaged. In my example of the salaries, the median would be R15 680. This salary is a realistic expected salary even if the outlier of R25 000 is present. Rumsey (2011: 80) notes that while a mean is affected by outliers, the median is not. This means that a median is resistant to outliers and is a better representation of typical values in skewed data.

Returning to the boxplot in Figure 4.5, the medians indicate skewed data. This is supported by the presence of various outliers indicated above the boxplots. It is important to note that if one boxplot is longer than the other it does not mean that it contains more data. Rumsey (2011: 122) notes that each section of a boxplot contains 25% of the data no matter what.¹⁶ Thus, if one section is longer than the other it simply indicates a wider range in the values of the data in that specific section, while a smaller section indicates that the data are more condensed (Rumsey, 2011: 122).

Rumsey argues that a boxplot is better than a histogram at representing skewed data and one can identify “actual measures of spread and centre directly from the boxplot” (Rumsey, 2011: 121–122). Even so, by studying both the boxplot in Figure 4.5 and the histograms in Figure 4.4, it is possible to come to the same conclusions – that the data are skewed and that nonparametric tests should therefore be used to analyse the data. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Kruskal-Wallis test (a nonparametric test) was used to analyse the data. Ostertagová et al (2014) explain nonparametric tests and the use thereof as follows:

Nonparametric methods require less stringent assumptions than do their parametric counterparts; on the other hand, they also use less information from the data. This makes the nonparametric tests somewhat less powerful than the corresponding parametric tests for the same situations, when the assumptions of the parametric tests are met. When the

¹⁵ According to Rumsey (2011: 77), high outliers drive the average upward and low outliers drive the average downward.

¹⁶ A boxplot consists of five descriptive statistics (the minimum value, the 25th percentile, the median, the 75th percentile, and the maximum value) divided into four parts – each containing 25% of the data.

assumptions of the parametric tests are not met, the nonparametric tests are the ones we should use (Ostertagová et al, 2014: 115)

Furthermore, Ostertagová et al (2014: 115) note that when the means of k populations are compared and it is determined that the populations are not normal or do not have equal variances, the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test should be used. Thus, even though nonparametric tests have a downside (using less information and therefore being less powerful), the skewed data in the present study call for a nonparametric method – specifically the Kruskal-Wallis test. According to Ostertagová et al (2014: 115), the Kruskal-Wallis test is particularly popular since it is useful in a variety of disciplines, including psychology, medicine and education.

In order to perform a Kruskal-Wallis test, two assumptions are required (Ostertagová et al, 2011: 116):

1. The continuous distributions for the test variable are the same for the different populations (except their medians).
2. The cases represent random samples from the populations and the scores on the test variable are independent of each other.

McKnight and Najab (2010) explain that since the variables are not normally distributed, one cannot compare means and therefore ranks are compared instead.

In any study containing a hypothesis, the hypothesis contains two opposing statements about a certain population parameter. The *null hypothesis* (H_0) always states that the population parameter is equal to the claimed value (Rumsey, 2011: 224). In the case of the present study, the general H_0 is that there are no distinct linguistic characteristics that can be used to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes (see Chapter 1). The alternative hypothesis (H_a) would then be the opposite – that there are distinctive linguistic characteristics that can be used to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. However, to test these hypotheses statistically, another set of null and alternative hypotheses needs to be stated. In the present study, this would be the following:

H_0 : there is no statistically significant difference between the use of appraisal categories in authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

H_a : there is a statistically significant difference between the use of appraisal categories in authentic and fabricated suicide notes.

It would even be possible to state both an H_0 and an H_a for each of the individual categories and groups. Once again, it is worth noting that even if the H_0 is rejected for the H_a (meaning that the statistics reveal a significant difference in the use of certain appraisal categories by one of the groups), it would still not mean that the general hypothesis of the study should be rejected as well. This is because the hypothesis in the present study is not based on the presence of *differences* but on the presence of *distinctiveness*. As mentioned in Chapter 1, differences, and even distinctive differences, are expected. However, differences between the corpora in terms of the use of linguistic appraisal categories do not mean that these differences are distinct to a specific corpus.

According to Van Hecke (2012), the Kruskal-Wallis test substitutes the rank in the overall dataset for each measurement value:

The smallest value gets a rank of 1, the second smallest gets a rank of 2 etc. Tied observations get average ranks; thus if there were four identical values occupying the fifth, sixth, seventh and eight smallest places, all would get a rank of 6.5 (Van Hecke, 2010: 242).

Van Hecke (2010: 242–243) explains that the sum of these ranks (R_i) is calculated for each group of the size n_i (Thus, $i = 1, 2, \dots, k$). Then, the test statistic H is calculated with an adjustment for the number of tied observations present. This statistic represents the variance in the ranks among the groups. According to Van Hecke (2010: 243), The H statistic is approximately χ^2 distributed, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of grouped k minus 1. Van Hecke (2010: 243) illustrates this as follows:

$$H = \frac{12}{N(N+1)} \sum_{i=1}^k \frac{R_i^2}{n_i} - 3(N+1), \quad N = \sum_{i=1}^k n_i.$$

Van Hecke (2012) performs a comparison to test the power of both the anova and the Kruskal-Wallis test, and finds that “for non-symmetrical distributions the non-parametrical Kruskal-Wallis test results in a higher power compared to the classical one-way anova” (Van Hecke, 2010: 246).

Once again, the Kruskal-Wallis tests in the present study are performed using SPSS statistical software. These tests rely on specific syntax and commands that have to be selected in the software.¹⁷ According to Statstutor (n.d.), Laerd Statistics (2018) and SPSS Tutorials (2019), this basic command is *Analyse* → *Nonparametric* → *Legacy Dialogs* → *Independent samples*. In the “fields” option of the software, one can select the dependent variable (in the “test field” option) and the independent variable (in the “groups” option).

In the case of the present study, the “groups” consist of eight independent groups with 12 dependent variables for the main category comparisons and 25 variables for the subcategory comparisons. Depending on the SPSS version being used, one might also have the option to complete a “test variable list” and a “grouping variable” option – which are essentially the same options as the ones mentioned above (Laerd Statistics, 2018). An example of the syntax for the Kruskal-Wallis tests in the present study is included in Appendix I. Remember that two Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed in the present study since the main categories and subcategories were separately compared.

The methodological aspects discussed in this chapter assist in understanding the results discussed in Chapter 5. The next chapter places specific emphasis on the implications of the results for future research on suicide notes and also emphasises the complications with annotations based on linguistic appraisal categories.

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion of the SPSS software and the functions used for Kruskal-Wallis tests, please consult the following websites:

Statstutor (n.d): https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.714567!/file/stcp-marshall-KruskalSPSS.pdf

Laerd Statistics (2018): <https://statistics.laerd.com/spss-tutorials/kruskal-wallis-h-test-using-spss-statistics.php>

SPSS Tutorial (2019): <https://www.spss-tutorials.com/spss-kruskal-wallis-test-simple-tutorial-with-example/>

Chapter 5

Results and discussion

5.1 Introduction

This chapter includes the results for both the reliability testing and the annotation comparisons. A discussion of these results reveals the problems with the data in terms of reliability, but also points to certain measures that could be put in place to ensure higher reliability in future research using appraisal category annotations. The discussion on the comparison results and the discussion in section 5.4 where the present results are compared with the results of previous studies seem to support the hypothesis in the present study that no distinct linguistic characteristics exist that can be used to differentiate between authentic and fabricated suicide notes with much certainty. It also supports the argument that differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes do not automatically suggest distinctiveness.

5.2 Results: reliability testing

It is mentioned in Chapter 4 that the data and available coders in the present study allowed for two types of reliability testing. The interrater results are discussed first before the test-retest reliability is discussed. At the end of section 5.2, a summary provides an overview of the problems and possible solutions discussed here.

5.2.1 Interrater reliability results

The discussion in Chapter 4 revealed that a Krippendorff analysis produces an output between 0 and 1. An output closer to 1 suggests higher reliability, while outputs closer to 0 indicate very low reliability. In order to determine interrater reliability, three Krippendorff analyses were performed on both the English and the Afrikaans texts. The first analysis compared the reliability between all the coders, including the researcher. Thus, 11 coders (the researcher plus the ten annotators) were compared. The second analysis compared only the independent coders, meaning that the researcher's annotations were not considered. The third analysis compared the researcher's annotations with the annotator who produced the closest number of annotations to the researcher. This means that the number of annotations by each coder was counted to determine which one

produced the number of annotations closest to that of the researcher. It is worth mentioning again that the annotations were matched one by one, so the number of annotations by the coders is a direct reflection of the number of identical annotations to that of the researcher.

Overall, the three Krippendorff analyses of the interrater reliability revealed very poor reliability between the researcher and the coders as well as between the coders themselves. This is not a surprising finding given the fact that the independent coders did not undergo training in linguistic appraisal annotation beforehand and there was no opportunity to retrain the coders and rerun the interrater reliability tests. Tables 5.1 to 5.6 include the results for the various interrater reliability tests. Since the coders were given Afrikaans and English texts to annotate, the decision was made to test the reliability of these annotations separately since some annotators might have greater competency in one language than the other. The results for the English texts are included first, followed by the results for the Afrikaans texts.

Table 5.1: Interrater reliability between all the coders, including annotator 0¹⁸ (English)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
0.1493	15	11	825

Each table from 5.1 to 5.6 include the same four columns. The first column indicates the alpha value (α) produced by the Krippendorff analysis. The second column includes the number of texts annotated and the third column includes the number of coders (or annotators) present. The final column includes the number of comparison pairs. The comparison pairs are calculated as follows:

Eleven annotators would produce 55 possible combinations (or “comparison pairs”) per unit. For example, a comparison between Annotator 0 and Annotator 1 would be considered ‘pair 1’ and a comparison between Annotator 0 and Annotator 2 would be considered ‘pair 2’ etc. The number of comparison pairs is then multiplied by the number of units (in this case, 15) in order to determine the total number of pairs. These calculations can be expressed in more detail as follows (Van Zyl 2019, personal communication, 7 May):

¹⁸ The researcher is identified as “Annotator 0”.

To determine the number of comparison pairs the formula $[N(N - 1)]/2$ is used. For Table 5.1 the calculation is as follows: $[11 \times (11-1)]/2 = 55$.

The number of possible combinations (55) is then multiplied by the number of units, thus: $55 \times 15 = 825$.

From Table 5.1 it is clear that the reliability between all the annotators is very low when annotator 0 is included ($\alpha = 0.1493$). As speculated earlier, one reason for this could be the fact that Annotator 0, the researcher, had spent the most time with the annotations while the other coders were only given a limited time to understand the annotations. This argument suggests that removing the researcher's annotations from the test would improve the results, since the researcher's annotations might skew them. In order to test the argument, a second analysis was performed after the researcher's annotations were removed. The result is included in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Interrater reliability between all the coders, excluding Annotator 0 (English)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
0.1913	15	10	675

As suspected, removing Annotator 0 from the test improved the reliability from $\alpha = 0.1493$ to $\alpha = 0.1913$, but an alpha of 0.1913 still indicates extremely low reliability. This casts doubt on the overall reliability of the annotations. In an effort to see if the reliability could be increased at all, the researcher's annotations were compared with the annotations of the coder who had the closest total number of annotations to the researcher's. Table 5.3 includes this result.

Table 5.3: Interrater reliability when comparing Annotator 0 with nearest annotator (English)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
-0.1454	15	2	15

Instead of increasing the reliability, the third analysis actually emphasised the lack of interrater reliability by producing a negative alpha, or an alpha below zero: $\alpha = -0.1454$. Krippendorff (2010: 670) notes that the occurrence of “systematic disagreement” could drive the alpha below zero, but that this should not occur when coders use the same coding instructions and work independently from each other. McHugh (2012) notes that a negative reliability statistic represents agreement that is worse than expected and which is referred to as “total disagreement”. A large negative reliability statistic indicates that the data collected are unlikely to represent the facts of the situation and such a finding requires either a retraining of raters or a redesign of the instrument (McHugh, 2012: 279). Both the suggestions by McHugh (2012) are relevant here. As already mentioned, repeated retraining and retesting was not a possibility at the time of writing, but redesigning the annotation instrument could be done and was done before the final annotations of the data. This solution is discussed in Chapter 4, where the steps taken to redesign the instrument for the final annotations are clearly stated.

However, before discussing the solution to the problems, it is worth considering why such low reliability could be expected. Figure 5.1 includes the total number of annotations for the researcher and each of the coders. The figure indicates that the researcher included 66 annotations in total, while Annotator 4 (who is the coder with the highest number of annotations from the group), only included 26 annotations. This undoubtedly points to a large discrepancy between the annotations and predicts low reliability in all tests.

Figure 5.1: The total number of annotations by each coder (English texts)

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
	Annot 0	Annot 1	Annot 2	Annot 3	Annot 4	Annot 5	Annot 6	Annot 7	Annot 8	Annot 9	Annot 10
Text 1	6	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	3	1
Text 2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1
Text 3	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Text 4	4	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1
Text 5	4	1	2	0	2	0	1	1	3	2	2
Text 6	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Text 7	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	0	0
Text 8	2	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Text 9	9	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	4	2
Text 10	4	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
Text 11	6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	0
Text 12	5	0	1	1	4	2	1	2	1	0	2
Text 13	4	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	2	2	2
Text 14	7	0	1	3	2	1	1	2	2	1	3
Text 15	6	0	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	4	3
	66	14	15	16	26	17	22	22	25	24	21

Tables 5.4 to 5.6 include the results for the exact same analyses, as displayed in Tables 5.1 to 5.3, performed on the Afrikaans texts. Although a slight increase in the reliability is reported here, the overall reliability is still very low.

Table 5.4: Interrater reliability between all the coders, including Annotator 0 (Afrikaans)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
0.1715	15	11	825

The result in Table 5.4 indicates an increase in the alpha from 0.1493 for the same analysis of the English texts to 0.1715 in the Afrikaans texts. Even though an alpha of 0.1715 is still extremely low, a possible observation is that the slight increase in reliability might be due to the fact that most of the coders are native Afrikaans speakers and therefore they might be able to identify certain linguistic appraisal categories more easily in the Afrikaans texts.

Once again, a second test was performed to determine whether eliminating the annotations of the researcher would increase the reliability. The results are included in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Interrater reliability between all the coders, excluding Annotator 0 (Afrikaans)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
0.1996	15	10	675

Although it again seems that excluding the researcher from the test did increase the reliability (see Table 5.5), an increase in reliability from $\alpha = 0.1715$ to $\alpha = 0.1996$ is minuscule. However, in Table 5.6 below it seems that comparing the annotations of the researcher with the annotations of the nearest coder does increase the reliability somewhat.

Table 5.6: Interrater reliability when comparing Annotator 0 with nearest annotator (Afrikaans)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
0.4534	15	2	15

Although $\alpha = 0.4534$ does not suggest high reliability, it is the highest reliability achieved thus far. This slight increase in agreement is expected when one again considers the total number of annotations for all the coders (included in Figure 5.2). In Figure 5.1, the difference between the total number of annotations for the researcher and the highest total number of annotations for a coder (Annotator 4) was 40. In Figure 5.2, Annotator 4 once again included the highest total number of annotations for a coder, but here the difference between this number and the total number of annotations by the researcher is only 28.

Figure 5.2: The total number of annotations by each coder (Afrikaans texts)

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
	Annot 0	Annot 1	Annot 2	Annot 3	Annot 4	Annot 5	Annot 6	Annot 7	Annot 8	Annot 9	Annot 10
Text 1	3	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	0	2	0
Text 2	6	0	3	3	5	2	2	1	3	4	1
Text 3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	1	0
Text 4	7	3	2	2	4	1	1	3	2	5	2
Text 5	5	2	2	4	3	2	1	2	2	5	4
Text 6	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Text 7	7	1	2	0	3	3	1	2	2	3	4
Text 8	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	1
Text 9	3	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2
Text 10	2	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0
Text 11	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	0	0	1	1
Text 12	5	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	1	4	2
Text 13	9	4	1	4	4	2	2	4	2	4	2
Text 14	11	4	3	3	8	2	2	6	3	6	4
Text 15	3	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
	71	20	22	26	43	20	22	29	19	42	27

The overall low reliability of the interrater analyses definitely sparks some concern about the annotations used in the present study. However, some of the issues which I believe to be the cause of low reliability could be identified quite easily and attempts were made to rectify these before the final annotations were analysed for the comparisons discussed in section 5.3 (see Chapter 4). Although there is no way to determine whether the steps taken had a significant impact on the accuracy and reliability of the results, it may be argued that by rethinking and rechecking the annotations, many possible issues that contributed to the low reliability were eliminated. Thus, even though the reliability of the annotations could not be increased by repeated testing, the tests still allowed for the identification and elimination of potential annotation errors.

5.2.2 Test-retest reliability results

The test-retest reliability was also computed using the Krippendorff analysis. The results in Tables 5.7 to 5.8 are therefore presented in a similar manner to the results in Tables 5.1 to 5.6.

The reliability of the annotations in both the Afrikaans and English texts was once again tested separately. For the test-retest reliability, only two sets of annotations are present – the 2018 annotations (indicated as Annotator 0) and the 2019 annotations (indicated as Annotator 1). Since the test-retest reliability determines the reliability of the researcher's annotations, both sets of

annotations from 2018 and 2019 represent only the annotations of the researcher during these periods. The result for the annotations in the English texts is included in Table 5.7 below.

Table 5.7: Test-retest reliability results (English)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
-0.1795	10	2	10

The result in Table 5.7 indicates an extremely low agreement between the annotations by the researcher in 2019 versus the 2018 annotations. Once again the alpha reflects a value below zero: $\alpha = -0.1795$. This is surprising since one would expect a single individual to display some sort of consistency when annotating the same texts over a period of time. However, low reliability in test-retest analyses is not uncommon. Since test-retest reliability is often performed in medical fields (Paiva, Barroso, Carneseca, de Padua Souza, Dos Santos, Lopez et al, 2014) and in psychology (Dikmen, Heaton, Grant and Temkin, 1999), one may turn to research in these fields for possible explanations. Bird, Papadopoulou, Ricciardelli, Rosser and Cipolotti (2003: 408) state that test-retest reliability provides a measure of the variability that can be expected as a result of everyday fluctuations in factors such as concentration and fatigue. They mention that good reliability is often reported for tests of general intelligence, or tests of reading, naming and phonemic fluency (Bird et al, 2003: 408). However, poor reliability has been reported on tests that have to do with memory (Bird et al, 2003: 408). Even though test-retest reliability in medicine and psychology measure the reliability of different aspects compared to linguistic annotations, the problems behind test-retest reliability mostly reside in the mind and therefore problems identified in other fields may still be relevant here. According to Polit (2014: 1715), a main problem affecting low reliability is what is known as a “response shift”:

Response shift is a change in a person’s self-evaluation of the construct (rather than a change in the construct itself) as a result of several forces, such as altered priorities or a reconceptualization of the target construct (Polit, 2014: 1715).

Polit’s (2014) suggestion for low reliability seems to make sense in the present study as well. Although the constructs (the texts themselves) did not change from 2018 to 2019, one could argue that the researcher might have reconceptualised certain thought units and annotations in 2019.

Since the researcher was actively reading up on and working with appraisal annotations in the months between the 2018 and 2019 annotations, it seems plausible to argue that enough information was gathered to influence the annotations in 2019. However, this can only be verified by doing another set of annotations on the same texts once a similar amount of time (about 7 months) has passed. Another explanation could again be that the language proficiency of the annotator plays a role in the success of the annotations. Thus, if annotations are performed on texts that reflect the native language of the annotator, the reliability might be higher. This seems to be a valid argument if one takes the results in Table 5.8 into account.

Similar to the interrater reliability testing, the total number of annotations for both 2018 and 2019 gives one an indication of the lack of agreement between the annotations. In Figure 5.3 below, the total number of annotations in 2018 is 102 compared to only 59 total annotations in 2019 – a decrease of 43 annotations in total.

Figure 5.3: The total number of annotations in 2018 and 2019 (English)

A	B	C
	2018	2019
Text 1	14	6
Text 2	8	3
Text 3	10	7
Text 4	8	5
Text 5	9	7
Text 6	11	7
Text 7	14	5
Text 8	15	8
Text 9	8	6
Text 10	5	5
	102	59

As mentioned earlier, it seems that the native language of the annotator might increase the ability to annotate the data. With the interrater reliability testing of the Afrikaans texts, the reliability was the highest – even though it was still very low. In Table 5.8, the test-retest reliability for the Afrikaans texts also indicates the highest reliability. In fact, this is the highest reliability reading for all the tests performed: $\alpha = 0.7146$. Although 0.7 is still considered a long way from 1, it does indicate a modest degree of reliability (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007).

Table 5.8: Test-retest reliability results (Afrikaans)

Alpha	Units	Observers	Pairs
0.7146	10	2	10

The higher degree of reliability in Table 5.8 is expected when one considers the total number of annotations for 2018 and 2019 in Figure 5.4. Here, in contrast to the large discrepancy between the total number of annotations in the English texts, the Afrikaans texts indicate a difference of only 20 annotations.

Figure 5.4: The total number of annotations in 2018 and 2019 (Afrikaans)

A	B	C
	2018	2019
Text 1	6	4
Text 2	7	6
Text 3	5	3
Text 4	9	6
Text 5	14	9
Text 6	12	11
Text 7	10	9
Text 8	15	13
Text 9	6	5
Text 10	9	7
	93	73

The reliability testing emphasises the importance of performing these tests to determine the reliability of annotations. However, the results also emphasise how unreliable the annotating of linguistic appraisal theories can be. As stated previously, an ideal situation would include the testing and retesting of the annotations after the coders have been retrained. However, since the reliability testing revealed some problems with the annotations, these could be addressed. Of course, it is possible that some annotations are still incorrect or missing, but the rechecking of the data eliminated many errors that could have negatively influenced the results to an even greater extent. It is worth noting that this study does not claim to be an error-free method for annotating

suicide notes; rather, it should be seen as a guideline for annotating texts using linguistic appraisal categories.

Section 5.3 includes a discussion concerning the comparisons of the annotations between the different corpora.

5.3 Results: comparisons

The results reported on in this section specifically reflect the comparisons between the small corpora. As mentioned in Chapter 4, and as indicated here, the small, individual corpora are the focus since they represent the corpora (in terms of size) compared and analysed in previous studies on suicide notes (Osgood and Walker, 1959; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960; Black, 1993; Shapero, 2011; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014).

The results in this section also indicate that suicide note corpora representing different cultures and even different time periods cannot be grouped or pooled together, since such a corpus cannot be considered a representation of “authentic” or “fabricated” suicide notes. One could argue that a corpus including a mix of different suicide notes from different cultures and periods might actually be a good representation of a specific classification of suicide notes, since such a corpus would contain the widest range of characteristics of a specific classification. However, this argument can only be valid once it is proven that there are no differences between authentic or fabricated suicide notes from different cultures and that all authentic and fabricated suicide notes contain the same characteristics. Thus, if it is proven that all authentic suicide notes, regardless of the culture or time period, include the same characteristics, one would be able to conclude that such a corpus contains enough evidence for a universal classification of authentic suicide notes. If this cannot be proven, combining different corpora together into one large corpus simply means that the corpus reflects the characteristics of specific corpora or notes. It would essentially be comparing a mix of apples and oranges with a mix of peaches and pears. It is worth mentioning here that in Chapter 1 an argument is made that each study comparing suicide notes will deliver different results because different data and methods are used. Thus, the results for different studies are essentially study specific. This is also the case in the present study. In fact, since the present study makes use of multiple corpora and multiple comparisons, this aspect of suicide note studies is emphasised.

The results and discussion in this section indicate that when each comparison is considered a separate study, the results are specific to the corpora used. Thus, even if the same method is applied, the corpora still influence the results (see discussions in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). This casts some doubt on any arguments for universal characteristics of suicide notes and it leads one to question the assumption that characteristics for authentic or fabricated suicide notes exist.

If it is true that no specific characteristics for either authentic or fabricated suicide notes exist, that would mean that grouping all suicide notes from a specific classification together is impossible, since the classification itself is questionable.

In an effort not to disturb the flow of this chapter, most of the results are included in Appendices K to O. However, all the results of the comparisons are discussed here in full. When necessary, the results are included in table or figure format in this section to provide context for the explanations or discussions.

5.3.1 The main categories

When the Kruskal-Wallis test (discussed in Chapter 4) is performed in SPSS, the results are produced in various formats.¹⁹ The first and main output is a table that gives a general indication of when a specific null hypothesis can be rejected or fails to be rejected. The results in this table should be interpreted separately from the results in the pairwise tables (see Appendices M and O). A discussion on the pairwise tables follows later in this section. The first output, indicated here as Table 5.9, includes the results for the main appraisal category comparisons. According to Conover and Iman (1979: 5), the first stage of a Kruskal-Wallis test tests for overall differences. Dinno (2015: 293) refers to this as an “omnibus test”. During this first stage, all the mean ranks are being compared at the same time (Van Zyl 2019, personal communication, 13 May) and therefore an overall result concerning the rejection of the null hypothesis or the failure to reject the null hypothesis in each case is provided.

¹⁹ Please consult the discussion by StatsTutor (https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.714567!/file/step-marshall-KruskalSPSS.pdf) and Laerd Statistics (<https://statistics.laerd.com/spss-tutorials/kruskal-wallis-h-test-using-spss-statistics.php>) for examples and explanations of each output.

Table 5.9: The Kruskal-Wallis test results for the main category comparisons

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of <i>Aff_Hap</i> is the same across categories of Group_A ²⁰	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
2	The distribution of <i>Aff_Unhap</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.004	Reject the null hypothesis
3	The distribution of <i>Aff_Sec</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.003	Reject the null hypothesis
4	The distribution of <i>Aff_Insec</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.004	Reject the null hypothesis
5	The distribution of <i>Aff_Sat</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
6	The distribution of <i>Aff_Dissat</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.765	Retain the null hypothesis

²⁰ For the purposes of reading the data into SPSS, “Group_A” refers to a combination of all the small corpora.

7	The distribution of <i>Desire</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	1.000	Retain the null hypothesis
8	The distribution of <i>Fear</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.304	Retain the null hypothesis
9	The distribution of <i>Judg_Est</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.270	Retain the null hypothesis
10	The distribution of <i>Judg_Sanc</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
11	The distribution of <i>Appr</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.013	Reject the null hypothesis
12	The distribution of <i>Grad</i> is the same across categories of Group_A	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis

Table 5.9 is divided into four columns. The first provides the null hypothesis for the comparisons. It is worth mentioning again that for the Kruskal-Wallis tests, all the corpora are compared to each other (see Table 4.4 in Chapter 4). Thus, for the omnibus test, all the corpora are simultaneously

compared and for the pairwise comparisons, all the corpora are compared in pairs of two at a time. The output for the Kruskal-Wallis omnibus tests formulates the null hypotheses slightly differently than discussed in Chapter 4. By stating that “the distribution of X is the same across categories of Group_A”, one is essentially stating that there are no statistical differences in the use of the categories by the suicide note writers of the different corpora. The second column simply indicates the test used, while the third column provides the significance level that is used to determine whether the null hypothesis can be rejected. For the Kruskal-Wallis test applied here, the significance level is set to .05. A significance level of .05 is often associated with p-values. Rumsey (2011: 230) explains that a p-value is a probability statistic associated with a test statistic. When a hypothesis test is performed in statistics, a p-value helps to determine the significance of the results. According to Rumsey (2011), in order to decide whether to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis, a predetermined cut-off point needs to be set “where only those p-values less than or equal to the cut off will result in rejecting the null hypothesis” (Rumsey, 2011: 231). While the cut-off point of .05 is very popular, stricter cut off points such as .01 can also be used (Rumsey, 2011: 231). If one were to reject the null hypothesis, it would mean that the results are statistically significant and therefore differences do occur (in terms of the H_0 in the present study). In order to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis, the following rules apply (Rumsey, 2011: 232):

1. If a p-value is less than or equal to the significance level, it meets the requirement for having enough evidence against the null hypothesis – thus, you reject the H_0 .
2. If a p-value is greater than the significance level, the evidence failed to show evidence beyond a reasonable doubt – thus, you fail to reject the H_0 .

These results are reflected in the final column of Table 5.9. For each mass comparison, the result reflects whether significant differences exist or not. The problem is that this table does not reflect the results for individual comparisons – these are captured in separate pairwise tables included in Appendix M. These individual results are discussed separately below.

To start, I will summarise the results in Table 5.9. The Kruskal-Wallis omnibus test reveals that when all the small corpora were compared, a significant difference occurred in the use of *affect* (*happiness*), *affect*, (*unhappiness*), *affect* (*security*), *affect* (*insecurity*), *affect* (*satisfaction*), *judgements of sanction*, the use of *appreciation*, and the use of *graduation*. This means that eight

of the 12 comparisons indicate a significant difference in use. A detailed reporting of these results follows below. However, before continuing, one aspect of the data in the present study must be emphasised once again. Richardson (2018: 940) states that the power of a statistical test in a specific situation is strongly dependent on the sample size. Noordzij, Tripepi, Dekker, Zoccali, Tanck and Jager (2010) note that a common request in statistics is to provide sample size calculations or justifications to support the argument for the specific method used. However, Fan, Zhang and Zhang (2011: 213) argue that while sample size calculations for parametric tests have been investigated, power and sample size calculations for nonparametric tests have received less attention. Although Fan et al (2011) suggest preferred methods for calculating the sample sizes for Kruskal-Wallis testing, these tests are not performed in the present study since no additional data to increase the current sample size were available. Jensen (2008: 4) argues that while a sample should be collected based on predefined criteria, one sometimes needs to work with what is available. Although Jensen (2008) specifically refers to an area of research such as historical linguistics, I argue that the same applies in the present study. Owing to a lack of texts based on their availability, the analyses are performed with what was available. McDonald (2019) does warn that if samples are too small, H (in Kruskal-Wallis testing) does not follow a chi-squared distribution very well and consequently the results of such tests should be used with caution. However, McDonald also notes that “ N less than 5 in each group” is an accepted definition of a sample size that is too small (McDonald, 2019). Since the smallest corpus in the present study contains 19 texts, one may argue that the sample sizes in the present study are not too small, even though they are still considered small. Since small sample sizes could affect the power of these statistic tests, only observations are noted in this chapter and in Chapter 6, but no definite conclusions can be drawn.

It is important to remember that when significance levels are reported, the degrees of freedom (df) should also be noted. For the 12 comparisons in Table 5.9, the degrees of freedom is seven in all cases ($df = 7$). For all 12 comparisons, the total number of units (N) is 344. However, the test statistic and the significance level differ from comparison to comparison (see Appendix L). According to Van Zyl (personal communication, 9 May), the test statistics and p-values indicated in the SPSS outputs (Appendix L) should be understood as follows: the calculation of the p-value

is determined by the division of the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic.²¹ This division approximates a chi-squared division with $k-1$ degrees of freedom. Thus, one uses the data as input to calculate the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (given a specific formula) and the test statistic is reported as a p-value (given the division of all test statistics for $k-1$ degrees of freedom), which indicates whether the null hypothesis can be rejected or fails to be rejected.

Based on the discussion thus far, the results in Table 5.9 can therefore be reported²² as follows (in terms of test statistics, p-values and the possible rejection of the null hypotheses):

1. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference²³ in the use of *affect (happiness)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 29.091$ ²⁴, $p = .000$.
2. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (unhappiness)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 20.896$, $p = .004$.
3. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (security)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 21.956$, $p = .003$.
4. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (insecurity)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 20.557$, $p = .004$.
5. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (satisfaction)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 28.363$, $p = .000$.
6. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (dissatisfaction)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 4.130$, $p = .765$.
7. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *desire* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = .000$, $p = 1.000$.

²¹ For additional information on the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic, the following web link can be consulted: http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/mph-modules/bs/bs704_nonparametric/BS704_Nonparametric7.html

²² Laerd Statistics suggest a general reporting method for Kruskal-Wallis (<https://statistics.laerd.com/spss-tutorials/kruskal-wallis-h-test-using-spss-statistics.php>).

²³ Here, “difference” refers to the fact that some corpora use a certain category with a higher percentage than others. These differences are explored in detail through the pairwise tables (see Appendix M).

²⁴ “ $\chi^2(x)$ ” indicates the test statistic.

8. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *fear* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 8.330$, $p = .304$.
9. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *judgements of esteem* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 8.770$, $p = .270$.
10. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *judgements of sanction* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 39.459$, $p = .000$.
11. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *appreciation* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 17.725$, $p = .013$.
12. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *graduation* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 39.412$, $p = .000$.

In order to determine the specific differences between the various corpora, each of the comparisons in Table 5.9 that indicated a rejection of the null hypothesis is analysed further through additional pairwise tables. The tables are not included here but the results are discussed. Note that only the calculations that lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis generate further pairwise comparisons. Thus, for the comparisons of the main and subcategories (discussed in section 5.3.2), only 21 pairwise tables are generated (out of the 37 Kruskal-Wallis outputs in total).

Dinno (2015) states that the ranks of the data on which the omnibus tests are based change if they are “reranked in a pairwise fashion” (Dinno, 2015: 293). This means that when pairwise comparisons are made, the meaning of α is redefined. This is a potential problem since the meaning of α “usually represents the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for one test, within the inferential framework of the hypothesis test” (Dinno, 2015: 293). In order to address this issue, a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests is applied. This adjustment can be used to modify the rejection level for any test by dividing α by the total number of tests and requires a much smaller p-value to reject any test (Dinno, 2015: 293). The adjustment is expressed as $p^* = pm$, meaning that each p-value is multiplied by m (Dinno, 2015: 299). The adjusted p-values and the unadjusted p-values (also known as “true” p-values) are referred to in this section of the discussion. The true p-values are listed first, followed by the adjusted values. The significance level is once again set

to .05. Note that the adjusted significance values are identified as “Adj. Sig” in the tables in Appendices M and O.

The pairwise tables generated for the main category comparisons reveal the following:

1. In terms of the appraisal category of *affect (happiness)* (Table 1, Appendix M), there are significant differences in use noted between:

- SFC_f / BC_a ($p = .002$ and $p = .047$)
- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .001$)
- SFC_f / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .009$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .015$)

In the pairwise tables, the first listed group has the lowest median, meaning that the use of a particular category will be higher in the second group (the medians for each corpus are included in Appendix K). Thus, for the comparison SFC_f and BC_a, the authentic corpus, BC_a includes the higher use of *affect (happiness)*. A summary table at the end of this section will illustrate the preferences of certain categories in specific corpora. In this case, higher frequency of use of the category *affection (happiness)* is noted in BC_a, GC_Af and LSC when they are compared with specific corpora. What I mean by this is that when one looks at the pairwise table for *affect (happiness)* as a whole, there are multiple comparisons between other corpora and BC_a. However, only the comparison SFC_f / BC_a leads to a significantly greater use of the category in BC_a. This first result therefore already seems to support earlier arguments that results are study and corpus specific. Furthermore, these results also seem to support the argument that it would be very difficult to determine the characteristics for a suicide note classification.

Although all four comparisons indicate a higher frequency of use in the authentic suicide note corpora when compared to the fabricated suicide note corpora, one would not be able to state that the higher frequency of use is a characteristic of authentic suicide note corpora in the present study. Firstly, only three of the six authentic suicide note corpora are represented here. Secondly, each corpus represents a different culture, time period and sample size. Thirdly, only the GC_Af indicates significant differences in use with both fabricated suicide note corpora. This can be confirmed by looking at the pairwise table (Table 1) in Appendix M. In the comparisons above, SFC_f (a fabricated suicide note corpus) compared to BC_a reveals a significantly greater use of

the category *affect (happiness)* in the BC_a. However, when BC_f (another fabricated suicide note corpus) is compared to the same authentic suicide note corpus, BC_a, no significant use in BC_a is noted on the adjusted p-value level ($p = .036$ and $p = \mathbf{1.000}$). It might be unclear at this point why significance on the adjusted p-value level is of specific importance. This is discussed further in section 5.3.2. In short, only significance indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis on *both* the true p-value and adjusted p-value levels are considered here since the adjusted p-value indicates stronger rejection criteria for the null hypothesis. Thus, many comparisons are significant only on the true p-value level, but not on both the true p-value and adjusted p-value levels. Since the study deals with small corpora, which already influences the strength of the analyses, a decision to select only significance based on the stronger criteria seems justified.

2. The pairwise table for the category *affect (unhappiness)* (Table 2, Appendix M) shows only one significant difference in use between two authentic suicide note corpora:

- SFC_a / LNC ($p = .001$ and $p = .031$)

This difference in the use of a specific category in this comparison (and others) can possibly be attributed to the homogeneity of the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpus. Since their corpus is based on suicide notes by men of a certain age and cultural background, one might expect the use of certain categories to differ from a corpus that is not homogeneous (the LNC).

3. *Affect (security)* reveals statistically significant differences in use between:

- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .017$)
- BC_f / GC_Af. ($p = .001$ and $p = .017$)

Once again, differences between fabricated and authentic suicide notes are indicated (see Table 3, Appendix M). Similar to the comparisons in number 1, it seems that the GC_Af again includes the highest frequency of use of a particular category when compared to the fabricated suicide note corpora. This might be expected, seeing that these two groups represent different cultures and languages and therefore significant differences in the use of certain categories are explicable to some extent. What is interesting in the results produced up to this point is that the fabricated suicide notes seem to be different from the GC_Af, but not necessarily from other authentic suicide note

corpora. This last observation again calls into question the validity of any claims that characteristics may be specifically attributable to authentic or fabricated suicide notes.

4. The pairwise table (Table 4, Appendix M) for *affect (insecurity)* includes three comparisons that indicate significant differences in use:

- SFC_a / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .004$)
- SFC_f / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .010$)
- BC_a / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .011$)

Here, it is noticeable that the LSC is present in the second position in each case – suggesting a higher median. This is interesting since the LSC is the smallest corpus, containing only 19 suicide notes. The fact that this extremely small corpus contains a significantly larger number of thought units expressing *affect (insecurity)* is unexpected. However, one cannot state that the frequency of use is higher in the LSC. Once again, one must indicate that the frequency of use is higher in specific comparisons with the LSC. In the present study, each corpus can be compared with seven others (authentic and fabricated). The bullet points above represent only three comparisons with LSC, meaning that four comparisons indicated no significant differences on both the true and adjusted p-value levels. If a higher frequency of use is indicated in a single corpus in more than half of the comparisons (at least five out of the possible seven comparisons), I would argue that one could mention the use of such a category as a possible characteristic of a *specific corpus*.

5. Six significant differences in the use of *affect (satisfaction)* are noted (see Table 5 in Appendix M). These are identified between:

- LNC / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- SF_a / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .002$)
- GC_En / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .006$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- BC_a / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .001$)
- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .002$ and $p = .043$)

Here, the first difference between an authentic suicide note corpus from the USA and the Afrikaans suicide note corpus from South Africa is noted. The fact that the Afrikaans corpus features in each

of the results and is even statistically different from the English South African corpus in terms of this category, strengthens the argument that this corpus should be considered separately and should not be grouped together with other authentic suicide notes from a different country or language. In this list above, six comparisons with the GC_Af are listed. Thus, as indicated in number 4, the number of comparisons with a specific corpus is high enough to note that the use of *affect (satisfaction)* might be a characteristic of the GC_Af.

6. The category *judgement of sanction* also produces six comparisons with significant differences in their use of the category (Table 6, Appendix M). These are:

- SFC_f / LSC (p = .002 and p = .044)
- SFC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- BC_f / LSC (p = .001 and p = .016)
- BC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- SFC_a / GC_Af (p = .001 and p = 0.27)
- BC_a / GC_Af (p = .001 and p = .020)

Here, differences are once again noted between both fabricated and authentic corpora and also between some of the authentic corpora. Both the GC_Af and LSC feature again and appear to include the higher use of the category *judgement of sanction*. However, in both cases the number of comparisons is too few to note any possible characteristics – the GC_Af shows significant use in only four comparisons and the LSC in only two.

7. A significant difference in the use of *appreciation* (Table 7, Appendix M) is only noted between BC_f / BC_a (p = .001 and p = .017)

8. In terms of *graduation* (Table 8, Appendix M), five comparisons produce significant differences in use:

- SFC_f / BC_a (p = .000 and p = .012)
- SFC_f / LSC (p = .000 and p = .002)
- SFC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- BC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- SFC_a / GC_Af (p = .002 and p = 0.44)

The pairwise comparisons for the main categories strengthen certain arguments made earlier in this chapter and in previous chapters. First, it is clear that multiple comparisons provide a clearer picture of how dangerous it is to draw any conclusions based on the comparison between suicide note corpora. The comparisons indicate that using the same method with different corpora can still lead to significant differences between both fabricated and authentic corpora and between different authentic corpora. This makes the arguments that (1) results are corpus and study specific, and (2) that no characteristics exclusive to a classification exist, seem plausible. Table 5.10 includes a summary of the eight pairwise tables discussed here.

Table 5.10: A summary of the results for the pairwise tables of the main categories

Category	Significant differences identified between	Higher use of category in
<i>Affect (happiness)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	BC_a GC_Af LSC
<i>Affect (unhappiness)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> authentic suicide notes 	LNC
<i>Affect (security)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	GC_Af
<i>Affect (insecurity)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fabricated and authentic suicide notes authentic suicide notes 	LSC

<i>Affect (satisfaction)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes • authentic suicide notes 	GC_Af
<i>Judgement of sanction</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes • authentic suicide notes 	LSC GC_Af
<i>Appreciation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	BC_a
<i>Graduation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes • authentic suicide notes 	BC_a LSC GC_Af

The summary in Table 5.10 serves as further support for the arguments in the short discussion on the findings of this section. From the summary table it is once again clear that no conclusions can be drawn about any linguistic appraisal categories being characteristic of either fabricated or authentic suicide notes in the present study. At best, one can indicate whether a particular category is possibly characteristic of a specific corpus.

The next section focuses on the comparisons between the corpora based on the subcategories.

5.3.2 The subcategories (small corpora)

The statistical significance of use for the subcategories is calculated in the same way as the main categories, therefore the results are discussed in a similar manner as in section 5.3.1. The columns for Table 5.11 have been discussed in section 5.3.1 and will therefore not be discussed here.

Table 5.11: The Kruskal-Wallis test results for the subcategory comparisons

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of <i>A_Hap_Ch</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.480	Retain the null hypothesis
2	The distribution of <i>A_Hap_Af</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
3	The distribution of <i>A_Uh_Mis</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.018	Reject the null hypothesis
4	The distribution of <i>A_Uh_Anti</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.042	Reject the null hypothesis
5	The distribution of <i>A_Sec_Con</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	0.56	Retain the null hypothesis

6	The distribution of <i>A_Sec_Tr</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
7	The distribution of <i>A_Ins_Dis</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.017	Reject the null hypothesis
8	The distribution of <i>A_Ins_Sur</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.819	Retain the null hypothesis
9	The distribution of <i>A_Sat_Int</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	1.000	Retain the null hypothesis
10	The distribution of <i>A_Sat_Adm</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
11	The distribution of <i>A_Diss_En</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.809	Retain the null hypothesis
12	The distribution of <i>A_Diss_Dis</i> is the same	Independent-samples;	.438	Retain the null hypothesis

	across categories of Group_A.	Kruskal-Wallis test		
13	The distribution of <i>J_Est_No</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.004	Reject the null hypothesis
14	The distribution of <i>J_Est_Cap</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.274	Retain the null hypothesis
15	The distribution of <i>J_Est_Ten</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.620	Retain the null hypothesis
16	The distribution of <i>J_Sanc_Ver</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.001	Reject the null hypothesis
17	The distribution of <i>J_Sanc_Pro</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
18	The distribution of <i>J_Ist_pos</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.289	Retain the null hypothesis

19	The distribution of <i>J_1st_neg</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.364	Retain the null hypothesis
20	The distribution of <i>J_2nd_pos</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
21	The distribution of <i>J_2nd_neg</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.008	Reject the null hypothesis
22	The distribution of <i>Appr_neg</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.165	Retain the null hypothesis
23	The distribution of <i>Appr_pos</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.071	Retain the null hypothesis
24	The distribution of <i>Force</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples; Kruskal-Wallis test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis
25	The distribution of <i>Focus</i> is the same across categories of Group_A.	Independent-samples;	.027	Reject the null hypothesis

		Kruskal-Wallis test		
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In Table 5.11 above, 13 out of the 25 comparisons (or omnibus tests) for the subcategories indicate statistically significant differences in use. The results for the subcategories can be reported as follows (see Appendix N):

1. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (happiness, cheer)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 6.529$, $p = .480$.
2. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (happiness, affection)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 32.023$, $p = .000$.
3. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (unhappiness, misery)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 16.841$, $p = .018$.
4. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (unhappiness, antipathy)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 14.572$, $p = .042$.
5. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (security, confidence)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 13.765$, $p = .056$.
6. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (security, trust)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 53.707$, $p = .000$.
7. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (insecurity, disquiet)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 17.077$, $p = .017$.
8. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (insecurity, surprise)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 3.649$, $p = .819$.
9. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (satisfaction, interest)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = .000$, $p = 1.000$.

10. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (satisfaction, admiration)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 28.363$, $p = .000$.
11. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (dissatisfaction, ennui)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 3.744$, $p = .809$.
12. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *affect (dissatisfaction, displeasure)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 6.913$, $p = .438$.
13. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (esteem, normality)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 20.892$, $p = .004$.
14. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (esteem, capacity)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 8.713$, $p = .274$.
15. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (esteem, tenacity)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 5.327$, $p = .620$.
16. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (sanction, veracity)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 23.661$, $p = .001$.
17. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (sanction, propriety)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 36.913$, $p = .000$.
18. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (1st, positive)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 8.522$, $p = .289$.
19. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (1st, negative)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 7.656$, $p = .364$.
20. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (2nd, positive)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 35.991$, $p = .000$.
21. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *judgement (2nd, negative)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 18.945$, $p = .008$.

22. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *appreciation (negative)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 10.447$, $p = .165$.

23. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was **no** statistically significant difference in the use of *appreciation (positive)* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 13.050$, $p = .071$.

24. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *force* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 45.517$, $p = .000$.

25. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the use of *focus* between the corpora in Group_A, $\chi^2(2) = 15.794$, $p = .027$.

Note that once again the degrees of freedom is seven in all cases above ($df = 7$) and the total number of units remains 344. Based on the outputs of the Kruskal-Wallis analyses of the subcategories, the presence of significant differences is once again noted. This suggests that significant differences in the use of linguistic appraisal categories are not only present when the main categories are considered but are also present when the subcategories are compared. When the 13 pairwise tables for each of the subcategories that indicate significant differences are considered (see Appendix O), the following is revealed:

1. Comparisons between the various corpora for the subcategory *affect (happiness, affection)*, reveal four instances of statistically significant differences (Table 1, Appendix O). These differences are noted between:

- SFC_f / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .008$)
- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .004$)
- LNC / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = 0.33$).

2. The comparisons between the corpora for the subcategory *affect (unhappiness, misery)* reveal no significant results when the adjusted p-value is considered (Table 2, Appendix O). The short discussion about the real and adjusted p-values in section 5.3.1 is relevant here. According to Van Zyl (personal communication, 13 May), more comparisons make it more difficult to identify significant differences. Van Zyl notes that it is possible to see significant differences in the omnibus tests but no obvious significant differences in the pairwise tests (Van Zyl, 2019, personal

communication, 13 May). A solution to determine whether any possible statistically significant results exist on any level would be to consider only the true (unadjusted) p-values. If these are considered, eight possible instances of statistically significant differences are noted (only the true p-values are reported here):

- SFC_a / BC_f (p = .009)
- SFC_a / BC_a (p = .004)
- SFC_a / LNC (p = .004)
- SFC_a / GC_Af (p = .009)
- SFC_f / BC_f (p = .025)
- SFC_f / BC_a (p = .012)
- SFC_f / LNC (p = .012)
- SFC_f / GC_Af (p = .022)

However, as mentioned in section 5.3.1, the adjusted p-values indicate significance based on stricter criteria than the true p-values, and therefore the decision is made to only consider results that produce adjusted p-values. Nonetheless, results reflecting only true p-values are still reported, even if they are not considered as indications of noteworthy significant differences. It remains interesting to note that the lower frequencies keep occurring in the SFC (either the authentic or the fabricated). This once again strengthens the argument that the homogeneity of these corpora have an impact on the results when compared to other, heterogeneous corpora.

3. Similar to the results for the subcategory of *affect (unhappiness, misery)*, the subcategory of *affect (unhappiness, antipathy)* also does not include any adjusted p-value results (Table 3, Appendix O). However, six true p-values indicating possible significant differences can be reported:

- SFC_a / LSC (p = .025)
- SFC_f / GC_Af (p = .039)
- SFC_f / LSC (p = .025)
- BC_f / GC_Af (p = .024)
- BC_f / LSC (p = .018)
- BC_a / LSC (.049).

4. In terms of the subcategory *affect (security, trust)*, seven instances of statistically significant differences on both true and adjusted p-value levels are noted (Table 4, Appendix O). The true p-value is indicated first followed by the adjusted p-value:

- BC_f / BC_a (p = .000 and p = .000)
- BC_f / SFC_a (p = .000 and p = .005)
- BC_f / LNC (p = .000 and p = .000)
- BC_f / GC_En (p = .000 and p = .004)
- BC_f / LSC (p = .000 and p = .002)
- BC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- SFC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .002).

What is interesting here is that the lowest frequency of use is noted in six comparisons between the BC_f and the authentic corpora. This suggests that in terms of this subcategory, this one corpus of fabricated suicide notes includes a significantly lower use of *affect (security, trust)*. Thus, using a limited number of thought units expressing trust might be a characteristic of this specific corpus.

5. Pairwise comparisons for the subcategory *affect (insecurity, disquiet)* reveal only one instance of a significant difference between the following corpora (Table 5, Appendix O):

- SFC_a / LSC (p = .001 and p = .020)

6. When the subcategory *affect (satisfaction, admiration)* is compared between the different corpora, six instances of significant differences are revealed (Table 6, Appendix O):

- LNC / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- SFC_a / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .002)
- GC_En / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .006)
- BC_f / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .000)
- BC_a / GC_Af (p = .000 and p = .001)
- SFC_f / GC_Af (p = .002 and p = .043)

The fact that the GC_Af is noted with the highest frequency of use for this subcategory in comparisons with four of the six authentic suicide note corpora, and in comparisons with both

fabricated suicide note corpora, once again suggests that there are culture-specific aspects of this corpus separating it from the rest. It is also possible that the high-frequency use of this specific subcategory is a characteristic of this specific corpus.

7. In terms of the subcategories for *judgement*, the category *judgement of esteem (normality)* reveals only one instance of significant use between (Table 7, Appendix O):

- LNC / LSC ($p = .001$ and $p = .033$)

8. While the other subcategories for *judgements of esteem* reveal no significant differences in use, comparisons for the subcategory *judgement of sanction (veracity)* produce seven instances of significant differences (Table 8, Appendix O):

- SFC_f / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- BC_f / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- SFC_a / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .004$)
- GC_En / LSC ($p = .001$ and $p = .015$)
- BC_a / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .001$)
- LNC / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .008$)
- GC_Af / LSC ($p = .001$ and $p = .023$).

Five of the comparisons above are between authentic suicide notes, while two are between fabricated and authentic suicide notes. In all cases, a higher frequency of the subcategory *judgements of sanction (veracity)* is noted in the LSC. It was mentioned in the previous section that this is the smallest corpus in the present study. The fact that this very small corpus once again appears to indicate the characteristic use of a specific category is noteworthy, especially considering that this is a subcategory and significance is indicated after the Bonferroni adjustments.

9. The subcategory *judgements of sanction (propriety)* also indicates significant differences in use (Table 9, Appendix O):

- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- SFC_a / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .020$)

- BC_a / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .016$)

Similar to the results in 6, the GC_Af once again shows the highest use of a particular category in particular comparisons. However, this is only the case in four comparisons. This means that there are another four comparisons with GC_Af that do not indicate any significant differences. Therefore, this particular category is not necessarily a characteristic of GC_Af, although it appears to be significant in these specific comparisons.

10. One aspect that could be potentially interesting in the analyses of the corpora, and which is directly linked to the appraisal category of *judgement*, is determining whether judgements are directed at others or the authors themselves. A second aspect of this is determining whether the judgements are positive or negative. The annotations for these aspects are discussed in Chapter 4. In terms of significant use, only pairwise tables for judgements directed at other individuals are generated. In the pairwise table for *positive judgements of others* (Table 10, Appendix O), four instances of significant difference in use are noted:

- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- SFC_a / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .011$)
- LNC / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .035$)

Once again, the GC_Af appears to include the highest frequency of use, but similar to the results in 9, only four comparisons are reflected here, meaning that the category is not characteristic of the corpus but simply prominent in these particular comparisons.

11. Comparisons for the category *negative judgements of others* (Table 11, Appendix O) reveal two significant differences in use:

- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .007$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .038$)

12. The final two subcategories that led to significant difference through the comparisons are both subcategories of *graduation*. The first is the subcategory of *force* (Table 12, Appendix O), which indicates seven significant differences:

- SFC_f / BC_a ($p = .000$ and $p = .008$)
- SFC_f / LSC ($p = .000$ and $p = .002$)
- SFC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- BC_f / LSC ($p = .001$ and $p = .032$)
- BC_f / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .000$)
- SFC_a / GC_Af ($p = .000$ and $p = .007$)
- LNC / GC_Af ($p = .001$ and $p = .034$)

While no obvious pattern is visible in the comparisons above, it does appear that overall the fabricated suicide notes include a lower frequency of the subcategory *force*. However, once again no assumptions can be made since the significant differences are not indicated in at least five of the seven possible comparisons with each of the fabricated suicide note corpora.

13. The final pairwise table for the subcategories (Table 13, Appendix O) includes the specific comparisons for the subcategory of *focus*. Similar to the tables discussed in 2 and 3, no significant results are indicated on the adjusted p-value level. Thus, while the true p-values are reported here, the results will not be taken into consideration:

- SFC_f / LNC ($p = .038$)
- SFC_f / BC_f ($p = .013$)
- SFC_f / LSC ($p = .004$)
- GC_En / LSC ($p = .024$)
- BC_a / BC_f ($p = .026$)
- BC_a / LSC ($p = .010$)
- SFC_a / LSC ($p = .023$)

Table 5.12 includes a summary of the results discussed above. Similar to the summary in Table 5.10, this table again highlights the impossibility of assigning characteristics to a classification of suicide notes. Thus, based on the discussions in both sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, it seems clear that no conclusions can be drawn about the use of specific linguistic appraisal categories in authentic or fabricated suicide notes in general. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.

Table 5.12: A summary of the results for the pairwise tables of the subcategories

Subcategory	Significant differences identified between	Higher use of subcategory in
<i>Affect (happiness, affection)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	LSC GC_Af
<i>Affect (unhappiness, misery)</i>	N/A	N/A
<i>Affect (unhappiness, antipathy)</i>	N/A	N/A
<i>Affect (security, trust)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	BC_a SFC_a LNC GC_En LSC GC_Af
<i>Affect (insecurity, disquiet)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> authentic suicide notes 	LSC
<i>Affect (satisfaction, admiration)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fabricated and authentic suicide notes authentic suicide notes 	GC_Af
<i>Judgement of esteem (normality)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> authentic suicide notes 	LSC

<i>Judgement of sanction (veracity)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes • authentic suicide notes 	LSC
<i>Judgement of sanction (propriety)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes • authentic suicide notes 	GC_Af
<i>Positive judgement of others</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes • authentic suicide notes 	GC_Af
<i>Negative judgement of others</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	GC_Af
<i>Force</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fabricated and authentic suicide notes 	BC_a LSC GC_Af
<i>Focus</i>	N/A	N/A

The discussion of the results based on the comparisons between the corpora has illuminated several possible issues with studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes. The first is the fact that studies often only consider two corpora at a time, specifically the Shneidman and Farberow

corpus (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Gottschalk and Gleser, 1960; Edelman and Renshaw, 1982; Black, 1993; Ioannou and Debowska, 2014). This means that at best the results of these studies reflect the characteristics of these two specific corpora. Studies that do compare more than two corpora (Osgood and Walker, 1959; Shapero, 2011) often make use of both suicide notes and non-suicide-related texts to determine whether there are differences in expressions, word use etc. between texts including possible suicidal ideation and texts that do not. Although such comparisons may be successful in indicating the characteristics of a specific genre to some extent, these studies will still not be able to determine the characteristics of a classification (authentic or fabricated). The best that studies such as these can do is to indicate possible characteristics for suicide notes in general, regardless of whether they are authentic or fabricated.

To emphasise this point, section 5.4 includes a summary of the results of previous studies comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes. The results of the present study are not included here for the simple reason that the results do not claim to reflect the characteristics of either authentic or fabricated suicide notes.

5.4 Summarising the results of previous research

The research summarised here only reflects the studies discussed in Chapter 2. Obviously, these studies are not an exhaustive list of all the comparison studies performed on suicide notes but they offer enough information to support the arguments that

- results are study specific
- results are specific to the corpora and method used
- no list of characteristics exclusive to either authentic or fabricated suicide notes can be compiled, suggesting that no characteristics specific to a classification of suicide notes exist.

The results in previous studies are summarised in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13: A summary of the results in previous research (authentic suicide notes)

Characteristics of authentic suicide notes	S+F ²⁵	G+G	E+R	L	B	G1	S	I+D	G2
Are longer					X	X			
Are dated					X		X		
Are not dated									
Include postscripts							X		
Include addressees							X		
Include instructions	X				X	X			
References to other people		X							
References to spatial relations		X							
Cognisance of objects			X						
Modification of objects			X						
Negating people, things			X						
“They”, “them” = positive			X						
Sense of alienation			X						
Decreased use in future references			X						
A wish to die				X					
Expressing a will to escape				X				X	
Expressing sadness/depression				X				X	
Evidence of poor health				X					
Constricted logic				X					
Narcissistic personality				X					
Expressing hopelessness									
Expressing feelings of futility									
Expressing love							X		
Expressing thankfulness									
Expressing guilt									

²⁵ Previous studies are abbreviated as follows: S+F = Shneidman and Farberow (1957), G+G = Gottschalk and Gleser (1960), E+R = Edelman and Renshaw (1982), L = Leenaars (1988), B = Black (1993), G1 = Gregory (1999), S = Shapero (2011), I+D = Ioannou and Debowska (2014), G2 = Grundlingh (2018).

Expressing fault							X		
Saying goodbye							X		
References to the act being a suicide									
Providing reasons for the suicide						X			
Perceiving suicide as relief									
Looking forward to being reunited with someone									
Self-mitigation								X	
References to failed relationships								X	
Lack of self-acceptance								X	
Includes expressions of trust									X
Includes judgements of propriety									X
Includes negative appreciation									X

The summary in Table 5.13 clearly indicates that the results for the different studies are specific to those studies. This is expected given the fact that each study follows a different approach to analysing the data, considering different aspects of importance each time. This leads one to believe that identifying characteristics specific to authentic suicide notes is not possible. This argument is strengthened by the summary of the results for fabricated suicide note studies in Table 5.14.

Table 5.14: A summary of the results in previous research (fabricated suicide notes)

Characteristics of fabricated suicide notes	S+F	G+G	E+R	L	B	G	S	I+D
Are shorter						X		
No instructions						X		
Expressions of depression					X			
Expressions of a purposeless life								X

Justifications for the act					X			
Containing reasons for suicide					X	X		
No references to the afterlife					X			
Contains instances of “oddness”						X	X	
Escape								X
Self-blame								X

The summary in Table 5.14 clearly supports the argument that no list of characteristics specific to either authentic or fabricated suicide notes exists. Most importantly, the results in Table 5.14 indicate that there are “characteristics” which occur in both authentic and fabricated suicide notes. For example, including reasons for suicide and expressing self-blame or fault are found in both authentic and fabricated suicide notes. This, together with the fact that it would be difficult to compile an exhaustive list of characteristics specific to a classification, seems to support arguments that any possible characteristics of suicide notes are simply specific to the genre in general or specific to a single corpus within a particular study. This brings the discussion back to the question of whether it is possible to identify a suicide note as either authentic or fabricated. This concern is discussed below in section 5.5.

5.5 Determining the authenticity of a single suicide note

Sections 5.2 to 5.4 of Chapter 5 have reported the results for the analyses in the present study as well as the results for previous studies in suicide note comparisons. From the discussion it has become clear that classifying a suicide note as either authentic or fabricated is quite problematic. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that one would be able to identify a single suicide note as being either authentic or fabricated. In a real-life forensic situation, this is exactly what a forensic linguist will have to attempt. In Chapter 1 it is emphasised that determining the authenticity of a suicide

note has potentially serious consequences and therefore it is of the utmost importance that if claims are made about the possibility to determine authenticity, these claims are true.

In an article by Leenaars and Lester (1991), they specifically mention the obstacles associated with determining the authenticity of suicide notes. According to these authors (Leenaars and Lester 1991), individuals trained in psychology had a difficult time successfully determining the authenticity of a suicide note and identified various characteristics that could point to authenticity. In fact, the only characteristic they could agree on was expressions of experiencing trauma.

Bennell, Jones and Taylor (2011) wrote an important research paper on the topic of determining the authenticity of suicide notes. In their study, Bennell et al (2011: 669) used two studies to examine the degree to which training could improve someone's ability to determine such authenticity. According to Bennell et al (2011: 669), there is little empirical evidence to guide decisions concerning the authenticity of suicide notes and an incorrect decision may not only prolong a criminal investigation, but also result in a miscarriage of justice.

Bennell et al (2011: 669–670) mention that if the empirical literature pertaining to the analysis of suicide notes is taken into account, two sets of variables may be useful in predicting the authenticity of a suicide note. The first set of variables relates to measures of language structure. This includes average sentence length, percentage of nouns or percentage of action verbs, percentage of cognitive process verbs, and suchlike. The second set of variables relates to thematic or content-related aspects of the suicide note. These variables refer to the total number of words in the note, the presence of instructions to survivors, expressions of positive affect, explanations for the suicidal act, and the like.

Bennell et al (2011: 670) indicate that their 2011 study is an extension of a 2007 study by Jones and Bennell where statistical prediction rules (SPRs) were devised to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Jones and Bennell (2007) found, like previous studies on suicide notes, that the authentic suicide notes were longer with shorter sentence fragments, contained more instructions to survivors and included a greater expression of positive affect. Bennell et al (2011: 670) focus the aim of their study on the results of the Jones and Bennell (2007) study:

Specifically, the aim is to measure the degree to which instructions based on empirically derived SPR that consists of two variables (average sentence length and expressions of positive affect) can improve the decision accuracy of human judges who are required to discriminate between genuine and simulated suicide notes. A further aim is to compare the accuracy of trained and untrained judges to the performance of the SPR when the latter is applied to the same set of notes examined by the judges (Bennell et al, 2011: 670).

Thus, Bennell et al (2011) sought to determine whether an SPR outperforms individuals, since that would suggest that SPRs or other computer-based software should be used to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal investigations where the authenticity of a suicide note is questioned.

Bennell et al (2011: 671) speculate that people are poor decision makers in terms of suicide note authenticity since they rely on inappropriate decision cues. According to a study by Snook and Mercer (2010), a group of police officers was unable to accurately determine the authenticity of a set of 30 suicide notes (half of which were simulated). They concluded that this was because the officers based their decisions on cues that are known to be ineffective discriminators, including the percentage of cognitive process verbs such as *feel*, *want* and *forgive* (Snook and Mercer, 2010; Bennell et al, 2011). Importantly, Bennell et al (2011: 671) mention that while some research has suggested “that it is possible to train individuals to improve their diagnostic accuracy on certain tasks by teaching them to use relevant decision cues”, other studies claim that training does not necessarily produce substantial improvements in diagnostic performance.

Bennell et al (2011: 673) devised two studies to test whether training could improve diagnostic performance and whether the results of human judges corresponded to the results from SPR.

For study 1, fifty undergraduate students were used as participants. This first study was aimed at examining decision-making performance concerning the authenticity of suicide notes. Bennell et al (2011: 673) compared the relative accuracy of naïve participants and those provided with instructions regarding the variables that could effectively distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Comparisons were also made between both these groups and an SPR.

Bennell et al (2011: 674) used a subset of the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpus as their suicide note data.²⁶

Bennell et al (2011: 676) report that while the SPR reached moderate levels of accuracy in the discrimination task, the human judges (trained and untrained) achieved only chance-level accuracy.

In study 2, Bennell et al (2011: 678) increased the training of one group of participants to determine whether an increase in training corresponds to an increase in successfully authenticating a suicide note. For study 2, ninety-seven undergraduate students were used as participants. Bennell et al (2011: 682) found that although the increase in training led to a general improvement in terms of performance, none of the training groups could match the level of accuracy achieved by the SPR. Bennell et al (2011: 682) argue that since the SPR outperformed the human participants, the study “provides support for the implementation of actuarial decision aids in the determination of suicide note authenticity”. Having said that, they also report that in both studies the SPR (of 0.73) only achieved moderate accuracy (Bennell et al, 2011).

While it can be agreed that a computer program might be a more reliable judge of authenticity, the problem is the criteria used to determine the authenticity. It has been repeatedly proven here that no conclusive checklist of characteristics for authentic or fabricated suicide notes exists. Thus, basing any program on a list of “characteristics” generated from previous research means that the program is essentially just looking for a myriad of aspects produced by different studies and different corpora. In fact, the only somewhat stable possible characteristics that seem to be identified by some studies are the longer length of authentic suicide notes (Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999) and the inclusion of instructions in authentic suicide notes (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957; Black, 1993; Gregory, 1999). However, deciding on the authenticity of a suicide note based on two or three possible constant characteristics seems extremely dangerous.

²⁶ For a detailed discussion of the procedure, the Bennell et al (2011) article can be downloaded from the following link: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0093854811405146>

The sections below indicate exactly how difficult it is to determine authenticity based on a single note. Even though the analyses are performed by hand, the examples illustrate the pitfalls of depending on a list of possible characteristics generated from multiple studies.

5.5.1 Problems with authenticating a suicide note

From the present study, it is obvious that appraisal theory categories cannot indicate significant differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. At best, significant differences between specific corpora in particular comparisons can be indicated. Therefore, appraisal theory categories will not be considered as part of the analysis in this section. To illustrate the pitfalls when trying to determine the authenticity of a single suicide note, only the characteristics identified in previous studies (see Tables 5.13 and 5.14) will be used in this section.

Once again, it is worth noting that the results in section 5.4 indicate that a variety of characteristics has been identified in previous suicide note studies. This speaks to the first problem, which is the fact that there is no refined list of suicide note characteristics available. Secondly, presenting data in table form, as is the case in section 5.4, makes it appear that the characteristics are mutually exclusive, with certain characteristics only appearing in authentic suicide notes and some only appearing in fabricated suicide notes. From the results of the present and previous studies, we know that this is not the case. This means that any characteristics may occur in either an authentic or a fabricated suicide note.

For the purposes of illustration, two single fabricated suicide notes from the Black corpus in the present study are included here. The suicide notes are numbered with a code consisting of a number (1 or 2), the gender of the writer (“M” for male), the corpus code (BC) and the shorthand “fabr”. Only the notes from male writers are considered in order to make it a fair comparison. Thought units are once again considered for the purposes of these analyses. Any possible authentic suicide note characteristics are identified by *A* and the characteristics for the fabricated suicide notes are identified by *F*.

5.5.1.1 Note: 1_M_BC_fabr

(For some reason)[F – Instance of oddness] I’ve decided to kill myself. [A – Reference to the act being a suicide] I want you to know that I love you and care about you. [A – Expressing love] As far as my

resources go, I've made provisions for your future. Sorry to freak out on you. I don't understand it myself. [F – Instance of oddness]

If one only considers the characteristics identified in section 5.4 above, it is clear that characteristics from both the authentic and fabricated suicide notes are present in this suicide note. The first problem is determining whether this note is short or long. For this purpose, one would need a corpus against which to compare the length of the suicide note. If it is compared to the suicide notes in the present study, one can conclude that the note is short. This might therefore point to a possible fabricated suicide note. However, there are a couple of problems with some of the authentic suicide note characteristics. Both Black (1993) and Shapero (2011) found that authentic suicide notes are more often dated than fabricated suicide notes, whereas Ho et al (1998) found the opposite. Thus, owing to this discrepancy, these two characteristics cannot be used.

If one is convinced about the accuracy of the possible characteristics identified by research, then, considering the length of the note and other aspects, a total of three “characteristics” pointing to a fabricated suicide note and two pointing to an authentic suicide note are found in the suicide note above. Three identifiers in favour of this being a fabricated suicide note (compared to two against) is not much and one would not be able to say with any certainty that this is in fact a fabricated suicide note.

5.5.1.2 Note: 2_M_BC_fabr

To My Family & Friends [A – Includes addressees]

(they will know who they are)

My life has become a box. Or more accurately a traveling back and forth between various boxes. I see no way out, no way off this railroad that yo-yo's between walls & dreariness. [A(x2) – Expressing sadness or depression or Expressing hopelessness / F – Expressing depression] I cannot love anymore. I cannot create anymore. I will never be capable of a single spontaneous act ever again. [A (x2) – Expressing sadness or depression or Expressing hopelessness / F(x2) – Expressing depression or expression of a purposeless life] What use then to live? To face an endless drift of mechanical days, this pressure inside my brain, this inability to escape this box on top of my head? [A – Expressing sadness or depression / F – Expressing depression]

Camus said that the only important question one faces is the question of whether to pull the trigger or not. [A – Reference to the act being a suicide] This (unreadable word) morality. I look at my past & see the horrors visited on me by my mother & father- out of negligence & design. [A – Reference to failed relationships] Their warfare became my twistings & I didn't know it. Have acted all my life in ignorance. It's too late now to change. [A – Expressing hopelessness] I will never achieve, never be the person I was meant to be in this lifetime. [A – Expressing sadness or depression / F – Expressing depression] To the 'friends' & 'lovers' who gave themselves to me- thank you & fuck you - & I mean both those things. [A(x2) – Expressing love or referring to failed relationships]

To my family, what a sick group, all except my sister, Mary who showed me. Thanks 'Liz'
[A(x2) - Expressing love or referring to failed relationships]

No one did this but me [A – Expressing fault /F – Expressing self-blame]

By comparison, this suicide note is a longer note and could therefore be considered an authentic suicide note in terms of this structural aspect. Furthermore, if the various “characteristics” of authentic and fabricated suicide notes are identified it appears that about 15 characteristics associated with authentic suicide notes are listed and only about six associated with fabricated suicide notes. When a “(x2)” appears next to either *A* or *F*, it indicates that two different characteristics associated with either authentic or fabricated suicide notes are present. The result suggests that note 2_M_BC_fabr is an authentic suicide note, when it is in fact a fabricated suicide note.

The method used here is not foolproof, but the point is simply to illustrate possible problems when it comes down to analysing a suicide note in isolation instead of comparing corpora to each other. From the very basic analyses above, it is clear that certain characteristics are difficult to determine, contradictory results from previous studies complicate the process and multiple aspects associated with both authentic and fabricated suicide notes can be present in a single note. It is also apparent that a “characteristic” considered to indicate either authenticity or simulation can be present in the same thought unit (indicated by *A/F* in the suicide note above).

Based on this short discussion and previous research on authenticating suicide notes, the conclusion can be drawn that it is extremely difficult to authenticate a single suicide note. Therefore, I suggest that no such attempts should be made. However, if someone is willing to take

the risk, I suggest that any authentication process, conducted by either a person or a computer, should at best be used as additional evidence in a criminal case and should not be the foundation on which such a case is built.

5.6 Conclusion

The discussion in Chapter 5 included the results from the present study and a short summary of the results from previous studies aimed at comparing authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Throughout the discussion certain observations have been made. No conclusions have been drawn because it is impossible to do so. The corpora in the present study are too small to represent the entire community of those who choose to die by suicide or those who choose to fake or stage a suicide. This means that these results, like those of other studies, are specific to the present study and represent the products of the specific data, theory and methods used here.

Although some corpora in the present study have been identified as having certain possible characteristics attributable to them based on the use of certain linguistic appraisal categories, the results do not support any arguments for these characteristics being assigned to a classification of suicide notes, either authentic or fabricated. In fact, the results suggest that even classifying a set of suicide notes as authentic or fabricated is probably impossible. Furthermore, the discussion on the possibility of authenticating a single suicide note suggests that even with the help of a computer program, the results will be problematic since the criteria are based on characteristics that are not necessarily characteristic at all.

Therefore, it seems safer to advocate for the identification of characteristics of suicide notes as a *genre*, rather than trying to determine the characteristics of a specific *classification* – something that might not even be possible to do.

Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the thesis and includes suggestions for dealing with the issues identified in this chapter and discussed above.

Chapter 6

Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 Introduction

The present study indicates how appraisal theory could lead to new insights concerning the analysis of suicide notes. Firstly, this study approaches the analysis of suicide notes from an alternative perspective. By hypothesising that there are no linguistic characteristics that can be used to authenticate a single suicide note or differentiate between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, the present study provides arguments for considering authentic and fabricated suicide notes as largely indistinguishable texts. Secondly, the present study reconceptualises the importance of the concepts “differences” and “distinction” when comparing suicide notes. The study clearly indicates that in order to draw any definite conclusions about the characteristics of either authentic or fabricated suicide notes, specific criteria concerning the distinctiveness of these characteristics need to be met. Thirdly, this study offers a platform from which to comment on other studies claiming to identify characteristics of either authentic or fabricated suicide notes. The aim of this is not to discredit the results of previous studies, but to indicate how complex the genre of suicide notes is and to indicate that drawing definite conclusions about a classification of suicide notes is ill-informed, since the process of classifying a suicide note might be flawed. Naturally, a study such as the one attempted here might call into question certain methods used or assumptions made in previous research, but accepting the arguments in the present study or the arguments in previous studies still remains the prerogative of the reader.

This final chapter thus highlights the successes and the limitations of the current study, and suggests possible future research based on the findings.

6.2 Findings

From the results and discussion, it appears that the methodology applied in the present study, that is, the analyses of suicide notes from an appraisal theory perspective, does have potential. It seems that linguistic appraisal categories can be identified in suicide notes, but it does not appear that the categories are able to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. Thus, if linguistic appraisal categories are only used for the purposes of determining what categories are used in

suicide notes in general, the method would be useful. However, it is not possible to use linguistic appraisal categories to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes in general. This finding is based on the results produced by the multiple comparisons in the present study. Since the present study compares multiple authentic and fabricated suicide note corpora, it became clear that one specific aspect of suicide note comparisons might not have been taken into account in previous studies: the observation that results are comparison specific. This means that the corpora being compared and the method being used will lead to particular results in each case. Thus, a study using corpora A and B and method C will lead to different results to studies using corpora A and D and method E or even studies using corpora A and B and method E. In the pairwise comparisons discussed in Chapter 5, it is apparent that each comparison represents an individual “study” making use of the same method. In the case of the present study, these individual, mini studies indicate that when one specific corpus of fabricated suicide notes is compared to one specific corpus of authentic suicide notes in terms of a specific linguistic appraisal category, a result is generated. However, when those same two corpora are compared in terms of a different linguistic appraisal category, or when each corpus is compared with another, different corpus, the results vary. This casts doubt on any conclusions drawn in previous studies, since this argument clearly suggests that each study is possibly generating specific results that will not necessarily repeat themselves with other corpora. It also disproves an earlier hypothesis of possible legitimacy markers in authentic suicide notes by Grundlingh (2018) where the same theory and some of the same data were used. The main reason for this was that Grundlingh (2018) did not consider multiple comparisons in the same way as it is attempted in the present study and did not consider the possibility that there might be no distinctive differences between authentic and fabricated suicide notes. The results in the present study suggest that previous studies should be repeated to determine whether they are in fact trustworthy and whether different data would deliver different results. A result such as this therefore suggests that identifying the characteristics of authentic and fabricated suicide notes would be almost impossible and seems to support the hypothesis of this study, meaning that:

It is not possible to verify a suicide note found at a crime scene as authentic based on distinctive linguistic features, because such features are also not present in corpora of authentic or fabricated suicide notes.

Such a conclusion is based on the fact that from the discussion in previous chapters, it appears that no linguistic characteristics are unique to a classification and no linguistic characteristics are unique to a specific suicide note in a classification. This means that one cannot state that a specific linguistic element only occurs in authentic or fabricated suicide notes. This also means that the term “characteristic” must be used with extreme caution. When one wants to claim that a linguistic element is “characteristic” of a specific classification, it means that such an element must be typically found within that classification. However, the present study has indicated that only a couple of elements have been identified as possibly characteristic by previous studies (see Chapter 5). For example, the studies by Black (1993) and Gregory (1999) both note that authentic suicide notes are longer than their fabricated counterparts, and the studies by Shneidman and Farberow (1957), Black (1993) and Gregory (1999) have found that authentic suicide notes often include instructions to others. Having said this, these studies are all based on the same corpora – the 33 authentic and 33 fabricated suicide notes collected by Shneidman and Farberow. This is problematic, since the present study notes (in Chapter 2) the pitfalls with using homogenous corpora. In fact, the present study also notes that comparing any authentic suicide note corpora with fabricated suicide note corpora generated in an experimental setting can lead to issues, since such notes will never reflect the true psychological state of a person writing a fabricated suicide note out of necessity. It therefore seems that even repeated results from different studies should be interpreted with caution.

The need to determine whether authentic and fabricated suicide notes can be distinguished is logical. As indicated in Chapter 1, instances have been noted where possible fabricated suicide notes formed part of a criminal investigation. Therefore, it would seem helpful to be able to determine the authenticity of a suicide note. However, in Chapter 2 it is emphasised that the fabrication of a suicide note is an extremely rare event (Gregory, 1999). This leads me to believe that other evidence in a criminal investigation (such as a history of mental illness, interviewing friends and family, a history relating to financial or other struggles etc.) will be sufficient to determine the authenticity of a suicide note. In fact, I think it might be nearly impossible to accurately authenticate a suicide note based on this very argument – the fact that the fabrication of a suicide note is so rare. As mentioned in Chapter 2, an ideal situation would be to gather a corpus of real-life fabricated suicide notes written in real-life circumstances and compare them to

authentic suicide notes. Unfortunately, that seems to be an almost impossible task given the lack of real-life fabricated suicide notes available for research purposes.

Two other aspects that also possibly hinder the ability to accurately authenticate a suicide note are the concept of an “idiolect” and research into deception detection. From Chapter 2, it is clear that arguments for the existence of an idiolect would negate any argument for the possibility of authenticating a suicide note. Since an idiolect implies that each individual has a unique writing style that can be used to identify a text produced by that particular author, it would also mean that each text produced by an author is unique to that person. Thus, a corpus of suicide notes, although they might share some similarities, is in fact just a collection of unique texts by different authors. This means that, at best, a collection of linguistic elements used by suicide note writers in general can be identified, but these elements will not necessarily be unique to only authentic suicide note writers since the writers of authentic suicide notes are each a unique author by themselves. With enough corpora, it might be possible to prove that some linguistic characteristics exist that are unique to only authentic suicide notes, but this will have to be investigated with further research. One might want to argue that if the argument for an idiolect interfering with the possibility of identifying unique characteristics for either authentic or fabricated suicide notes exists, this must also be true for other corpora – such as those used to determine the differences in language use between genders. Such an argument will be a valid one since it cannot be denied that most corpora are essentially just a collection of individual texts by different authors. Having said that, I would like to refer back to an earlier statement that in order for something to be “characteristic” is must be typical in a specific corpus. I would argue that, in the case of authenticating a suicide note, a characteristic should also be unique to a classification. This will provide some certainty when arriving at a verdict concerning a suicide note’s authenticity. In determining whether there are differences in the use of language between genders, such certainty is not a prerequisite, since stating that a specific linguistic characteristic is typical or more frequent in a specific gender is sufficiently valid for the purposes of such studies. Thus, although idiolect will influence all corpora of heterogeneous texts, the aim of the corpora will determine whether the idiolect ultimately causes problems concerning the conclusions drawn or not.

It is also important to take note of the fact that all suicide notes, authentic or fabricated, might be considered deceptive texts. In Chapter 2, a thorough discussion is included about the deceptive

nature of all suicide notes. This would mean that distinguishing between authentic and fabricated suicide notes is extremely difficult and that authenticating a single suicide note would also be a difficult task.

Thus, based on the discussion in this and previous chapters, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. It is not possible to distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes in the present study. One can only identify the possible characteristics of specific corpora in specific comparisons.
2. The results of all studies comparing suicide notes (including the present study) are study specific, meaning that each study will generate a different batch of results depending on the data or the methods.
3. No exhaustive or trustworthy list of linguistic characteristics can be compiled that can be used to determine whether a suicide note is authentic. The main reason for this is that no linguistic characteristics seem to exist that are unique to a specific classification of suicide notes.
4. Classifying suicide notes is risky. Since no characteristics are unique to a specific type of suicide note, the grounds for classifying a suicide note – based on linguistic means – as either authentic or fabricated seem problematic. At best, one can classify them based on how they were generated – that is, either through a real-life suicide (authentic) or in an experimental setting (fabricated).

6.3 Recommendations and future research

From the methodology and analyses in the present study, certain limitations have been illuminated that should be addressed in future research.

The first is that the analysis and comparison of small corpora lead to limited abilities in terms of drawing conclusions. In fact, no finite conclusions can or should be drawn when analysing small corpora since, realistically, only observations can be made in such cases. Because it seems highly unlikely that large corpora of suicide notes can be gathered, future studies must take care not to extrapolate any observations to all those who die by suicide.

Secondly, linguistic appraisal categories can be identified in suicide notes, but the annotation of these categories is extremely problematic. This means that determining interrater reliability and test-retest reliability is essential. As mentioned multiple times in this study, coders should preferably be trained and retrained in order to deliver higher rates of reliability and the annotation tool should be continuously modified and retested. The subjectivity of the methods employed in this study should be seen as a weakness since it undermines efforts to accurately determine the authenticity of a suicide note. This means that such methods should be used with caution and that the weaknesses of such methods must be considered and acknowledged. In fact, it is important to use and test these methods because it will determine how accurately certain linguistic methods are when faced with problems of linguistic distinction, specifically when trying to separate texts based on psychological or cognitive processes.

Thirdly, since the present study calls into question the ability to successfully distinguish between authentic and fabricated suicide notes, future studies might want to consider rethinking the possibilities concerning comparison studies. A more reliable option might be to try and determine whether there are possible characteristics of suicide notes as a genre that have not been considered previously. If it were possible to compile a corpus of real-life fabricated suicide notes to compare with authentic suicide notes, that would possibly still be a valid study leading to somewhat reliable results concerning the actual elements found in fabricated suicide notes.

Final suggestions to consider concerning the analysis of suicide notes are (1) a study that includes an analysis of how suicide note writers refer to the act of suicide in their notes. One could investigate whether writers refer to the act explicitly or make use of euphemisms, and the possible reasons for this could be hypothesised. (2) The inclusion and use of politeness markers in suicide notes could be investigated. It would be interesting to determine whether different cultures use more politeness markers or use them differently. The Afrikaans corpora seem to suggest that they use more politeness markers but this would have to be confirmed by means of a separate study. (3) A corpus of fabricated suicide notes selected by heterogeneous note writers could be compared to the Shneidman and Farberow (1957) corpus to determine what the differences between a homogeneous and heterogeneous group of fabricated suicide note writers might be. (4) One might also want to consider replicating and verifying the results of previous studies using different methodologies or corpora.

6.4 Final comments

From the analyses and discussions it is clear that the genre of suicide notes lends itself better to authorship identification or verification than to authentication. Nevertheless, the analysis of suicide notes from a different perspective is useful. Such analyses indicate which methods are more reliable in a specific study or more suitable to a specific aim, and provide possible new avenues for research in suicide notes from both a linguistic and psychology perspective.

In terms of a forensic linguistic study, using appraisal theory to analyse a single suicide note or distinguishing between an authentic and fabricated suicide note is not successful. However, perhaps creating a profile of a suicide note writer based on culture-specific linguistic appraisal categories or identifying the characteristics of a single corpus in terms of linguistic appraisal categories would be more plausible.

In summary, the present study not only indicates the uses and limitations of the analysis of suicide notes from a linguistic appraisal theory perspective, but also indicates to what extent appraisal theory can possibly be used in future linguistic and forensic linguistic research concerning a number of different texts. By illuminating the problems with annotating appraisal categories in suicide notes, the study provides opportunities to improve on these and other aspects of linguistic appraisal analyses in other texts. Furthermore, the present study emphasises the limitations of certain forensic linguistic analyses. Since forensic linguistics is a field of research with a real and serious impact on real-life scenarios, it is important that theories and hypotheses are questioned, tested and improved.

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APPENDIX A: Information sheet distributed to annotators

Information sheet: Interrater Reliability Test (IRR) for PhD study

Dear participant

Thank you for taking part in the IRR test for my PhD study: *Considering authentic and fabricated suicide notes as indistinguishable texts* (working title). I would once again like to emphasise that participation is voluntary. If you feel uncomfortable at any point, you can immediately withdraw from this test.

Background:

The present study is categorised as a **forensic linguistic** study. Forensic linguistics is an area of research that applies linguistics to the domains of written legal texts, spoken legal practices and the provision of evidence for both criminal and civil investigations and courtroom disputes.

This study is based on the hypothesis that it is not possible to verify a suicide note found at a crime scene as authentic based on distinctive linguistic features, because such features are also not present in corpora of authentic, fabricated and parasuicide notes. This hypothesis contradicts the hypotheses of previous studies, claiming that such distinctions are possible.

In order to test the hypothesis, the data is analysed from an **appraisal theory** perspective. Appraisal theory is deemed an appropriate theory in the present study since it allows one to analyse positive and negative assessments as well as the intensity or directness of attitudinal utterances. In appraisal theory the “language of evaluation” refers to the speaker’s or writer’s personal, evaluative involvement in the text which is revealed as they adopt stances toward phenomena (entities, happenings, or states of affairs being construed by the text) or toward metaphenomena (propositions about entities, happenings, and state of affairs). However, there are various issues with appraisal theory analyses. Fuoli (2015)²⁷ notes that manually annotating appraisal categories is a complex and highly subjective task. Therefore, whenever such an analysis is attempted it is necessary to perform tests to determine the reliability, replicability and transparency of the analyses. The most appropriate test to perform in the present study, is the interrater reliability test.

²⁷ Fuoli, M. 2015. A step-wise method for annotating appraisal. *Functions of Language*, 25(2).

Appraisal theory:

Appraisal theory (as described by Martin and Rose, 2003²⁸; Martin and White, 2005²⁹) is quite complex. The framework for analysis consists of various categories, subcategories and even smaller subcategories. The categories utilised in an analyses depends on the data being analysed. If one is considering an in-depth analysis of appraisal in a novel, all the categories and subcategories will probably be considered. However, when one is dealing with limited data and comparing corpora, such as the case in the present study, one can choose to include only the main categories and their immediate subcategories. The reasoning behind this is simple: if no distinctions are possible through an analysis using the main categories and immediate subcategories, no distinction will be possible through an analysis using the specialized categories.

Summary of the data for the IRR test:

For the purposes of this IRR test, only 30 sections from authentic suicide notes by both English and Afrikaans writers (men and women) will be annotated. Since the data is sensitive in nature and potentially upsetting and the distribution of the data controlled by ethical guidelines, only fragments from the suicide notes (rather than full-length letters) are included. Some sections are short paragraphs while others are single sentences. There are 15 sections to annotate in the English document and 15 sections to annotate in the Afrikaans document. Please see the ***Instructions*** document for a full explanation of how the data must be annotated.

What is an IRR test?

An IRR test measures the degree to which an analysis can be replicated by different individuals. In the context of manual annotation, it determines the extent to which the annotations by independent annotators (working under the same guidelines) correspond to each other.

Remember that the argument here is that appraisal theory is *appropriate* in the context of the present study, it does not mean that it is an *effective* way to analyse the data. Pointing out the possible flaws of the theory concerning the manual annotation of the categories is a crucial part of the study.

²⁸ Martin, J.R. and Rose, D. 2003. *Working with discourse: meaning beyond the clause*. New York: Continuum.

²⁹ Martin, J.R. and White, P.R.R. 2005. *The language of evaluation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

APPENDIX B: Instructions sent to the annotators

Instructions: annotating the data

This document contains information on the appraisal categories used in the present study and how the data should be annotated. Please read this document very carefully. If you have any questions, you can contact the researcher at thiarl@unisa.ac.za.

The appraisal categories:

This section includes the categories and subcategories used to annotate the data in the present study. The annotations are included in the tables underneath each subcategory or in the description of a specific category. A detailed explanation of the annotations follows in the *Annotations* section in this document.

Main category 1: Attitude - Affect [Affect refers to how people express their feelings in discourse]

Note that for the subcategories of *affect*, *judgement* and *appreciation*, the annotations include either a + (plus) or – (minus) which indicates whether the affect is positive or negative.

Subcategories of affect:

Happiness (cheer): refers to the mood of the author. [+ affect, hap, cheer]	The author expresses feeling cheerful/positive/enthusiastic/motivated/glad etc.
Happiness (affection): feelings directed at someone else. [+ affect, hap, aff]	The author expresses feelings of love towards another/of adoring someone else/of being fond of someone
Unhappiness (misery): refers to the mood of the author. [- affect, unhap, mis]	Feeling down/sad/depressed
Unhappiness (antipathy): feelings directed at someone else. [- affect, unhap, anti]	Disliking someone else
Security (confidence) [+ affect, sec, conf]	Being sure of something, confident about something or knowing something

Security (trust) [+ affect, sec, trust]	Being comfortable with someone/something or trusting someone. It can also refer to an author asking someone else to do something for them
Insecurity (disquiet) [- affect, inse, disq]	Expressing feelings of being uneasy, anxious or unsure
Insecurity (surprise) [- affect, inse, surp]	Being taken aback or astonished by something
Satisfaction (Interest) [+ affect, sat, int]	Being curious about someone or something
Satisfaction (admiration) [+ affect, sat, adm]	Being impressed or proud
Dissatisfaction (ennui) [- affect, dissat, en]	Expressing boredom or being fed up
Dissatisfaction (displeasure) [- affect, dissat, displ]	Expressing feelings of anger
Fear [- affect, fear]	Being fearful or wary
Desire [- affect, desire]	Missing someone or longing for someone

Please note that with both affect and judgement (below), attitudes can be expressed either directly or be implied. If a person is stating an attitude explicitly it is considered a direct expression. If a person is implying an attitude, it would be an example of an indirect (or implied) expression. These are annotated as [DIR] or [IMPL].

For example:

I love you = direct, explicit expression of happiness (affection).

You could have helped me out = implied expression of judgement of sanction (propriety).

The second main category of attitude is *judgement*. It is important to note that judgement can be either positive or negative (like affect), but judgement can also be expressed in two ways: a person can judge themselves or they can judge others. Therefore, the additions of either “1st” or “2nd” are added to the annotations for judgement (please see the *Examples* section).

Main category 2: Attitude - Judgement [Judgements are attitudes expressed towards people and how they behave]

Subcategories of affect:

Judgement of esteem (normality) [judgement, est, norm]	Refers to how normal or unusual someone is. Normality can refer to a range of things such as being a good or bad parent, being a gifted person, perceiving yourself as a loser etc.
Judgement of esteem (capacity) [judgement, est, cap]	Refers to how capable or incapable someone is. For example, if someone is unable to physically or mentally do something, they would be considered “incapable”.
Judgement of esteem (tenacity) [judgement, est, ten]	Refers to how tenacious or weak/undetermined someone is. For example, if someone indicated that they were unable to complete something or continue with something (physically or mentally), they would be considered “undetermined”.
Judgement of sanction (veracity) [judgement, sanc, ver]	Refers to how truthful or untruthful someone is
Judgement of sanction (propriety) [judgement, sanc, prop]	Refers to how ethical or unethical someone is. Unethical behaviour can range from something as serious as killing another person to simply being unable to help another person. Similarly, someone can be considered as acting “ethically” by helping someone else or being kind.

Main category 3: Attitude – Appreciation [*Appreciation* is the third and final main category for attitude. Appreciation refers to the evaluation of things, objects, events or situations and not people.]

Appreciation is either positive or negative and the annotations for these are simply [+ **appreciation**] or [- **appreciation**].

Main category 4: Graduation [*Graduation* refers to the linguistic choices a person makes in order to increase an attitude towards something or someone or decrease an attitude towards something or someone.]

Graduation consists of two types of grading: *focus* and *force*.

Focus refers to graduation being applied in terms of prototypicality to categories that are usually not scaled. For example, if someone is a “jerk” that person could be referred to as “a real jerk” in certain situations (increasing the attitude) or “kind of a jerk” in other situations (decreasing the attitude).

Force refers to grading attitudes according to intensity or amount. For example, using words such as “very”, “really”, “greatly”, “always”, “love”, “hate” all indicate force in terms of intensity. Words like “huge”, “large”, “vast” indicate force in terms of quantity. Force is also indicated through curse words such as “fuck”, “fucking”, “Jesus!” etc.

For the purposes of the present study, force and focus are simply indicated as either [**grad, focus**] or [**grad, force**].

Annotations

For this IRR you need to annotate each of the 30 authentic suicide note sections provided. You should do this by focusing on the *thought units* in each section. A thought unit is a section of text not limited by punctuation. Thus, each section or sentence provided could be made up of multiple thought units, or be considered a single thought unit.

For example, a sentence such as “I don’t know if I can continue, I am so depressed all the time” Could be considered a single thought unit expressing both a negative judgement about the author in terms of tenacity and expressing unhappiness (misery). Alternatively, it could be seen as two thought units – the first part expressing the judgement and the second expressing the unhappiness. This distinction is up to you. However, if you view it as two thought units, please annotate each one separately. If you don’t, annotate both appraisal categories at the end of the thought unit (please see the *Examples* section).

Remember the following when annotating:

1. Use the annotations as indicated in the section “*The appraisal categories*”.
2. Indicate whether an appraisal is **positive** or **negative**.
3. With judgement, indicate whether the judgements are directed at the **authors themselves** or at **another individual**.
4. Indicate whether an appraisal is expressed **directly** or **indirectly**.

Examples

This section includes some examples of how the annotations should be done. It covers many of the categories and subcategories discussed above. Remember that you can annotate in two ways depending on your interpretation of what indicates a thought unit. You can either annotate each thought unit separately: xxxxxx **[annotation]** xxxxxx **[annotation]**, or you can combine two or three thought units and annotate them at the end of each section: XXXXXXXX, xxxxxxxx. XXXXXXXX **[annotation]** / **[annotation]**

****Examples of annotations from data:**

I can't find my place in life **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**

I knew that **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** if I went to a doctor I would lose my job.

X is the most wonderful person on earth **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**.

I fell so **[grad, force]** madly in Love with her **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]**

I have only **[grad, force]** hurt everyone **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**.

I was happy regardless **[DIR + affect, hap, cheer]**.

No man could have asked for a better wife than you have been. **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff]** / **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

Be good to your mother girls **[DIR + affect, sec, trust]**

Remember you will never have any happiness with anyone until you learn to help yourself **[IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 2nd]**.

No one should feel bad about my going as I am not worth it **[IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]**.

[...] a rather gruesome thought **[- appreciation]**

You have been the best wife **[grad, focus]** a man could want **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

APPENDIX C: Afrikaans annotations for interrater reliability.

ANNOTATOR 0

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. [IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] en kan jy maak soos jy wil. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]

2.

Ek is so [grad, force] verskriklik [grad, force] jammer, ek weet [DIR + affect, sec, conf] dis baie [grad, force] selfsugtig van my maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde [IMPL – affect, unhap, anti]. Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie. [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]

4.

Jy was en is die enigste [grad, force] wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig [grad, force] omgee het [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. Ek het jou so [grad, force] lief [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force], maar jy wil my nie he nie [IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd], en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie.

5.

Ek het haar so [grad, force] gemis en nodig gehad met S [DIR + affect, desire] / [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie G so erg is oor S, want sy het geweet en verstaan ? nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [DIR + affect, desire] / [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs) [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis].

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] met n wonderlike pappa [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. [IMPL + affect, hap, aff] n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. Mams is n ou loser [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st] en oom X dink minder as grond van my [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd], waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het [IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd].

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar, en ek sal altyd so **[grad, force]** dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand. **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff] / [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**

9.

Dankie vir als, nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help **[IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]** maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok **[DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force]**.

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie. **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]**

11.

Ek weet **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens **[DIR + judgement, est, cap, 2nd]**. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan **[Req, DIR]**, maak n verskil **[Req, DIR]** – ek weet **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken **[Req, IMPL]**.

12.

So **[grad, force] / [premod, adj]** lief vir jou **[DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force]**, maar kan net nie meer verder nie **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**, my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar. **[IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]**

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik **[grad, force] / [DIR + affect, desire]** en is so **[grad, force]** ontsettend **[grad, force]** lief vir jou **[DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force]**. So **[grad, force]** jammer ek het so **[grad, force]** n gemors gemaak van ons lewe **[IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**.

14.

X, ek is baie **[grad, force]** lief vir jou **[DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force]**. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie **[grad, force]** na ma en pa **[DIR + affect, desire]**. Jy is n yster en baie **[grad, force]** dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so **[grad, force]** onbeskryflik **[grad, force]** lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force]**

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**. X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster **[IMPL + affect, hap,**

aff]. Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie [**IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**].

ANNOTATOR 1

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek en kan jy maak soos jy wil. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie. [**DIR –aff dissat en 2nd force**] / [**DIR –judg est norm 2nd force**]

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer [**focus**], ek weet dis baie selfsugtig [**focus**] van my maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie. [**DIR –aff dissat en 1st**]

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde. Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie. [**IMPL –aff unhap anti 2nd**]

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het [**force**], regtig omgee het [**force**]. [**DIR +aff hap aff 2nd**] Ek het jou so lief, maar jy wil my nie he nie, en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie. [**DIR –aff unhap mis 1st**]

5.

Ek het haar so gemis [**force**] en nodig gehad met X. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is [**force**] oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [**force**] [**DIR –aff desire 2nd**]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie – hoe hard jy as mens probeer [**force**] om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur [**force**] van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs). [**IMPL –aff dissat en 1st**]

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders met n wonderlike papa [**focus**]. ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry. [**DIR =aff hap cheer 2nd**] Ek is n ou loser [**focus**] en oom X dink minder as grond [**force**] van my, waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het. [**DIR –judg est norm 1st**]

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, ek dink julle was lamal great [**focus**] deur my 49 jaar, en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand. [**DIR +aff hap cheer 2nd**]

9.

Dankie vir als, nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, **[DIR +aff hap cheer 2nd]** maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok. **[IMPL –aff dissat displ 2nd]**

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie. **[DIR –aff desire 2nd]**

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken. **[IMPL +judg est cap 2nd]**

12.

So lief vir jou, **[DIR +aff happ aff 2nd force]** maar kan net nie meer verder nie, my intense pyn **[force]** en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, **[force]** en ruk my lyf uitmekaar.

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik **[DIR –aff desire 2nd force]** en is so ontsettend lief vir jou. **[DIR +aff hap aff 2nd force]** So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe. **[IMPL –judg est norm 1st force]**

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou. **[DIR +aff hap aff 2nd force]** Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. **[DIR –aff desire 2nd force]** Jy is n yster en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so onbeskryflik lief **[focus]** vir jou. **[DIR +judg est norm 2nd force]**

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense **[focus]** wat ek ken. X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster. Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie. **[DIR +aff hap aff 2nd]** / **[DIR +judg est norm 2nd]**

ANNOTATOR 2

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het **[+appreciation]**. Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek en kan jy maak soos jy wil **[IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 2nd]**. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie **[DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st]**.

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer [**grad, force**]/ [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**], ek weet dis baie selfsugtig van my [**IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st**] maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie [**IMPL – affect, dissat, en**], maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde [**IMPL -judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**].

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het [**+appreciation**], regtig omgee het [**grad, force**]. Ek het jou so life [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**], maar jy wil my nie he nie [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 2nd**], en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X [**DIR – affect, desire**]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X [**IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 2nd**], want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**], en hoe baie ek haar mis [**grad, force**]/ [**DIR – affect, desire**]!

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie [**IMPL – affect, insec, disq**] – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde [**IMPL- affect, insec, disq**]. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs).

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**] met n wonderlike papa [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Ek is n ou loser [**DIR – judgement, est, norm**] en oom X dink minder as grond van my [**IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 2nd**], waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het [**+ appreciation**].

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**], ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar [**+appreciation**], en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand [**+appreciation**].

9.

Dankie vir als [**-appreciation**], nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**].

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**], maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik [**IMPL + judgement, est, cap, 2nd**] – want jy is so n mens [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan [**IMPL + affect, sec, trust**], maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken [**IMPL + affect, sec, trust**].

12.

So lief vir jou [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**], maar kan net nie meer verder nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**], my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**].

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik en is so ontsettend lief vir jou [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**]. So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**].

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**]. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. Jy is n yster en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen [**+appreciation**]. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie [**+appreciation**]. Ek is so onbeskryflik lief vir jou [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**]/[**grad, force**].

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken [**+appreciation**]/ [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie [**+ appreciation**]. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster [**+appreciation**]. Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie [**+appreciation**].

ANNOTATOR 3

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het [**+ appreciation**]. Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek [**IMPL, – affect, dissat, en**] en kan jy maak soos jy wil [**IMPL, – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles [**grad, force**] nie[**DIR, – affect, unhap, mis**].

2.

Ek is so verskriklik [**grad, force**] jammer, ek weet [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] dis baie selfsugtig [**IMPL, – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**] van my maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie [**DIR, – affect, unhap, mis**] .

3.

Ja, jys seker [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**] verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde [**IMPL, + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie [**IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis**].

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het [**+ appreciation**], regtig omgee het [**DIR, + affect, hap, aff**]. Ek het jou so [**grad, force**] lief, maar jy wil my nie he nie [**IMPL, – affect, desire**], en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie [**DIR, – affect, unhap, mis**] .

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X [**DIR, – affect, desire**] . Ek dink [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**] dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg [**DIR, + affect, hap, aff**] is oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie [**grad, force**] ek haar mis [**DIR, – affect, desire**] !

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie [**DIR, – affect, unhap, mis**] – hoe hard [**grad,force**] jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak [**IMPL, + judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**] hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe [**IMPL, – judgement, est, cap, 1st**]. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde [**IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis**] . Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs) [**IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis**].

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders [**DIR, +affect, hap, aff**] met n wonderlike papa [**DIR, + affect, sat, adm**]. ‘n Beter pa [**grad, force**] sal jul nerens kry. Ek is n ou loser [**grad,focus**] en oom X dink minder as grond van my, waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het [**+appreciation**].

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet [**IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis**] , ek dink julle was lamal great [**DIR, + affect, sat, adm**] deur my 49 jaar, en ek sal altyd so [**grad, force**] dankbaar [**+appreciation**] vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand.

9.

Dankie vir als [**+ appreciation**], nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, maar my laaste dae niks gehad [**IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis**] en gedog jy sou my help [**IMPL, – affect, sec, trust**] maar nog steeds [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**] lief vir jou ok [**DIR, +affect, hap, aff**].

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan [IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis], maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie [DIR, – judgement, est, cap, 1st].

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik [DIR + affect, sec, trust] – want jy is so n mens [DIR, + judgement, est, cap, 2nd]. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan[IMPL, – judgement, est, ten, 2nd], maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak [DIR + affect, sec, trust] en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken [DIR, + affect, sat, adm].

12.

So lief vir jou[DIR, +affect, hap, aff], maar kan net nie meer verder nie [IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis], my intense [grad, force] pyn en sielsverdrukking [DIR, – affect, unhap, mis] is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar.

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik [DIR, - affect, desire] en is so [grad, force] ontsettend lief vir jou [DIR, +affect, hap, aff]. So jammer [IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis] ek het so [grad, force] ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe [IMPL, – judgement, est, ten, 1st] .

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou [DIR, +affect, hap, aff]. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa [DIR, - affect, desire]. Jy is n yster [DIR, + judgement, est, cap, 2nd] en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen [+ appreciation]. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie [+ appreciation]. Ek is so onbeskryflik [grad, force] lief vir jou [DIR, +affect, hap, aff].

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste [grad, force] mense wat ek ken [DIR, + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] . X jy is vir my die broer [DIR, +affect, hap, aff]. wat ek nooit gehad het nie. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster [DIR, +affect, hap, aff].. Die Here het my gestuur na julle [IMPL, +affect, hap, aff].. Dankie [+ appreciation] dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie [IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis].

ANNOTATOR 4

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek [IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st] en kan jy maak soos jy wil [IMPL – affect, dissat, en]. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st].

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**] / [**grad, force**], ek weet dis baie selfsugtig van my [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] / [**grad, force**] maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] . Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**] / [- appreciation].

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig omgee het [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] / [**grad, force**]. Ek het jou so life [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**] maar jy wil my nie he nie [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 2nd**], en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X [**DIR – affect, desire**] / [**grad / force**]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [**DIR – affect, desire**]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie [**IMPL – affect, insec, disq**] – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe [**IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st**]. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**]. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs) [- appreciation].

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**] met n wonderlike papa [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] / [**grad/focus**]. ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Ek is n ou loser [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st**] en oom X dink minder as grond van my [**IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] , waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**].

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**], en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] / [**grad, force**].

9.

Dankie vir als [**IMPL – affect, dissat, en**], nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra [**IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 2nd**] , maar my laaste dae niks gehad [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**] en gedog jy sou my help [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**] maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten 1st**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] – want jy is so n mens [**IMPL + judgement, est, ten, 2nd**] . Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**].

12.

So lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**], maar kan net nie meer verder nie, [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**] my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**].

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik [**DIR – affect, desire**] en is so ontsettend lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe [**IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st**] / [**grad, force**].

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. [**DIR – affect, desire**] / [**grad, force**] Jy is n yster [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop**] / [**grad, force**]. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie [**DIR + affect, hap, cheer**]. Ek is so onbeskryflik lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]...

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**].

ANNOTATOR 5

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd]. Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek [grad, force] en kan jy maak soos jy wil [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 1st]. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie [DIR judgement, est, ten, 1st].

2.

Ek is so verskriklik [grad, force] jammer [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st], ek weet dis baie selfsugtig van my [DIR judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie [DIR judgement, est, ten, 1st].

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas [IMPL - affect, dissat, displ, 2nd] dat ek nie pille gesuip [grad, force] het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde [IMPL - affect, dissat, displ, 2nd] . Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st].

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig omgee het [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd]. Ek het jou so lief [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd], maar jy wil my nie he nie [IMPL - affect, fear, 1st], en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st].

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X [DIR - affect, desire, 1st]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X [IMPL judgement, est, norm, 2nd], want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 1st], en hoe baie ek haar mis [DIR - affect, desire, 1st]!

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie [DIR - affect, insec, disq, 1st] – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe [DIR judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st]. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs) [DIR - affect, dissat, en, 1st].

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders [DIR + affect, sat, adm,] met n wonderlike papa [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] . ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. Ek is n ou loser [DIR - judgement, est, norm, 1st] en oom X dink minder as grond van my [DIR - affect, unhap, anti, 2nd], waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd].

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet [IMPL + affect, hap, cheer, 1st], ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd], en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand [IMPL + affect, hap, aff, 2nd].

9.

Dankie vir als [DIR + affect, sat, adm, 2nd], nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 1st], maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 1st] maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd].

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 1st], maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st] sonder jou in my lewe nie [DIR - affect, desire, 2nd].

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens [DIR + judgement, est, cap, 2nd]. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan [DIR + affect, hap, cheer, 2nd], maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken [DIR + judgement, est, cap, 2nd].

12.

So lief vir jou [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd], maar kan net nie meer verder nie [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st], my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st].

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik [DIR - affect, desire, 2nd] en is so ontsettend lief vir jou [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd]. So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe [DIR judgement, est, norm, 1st].

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou [DIR - affect, desire, 2nd]. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa [DIR - affect, desire, 2nd]. Jy is n yster [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 1st]. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf [grad, force] hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so onbeskryflik lief vir jou [DIR - affect, desire, 2nd].

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd]. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd]. Die Here het my gestuur na julle [IMPL + affect, sat, adm, 2nd].

Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie [DIR+ judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd].

ANNOTATOR 6

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het [DIR + affect, hap, aff]. Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek en kan jy maak soos jy wil. Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st].

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer, ek weet [DIR + affect, sec, conf] dis baie selfsugtig van my maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st].

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde [IMPL – affect, unhap, anti]. Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis].

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig omgee het [DIR + affect, hap, aff]. Ek het jou so lief, maar jy wil my nie he nie, en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie [DIR – affect, desire].

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [DIR + affect, hap, aff]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe [IMPL - judgement, est, cap, 2nd]. So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs) [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis].

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders met n wonderlike pappa. ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]. Ek is n ou loser en oom X dink minder as grond van my [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st], waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het.

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar [**IMPL + affect, hap, cheer**], en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

9.

Dankie vir als, nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**]/[**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

11.

Ek weet [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken.[**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]

12.

So lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**], maar kan net nie meer verder nie[**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**], my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar [**DIR – affect, unhap, aff**].

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik en is so ontsettend lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]. So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**].

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. Jy is n yster en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so onbeskryflik lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken [**grad, focus**]. X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

ANNOTATOR 7

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. [IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek en kan jy maak soos jy wil. [IMPL – affect, dissat, displ] Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer, [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] ek weet dis baie selfsugtig van my [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st] maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde. [IMPL – affect, dissat, displ] Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie. [DIR – affect, dissat, en]

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig [grad, force] omgee het. [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] Ek het jou so [grad, force] lief, [DIR + affect, hap, aff] maar jy wil my nie he nie, en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie. [DIR – affect, desire]

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X. [DIR – affect, desire] Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het, [IMPL + affect, sec, trust] en hoe baie ek haar mis! [DIR – affect, desire]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie [DIR – affect, insec, disq] – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe. [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs). [IMPL – affect, dissat, en]

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders met n wonderlike pappa. ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry. [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] Ek is n ou loser [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st] en oom X dink minder as grond van my, [IMPL – affect, unhap, anti] waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het. [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar, **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand. **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**

9.

Dankie vir als, **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]** nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help **[IMPL – affect, dissat, displ]** maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig... dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, **[IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]** maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]** sonder jou in my lewe nie. **[DIR – affect, desire]**

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens. **[DIR + judgement, est, ten, 2nd]** Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken. **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

12.

So **[grad, force]** lief vir jou, **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** maar kan net nie meer verder nie, my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar. **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik **[DIR – affect, desire]** en is so ontsettend **[grad, force]** lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe. **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**

14.

X, ek is baie **[grad, force]** lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. **[DIR – affect, desire]** Jy is n yster **[DIR + judgement, est, cap. 2nd]** en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]** Ek is so onbeskryflik **[grad, force]** lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken. **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]** X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster. **[DIR + affect, sec, trust]**

Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie. **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**

ANNOTATOR 8

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek en kan jy maak soos jy wil. **[IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR – affect, unhap, mis]**

Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie. **[DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR – affect, unhap, mis]**

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer, **[DIR – affect, unhap, mis]**

ek weet **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** dis baie selfsugtig van my **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie. **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde. **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie. **[DIR – affect, dissat, en & displ]**

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het, **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

regtig omgee het. **[grad, force]**

Ek het jou so lief, **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

maar jy wil my nie he nie, **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie. **[DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X. **[DIR – affect, desire]**

Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X, **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**

want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! **[DIR – affect, desire]**

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe. [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**]

So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. [**DIR – affect, dissat, en**]

Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs). [**IMPL – affect, dissat, en**]

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

met n wonderlike pappa. [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 3rd**]

‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry. [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 3rd**]

Ek is n ou [**grad, focus**] loser [**DIR - judgement, est, norm, 1st**]

en oom X dink minder as grond van my, [**DIR – affect, unhap, anti**]

waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het. [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 3rd**]

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar, [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand. [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

9.

Dankie vir als, [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help [**DIR – judgement, est, prop**]

maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok. [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig... dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**] / [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st**]

maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie. [**DIR – judgement, est, cap. 1st**]

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens. [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]

Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

12.

So lief vir jou, **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

maar kan net nie meer verder nie, **[DIR – judgement, est, cap. 1st]**

my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar. **[IMPL – judgement, est, cap. 1st]**

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik **[DIR – affect, desire]**

en is so ontsettend lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe. **[DIR – affect, unhap, mis] / [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. **[DIR – affect, desire]**

Jy is n yster en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

Ek is so onbeskryflik lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

Die Here het my gestuur na julle. **[DIR + affect, hap, cheer]**

Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

ANNOTATOR 9

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. **[DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] / [+appreciation]** Nou is jy verlos van die meulsteen om jou nek en kan jy maak soos jy wil. **[DIR -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [IMPL -judgement, est, cap, 2nd] / [IMPL -judgement, est, ten, 1st]** Ek sien nie

meer kans vir alles nie. [DIR -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

2.

Ek is so verskriklik [grad, force] jammer, [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] ek weet dis baie selfsugtig van my maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie. [DIR -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, [IMPL -affect, insec, surp, 2nd] maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde. [IMPL +affect, sec, conf, 2nd] Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie. [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit [grad, force] vir my omgee het, regtig [grad, force] omgee het. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, sec, trust, 2nd] / [IMPL +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] Ek het jou so [grad, force] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] lief, maar jy wil my nie he nie, [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, fear, 1st] / [DIR -affect, dissat, displ, 2nd] en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, desire, 2nd]

5.

Ek het haar so [grad, force] gemis en nodig gehad met X. [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, displ, 1st] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan (?) nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [grad, force] / [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, displ, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe. [IMPL -affect, insec, disq, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, displ, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, ten, 1st] So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs). [grad, force] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, displ, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders met n wonderlike pappa. ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, sat, adm, 1st] Ek is n ou loser en

oom X dink minder as grond van my, [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, nom, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff, 1st, 2nd] / [IMPL +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, sec, trust, 2nd]

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, [IMPL -affect, dissat, en, 1st] ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar, en ek sal altyd so [grad, force] dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 1st, 2nd] / [DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [IMPL +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, sec, trust, 2nd]

9.

Dankie vir als, nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 1st, 2nd] / [DIR +judgement, est, nom, 2nd] / [IMPL +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help, [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok. [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, desire]

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] maar ek sien werklik [grad, force] nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie. [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, desire, 2nd] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, en, 1st]

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens. [DIR +affect, hap, cheer, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, se, conf, 2nd] Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken. [DIR +affect, sat, adm, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, sec, trust, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd]

12.

So [grad, force] lief vir jou, [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] maar kan net nie meer verder nie, [DIR -affect, dissat, en, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, ten, 1st] my intense [grad, force] pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar. [grad, force] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik [grad, force] en is so ontsettend [grad, force] lief vir jou. [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] So jammer ek het so ‘n gemors gemaak van ons lewe. [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st]

14.

X, ek is baie [grad, force] lief vir jou. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] Jy is n yster [grad, focus] en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen. [+appreciation] Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so onbeskryflik [grad, force] lief vir jou. . [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd]

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [IMPL +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster. Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [+appreciation] / [DIR +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, sec, trust]

ANNOTATOR 10

1.

Dankie vir wat jy vir my en J gedoen het. [DIR +appreciation] Nou is jy verlos [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] van die meulsteen om jou nek [IMPL -judgement, est, cap, 1st] en kan jy maak soos jy wil. [DIR +affect, sec, trust] Ek sien nie meer kans vir alles nie. [DIR -affect, unhap, mis]

2.

Ek is so verskriklik jammer, [grad, focus] ek weet dis baie selfsugtig van my [DIR -judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] maar ek kan en wil nie meer sukkel en seer he nie. [DIR -affect, dissat, en]

3.

Ja, jys seker verbaas dat ek nie pille gesuip het nie, [DIR -affect, insec, surp] maar vir jou is dit seker dieselfde. [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 2nd] Maar nou ja, nie dat enige iets meer saak maak nie. [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, dissat, en]

4.

Jy was en is die enigste wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig omgee het. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force] Ek het jou so lief, maar jy wil my nie he nie, en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [DIR -affect, desire]

5.

Ek het haar so gemis en nodig gehad met X. [DIR -affect, desire] Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie Y so erg is oor X, want sy het geweet en verstaan [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [DIR +judgement, est, cap, 2nd] (?) nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [DIR -affect, desire] / [grad, force]

6.

Alles maak net nie sin nie [DIR -affect, dissat, en] – hoe hard jy as mens probeer om die lewe ligter te maak hoe meer mense kom jy te na in die lewe. [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] / [DIR -judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] So wat beteken alles op die langeduur van die ewige stryd van voortbestaan op die aarde. [IMPL -affect, dissat, en] Soos die prediker se “Alles is tevergeefs” – (alles is tevergeefs). [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis]

7.

Julle is 2 spogkinders met n wonderlike pappa. [DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, sat, adm] ‘n Beter pa sal jul nerens kry. [DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] Ek is n ou loser [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] en oom X dink minder as grond van my, [IMPL -judgement, est norm, 2nd] / [IMPL -affect, unhap, anti] waar pappa my altyd op die hande gedra het. [IMPL +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, hap, aff]

8.

Hey guys, hierdie net n kort brief om vir julle almal te groet, ek dink julle was lamal great deur my 49 jaar, [DIR +affect, hap, aff] en ek sal altyd so dankbaar vir wees vir al jul liefde en bystand. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff] / [+appreciation]

9.

Dankie vir als, nie veel in my lewe van jou gevra, [-appreciation] maar my laaste dae niks gehad en gedog jy sou my help [IMPL -judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] maar nog steeds lief vir jou ok. [DIR +affect, hap, aff]

10.

Jammer dat dit so moet eindig...dat ek op hierdie manier moet gaan, [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] maar ek sien werklik nie kans om voor te begin sonder jou in my lewe nie. [DIR -affect, fear] / [DIR -affect, desire]

11.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens. [DIR +affect, sec, conf] Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken. [DIR +affect, sec, trust]

12.

So lief vir jou, [DIR +affect, hap, aff] maar kan net nie meer verder nie, my intense pyn en sielsverdrukking is eenmaal net te veel, en ruk my lyf uitmekaar. [DIR -affect, dissat, en] / [IMPL -judgement, est, ten, 1st]

13.

Ek mis jou verskriklik en is so ontsettend lief vir jou. [DIR -affect, desire] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff] So jammer ek het so 'n gemors gemaak van ons lewe. [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

14.

X, ek is baie lief vir jou. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie na ma en pa. [DIR -affect, desire] Jy is n yster en baie dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen. [DIR +judgement, est, cap, 2nd] Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. [+appreciation] Ek is so onbeskryflik lief vir jou. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]

15.

Julle is die wonderlikste mense wat ek ken. [DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] X jy is vir my die broer wat ek nooit gehad het nie. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff] Y jy is vir my soos nog n suster. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff] Die Here het my gestuur na julle. Dankie dat julle bereid was om my n slaapplek te gee te ek nie een gehad het nie. [IMPL +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]

APPENDIX D: English annotations for interrater reliability

ANNOTATOR 0

1.

My Goodness [**grad, force**] what a friend you've been [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Always [**grad, force**] smiling, always [**grad, force**] happy [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**].

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st**], that I have now to make a rational decision to die [+ **affect, sec, conf**].

3.

But I can't blame you because of this fault in me [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st**] that I knew was there [**DIR + affect, sec, confident**].

4.

But I never [**grad, force**] / [**DIR + affect, sec, confident**] lied to you [**DIR + judgement, sanc, ver, 1st**], you knew how much, I knew, I would not make it [**DIR + affect, sec, confident**].

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]. Just hope that I am successful this time [**IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st**] I hope more than anything. I don't regret knowing and caring for you [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]. I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts [**IMPL – affect, unhap, anti**]

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st**], but I would have screwed up all over again [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st**].

7.

I know this time i've really [**grad, force**] hurt everybody I love [**DIR - judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**] / [**DIR + affect, hap, aff >**]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff [**IMPL – affect, unhap, anti**] / [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig [IMPL – affect, unhap, anti] / [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] your so [grad, force] very [grad, force] different and so special of a person I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force] and miss you [DIR + affect, desire] so [grad, force] very [grad, force] much.

10.

I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] mush please rember all the love I have shown you [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]. rember please [Req, DIR] for God sake [grad, force] rember [Req, DIR].

11.

I want only [grad, force] one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [Req, IMPL] God [grad, force] I don't know [DIR – affect, insec, disq] why in the hell [grad, force] is has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force].

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]. It scared me to death but nobody cared [DIR – affect, fear] / [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. If I don't kill myself I'll kill her and I love her [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force] to much [grad, force]

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart I know everything that's happened to us was my fault [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]. I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]. You gave me the only [grad, force] happiness I've ever known [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]

14.

You are a good kid [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. If you had given me more of a chance [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] I would have done anything for you [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]. But I love you just the same [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force]. I know [DIR + affect, sec, conf] you can't cope with Me [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st].

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you [Req, DIR]. I'm fucked [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis] / [grad, force]. But I do love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force] very *much* [grad, force]. I just can't cope [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st].

ANNOTATOR 1

1.

My Goodness what a friend you've been. **[DIR +aff sec conf 2nd]** Always smiling, always happy. **[DIR +judg est norm force 2nd]**

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways, **[DIR –aff unhap mis force 1st]** that I have now to make a rational decision to die. **[DIR +judg est cap 1st]**

3.

But I can't blame you because of this fault in me that I knew was there. **[IMPL +aff happ aff 2nd]**

4.

But I never lied to you, you knew how much, I knew, I would not make it. **[DIR –judg est ten 1st force]**

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me. Just hope that I am successful this time I hope more than anything. I don't regret knowing and caring for you. I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts. **[DIR –judg est cap 1st force] / [DIR +judg est norm 2nd force]**

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems, but I would have screwed up all over again. **[DIR –judg est cap 1st] [IMPL –aff unhap mis 1st force]**

7.

I know this time i've really hurt everybody I love. **[DIR –aff unhap mis 1st force]**

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff. **[IMPL –aff unhap anti 2nd force] / [IMPL –judg sanc prop 2nd force]**

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig **[DIR –aff unhap anti 2nd]** your so very different and so special of a person I love you and miss you so very much. **[DIR +judg est norm 2nd force] / [DIR +aff hap aff 2nd force]**

10.

I love you mush [**DIR +aff hap aff 2nd force**] please rember all the love I have shown you.
rember please for God sake rember. [**IMPL –aff insec disq 2nd force**]

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together God I don't know why in the hell it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you. [**DIR +aff hap aff 1st force**]

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. It scared me to death [**focus**] but nobody cared.If I don't kill myself I'll kill her and I love her to much. [**IMPL +aff sec conf 1st force**]

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart I know everything that's happened to us was my fault. I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure. [**IMPL –judg est cap 1st**] You gave me the only happiness I've ever known. [**DIR +aff hap aff 2nd force**]

14.

You are a good kid. [**DIR +judg est norm 2nd focus**] If you had given me more of a chance [**focus**] I would have done anything for you. But I love you just the same. [**IMPL –aff dissat displ 2nd force**]

I know you can't cope with Me. [**IMPL –aff dissat displ 2nd**]

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you. [**IMPL +aff hap aff 2nd**] / [**IMPL +judg est norm 2nd**] I'm fucked. But I do love you very much. I just can't cope. [**DIR –judg est cap 1st force**]

ANNOTATOR 2

1.

My Goodness what a friend you've been [+ **appreciation**]. Always smiling, always happy [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**].

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**], that I have now to make a rational decision to die [**DIR - judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

3.

But I can't blame you [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 2nd**] because of this fault in me that I knew was there [**DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st**].

4.

But I never lied to you [**DIR – judgement, sanc, ver**] , you knew how much [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 2nd**], I knew, I would not make it [**DIR – judegment, sanc, prop**] .

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me [**+appreciation**]. Just hope that I am successful this time [**IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st**] I hope more than anything. I don't regret knowing and caring for you [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]. I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**]

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems [**DIR – judgement, est, cap**], but I would have screwed up all over again [**IMPL – affect, dissat, en**].

7.

I know [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, !st**] this time i've really hurt everybody I love [**IMLP – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**].

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff [**DIR -affect, dissat, displ**].

9.

Your not like Jane [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] she was a pig [**grad, force**] your so very different and so special of a person [**+appreciation**] I love you [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**] and miss you so very much [**DIR – affect, desire**].

10.

I love you [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**] mush pleace rember all the love I have shown you [**DIR – affect, desire**]. rember please for God sake rember [**grad, force**].

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [**DIR – affect, desire**] God [**grad, force**] I don't know why in the hell [**grad, force**] it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**].

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas [**DIR – affect, unhap, mis**]. It scared me to death [**grad, focus**] but nobody cared [**IMPL – affect, unhap, anti**]. If I don't kill myself [**IMPL – affect, dissat, en**] I'll kill her [**DIR – affect, dissat, displ**] and I love her to much [**DIR +affect, hap, aff**].

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart [**grad, focus**] I know everything that's happened to us was my fault [**IMPL - judgement, est, norm, 1st**]. I wish I could have been your white knight [**DIR -affect, unhap, mis**] I just couldn't take the pressure [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**]. You gave me the only happiness I've ever known [**+appreciation**].

14.

You are a good kid [**DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. If you had given me more of a chance I would have done anything for you. But I love you [**DIR +affect,hap, aff**] just the same.

I know you can't cope with Me [**IMPL -judgement, est, cap, 2nd**].

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you [**IMPL -judgement, est, cap**]. I'm fucked [**grad, force**]. But I do love you very much [**DIR +affect,hap, aff**]. I just can't cope [**DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

ANNOTATOR 3

1.

My Goodness [**DIR, + affect, sat, adm**]/ [**grad, force**] what a friend you've been [**+ appreciation**]. Always smiling, always happy [**IMPL, + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**].

2.

Anger confuses [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**]; and caused me to mess up my life [**IMPL, – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**] in so many ways [**grad, focus**], that I have now to make a rational [**grad, focus**] decision to die [**IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis**].

3.

But [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**] I can't blame you because of this fault [**IMPL, – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**] in me that I knew was there.

4.

But [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**] I never lied to you [**DIR, + judgement, sanc, ver, 1st**], you knew how much [**IMPL, + judgement, sanc, ver, 1st**], I knew, I would not make it [**DIR, – judgement, est, cap, 1st**].

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me [**+ appreciation**]. Just hope that I am successful this time [**IMPL, – judgement, est, ten, 1st**] I hope more [**grad, force**] than anything [**IMPL, - affect, insec, disq**]. I don't regret knowing and caring for you. I do regret not being able [**DIR, – judgement, est, cap, 1st**] to Put you out of my thoughts.

6.

Sometimes I wish **[DIR, - affect, desire]** I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems **[IMPL, – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**, but I would have screwed up all over again **[IMPL, – affect, dissat, en]**.

7.

I know this **[grad, focus]** time i've really **[grad, force]** hurt everybody I love **[IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis]**.

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards **[IMPL, - affect, unhap, anti]** pick through of my stuff **[IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis]**.

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig **[DIR, - affect, unhap, anti]** your so **[grad, force]** very different and so special **[grad, focus]** of a person **[DIR, + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**. I love you and miss you so **[grad, force]** very much **[DIR, - affect, desire]**.

10.

I love you mushv **[grad, force]** pleace rember all **[grad, force]** the love **[DIR, +affect, hap, aff]** I have shown you. rember please for God sake rember**[DIR, - affect, desire]**.

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together **[DIR, + affect, desire]** God I don't know **[DIR, – affect, sec, conf]** why in the hell **[IMPL, - affect, fear]** it has taken me all these years **[grad, force]** to be able to tell you I love you **[DIR, +affect, hap, aff]**.

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. It scared **[DIR, - affect, fear]** me to death **[grad, force]** but nobody cared **[IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis]**.If I don't kill myself I'll kill her **[IMPL, – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**and I love her to much **[DIR, +affect, hap, aff]**.

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart **[IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis]** I know everything that's happened to us was my fault **[IMPL, – affect, unhap, mis]**. I wish **[DIR, - affect, desire]** I could have been **[DIR, - affect, desire]** your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure **[DIR, – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**. You gave me the only **[grad, force]** happiness **[DIR, +affect, hap, aff]** I've ever known **[+ appreciation]**.

14.

You are a good kid **[DIR, + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]/ [DIR, + affect, sat, adm]**. If you had given me more of a chance **[DIR, - affect, desire]** I would have done anything for you **[IMPL, +affect, hap, aff]**. But I love you just the same **[DIR, +affect, hap, aff]**. I know you can't cope with Me **[DIR, – judgement, est, cap, 2nd]**.

15.

Please don't think **[IMPL, - affect, insec, disq]** I did this because of you. I'm fucked **[IMPL, – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**. But I do love you very **[grad, force]** much **[DIR, +affect, hap, aff]**. I just can't cope **[DIR, – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**.

ANNOTATOR 4

1.

My Goodness **[grad, force]** what a friend you've been **[DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**. Always smiling, always happy **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**.

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways **[IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**, that I have now to make a rational decision to die **[IMPL – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**

3.

But I can't blame you **[IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]** because of this fault in me that I knew was there **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**.

4.

But I never lied to you **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**, you knew how much, I knew, I would not make it **[IMPL + affect, sec, trust] / [IMPL – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**.

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff]**. Just hope that I am successful this time **[IMPL - affect, insec, disq]** I hope more than anything **[grad, force]**. I don't regret knowing and caring for you **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff]**. I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts **[DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**.

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**, but I would have screwed up all over again ways **[IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**.

7.

I know this time i've really hurt everybody I love. [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] / [grad, force]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them [IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff [IMPL – judgement, est, ten, 1st].

9.

Your not like Jane [IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] she was a pig [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 2nd] your so very different and so special of a person [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [grad, force] I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff] and miss you so very much [DIR – affect, desire] / [grad, force].

10.

I love you mush [DIR – affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]. please rember all the love I have shown you. rember please for God sake rember. [DIR + affect, sec, trust] / [grad, force]

11.

I want only one thing right now [- affect, insec, disq] that is for us to pull this together [+ affect, sec, trust] God I don't know why in the hell it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you [DIR – affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force].

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] It scared me to death but nobody cared. [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] / [grad, focus] If I don't kill myself I'll kill her and I love her to much. [IMPL + affect, hap, aff] / [grad / force]

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart I know everything that's happened to us was my fault [IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st]. I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure [DIR, - judgement, est, ten, 1st]. You gave me the only happiness I've ever known [DIR, + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd].

14.

You are a good kid [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. If you had given me more of a chance I would have done anything for you [IMPL – judgement, san, prop 2nd]. But I love you just the same [DIR, + affect, hap, aff]

I know you can't cope with Me [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 2nd].

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you [IMPL – affect, insec, disq]. I'm fucked [IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st]. But I do love you very much [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force] . I just can't cope [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st].

ANNOTATOR 5

1.

My Goodness what a friend [grad, force] you've been. Always smiling, always happy [IMPL+ affect, sat, adm, 2nd].

2.

Anger confuses [DIR - affect, dissat, displ, 1st]; and caused me to mess up [grad, force] my life in so many ways, that I have now to make a rational decision to die [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st].

3.

But I can't blame you [IMPL + affect, sec, conf, 2nd] because of this fault in me that I knew was there [DIR - judgement, est, norm, 1st]

4.

But I never lied to you [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd], you knew how much [grad, force], I knew, I would not make it [DIR - judgement, est, ten, 1st].

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd]. Just hope that I am successful this time [IMPL - judgement, est, ten, 1st] I hope more than anything [grad, force]. I don't regret knowing and caring for you [DIR + affect, sat, adm, 2nd]. I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd].

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems [DIR - affect, unhap, mis, 1st], but I would have screwed up [grad, force] all over again [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st].

7.

I know this time i've really [grad, force] hurt everybody I love [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 2nd].

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards [grad, focus] pick through of my stuff [DIR- affect, unhap, anti, 2nd].

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig [grad, focus] your so very different and so special of a person I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd] and miss you [DIR - affect, desire, 2nd] so very much [grad, force].

10.

I love you mush [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd] please rember all the love I have shown you. rember please [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd] for God sake [grad, force] rember.

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [IMPL + affect, sec, trust, 2nd] God [grad, force] I don't know why [IMPL - affect, insec, surp, 1st] in the hell [grad, force] it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd].

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 2nd]. It scared me to death [grad, force] but nobody cared [DIR - judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. If I don't kill myself I'll kill her [DIR - judgement, sanc, prop, 1st and 2nd] and I love her to much [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd].

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart [IMPL + affect, hap, aff, 2nd] I know everything that's happened to us was my fault [DIR - judgement, est, ten, 1st]. I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st]. You gave me the only happiness I've ever known [IMPL + affect, sat, adm, 2nd].

14.

You are a good kid [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. If you had given me more of a chance [IMPL - judgement, est, ten, 2nd] I would have done anything for you [IMPL + affect, hap, aff, 2nd]. But I love you just the same [IMPL + affect, hap, aff, 2nd]. I know you can't cope with Me [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 2nd].

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you [IMPL - affect, fear, 2nd]. I'm fucked [grad, force]. But I do love you very much [DIR + affect, hap, aff, 2nd]. I just can't cope [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st].

ANNOTATOR 6

1.

My Goodness [grad, force] what a friend you've been [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. Always smiling, always happy. [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways [- **appreciation**], that I have now to make a rational decision to die. [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**].

3.

But I can't blame you because of this fault in me [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**] that I knew [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] was there.

4.

But I never lied to you [**DIR + judgement, sanc, ver, 1st**], you knew how much, I knew [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**], I would not make it [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]. Just hope that I am successful this time I hope [**DIR - affect, desire**] more than anything. I don't regret knowing and caring for you. I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st**].

6.

Sometimes I wish [- **affect, desire**] I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems, but I would have screwed up all over again [**IMPL + judgement, est, cap, 1st**].

7.

I know [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] this time i've really [**grad, force**] hurt everybody I love. [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them [**IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st**]. I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff [**DIR – affect, desire**].

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig [**DIR – affect, unhap, anti**] your so very different and so special of a person [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] I love you and miss you so very much [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

10.

I love you mush [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] pleace rember all the love I have shown you. rember please for God sake [**grad, force**] rember.

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [**DIR – affect, desire**] God [**grad, force**] I don't know [**DIR - affect, insecc, disq**] why in the hell it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas [**IMPL – affect, fear**]. It scared me to death but nobody cared [**DIR - affect, fear**]. If I don't kill myself I'll kill her and I love her too much [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart I know everything that's happened to us was my fault [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**]. I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure [**DIR - affect, desire**]/ [**DIR - judgement, est, ten, 1st**]. You gave me the only happiness I've ever known [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

14.

You are a good kid [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. If you had given me more of a chance I would have done anything for you [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**]. But I love you just the same [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**].

I know you can't cope with Me [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you. I'm fucked [**grad, force**]/ [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 1st**]. But I do love you very much [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**]. I just can't cope [**DIR - judgement, est, ten, 1st**].

ANNOTATOR 7

1.

My Goodness [**grad, force**] what a friend you've been. [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]
Always smiling, always happy. [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]

2.

Anger confuses; [**DIR – affect, insecc, disq**] and caused me to mess up my life in so many [**grad, force**] ways, [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**] that I have now to make a rational decision to die. [**DIR + judgement, est, ten, 1st**]

3.

But I can't blame you [**IMPL + judgement, est, cap, 2nd**] because of this fault in me [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st**] that I knew was there. [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**]

4.

But I never lied to you, [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] you knew how much [grad, force], I knew, [DIR + affect, sec, conf] I would not make it. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me. [DIR + affect, hap, aff] Just hope that I am successful this time [IMPL + judgement, est, ten, 1st] I hope more than anything [grad, force]. I don't regret knowing and caring for you. [IMPL + affect, sec, trust] I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts. [IMPL – affect, dissat, en]

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems, but I would have screwed up all over again. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]

7.

I know [DIR – affect, sec, conf] this time i've really [grad, force] hurt everybody I love. [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them [DIR + affect, sec, trust] I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff. [IMPL – affect, fear]

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig [DIR – affect, unhap, mis] your so very [grad, force] different and so special of a person [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff] and miss you so very much. [DIR – affect, desire]

10.

I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff] mush [grad, force] pleace rember all the love I have shown you. rember please for God sake rember. [IMPL – affect, insec, disq]

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [DIR + judgement, est, ten, 1st] God [grad, force] I don't know why in the hell it has taken me all these years [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st] to be able to tell you I love you. [DIR + affect, hap, aff]

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] It scared me [DIR – affect, fear] to death [grad, focus] but nobody cared. [IMPL – affect, dissat, displ] If I don't kill myself I'll kill her [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] and I love her to much. [DIR + affect, hap, aff]

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart I know everything that's happened to us was my fault. [DIR – judgement, sance, prop, 1st] I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st] You gave me the only happiness I've ever known. [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]

14.

You are a good kid. [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] If you had given me more of a chance [IMPL – affect, dissat, displ] I would have done anything for you. [DIR + judgement, est, ten, 1st] But I love you just the same. [DIR + affect, hap, aff]

I know you can't cope with Me. [DIR + affect, sec, conf]

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you. I'm fucked. [IMPL + affect, sec, conf] But I do love you very [grad, force] much. [DIR + affect, hap, aff] I just can't cope. [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]

ANNOTATOR 8

1.

My Goodness [grad, force]

what a friend you've been [IMP +affect, hap, aff] / [IMP + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]

Always smiling, always happy [DIR +judgement, est, 2nd].

2.

Anger confuses; [DIR – aff, unhap, mis]

and caused me to mess up my life [DIR - judgement, est, cap, 1st]

in so many ways, [grad, force]

that I have now to make a rational decision to die. [DIR + judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR + affect, sec, conf]

3.

But I can't blame you [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]

because of this fault in me [DIR – judgement, sanc, ver, 1st]

that I knew was there. [DIR – judgement, sanc, ver, 1st]

4.

But I never lied to you, [DIR + judgement, sanc, ver, 1st]

you knew how much, [DIR + affect, sec, trust] / [grad, force]

I knew, I would not make it. [DIR – affect, unhap, mis] / [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me. [DIR +affect, hap, aff]

Just hope that I am successful this time [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]

I hope more than anything. [grad, force]

I don't regret knowing and caring for you. . [DIR +affect, hap, aff]

I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts. [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems, [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]

but I would have screwed up all over again. [DIR – judgement, est, cap & ten, 1st]

7.

I know [DIR + affect, sec, conf]

this time [grad, focus]

i've really hurt everybody I love. [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them [DIR + affect, sec, conf]

I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff. [IMP – affect, dissat, en]

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig [DIR – affect, unhap, ant]

your so very different and so special of a person [IMP +affect, hap, aff] / [IMP + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]

I love you [IMP +affect, hap, aff] and miss you so very much. [DIR – affect, desire]

10.

I love you mush [DIR + affect, hap, aff]

pleace [grad, force] rember all the love I have shown you. [DIR – affect, insec, disq]

rember please for God sake [grad, force] rember. [DIR – affect, insec, disq]

11.

I want only one thing right now **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**

that is for us to pull this together **[DIR + judgement, est, ten, 1st & 2nd]**

God **[grad, force]** I don't know why in the hell **[grad, force]** it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you. **[DIR – affect, unhap, mis] / [DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. **[DIR – affect, insec, disq]**

It scared me **[DIR – affect, fear]**

to death **[grad, focus]**

but nobody cared. **[DIR – affect, unhap, anti]**

If I don't kill myself I'll kill her **[DIR – affect, fear]**

and I love her too much. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart **[DIR – affect, insec, disq]**

I know everything that's happened to us was my fault. **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**

I wish I could have been your white knight **[DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**

I just couldn't take the pressure. **[DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**

You gave me the only happiness I've ever known. **[IMP + affect, hap, aff] / [IMP + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

14.

You are a good kid. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**

If you had given me more of a chance I would have done anything for you. **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**

But I love you just the same. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

I know you can't cope with Me. **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you. **[DIR – affect, insec, disq]**

I'm fucked. **[DIR – affect, unhap, mis] / [grad, force]**

But I do love you very much. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**

I just can't cope. [DIR – judgement, est, cap]

ANNOTATOR 9

1.

My Goodness what a friend you've been. Always smiling, [grad, force] always happy. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd]

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways, that I have now to make a rational decision to die. [IMPL - affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

3.

But I can't blame you because of this fault in me that I knew was there. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten 1st]

4.

But I never lied to you, you knew how much, I knew, I would not make it. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 2nd] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st]

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] Just hope that I am successful this time I hope more than anything. [grad, force] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] I don't regret knowing and caring for you. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts. [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd]

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems, but I would have screwed up all over again. [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR -affect, dissat, displ, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st]

7.

I know this time i've really hurt everybody I love. [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff. [DIR +affect, sec, trust, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, dissat, displ, 1st]

9.

Your not like Jane she was a pig [DIR -affect, unhap, anti, 2nd] / [grad, force] your so very [grad, force] different and so special of a person I love you and miss you so very [grad, force] much. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] / [DIR +affect, sec, conf] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 2nd]

10.

I love you mush please rember all the love I have shown you. rember please for God sake [grad, force] rember. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd]

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] God [grad, force] I don't know why in the hell [grad, force] it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. It scared me to death but nobody cared. [DIR, -affect, fear, 2nd] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR -affect, dissat, displ, 1st] If I don't kill myself I'll kill her and I love her to [grad, force] much. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] I know everything that's happened to us was my fault. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] I wish I could have been your white knight [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] I just couldn't take the pressure. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] You gave me the only happiness I've ever known. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd]

14.

You are a good kid. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 2nd] If you had given me more of a chance I would have done anything for you. But I love you just the same. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] / [DIR -affect, desire, 2nd]

I know you can't cope with Me. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] I'm fucked.[grad, force] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

But I do love you very much. [DIR +affect, hap, aff, 2nd] I just can't cope. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [DIR -affect, unhap, mis, 1st]

ANNOTATOR 10

1.

My Goodness what a friend you've been. Always smiling, always happy. [IMPL +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [IMPL +affect, hap, aff]

2.

Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways, [IMPL -affect, insecc, disq] that I have now to make a rational decision to die. [IMPL +affect, sec, conf] / [DIR, +judgement, est, ten, 1st]

3.

But I can't blame you because of this fault in me that I knew was there. [IMPL -judgement, est, norm, 1st]

4.

But I never lied to you, you knew how much, [IMPL +affect, sec conf] I knew, I would not make it. [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st]

5.

Goodbye, you meant so much to me. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] Just hope that I am successful this time I hope more than anything. [DIR +judgement, est, ten, 1st] I don't regret knowing and caring for you. [IMPL +affect, hap aff] I do regret not being able to Put you out of my thoughts. [DIR +affect, hap, aff]

6.

Sometimes I wish I would have been strong enough to pull threw my problems, but I would have screwed up all over again. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [IMPL -judgement, est, ten, 1st]

7.

I know this time i've really hurt everybody I love. [DIR +affect, sec, conf]

8.

I have signed all of the pink slips for the cars so it will be easier for you dispose of them I don't want to be here when all the Buzzards pick through of my stuff. [IMPL -affect, dissat, en]

9.

Your not like Jane [IMPL +affect, hap, aff] she was a pig [IMPL -affect, unhap, anti] your so very different and so special of a person I love you and miss you so very much. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [DIR -affect, desire]

10.

I love you mush pleace rember all the love I have shown you. rember please for God sake rember. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [DIR +affect, sec, trust] / [grad, force]

11.

I want only one thing right now that is for us to pull this together [IMPL -affect, insec, disq] God I don't know why in the hell it has taken me all these years to be able to tell you I love you. [DIR -affect, insec, surp]

12.

I'm sorry I hurt you and scared you Christmas. [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] It scared me to death but nobody cared. [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] / [IMPL -judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] If I don't kill myself I'll kill her and I love her to much. [IMPL -affect, fear] / [DIR, +affect, hap, aff]

13.

I'm sorry sweetheart [IMPL -affect, unhap, mis] I know everything that's happened to us was my fault. [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] I wish I could have been your white knight I just couldn't take the pressure. [DIR -judgement, est, ten, 1st] You gave me the only happiness I've ever known. [IMPL +affect, hap, aff] / [IMPL -affect unhap, mis]

14.

You are a good kid. [DIR +judgement, est, norm, 2nd] If you had given me more of a chance I would have done anything for you. [IMPL -judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] But I love you just the same. [DIR +affect, hap, aff]

I know you can't cope with Me. [DIR +affect, sec, conf] / [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 2nd]

15.

Please don't think I did this because of you. I'm fucked. [IMPL +judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] / [DIR -judgement, est, norm, 1st] / [grad, force] But I do love you very much. [DIR +affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force] I just can't cope. [DIR -judgement, est, cap, 1st]

APPENDIX E: Afrikaans annotations by the researcher (2018)

1.

K en D ek is vir julle lief [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**] met my lewe [**grad, force**]!
 Ek is bevoorreg en geseend om twee sulke pragtige dogters te he! [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] Ek is so [**grad, force**] trots op julle [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**]! Julle is {?}

2.

Jy was en is die enigste [**grad, force**] wat ooit vir my omgee het, regtig [**grad, force**] omgee het [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Ek het jou so [**grad, force**] lief [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**], maar jy wil my nie he nie [**IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**], en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie.

3.

Ek dink dinge sou ook vir my makliker gewees het as mamma nog geleef het. Ek het haar so [**grad, force**] gemis en nodig gehad met S [**DIR + affect, desire**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie G so erg is oor S, want sy het geweet en verstaan {?} nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie ek haar mis! [**DIR + affect, desire**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]

4.

Wat kan ek vir jou se my seun, jy is pragtig en het soveel goed in jou [**IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**], ek hoop regtig [**grad, force**] dat jy iewers in jou lewe iets bereik en altyd lief sal wees vir jou suster soos ek [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**], ek weet [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] jy kan en wil, julle moet altyd een wees asb [**Req, DIR**]. Love you [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**] so so [**grad, force**] much my son!

5.

Ek weet [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens [**DIR + judgement, est, cap, 2nd**]. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan [**Req, DIR**], maak n verskil [**Req, DIR**] – ek weet [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken [**Req, IMPL**]. Ek is so [**grad, force**] ontsettend [**grad, force**] trots [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**] en lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. Hou jou ma se hand en hart naby [**Req, DIR**], dit was slegs jou en haar liefde wat my so [**grad, force**] lank die pad laat stap het. [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]

6.

Kyk asb baie [**grad, force**] mooi na K [**Req, DIR**] – ek weet [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] julle twee is fighters wat die lewe oop oe en met liefde en geloof deurgaen [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Wees daar vir mekaar. [**Req, DIR**]

Ek het so [**grad, force**] mooi gevra en gebid vir hulp maar niemand antwoord nie [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. As God daar is, hoop ek op vergifnis [**Req, IMPL**]. Ek kan die

pyn en intense **[grad, focus]** sielsverdrukking net nie meer verduur nie **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]** / **[IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]**. Vergeef my o Here **[Req, DIR]**

7.

N, ek is baie **[grad, force]** lief vir jou **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie **[grad, force]** na ma en pa **[DIR + affect, desire]**. Jy is n yster en baie **[grad, force]** dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen **[IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so **[grad, force]** onbeskryflik **[grad, force]** lief vir jou. **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]**

8.

Moenie haar kwalik neem of kwaad wees vir haar nie asseblief **[Req, DIR]** ek het ook my foute gehad **[DIR – judgement, est, nomr, 1st]**. Lief vir julle **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]** my {?} die {?} wat oor is is als pa sn asseblief gee my visstokke en als vir L en al my kamp goed **[Req, DIR]**. Se ook vir T ek was baie **[grad, force]** lief vir hom **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]** en het waardeer dat hy altyd daar was vir my **[IMPL + judgement sanc, prop, 2nd]** my sound en musiek in die huis is als M sn asseblief laat hy als wat {?} sorg daarvoor asseblief **[Req, DIR]** die res is als M sn gee als vir haar **[Req, DIR]**. Ek vertrou pa sal asseblief reg uitsort **[Req, IMPL]**. Lief vir julle **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]** baie **[grad, force]**

9.

Jy was net die beste vir my jy het als vir my beteken **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff]**. Jammer ek het my foute gemaak **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]** maar ek kon nie my lewe sonder jou sien nie ek was te lief vir jou **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]**. Dankie vir die tyd wat ons saam was dit was wonderlik **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff]** als in die huis is joune pas jouself mooi op asseblief en moenie agteruit gaan nie asseblief **[Req, DIR]**. Jammer dis al wat ek vir jou los en jou met al die skuld los maar het gehoop dinge kon anders wees geniet jou lewe hoop J sal die goeie dinge toe. Hoop jy vind n goeie man wat mooi na jou sal kyk. Jammer ding moes so uitwerk.

10.

Ek is lief vir julle **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]**, asseblief moet nie kwaad wees vir my nie **[Req, DIR]**. Dis net ek weet nie **[DIR – affect, insec, disq]**. Kom ek hou dit kort en kragtig... Se asseblief **[Req, DIR]** vir E as sy groot is en kan verstaan dat ek regtig **[grad, force]** baie **[grad, force]** lief is vir haar **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[grad, force]** en sal wees. Sys die heel beste besteding wat met my gebeur het.

APPENDIX F: English annotations by the researcher (2018)

1.

Well, finally huh? I owe you So **[grad, force]** much Linda **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]**- My Goodness **[grad, force]** what a friend you've been **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** / **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**. Always **[grad, force]** smiling, always **[grad, force]** happy **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**. Thank-You for all your support during lifes Ups&Downs- Especially **[grad,force]** with Bill **[DIR + affect, hap, aff]** /**[DIR + judgement, est, cap, 2nd]**. My goodness **[grad, force]** what a joke all that was huh? **[- appreciation]** What a fool I was... **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**

Ah well that's over now.

2.

The anger is gone now. Which makes this more difficult for me. You are right about anger and suicide. But not all the time. Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways **[DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st]**, that I have now to make a rational decision to die **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**.

You were there for a very **[grad, force]** long time you were with me in every step I took **[IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**. You did promise not to “Divorce” leave me. But I can't blame you because of this fault in me **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]** that I knew was there **[DIR + affect, sec, confident]**. I told you in I.C.U. when we met, that there was no use in trying again **[DIR + affect, sec, confident]**. You are a sincere man **[DIR + judgement, sanc, ver, 2nd]**.

3.

I knew, I would not make it **[DIR + affect, sec, confident]**. I should have listened to my feelings. Instead of wasting your time **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**, and my pain, in trying to live. I don't know why I believed so **[grad, force]** / much in you **[DIR – affect, inse, disq]**. I have always **[grad, force]** known **[DIR + affect, sec, confident]**, and I told you I hurt everyone or anything I touch **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**. I know this **[DIR + affect, sec, confident]**, all the more reason I should never **[grad, force]** have taken your hand. I have no right to be angry with you. I caused you to lie to me **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**.

4.

Dear Sally,

These are my final words to you, so I hope they are fitting **[IMPL – affect, inse, disq]**.

I can no longer endure the pain and agony of life **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]** / **[IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]**. I am sure that **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** all of you around me feel the same. I know this **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** is a bad time to do this but nonetheless I have no choice. I have tried to get help in as many ways as I know how. It doesn't seem like anyone wants to help me **[IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**. I know **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** you don't either **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**.

5.

Im sorry. I just couldn't cope any more [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]. Please forgive me [DIR + affect, sec, trust]. You were the best wife anyone could have / [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. Please take care of yourself [DIR + affect, sec, trust]. Im sorry that I hurt [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st] the people I love [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]. I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]

6.

After last night I know [DIR + affect, sec, conf] you do love me [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. You tried so [grad, force] hard to say you don't but your not speaking from your heart. Listen to it Bay remember in sickness and in health, richer or poorer till Death remember [Req, DIR] its going to Be our wedding date so [grad, force] very [grad, force] soon. I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff >] / [grad, force] you stupid head. SMO I hope you Shno so [grad, force] deeply. I've been wrong [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] but I'm still you loveing husband [DIR + affect, hap, aff] forever.

7.

I gave everything I had to a relationship that wasnt worth the fucking [grad, force] powder to blow it to hell [grad, force] / [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis] / [IMPL – affect, dissat, displ]. I guess since that time Ive always been afraid [DIR – affect, fear] to be vulnerable. I sat in solitary confinement for weeks crying my heart out. I swore to myself at that time there would never be another time [DIR + affect, sec, conf]. I've blown it to hell [grad, force] with you [IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st]. I can only [grad, force] ask for your understanding [Req, DIR] and this guidance Im reaching out for now. I can state truthfully I should have looked for help earlier. I know [DIR + affect, sec, conf] I'll be able to express love to you [DIR + judgement, est, cap, 1st] / [DIR + affect, hap, aff] if you will find it in your heart to let me [Req, DIR].

8.

Joe You are a good kid [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. If you had given me more of a chance [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] I would have done anything for you [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]. But I love you just the same [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]. Your mother and I had our difference but I still love her [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force] very much [grad, force] so please take good care [grad, focus] of her for me please [Req, DIR].

P.S. Joe The bike is still yours. But please be carefull with it [Req, DIR]. Drive it with the utmost safety [grad, focus] *please* [Req, DIR]

Good bye Joe remember I love you her [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]

Your Father

Bill

9.

My darlings, I thought I was OK but I can not lead a normal life [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st**]. You have both been perfect it is no one's fault [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. It is a disease like cancer which won't let go. I love you [**DIR + affect, hap, aff >**] / [**grad, force**] both very [**grad, force**] much. I'm sorry. Please make up with A [**Req, DIR**], it was all my fault [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**]. I want you to marry someone who will be good to B [**Req, DIR**].

10.

Dear B. Thank you for being my friend all this time and for putting up with me [**IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Will you please do this for me, I mean call C so that he will get the letter [**Req, DIR**]. When I talked to him this morning he said he wanted the letter I wrote to him. His number is D. My aunt E; her number is listed as I'm sorry I've had to bother you so [**grad, force**] much when you've had so [**grad, force**] many problems. Your whole family means a lot to me [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]. Take care. Love,

APPENDIX G: Afrikaans annotations by the researcher (2019)

1.

K en D ek is vir julle lief met my lewe [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]! Ek is bevoorreg en geseend om twee sulke pragtige dogters [**grad, force**] te he [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]! Ek is so trots op julle [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**]! Julle is {?}

2.

Jy was en is die enigste [**grad, force**] wat ooit [**grad, force**] vir my omgee het, regtig omgee [**grad, force**] het [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Ek het jou so [**grad, force**] lief [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**], maar jy wil my nie he nie, en ek wil nie sonder jou lewe nie. [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**]

3.

Ek dink dinge sou ook vir my makliker gewees het as mamma nog geleef het. Ek het haar so [**grad, force**] gemis en nodig gehad met S [- **affect, desire**]. Ek dink dis hoekom Tannie G so erg is oor S, want sy het geweet en verstaan {?} nodig ek my ma het, en hoe baie [**grad, force**] ek haar mis! [- **affect, desire**]

4.

Wat kan ek vir jou se my seun, jy is pragtig [**grad, force**] en het soveel [**grad, force**] goed in jou [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**], ek hoop regtig [**grad, force**] dat jy iewers in jou lewe iets bereik en altyd [**grad, force**] lief sal wees vir jou suster [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] soos ek [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**], ek weet jy kan en wil, julle moet altyd [**grad, force**] een wees asb [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Love you so so [**grad, force**] much my son! [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]

5.

Ek weet jy sal die lewe kan verder deurmaak en dit geniet en sielsgenot kan bereik – want jy is so n mens [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] / [**IMPL + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Wees sterk en vat die lewe met albei hande aan, maak n verskil – ek weet en glo jy gaan dit groot maak en n verskil in ander se lewens beteken [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] / [**IMPL + judgement, est, cap, 2nd**]. Ek is so ontsettend [**grad, force**] trots en lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, sat, adm**] / [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. Hou jou ma se hand en hart naby [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**], dit was slegs [**grad, force**] jou en haar liefde wat my so lank [**grad, force**] die pad laat stap het. [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]

6.

Kyk asb baie mooi na K [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] – ek weet julle twee is fighters wat die lewe oop oë en met liefde en geloof deurgaen [**DIR + affect, sec, conf**] / [**IMPL + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. Wees daar vir mekaar. [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]

Ek het so mooi [**grad, force**] gevra en gebid vir hulp maar niemand antwoord nie [**DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**]. As God daar is, hoop ek op vergifnis [**IMPL + affect, sec, trust**]. Ek kan die pyn en intense [**grad, force**] sielsverdrukking net nie meer verduur nie [**DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st**] / [**IMPL – affect, unhap, mis**]. Vergeef my o Here [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]

7.

N, ek is baie lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. Die laaste tyd verlang ek baie [**grad, force**] na ma en pa [- **affect, desire**]. Jy is n yster en baie [**grad, force**] dankie vir als wat jy vir my doen [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] / [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**]. Ek het nie woorde om te beskryf hoe ek dit waardeer nie. Ek is so onbeskryflik [**grad, force**] lief vir jou. [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]

8.

Moenie haar kwalik neem of kwaad wees vir haar nie asseblief ek het ook my foute gehad [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] / [**DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st**]. Lief vir julle [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**] my {?} die {?} wat oor is is als pa sn asseblief gee my visstokke en als vir L en al my kamp goed [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Se ook vir T ek was baie [**grad, force**] lief vir hom en het waardeer dat hy altyd [**grad, force**] daar was vir my my [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] / [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] / [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] sound en musiek in die huis is als M sn asseblief laat hy als wat {?} sorg daarvoor asseblief die res is als M sn gee als vir haar [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Ek vertrou pa sal asseblief reg uitsort [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Lief vir julle baie [**grad, force**] / [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]

9.

Jy was net die beste vir my jy het als [**grad, force**] vir my beteken [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]. Jammer ek het my foute gemaak maar ek kon nie my lewe sonder jou sien nie ek was te lief vir jou [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**] / [**IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st**]. Dankie vir die tyd wat ons saam was dit was wonderlik [**grad, force**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**] als in die huis is joune pas jouself mooi op asseblief en moenie agteruit gaan nie asseblief [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Jammer dis al wat ek vir jou los en jou met al die skuld los maar het gehoop dinge kon anders wees geniet jou lewe hoop J sal die goeie dinge toe [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Hoop jy vind n goeie man wat mooi na jou sal kyk. [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] Jammer ding moes so uitwerk.

10.

Ek is lief vir julle, asseblief moet nie kwaad wees vir my nie [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**] / [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]. Dis net ek weet nie [**DIR – affect, inse, disq**]. Kom ek hou dit kort en kragtig... Se asseblief vir E as sy groot is en kan verstaan dat ek regtig [**grad, force**] baie lief is vir haar en sal wees [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] / [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. Sys die heel beste besteding [**grad, force**] wat met my gebeur het. [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]

APPENDIX H: English annotations by the researcher (2019)

1.

Well, finally huh? I owe you So **[grad, force]** much Linda - My Goodness what a friend you've been. Always **[grad, force]** smiling, always **[grad, force]** happy **[DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]**. Thank-You for all your support during lifes Ups&Downs- Especially **[grad, force]** with Bill. **[DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]** My goodness **[grad, force]** what a joke all that was huh? What a fool I was... **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**

Ah well that's over now.

2.

The anger is gone now. Which makes this more difficult for me **[IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]**. You are right about anger and suicide. But not all the time. Anger confuses; and caused me to mess up my life in so many ways **[IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**, that I have now to make a rational decision to die. **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**

You were there for a very **[grad, force]** long time you were with me in every step I took. **[DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]** You did promise not to “Divorce” leave me. But I can't blame you because of this fault in me that I knew was there **[DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st]**. I told you in I.C.U. when we met, that there was no use in trying again. You are a sincere man. **[DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]** / **[IMPL + affect, hap, aff]**

3.

I knew, I would not make it **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**. I should have listened to my feelings. Instead of wasting your time, and my pain, in trying to live **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**. I don't know **[DIR + affect, inse, disq]** why I believed so much **[grad, force]** in you. I have always **[grad, force]** known, and I told you I hurt everyone or anything I touch **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**. I know this, all the more reason I should never **[grad, force]** have taken your hand **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]**. I have no right to be angry with you. I caused you to lie to me. **[DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]**

4.

Dear Sally,

These are my final words to you, so I hope they are fitting.

I can no longer endure the pain and agony of life **[DIR – affect, unhap, mis]** / **[DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]**. I am sure that all of you around me feel the same. I know this is a bad time to do this but nonetheless I have no choice. **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** I have tried to get help in as many ways as I know how. It doesn't seem like anyone wants to help me. I know you don't either. **[DIR + affect, sec, conf]** / **[IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]**

5.

Im sorry. I just couldn't cope any more [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis] / [DIR – judgement, est, ten, 1st]. Please forgive me [DIR + affect, sec, trust]. You were the best wife anyone could have [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd] / [IMPL + affect, hap, aff]. Please take care of yourself [DIR + affect, sec, trust]. Im sorry that I hurt the people I love [DIR – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st]. I love you [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]

6.

After last night I know you do love me [DIR + affect, sec, conf] / [DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd]. You tried so hard to say you don't but your not speaking from your heart. Listen to it Bay remember in sickness and in health, richer or poorer till Death remember its going to Be our wedding date so very soon [grad, force] / [DIR + affect, sec, trust]. I love you you stupid head [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]. SMO I hope you Shno so deeply [grad, force]. I've been wrong [DIR – judgement, est, norm, 1st] but I'm still you loveing husband [IMPL + affect, hap, aff] forever [grad, force].

7.

I gave everything I had to a relationship that wasnt worth the fucking [grad, force] powder to blow it to hell [grad, force]. I guess since that time Ive always [grad, force] been afraid to be vulnerable [DIR – affect, inse, disq]. I sat in solitary confinement for weeks crying my heart out [IMPL – affect, unhap, mis]. I swore to myself at that time there would never [grad, force] be another time. I've blown it to hell [grad, force] with you [IMPL – judgement, est, cap, 1st]. I can only [grad, force] ask for your understanding and this guidance Im reaching out for now. I can state truthfully [grad, force] I should have looked for help earlier. I know I'll be able to express love to you if you will find it in your heart to let me. [IMPL + affect, hap, aff] / [DIR + affect, sec, conf]

8.

Joe You are a good kid [DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd]. If you had given me more of a chance [IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd] I would have done anything for you. But I love you just the same [DIR + affect, hap, aff]. Your mother and I had our difference but I still love her very [grad, force] much [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force] so please take good care of her for me please. [DIR + affect, sec, trust]

P.S. Joe The bike is still yours. But please be carefull with it. Drive it with the utmost safety *please* [DIR + affect, sec, trust]

Good bye Joe remember I love you her [DIR + affect, hap, aff] / [grad, force]

Your Father

Bill

9.

My darlings, I thought I was OK but I can not lead a normal life [**DIR – judgement, est, cap, 1st**] / [**IMPL – judgement, est, norm, 1st**]. You have both been perfect it is no one's fault [**DIR + judgement, est, norm, 2nd**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**]. It is a disease like cancer which won't let go. I love you both very much [**DIR + affect, hap, aff**] / [**grad, force**]. I'm sorry. Please make up with A, it was all my fault. [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] I want you to marry someone who will be good to B. [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**]

10.

Dear B. Thank you for being my friend all this time and for putting up with me. [**DIR + judgement, sanc, prop, 2nd**] / [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**] Will you please do this for me, I mean call C so that he will get the letter. [**DIR + affect, sec, trust**] When I talked to him this morning he said he wanted the letter I wrote to him. His number is D. My aunt E; her number is listed as I'm sorry I've had to bother you so much [**grad, force**] when you've had so many [**grad, force**] problems [**IMPL – judgement, sanc, prop, 1st**]. Your whole family [**grad, focus**] means a lot to me. [**IMPL + affect, hap, aff**] Take care. Love,

APPENDIX I: SPSS syntax for the Kruskal-Wallis tests in the present study

*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples.

NPTESTS

/INDEPENDENT TEST (

Aff_Hap

Aff_Unhap

Aff_Sec

Aff_Insec

Aff_Sat

Aff_Dissat

Desire

Fear

Judg_Est

Judg_Sanc

Appr

Grad

A_Hap_Ch

A_Hap_Af

A_Uh_Mis

A_Uh_Anti

A_Sec_Con

A_Sec_Tr

A_Ins_Dis

A_Ins_Sur

A_Sat_Int

A_Sat_Adm

A_Diss_En

A_Ddiss_Dis

J_Est_No
J_Est_Cap
J_Est_Ten
J_Sanc_Ver
J_Sanc_Pro
J_1st_pos
J_1st_neg
J_2nd_pos
J_2nd_neg
Appr_neg
Appr_pos
Force
Focus)

GROUP (Group_A) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)


/MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE

/CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.


APPENDIX J: Distribution graphs for all categories

Main categories:


Affect (happiness)




Affect (unhappiness)




Affect (security)




Affect (insecurity)







Affect (satisfaction)







Affect (dissatisfaction)




Desire*Fear*

Judgement (esteem)*Judgement (sanction)*


Appreciation*Graduation*

Subcategories:*Affect (happiness, cheer)**Affect (happiness, affection)*


Affect (unhappiness, misery)




Affect (unhappiness, antipathy)




Affect (security, confidence)




Affect (security, trust)




Affect (insecurity, disquiet)




Affect (insecurity, surprise)




Affect (satisfaction, interest)




Affect (satisfaction, admiration)




Affect (dissatisfaction, ennui)




Affect (dissatisfaction, displeasure)




Judgement of esteem (normality)




Judgement of esteem (capacity)







Judgement of esteem (tenacity)




Judgement of sanction (veracity)



Judgement of sanction (propriety)*Appreciation (negative)*


Appreciation (positive)*Graduation (force)*

Graduation (focus)




Additional categories for judgement:


Judgement (author, positive)




Judgement (author, negative)



Judgement (other, positive)



Judgement (other, negative)



APPENDIX K: Summary table for all categories

		Group_A							
		G_1.1	G_1.2	G_1.3	G_1.4	G_2.1	G_2.2	G_3.1	G_3.2
Aff_Hap	Mean	2.0	1.6	3.0	1.4	3.3	2.1	1.0	0.6
	Standard Deviation	2.90	2.38	3.89	1.75	3.94	2.89	1.22	0.75
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	1.3	1.0	1.1	0.8	1.9	0.9	0.7	0.3
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	2.6	2.3	4.9	2.0	4.7	3.3	1.3	0.8
	Median	1.0	0.5	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	1.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	2.0	1.0	5.0	2.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	
	Mode	0 ^a	0	2	0	1	0	0 ^a	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	18	8	17	8	15	13	7	3
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Aff_Unhap	Mean	1.2	1.1	1.7	0.3	1.6	1.0	0.8	0.3
	Standard Deviation	1.83	1.24	3.68	0.63	3.02	1.68	1.16	0.64
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.8	0.7	-0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.1
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	1.6	1.4	3.5	0.5	2.7	1.7	1.1	0.5
	Median	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median		1.0			0.0			
	95,0% Upper CL for Median		2.0			2.0			
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	9	5	16	2	16	7	7	3
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Aff_Sec	Mean	3.6	3.3	5.8	2.3	5.2	4.2	1.7	1.4

	Standard Deviation	4.68	3.59	7.68	2.11	5.63	5.86	1.68	1.39
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.5	3.2	1.7	1.3	0.9
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	4.7	4.3	9.5	3.0	7.1	6.6	2.1	1.9
	Median	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	1.0	1.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	4.0	4.0	8.0	3.0	7.0	7.0	2.0	2.0
	Mode	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	29	15	26	7	25	26	7	6
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Aff_Insec	Mean	0.2	0.3	1.2	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1
	Standard Deviation	0.51	0.69	2.50	0.24	0.99	0.96	0.81	0.29
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.3	0.5	2.4	0.1	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.2
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	3	3	11	1	5	3	5	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Aff_Sat	Mean	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.12	0.00	0.92	0.00	0.65	0.00	0.00	0.17
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	1	0	4	0	3	0	0	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Aff_Dissat	Mean	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.46	0.30	0.23	0.24	0.17	0.00	0.25	0.17
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	3	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
	Desire	Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Standard Deviation		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
95,0% Lower CL for Mean		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
95,0% Upper CL for Mean		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Median		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Fear	Mean	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.00	0.24	0.69	0.00	0.17	0.20	0.12	0.00
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	0	1	3	0	1	1	1	0
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Judg_Est	Mean	2.1	1.5	2.6	0.8	2.0	1.6	1.1	0.9
	Standard Deviation	2.92	1.88	2.95	0.83	2.68	2.38	1.33	0.91
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	1.4	1.0	1.2	0.6	1.1	0.7	0.8	0.6
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	2.8	2.0	4.0	1.1	3.0	2.6	1.4	1.2
	Median	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0

	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	8	6	4	2	2	1	3	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Grad	Mean	3.8	4.0	9.3	2.8	9.0	4.8	2.1	1.2
	Standard Deviation	4.60	5.09	13.55	3.10	9.54	5.82	2.01	1.70
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	2.7	2.6	2.8	1.7	5.7	2.4	1.6	0.6
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	4.9	5.4	15.8	3.9	12.4	7.2	2.5	1.8
	Median	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	6.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	5.0	1.0	2.0	1.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	4.0	5.0	11.0	5.0	14.0	5.0	3.0	4.0
	Mode	1	0 ^a	0 ^a	0	0 ^a	0	0 ^a	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	23	19	52	12	36	20	9	6
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Hap_Ch	Mean	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.23	0.14	0.32	0.17	0.00	0.20	0.34	0.17
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Hap_Af	Mean	1.9	1.6	2.9	1.4	3.4	2.0	0.9	0.5

	Standard Deviation	2.82	2.37	3.83	1.73	3.92	2.80	1.00	0.67
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	1.3	0.9	1.0	0.8	2.0	0.8	0.7	0.3
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	2.6	2.2	4.7	2.0	4.7	3.2	1.1	0.8
	Median	1.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	1.0		2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	2.0		4.0	2.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	
	Mode	1	0	2	0	0 ^a	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	17	8	17	8	15	13	5	2
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Uh_Mis	Mean	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.2	1.4	0.9	0.7	0.3
	Standard Deviation	1.54	1.11	1.54	0.56	2.71	1.67	1.06	0.52
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.1
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	1.4	1.2	1.7	0.4	2.3	1.6	1.0	0.5
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	8	4	6	2	14	7	6	2
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Uh_Anti	Mean	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.85	0.51	2.31	0.17	0.48	0.37	0.28	0.17
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.4	0.3	1.8	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	6	3	10	1	2	1	2	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Sec_Con	Mean	1.2	0.7	1.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	1.2	0.6
	Standard Deviation	1.67	1.25	2.29	0.67	1.12	0.87	1.31	0.71
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.3
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	1.6	1.0	2.5	0.7	1.2	1.0	1.5	0.8
	Median	0.5	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	0.0		0.0				1.0	
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	1.0		2.0				2.0	
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	7	6	8	2	5	3	5	2
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Sec_Tr	Mean	2.4	2.7	4.4	1.8	4.3	3.6	0.5	0.8
	Standard Deviation	3.65	3.14	5.80	1.70	4.86	5.34	0.80	1.07
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.2	2.6	1.4	0.3	0.4
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	3.3	3.5	7.2	2.4	6.0	5.8	0.7	1.2
	Median	1.0	1.5	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	0.0

	95,0% Lower CL for Median	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0		
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	2.0	3.0	13.0	3.0	5.0	7.0		
	Mode	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	24	15	18	6	20	24	4	4
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Ins_Dis	Mean	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1
	Standard Deviation	0.51	0.68	2.50	0.24	0.99	0.96	0.79	0.29
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.3	0.4	2.3	0.1	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.2
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	3	3	11	1	5	3	5	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Ins_Sur	Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								

	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	1	0	4	0	3	0	0	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Diss_En	Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.12	0.19	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.00	0.23	0.17
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
A_Diss_Dis	Mean	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.44	0.24	0.23	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_Est_No	Mean	0.8	0.3	1.2	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.2

	Standard Deviation	1.42	0.85	1.81	0.66	1.15	1.08	0.61	0.36
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	1.2	0.5	2.1	0.6	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.3
	Median	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median			1.0					
	95,0% Upper CL for Median			3.0					
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	6	4	7	3	4	4	3	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_Est_Cap	Mean	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3
	Standard Deviation	1.42	1.12	1.63	0.61	1.26	0.96	0.64	0.64
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	1.1	0.9	1.5	0.5	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.5
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	6	5	7	2	5	4	3	2
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_Est_Ten	Mean	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5
	Standard Deviation	0.78	0.93	0.76	0.44	1.16	0.99	0.71	0.51
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3

	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.4	1.1	1.1	0.7	0.6
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_Sanc_Ver	Mean	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.68	0.24	0.58	0.35	0.38	0.20	0.12	0.00
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	5	1	2	2	2	1	1	0
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_Sanc_Pro	Mean	1.4	1.1	2.3	0.8	2.8	1.8	0.6	0.5
	Standard Deviation	2.83	1.68	3.46	1.12	2.99	2.51	1.02	0.91
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.4	1.7	0.8	0.3	0.2
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	2.1	1.6	4.0	1.2	3.8	2.9	0.8	0.8
	Median	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	0.0	0.0


	95,0% Lower CL for Median		1.0	1.0		1.0	1.0		
	95,0% Upper CL for Median		2.0	2.0		3.0	3.0		
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	14	8	14	4	13	9	5	4
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_1st_pos	Mean	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
	Standard Deviation	1.21	0.44	0.37	0.42	0.38	1.01	0.35	0.00
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.2	0.0
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	10	2	1	2	2	5	2	0
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
J_1st_neg	Mean	2.0	1.6	2.2	0.8	2.2	1.6	1.1	1.2
	Standard Deviation	3.50	1.93	2.30	0.71	3.46	2.14	1.29	1.29
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.5	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.8
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	2.8	2.2	3.3	1.0	3.4	2.4	1.4	1.7
	Median	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0

	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	13	6	6	4	7	7	4	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Appr_neg	Mean	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1
	Standard Deviation	0.64	0.47	0.32	0.38	0.44	0.28	0.20	0.24
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	4	2	1	2	2	1	1	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Appr_pos	Mean	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
	Standard Deviation	0.75	0.65	0.71	0.00	0.29	0.20	0.38	0.17
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	4	4	3	0	1	1	2	1
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Force	Mean	3.6	3.8	8.5	2.5	8.6	4.7	1.7	1.2

	Standard Deviation	4.34	4.98	12.30	3.16	8.89	5.65	1.75	1.58
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	2.6	2.4	2.5	1.4	5.5	2.4	1.3	0.6
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	4.6	5.2	14.4	3.6	11.7	7.1	2.1	1.7
	Median	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	6.0	2.0	1.0	1.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Median	4.0	5.0	10.0	5.0	13.0	5.0	2.0	4.0
	Mode	1	0	0 ^a	0	0 ^a	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	22	18	49	12	35	19	8	6
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33
Focus	Mean	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.1
	Standard Deviation	0.61	0.54	1.57	0.94	1.02	0.33	0.63	0.38
	95,0% Lower CL for Mean	0.0	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
	95,0% Upper CL for Mean	0.3	0.4	1.6	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.2
	Median	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	95,0% Lower CL for Median								
	95,0% Upper CL for Median								
	Mode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	4	2	6	5	4	1	3	2
	Valid n	74	52	19	33	34	25	74	33


APPENDIX L: Kruskal-Wallis outputs for main categories (test statistics and degrees of freedom)

Affect (happiness)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	29.091
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Affect (unhappiness)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	20.896
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.004

Affect (security)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	21.956
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.003

Affect (insecurity)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	20.557
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.004

Affect (satisfaction)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	28.363
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Affect (dissatisfaction)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	4.130
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.765

*Desire***Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test**


Total N	344
Test Statistic	.000
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	1.000

Fear




Total N	344
Test Statistic	8.330
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.304

Judgement (esteem)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	8.770
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.270


Judgement (sanction)



Total N	344
Test Statistic	39.459
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Appreciation

Total N	344
Test Statistic	17.725
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.013

Graduation

Total N	344
Test Statistic	39.412
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

APPENDIX M: Pairwise tables for main categories

Table 1: Affect (happiness)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	29.846	20.004	1.492	.136	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	34.925	21.269	1.642	.101	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	48.758	23.526	2.072	.038	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	62.676	25.338	2.474	.013	.375
G_3.2-G_1.1	62.832	20.004	3.141	.002	.047
G_3.2-G_2.1	98.386	23.352	4.213	.000	.001
G_3.2-G_1.3	98.926	27.521	3.595	.000	.009
G_3.1-G_1.2	5.079	17.293	.294	.769	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	18.912	20.004	.945	.344	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	32.831	22.107	1.485	.138	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	32.986	15.711	2.100	.036	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	68.541	19.799	3.462	.001	.015
G_3.1-G_1.3	69.080	24.578	2.811	.005	.138
G_1.2-G_1.4	-13.833	21.269	-.650	.515	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-27.752	23.258	-1.193	.233	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	27.907	17.293	1.614	.107	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-63.462	21.077	-3.011	.003	.073
G_1.2-G_1.3	-64.001	25.618	-2.498	.012	.349
G_1.4-G_2.2	-13.919	25.338	-.549	.583	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	14.075	20.004	.704	.482	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-49.629	23.352	-2.125	.034	.940
G_1.4-G_1.3	50.168	27.521	1.823	.068	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	.156	22.107	.007	.994	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	35.710	25.177	1.418	.156	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	36.249	29.085	1.246	.213	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-35.554	19.799	-1.796	.073	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-36.094	24.578	-1.469	.142	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	.539	27.372	.020	.984	1.000

Table 2: Affect (unhappiness)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj. Sig.
G_1.4-G_3.2	-5.636	22.036	-.256	.798	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-44.529	23.733	-1.876	.061	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-47.862	18.736	-2.554	.011	.298
G_1.4-G_1.3	56.856	25.777	2.206	.027	.767
G_1.4-G_1.1	58.031	18.736	3.097	.002	.055
G_1.4-G_2.1	-64.571	21.873	-2.952	.003	.088
G_1.4-G_1.2	65.034	19.921	3.265	.001	.031
G_3.2-G_2.2	38.893	23.733	1.639	.101	1.000
G_3.2-G_3.1	42.225	18.736	2.254	.024	.678
G_3.2-G_1.3	51.220	25.777	1.987	.047	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	52.394	18.736	2.796	.005	.145
G_3.2-G_2.1	58.934	21.873	2.694	.007	.197
G_3.2-G_1.2	59.398	19.921	2.982	.003	.080
G_2.2-G_3.1	-3.333	20.706	-.161	.872	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	12.327	27.242	.453	.651	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	13.502	20.706	.652	.514	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	20.042	23.582	.850	.395	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.2	20.505	21.784	.941	.347	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	8.995	23.020	.391	.696	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	10.169	14.715	.691	.490	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	16.709	18.545	.901	.368	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	17.172	16.197	1.060	.289	1.000
G_1.3-G_1.1	1.174	23.020	.051	.959	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-7.714	25.638	-.301	.763	1.000
G_1.3-G_1.2	8.178	23.995	.341	.733	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-6.540	18.545	-.353	.724	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.2	-7.003	16.197	-.432	.665	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.2	.463	19.741	.023	.981	1.000

Table 3: Affect (security)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	12.378	20.510	.603	.546	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	35.318	24.121	1.464	.143	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	50.377	21.807	2.310	.021	.585
G_3.2-G_2.2	51.182	25.980	1.970	.049	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	51.965	20.510	2.534	.011	.316
G_3.2-G_1.3	73.611	28.217	2.609	.009	.254
G_3.2-G_2.1	82.081	23.943	3.428	.001	.017
G_3.1-G_1.4	22.941	20.510	1.119	.263	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	37.999	17.730	2.143	.032	.899
G_3.1-G_2.2	38.805	22.666	1.712	.087	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	39.588	16.108	2.458	.014	.392
G_3.1-G_1.3	61.233	25.200	2.430	.015	.423
G_3.1-G_2.1	69.703	20.300	3.434	.001	.017
G_1.4-G_1.2	15.059	21.807	.691	.490	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-15.864	25.980	-.611	.541	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	16.647	20.510	.812	.417	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	38.293	28.217	1.357	.175	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-46.762	23.943	-1.953	.051	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-.805	23.846	-.034	.973	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	1.588	17.730	.090	.929	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-23.234	26.266	-.885	.376	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-31.704	21.610	-1.467	.142	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	.783	22.666	.035	.972	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	22.428	29.821	.752	.452	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	30.898	25.814	1.197	.231	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-21.645	25.200	-.859	.390	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-30.115	20.300	-1.483	.138	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-8.470	28.065	-.302	.763	1.000

Table 4: Affect (insecurity)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_1.4-G_3.2	-4.894	16.269	-.301	.764	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	12.861	13.834	.930	.353	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	20.010	14.708	1.360	.174	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-22.820	13.834	-1.650	.099	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-26.139	16.149	-1.619	.106	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-40.312	17.523	-2.301	.021	.600
G_1.4-G_1.3	72.949	19.032	3.833	.000	.004
G_3.2-G_1.1	7.967	13.834	.576	.565	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	15.116	14.708	1.028	.304	1.000
G_3.2-G_3.1	17.926	13.834	1.296	.195	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	21.245	16.149	1.316	.188	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	35.418	17.523	2.021	.043	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.3	68.055	19.032	3.576	.000	.010
G_1.1-G_1.2	-7.149	11.959	-.598	.550	1.000
G_1.1-G_3.1	-9.959	10.865	-.917	.359	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-13.278	13.692	-.970	.332	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-27.451	15.288	-1.796	.073	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-60.088	16.997	-3.535	.000	.011
G_1.2-G_3.1	-2.810	11.959	-.235	.814	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-6.128	14.575	-.420	.674	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-20.302	16.084	-1.262	.207	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-52.939	17.716	-2.988	.003	.079
G_3.1-G_2.1	3.318	13.692	.242	.809	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	17.492	15.288	1.144	.253	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	50.129	16.997	2.949	.003	.089
G_2.1-G_2.2	-14.174	17.411	-.814	.416	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	46.810	18.929	2.473	.013	.375
G_2.2-G_1.3	32.637	20.114	1.623	.105	1.000

Table 5: Affect (satisfaction)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_1.2-G_1.4	.000	5.778	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	.000	6.319	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.2-G_3.1	.000	4.698	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	2.304	4.698	.490	.624	1.000
G_1.2-G_3.2	-5.167	5.778	-.894	.371	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-9.237	6.960	-1.327	.184	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-25.279	5.726	-4.415	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	.000	6.884	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	.000	5.435	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	2.304	5.435	.424	.672	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.2	-5.167	6.392	-.808	.419	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	9.237	7.477	1.235	.217	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-25.279	6.344	-3.985	.000	.002
G_2.2-G_3.1	.000	6.006	.000	1.000	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	2.304	6.006	.384	.701	1.000
G_2.2-G_3.2	-5.167	6.884	-.751	.453	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	9.237	7.902	1.169	.242	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	25.279	6.840	3.696	.000	.006
G_3.1-G_1.1	2.304	4.268	.540	.589	1.000
G_3.1-G_3.2	-5.167	5.435	-.951	.342	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	9.237	6.677	1.383	.167	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	25.279	5.379	4.700	.000	.000
G_1.1-G_3.2	-2.863	5.435	-.527	.598	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-6.933	6.677	-1.038	.299	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-22.975	5.379	-4.271	.000	.001
G_3.2-G_1.3	4.070	7.477	.544	.586	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	20.113	6.344	3.170	.002	.043
G_1.3-G_2.1	-16.043	7.436	-2.157	.031	.868

Table 6: Judgement (sanction)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	2.378	19.210	.124	.902	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	24.318	22.593	1.076	.282	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	34.033	19.210	1.772	.076	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	42.127	20.425	2.063	.039	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	67.082	24.333	2.757	.006	.163
G_3.2-G_1.3	83.611	26.429	3.164	.002	.044
G_3.2-G_2.1	98.301	22.426	4.383	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	21.941	19.210	1.142	.253	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	31.655	15.087	2.098	.036	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	39.749	16.607	2.394	.017	.467
G_3.1-G_2.2	64.705	21.230	3.048	.002	.065
G_3.1-G_1.3	81.233	23.603	3.442	.001	.016
G_3.1-G_2.1	95.924	19.014	5.045	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	9.715	19.210	.506	.613	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	17.809	20.425	.872	.383	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-42.764	24.333	-1.757	.079	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	59.293	26.429	2.243	.025	.696
G_1.4-G_2.1	-73.983	22.426	-3.299	.001	.027
G_1.1-G_1.2	-8.094	16.607	-.487	.626	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-33.049	21.230	-1.557	.120	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-49.578	23.603	-2.101	.036	.999
G_1.1-G_2.1	-64.268	19.014	-3.380	.001	.020
G_1.2-G_2.2	-24.955	22.335	-1.117	.264	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-41.484	24.602	-1.686	.092	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-56.174	20.241	-2.775	.006	.154
G_2.2-G_1.3	16.528	27.931	.592	.554	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	31.219	24.179	1.291	.197	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-14.690	26.287	-.559	.576	1.000

Table 7: Appreciation

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_1.4-G_3.2	-4.182	15.481	-.270	.787	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-5.536	13.163	-.421	.674	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-8.895	16.674	-.533	.594	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-15.396	15.367	-1.002	.316	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	16.445	13.996	1.175	.240	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	25.349	18.110	1.400	.162	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	40.948	13.163	3.111	.002	.052
G_3.2-G_3.1	1.354	13.163	.103	.918	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	4.713	16.674	.283	.777	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	11.214	15.367	.730	.466	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	12.263	13.996	.876	.381	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.3	21.167	18.110	1.169	.242	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	36.766	13.163	2.793	.005	.146
G_3.1-G_2.2	3.359	14.547	.231	.817	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	9.860	13.029	.757	.449	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	10.909	11.379	.959	.338	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	19.814	16.173	1.225	.221	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	35.412	10.338	3.425	.001	.017
G_2.2-G_2.1	6.501	16.568	.392	.695	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.2	7.550	15.304	.493	.622	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	16.455	19.139	.860	.390	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	32.053	14.547	2.203	.028	.772
G_2.1-G_1.2	1.049	13.869	.076	.940	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	9.954	18.012	.553	.581	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.1	25.552	13.029	1.961	.050	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-8.904	16.858	-.528	.597	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	24.503	11.379	2.153	.031	.876
G_1.3-G_1.1	15.599	16.173	.964	.335	1.000


Table 8: Graduation

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	41.579	20.558	2.022	.043	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	54.682	24.178	2.262	.024	.664
G_3.2-G_1.2	66.410	21.858	3.038	.002	.067
G_3.2-G_1.1	72.193	20.558	3.512	.000	.012
G_3.2-G_2.2	72.627	26.041	2.789	.005	.148
G_3.2-G_1.3	113.780	28.283	4.023	.000	.002
G_3.2-G_2.1	130.580	24.000	5.441	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	13.103	20.558	.637	.524	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	24.831	17.772	1.397	.162	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	30.615	16.146	1.896	.058	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	31.049	22.719	1.367	.172	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	72.201	25.259	2.858	.004	.119
G_3.1-G_2.1	89.002	20.348	4.374	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	11.728	21.858	.537	.592	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	17.512	20.558	.852	.394	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-17.945	26.041	-.689	.491	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	59.098	28.283	2.089	.037	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-75.898	24.000	-3.162	.002	.044
G_1.2-G_1.1	5.784	17.772	.325	.745	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-6.217	23.902	-.260	.795	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-47.370	26.328	-1.799	.072	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-64.170	21.661	-2.963	.003	.085
G_1.1-G_2.2	-.434	22.719	-.019	.985	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-41.586	25.259	-1.646	.100	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-58.387	20.348	-2.869	.004	.115
G_2.2-G_1.3	41.153	29.891	1.377	.169	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	57.953	25.875	2.240	.025	.703
G_1.3-G_2.1	-16.800	28.131	-.597	.550	1.000


APPENDIX N: Kruskal-Wallis outputs for subcategories (test statistics and degrees of freedom)

Affect (happiness, cheer)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	6.529
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.480

Affect (happiness, affection)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	32.023
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Affect (unhappiness, misery)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	16.841
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.018

Affect (unhappiness, antipathy)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	14.572
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.042

Affect (security, confidence)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	13.765
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.056

Affect (security, trust)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	53.707
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Affect (insecurity, disquiet)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	17.077
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.017

Affect (insecurity, surprise)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	3.649
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.819

Affect (satisfaction, interest)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	.000
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	1.000

Affect (satisfaction, admiration)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	28.363
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Affect (dissatisfaction, ennui)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	3.744
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.809

Affect (dissatisfaction, displeasure)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	6.913
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.438

Judgement of esteem (normality)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	20.892
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.004

Judgement of esteem (capacity)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	8.713
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.274

Judgement of esteem (tenacity)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	5.327
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.620

Judgement of sanction (veracity)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	23.661
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.001

Judgement of sanction (propriety)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	36.913
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Appreciation (negative)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	10.447
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.165

Appreciation (positive)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	13.050
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.071

Graduation (force)



Total N	344
Test Statistic	45.517
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000


Graduation (focus)



Total N	344
Test Statistic	15.794
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.027


Additional analyses for judgement:

Judgement (author, positive)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	8.522
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.289

Judgement (author, negative)




Total N	344
Test Statistic	7.656
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.364

Judgement (other, positive)



Total N	344
Test Statistic	35.991
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

Judgement (other, negative)



Total N	344
Test Statistic	18.945
Degrees of Freedom	7
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.008

APPENDIX O: Pairwise tables for subcategories

Table 1: Affect (happiness, affection)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	26.496	19.975	1.326	.185	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	33.601	21.239	1.582	.114	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	49.136	23.493	2.092	.036	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	62.294	19.975	3.119	.002	.051
G_3.2-G_2.2	63.451	25.303	2.508	.012	.340
G_3.2-G_1.3	99.828	27.482	3.633	.000	.008
G_3.2-G_2.1	101.914	23.319	4.370	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	7.104	17.268	.411	.681	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	22.640	19.975	1.133	.257	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	35.797	15.688	2.282	.023	.630
G_3.1-G_2.2	36.955	22.075	1.674	.094	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	73.331	24.543	2.988	.003	.079
G_3.1-G_2.1	75.418	19.771	3.815	.000	.004
G_1.2-G_1.4	-15.536	21.239	-.731	.464	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	28.693	17.268	1.662	.097	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-29.850	23.225	-1.285	.199	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-66.227	25.582	-2.589	.010	.270
G_1.2-G_2.1	-68.314	21.047	-3.246	.001	.033
G_1.4-G_1.1	13.157	19.975	.659	.510	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-14.315	25.303	-.566	.572	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	50.691	27.482	1.845	.065	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-52.778	23.319	-2.263	.024	.661
G_1.1-G_2.2	-1.157	22.075	-.052	.958	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-37.534	24.543	-1.529	.126	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-39.621	19.771	-2.004	.045	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	36.377	29.044	1.252	.210	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	38.464	25.142	1.530	.126	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-2.087	27.334	-.076	.939	1.000

Table 2: Affect (unhappiness, misery)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_1.4-G_3.2	-6.758	21.632	-.312	.755	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-34.405	23.298	-1.477	.140	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	47.835	25.305	1.890	.059	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-47.870	18.393	-2.603	.009	.259
G_1.4-G_1.1	53.201	18.393	2.892	.004	.107
G_1.4-G_1.2	56.007	19.556	2.864	.004	.117
G_1.4-G_2.1	-56.119	21.472	-2.614	.009	.251
G_3.2-G_2.2	27.648	23.298	1.187	.235	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.3	41.077	25.305	1.623	.105	1.000
G_3.2-G_3.1	41.112	18.393	2.235	.025	.711
G_3.2-G_1.1	46.443	18.393	2.525	.012	.324
G_3.2-G_1.2	49.249	19.556	2.518	.012	.330
G_3.2-G_2.1	49.361	21.472	2.299	.022	.602
G_2.2-G_1.3	13.429	26.743	.502	.616	1.000
G_2.2-G_3.1	-13.464	20.327	-.662	.508	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	18.795	20.327	.925	.355	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.2	21.602	21.385	1.010	.312	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	21.714	23.150	.938	.348	1.000
G_1.3-G_3.1	-.035	22.599	-.002	.999	1.000
G_1.3-G_1.1	5.366	22.599	.237	.812	1.000
G_1.3-G_1.2	8.172	23.555	.347	.729	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-8.284	25.168	-.329	.742	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	5.331	14.445	.369	.712	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	8.137	15.900	.512	.609	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	8.249	18.205	.453	.650	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.2	-2.806	15.900	-.176	.860	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-2.918	18.205	-.160	.873	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-.112	19.379	-.006	.995	1.000

Table 3: Affect (unhappiness, antipathy)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_1.4-G_3.2	.000	12.153	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-1.896	10.334	-.183	.854	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	6.936	10.334	.671	.502	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	17.832	10.987	1.623	.105	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-21.789	13.089	-1.665	.096	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-24.939	12.064	-2.067	.039	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	31.962	14.217	2.248	.025	.688
G_3.2-G_3.1	1.896	10.334	.183	.854	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	6.936	10.334	.671	.502	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	17.832	10.987	1.623	.105	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	21.789	13.089	1.665	.096	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	24.939	12.064	2.067	.039	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.3	31.962	14.217	2.248	.025	.688
G_3.1-G_1.1	5.041	8.116	.621	.535	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	15.937	8.933	1.784	.074	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	19.894	11.420	1.742	.082	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	23.043	10.228	2.253	.024	.679
G_3.1-G_1.3	30.066	12.697	2.368	.018	.501
G_1.1-G_1.2	-10.896	8.933	-1.220	.223	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-14.853	11.420	-1.301	.193	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-18.002	10.228	-1.760	.078	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-25.026	12.697	-1.971	.049	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-3.957	12.015	-.329	.742	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-7.106	10.888	-.653	.514	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-14.130	13.234	-1.068	.286	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	3.149	13.006	.242	.809	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	10.173	15.025	.677	.498	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	7.023	14.140	.497	.619	1.000

Table 4: Affect (security, trust)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.1-G_3.2	-19.813	20.091	-.986	.324	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	71.223	15.779	4.514	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	75.601	20.091	3.763	.000	.005
G_3.1-G_1.2	81.573	17.368	4.697	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	85.099	22.204	3.833	.000	.004
G_3.1-G_1.3	97.208	24.685	3.938	.000	.002
G_3.1-G_2.1	111.904	19.886	5.627	.000	.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	51.410	20.091	2.559	.011	.294
G_3.2-G_1.4	55.788	23.629	2.361	.018	.510
G_3.2-G_1.2	61.760	21.362	2.891	.004	.107
G_3.2-G_2.2	65.286	25.449	2.565	.010	.289
G_3.2-G_1.3	77.396	27.641	2.800	.005	.143
G_3.2-G_2.1	92.091	23.455	3.926	.000	.002
G_1.1-G_1.4	-4.378	20.091	-.218	.828	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.2	-10.350	17.368	-.596	.551	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-13.876	22.204	-.625	.532	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-25.985	24.685	-1.053	.292	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-40.681	19.886	-2.046	.041	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	5.972	21.362	.280	.780	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-9.498	25.449	-.373	.709	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	21.608	27.641	.782	.434	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-36.303	23.455	-1.548	.122	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-3.526	23.360	-.151	.880	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-15.636	25.730	-.608	.543	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-30.331	21.169	-1.433	.152	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	12.109	29.213	.415	.678	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	26.805	25.288	1.060	.289	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-14.696	27.492	-.535	.593	1.000

Table 5: Affect (insecurity, disquiet)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.-Sig.
G_1.4-G_3.2	-4.924	15.939	-.309	.757	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	12.881	13.552	.950	.342	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	16.873	14.410	1.171	.242	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-20.293	13.552	-1.497	.134	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-26.122	15.821	-1.651	.099	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-40.212	17.167	-2.342	.019	.536
G_1.4-G_1.3	63.152	18.645	3.387	.001	.020
G_3.2-G_1.1	7.957	13.552	.587	.557	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	11.948	14.410	.829	.407	1.000
G_3.2-G_3.1	15.369	13.552	1.134	.257	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	21.198	15.821	1.340	.180	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	35.287	17.167	2.056	.040	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.3	58.227	18.645	3.123	.002	.050
G_1.1-G_1.2	-3.991	11.716	-.341	.733	1.000
G_1.1-G_3.1	-7.412	10.644	-.696	.486	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-13.241	13.414	-.987	.324	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-27.330	14.977	-1.825	.068	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-50.270	16.651	-3.019	.003	.071
G_1.2-G_3.1	-3.421	11.716	-.292	.770	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-9.249	14.279	-.648	.517	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-23.339	15.757	-1.481	.139	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-46.279	17.356	-2.666	.008	.215
G_3.1-G_2.1	5.829	13.414	.435	.664	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	19.918	14.977	1.330	.184	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	42.858	16.651	2.574	.010	.282
G_2.1-G_2.2	-14.089	17.058	-.826	.409	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	37.029	18.545	1.997	.046	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	22.940	19.705	1.164	.244	1.000

Table 6: Affect (satisfaction, admiration)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_1.2-G_1.4	.000	5.778	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	.000	6.319	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.2-G_3.1	.000	4.698	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	2.304	4.698	.490	.624	1.000
G_1.2-G_3.2	-5.167	5.778	-.894	.371	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-9.237	6.960	-1.327	.184	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-25.279	5.726	-4.415	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	.000	6.884	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	.000	5.435	.000	1.000	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	2.304	5.435	.424	.672	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.2	-5.167	6.392	-.808	.419	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	9.237	7.477	1.235	.217	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-25.279	6.344	-3.985	.000	.002
G_2.2-G_3.1	.000	6.006	.000	1.000	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	2.304	6.006	.384	.701	1.000
G_2.2-G_3.2	-5.167	6.884	-.751	.453	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	9.237	7.902	1.169	.242	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	25.279	6.840	3.696	.000	.006
G_3.1-G_1.1	2.304	4.268	.540	.589	1.000
G_3.1-G_3.2	-5.167	5.435	-.951	.342	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	9.237	6.677	1.383	.167	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	25.279	5.379	4.700	.000	.000
G_1.1-G_3.2	-2.863	5.435	-.527	.598	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-6.933	6.677	-1.038	.299	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-22.975	5.379	-4.271	.000	.001
G_3.2-G_1.3	4.070	7.477	.544	.586	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	20.113	6.344	3.170	.002	.043
G_1.3-G_2.1	-16.043	7.436	-2.157	.031	.868

Table 7: Judgement of esteem (normality)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_1.2	2.198	17.196	.128	.898	1.000
G_3.2-G_3.1	11.837	16.173	.732	.464	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	14.441	20.486	.705	.481	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	28.955	19.021	1.522	.128	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	39.513	16.173	2.443	.015	.408
G_3.2-G_2.1	41.268	18.880	2.186	.029	.807
G_3.2-G_1.3	69.463	22.250	3.122	.002	.050
G_1.2-G_3.1	-9.639	13.981	-.689	.491	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-12.243	18.804	-.651	.515	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.4	-26.756	17.196	-1.556	.120	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	37.315	13.981	2.669	.008	.213
G_1.2-G_2.1	-39.070	17.040	-2.293	.022	.612
G_1.2-G_1.3	-67.265	20.712	-3.248	.001	.033
G_3.1-G_2.2	2.604	17.873	.146	.884	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	17.117	16.173	1.058	.290	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	27.676	12.702	2.179	.029	.822
G_3.1-G_2.1	29.431	16.008	1.839	.066	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	57.626	19.871	2.900	.004	.104
G_2.2-G_1.4	14.513	20.486	.708	.479	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.1	25.072	17.873	1.403	.161	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	26.827	20.356	1.318	.188	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	55.022	23.515	2.340	.019	.540
G_1.4-G_1.1	10.559	16.173	.653	.514	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-12.314	18.880	-.652	.514	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	40.509	22.250	1.821	.069	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-1.755	16.008	-.110	.913	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-29.950	19.871	-1.507	.132	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	28.195	22.131	1.274	.203	1.000

Table 8: Judgement of sanction (veracity)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.-Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	2.291	7.595	.302	.763	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	5.348	8.932	.599	.549	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	6.780	9.620	.705	.481	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	7.128	7.595	.939	.348	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	9.779	8.075	1.211	.226	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	10.176	8.866	1.148	.251	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.3	44.974	10.449	4.304	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	3.058	7.595	.403	.687	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	4.489	8.393	.535	.593	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	4.838	5.965	.811	.417	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	7.488	6.566	1.141	.254	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	7.886	7.517	1.049	.294	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	42.683	9.332	4.574	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-1.432	9.620	-.149	.882	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	1.780	7.595	.234	.815	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	4.430	8.075	.549	.583	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-4.828	8.866	-.545	.586	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	39.625	10.449	3.792	.000	.004
G_2.2-G_1.1	.348	8.393	.042	.967	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.2	2.999	8.830	.340	.734	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	3.396	9.559	.355	.722	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	38.194	11.043	3.459	.001	.015
G_1.1-G_1.2	-2.650	6.566	-.404	.686	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-3.048	7.517	-.405	.685	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-37.845	9.332	-4.056	.000	.001
G_1.2-G_2.1	-.398	8.002	-.050	.960	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-35.195	9.727	-3.618	.000	.008
G_2.1-G_1.3	34.797	10.393	3.348	.001	.023

Table 9: Judgement of sanction (propriety)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	1.545	19.107	.081	.936	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	21.803	22.471	.970	.332	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	32.112	19.107	1.681	.093	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	38.471	20.315	1.894	.058	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	60.608	24.202	2.504	.012	.344
G_3.2-G_1.3	74.367	26.287	2.829	.005	.131
G_3.2-G_2.1	97.420	22.305	4.368	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	20.258	19.107	1.060	.289	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	30.568	15.006	2.037	.042	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	36.926	16.517	2.236	.025	.711
G_3.1-G_2.2	59.063	21.115	2.797	.005	.144
G_3.1-G_1.3	72.822	23.476	3.102	.002	.054
G_3.1-G_2.1	95.876	18.911	5.070	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	10.309	19.107	.540	.590	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	16.668	20.315	.820	.412	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-38.805	24.202	-1.603	.109	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	52.564	26.287	2.000	.046	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-75.617	22.305	-3.390	.001	.020
G_1.1-G_1.2	-6.358	16.517	-.385	.700	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-28.496	21.115	-1.350	.177	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-42.255	23.476	-1.800	.072	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-65.308	18.911	-3.453	.001	.016
G_1.2-G_2.2	-22.137	22.215	-.997	.319	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-35.896	24.469	-1.467	.142	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-58.950	20.131	-2.928	.003	.095
G_2.2-G_1.3	13.759	27.781	.495	.620	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	36.812	24.048	1.531	.126	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-23.053	26.145	-.882	.378	1.000

Table 10: Positive judgements of others

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	14.194	16.526	.859	.390	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	23.636	19.436	1.216	.224	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	35.782	17.571	2.036	.042	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.2	46.867	20.933	2.239	.025	.705
G_3.2-G_1.1	49.836	16.526	3.016	.003	.072
G_3.2-G_1.3	67.404	22.736	2.965	.003	.085
G_3.2-G_2.1	91.946	19.292	4.766	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	9.443	16.526	.571	.568	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	21.588	14.286	1.511	.131	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	32.673	18.263	1.789	.074	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	35.642	12.979	2.746	.006	.169
G_3.1-G_1.3	53.210	20.304	2.621	.009	.246
G_3.1-G_2.1	77.752	16.357	4.754	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	12.146	17.571	.691	.489	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-23.230	20.933	-1.110	.267	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	26.199	16.526	1.585	.113	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	43.767	22.736	1.925	.054	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-68.310	19.292	-3.541	.000	.011
G_1.2-G_2.2	-11.085	19.214	-.577	.564	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.1	14.054	14.286	.984	.325	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-31.621	21.164	-1.494	.135	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-56.164	17.412	-3.226	.001	.035
G_2.2-G_1.1	2.969	18.263	.163	.871	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	20.537	24.028	.855	.393	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	45.079	20.800	2.167	.030	.846
G_1.1-G_1.3	-17.568	20.304	-.865	.387	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-42.110	16.357	-2.575	.010	.281
G_1.3-G_2.1	-24.543	22.613	-1.085	.278	1.000

Table 11: Negative judgements of others

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	17.592	15.587	1.129	.259	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	28.030	18.331	1.529	.126	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	34.390	15.587	2.206	.027	.766
G_3.2-G_1.2	35.965	16.572	2.170	.030	.840
G_3.2-G_1.3	46.588	21.444	2.173	.030	.835
G_3.2-G_2.2	50.447	19.743	2.555	.011	.297
G_3.2-G_2.1	66.975	18.196	3.681	.000	.007
G_3.1-G_1.4	10.438	15.587	.670	.503	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	16.797	12.242	1.372	.170	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	18.372	13.474	1.364	.173	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	28.995	19.151	1.514	.130	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.2	32.854	17.225	1.907	.056	1.000
G_3.1-G_2.1	49.383	15.427	3.201	.001	.038
G_1.4-G_1.1	6.359	15.587	.408	.683	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	7.934	16.572	.479	.632	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	18.557	21.444	.865	.387	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-22.416	19.743	-1.135	.256	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.1	-38.945	18.196	-2.140	.032	.905
G_1.1-G_1.2	-1.575	13.474	-.117	.907	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-12.198	19.151	-.637	.524	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.2	-16.057	17.225	-.932	.351	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-32.586	15.427	-2.112	.035	.971
G_1.2-G_1.3	-10.623	19.961	-.532	.595	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-14.482	18.122	-.799	.424	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-31.011	16.423	-1.888	.059	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.2	-3.859	22.663	-.170	.865	1.000
G_1.3-G_2.1	-20.388	21.328	-.956	.339	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	16.529	19.618	.843	.399	1.000

Table 12: Graduation (force)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_3.1	30.220	20.511	1.473	.141	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	42.864	24.122	1.777	.076	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	61.070	21.808	2.800	.005	.143
G_3.2-G_1.1	74.139	20.511	3.615	.000	.008
G_3.2-G_2.2	74.588	25.980	2.871	.004	.115
G_3.2-G_1.3	112.112	28.218	3.973	.000	.002
G_3.2-G_2.1	130.951	23.944	5.469	.000	.000
G_3.1-G_1.4	12.644	20.511	.616	.538	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.2	30.850	17.731	1.740	.082	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.1	43.919	16.109	2.726	.006	.179
G_3.1-G_2.2	44.368	22.667	1.957	.050	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	81.892	25.200	3.250	.001	.032
G_3.1-G_2.1	100.731	20.301	4.962	.000	.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	18.206	21.808	.835	.404	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.1	31.275	20.511	1.525	.127	1.000
G_1.4-G_2.2	-31.725	25.980	-1.221	.222	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	69.248	28.218	2.454	.014	.396
G_1.4-G_2.1	-88.088	23.944	-3.679	.000	.007
G_1.2-G_1.1	13.069	17.731	.737	.461	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.2	-13.519	23.847	-.567	.571	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-51.042	26.267	-1.943	.052	1.000
G_1.2-G_2.1	-69.882	21.611	-3.234	.001	.034
G_1.1-G_2.2	-.449	22.667	-.020	.984	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.3	-37.973	25.200	-1.507	.132	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-56.812	20.301	-2.799	.005	.144
G_2.2-G_1.3	37.523	29.822	1.258	.208	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	56.363	25.815	2.183	.029	.812
G_1.3-G_2.1	-18.840	28.066	-.671	.502	1.000

Table 13: Graduation (focus)

Each node shows the sample average rank of Group_A.

Sample1-Sample2	Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
G_3.2-G_2.2	8.833	17.851	.495	.621	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.1	10.361	14.093	.735	.462	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.4	11.076	16.575	.668	.504	1.000
G_3.2-G_2.1	21.067	16.452	1.280	.200	1.000
G_3.2-G_1.2	31.100	14.984	2.075	.038	1.000
G_3.2-G_3.1	34.928	14.093	2.478	.013	.370
G_3.2-G_1.3	55.089	19.389	2.841	.004	.126
G_2.2-G_1.1	1.528	15.575	.098	.922	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.4	2.243	17.851	.126	.900	1.000
G_2.2-G_2.1	12.234	17.738	.690	.490	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.2	22.267	16.385	1.359	.174	1.000
G_2.2-G_3.1	-26.095	15.575	-1.676	.094	1.000
G_2.2-G_1.3	46.256	20.491	2.257	.024	.672
G_1.1-G_1.4	-.715	14.093	-.051	.960	1.000
G_1.1-G_2.1	-10.706	13.949	-.768	.443	1.000
G_1.1-G_1.2	-20.739	12.183	-1.702	.089	1.000
G_1.1-G_3.1	-24.568	11.068	-2.220	.026	.740
G_1.1-G_1.3	-44.728	17.315	-2.583	.010	.274
G_1.4-G_2.1	-9.991	16.452	-.607	.544	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.2	20.024	14.984	1.336	.181	1.000
G_1.4-G_3.1	-23.852	14.093	-1.692	.091	1.000
G_1.4-G_1.3	44.013	19.389	2.270	.023	.650
G_2.1-G_1.2	10.033	14.849	.676	.499	1.000
G_2.1-G_3.1	-13.861	13.949	-.994	.320	1.000
G_2.1-G_1.3	34.022	19.284	1.764	.078	1.000
G_1.2-G_3.1	-3.828	12.183	-.314	.753	1.000
G_1.2-G_1.3	-23.989	18.048	-1.329	.184	1.000
G_3.1-G_1.3	20.160	17.315	1.164	.244	1.000

COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

Registration number: REC-240816-052

31 May 2017

NHREC Registration # REC-
240816-052

CREC Reference #: 2017-CHS-016

Name: Mrs L Grundlingh

Staff Number: 90188586

Dear Mrs L Grundlingh

**Decision: Ethics Approval from 1
June 2017 to 31 May 2022**

Name: Lezandra Grundlingh
Department of Afrikaans and Theory of Literature
thiarl@unisa.ac.za
012 429 6790

Supervisor (s): Dr TR Carney
012 429 6683
carnetr@unisa.ac.za

Working title of research: Using grammatical markers of stance to identify possible legitimacy markers in suicide notes.

Qualification: M.A in linguistics

Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the College of Human Sciences Research Ethics Review Committee. Final approval is granted for the duration of the research period.



*The **low risk application** was reviewed by the CHS Research Ethics Committee on 24 May in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics and Standard Operating Procedure on Research Ethics Risk Assessment. The decision was approved on 24 May 2017 of meeting.*

The proposed research may commence with the proviso that:

- 1) The researcher/s will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.*
- 2) Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study, as well as changes in the methodology, should be communicated in writing to the CHS Ethics Review Committee.*
- 3) The researcher/s will conduct the study according to the methods and procedures set out in the approved application.*
- 4) Any changes that affect the study-related risks for the research participants, particularly in terms of assurances made with regards to the protection of participants' privacy and the confidentiality of the data, should be reported to the Committee in writing, accompanied by a progress report.*
- 5) The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study. Adherence to the following South African legislation is important, if applicable: Protection of Personal Information Act, no 4 of 2013; Children's act no 38 of 2005 and the National Health Act, no 61 of 2003.*
- 6) Only de-identified research data may be used for secondary research purposes in future on condition that the research objectives are similar to those of the original research. Secondary use of identifiable human research data require additional ethics clearance.*
- 7) No filed work activities may continue after 31 May 2022. Submission of a completed research ethics progress report will constitute an application for renewal of Ethics Research Committee approval.*


Note:

The reference number [2017-CHS-016] should be clearly indicated on all forms of communication with the intended research participants, as well as with the College of Human Sciences Research Ethics Review Committee.

Kind regards,



Professor AH Mavhandu-Mudzusi
Chair: CHS Ethics Review Committee
Department of Health Studies
Tel: 012 429 2055
Cell: 082 406 2494
Email: mmudza@unisa.ac.za



Professor A Phillips
Executive Dean: College of Human Sciences
Tel: 012 429 6825
Email: phillap@unisa.ac.za

NATIONAL OFFICE

PRIVATE BAG X81, PRETORIA, 0001. Momentum Centre, 329 Pretorius Street
PRETORIA Tel (012) 315 4840,

Ref: HRD/11/16

Enq: (012) 315 4840

E-mail: MLebaka@justice.gov.za

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


This serve to confirm that the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has given Ms L Grundlingh permission to conduct Academic Research in the Department.

Ms Grundlingh's research topic is "Using grammatical markers of stance to identify possible legitimacy markers in suicide notes".

Ms L Grundlingh's approval is on condition that:

- (a) She only collects information that is relevant to her academic research.
- (b) She share the information obtained from the Department for academic purpose only.
- (c) She maintains, uphold and stick to strict confidentiality on all information obtained from the Department.
- (d) She should not publicly publish the findings and recommendations of the research without prior approval of the Department. The publishing should only be limited to the Academic Institution's requirements.
- (e) She shares her findings and recommendations of her research with the Department.

Best regards,



Mr D Muzwayine

Acting Director: Human Resource Development

20/6/2017
Date